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2Abstract
The early to mid-nineteen eighties saw the 
publication of several substantial studies of the two 
immediate post-war Labour governments, studies which — in 
claiming to meet all the requirements of scholarly 
history - also made out a strong case for the possibility 
of a value-free explanation of the recent past.
The basis for this assertion is examined in the 
present account by means of a preliminary survey of the 
changes through which the literature on the Attlee 
governments has already passed, drawing attention to the 
differing attitudes and presuppositions of the main 
schools of historical and other disciplinary opinion and 
the extent to which these differing approaches - 
exhibiting contrasting elements of commitment and 
detachment, and of insight and distortion — can be shown 
to have contributed to, or departed from, the notion of 
an enhanced understanding.
Evidence for the growth of a more objectively 
critical history is then explored in greater detail by 
tracing the development of some of the central problems 
and controversies relating to the period after 1945, 
clarifying the main points at issue, outlining the 
evolution of evidence and interpretation, and 
demonstrating the way in which empirically—based 
explanations have, by scholars working independently 
together, become recognisably accepted. That these 
arguments have given rise to a variety of alternative 
viewpoints, which it is has not proved possible to choose 
between or account for on empirical grounds alone, also 
lends support — however — to the continuing influence of 
personal, partial and evaluative considerations.
To this end, a framework of historiographical change 
is proposed which, in tracing the progress made towards a 
more dispassionate view of the Attlee years, and the 
reasons for the persistence of remaining disagreements, 
throws light upon the wider question of the possibilities 
and limitations of contemporary historical inquiry.
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1: Commitment and detachment (1)
With the publication in close succession in the early part 
of the 1980*s of several scholarly accounts of the immediate 
post-war Labour governments (1945-51), many of them from 
leading specialist historians, the study of the ’Attlee era’ 
- itself an improbable title to earlier generations - was 
said to have come of age and been "stripped of the 
mythology"(2). Painstaking research began to take the 
place of conjecture and opinion, and more balanced 
judgements could prevail. It was only now, after a lengthy 
cooling-off period, that the real history of those years 
could be clearly discerned, free of partisan controversy.
The publishing bulge of the early eighties, in terms both of 
range and quality one of the most productive in modern 
times, placed the Attlee governments squarely in the 
historical and not just recent past, providing a convincing 
demonstration, according to its exponents, of what the study 
of contemporary history is capable of.
What do these large claims of historiographic maturity 
imply?
The usual objections to any proper discussion of 
contemporary history are three-fold: that basic and reliable 
documentation about the recent past is not yet available; 
that the all-important advantage of perspective is lacking; 
and that the events in question are often still too bound up 
with current passions and interests.
So far as the early post-war period is concerned, the 
first two of these objections have ceased to have any
1 A condensed version of this thesis appeared in the 
Summer 1991 issue Of Contemporary Record.
2 K.Laybourn, The Labour Party 1881-1951 (1988), 
P . 123.
6validity. Source material is now plentiful, made up of 
official papers, private archives and oral testimony, from 
which the historical narrative can be reconstructed. Some, 
.indeed, have remarked on the present, bewildering abundance 
of records(3). Many 'big' books have appeared, especially 
in the form of biographies and diaries, not always to 
universal acclaim(4). But the freeing up of evidence has 
meant that much more is now known and in greater and 
convincing detail, such that the years in question have even 
begun to lose any self-contained unity. Technical 
improvements have led to scholarship (in all its aspects - 
foreign, economic and social) outgrowing the conventional 
limits. Far more monographs and articles have appeared than 
any one person can digest. Wartime and immediate post-war 
Britain are even in danger of becoming over-studied.
And secondly, the gradual passage of time, and a 
knowledge of what happened next, has enabled historians to 
separate out the significant from the insignificant, and to 
gauge the long-run importance of what then occurred. Later 
Labour governments did not, or were not perceived as having, 
.measured up to the expectations set in the 1940s; the ideas 
and policies of that time were gradually opened up to 
searching inspection; the full consequences of reform began 
to work themselves through. Labour's 'radical' claims were 
qualified by ideological and structural constraints. 
Attention turned back to the war, to the critical power 
shift of 1940, and the extent to which war and postwar 
formed a continuous whole. The subordination of domestic 
policy to external priotities was recognised. Welfare 
achievements, once hailed, came under heavy fire.
Eventually, and controversially, 1945 emerged as the natural
3 H.M.Pelling, preface to The Labour Governments 1945- 
51 (1984).
4 “Perhaps the time has now come when it would be 
interesting to know rather less about Edward Hugh John Neale 
Dalton..." E.Christiansen, 'Passion that's bred in the 
bone', The Independent, 29 January 1987, p.15.
7starting-point - or at least major staging-post - in any 
analysis of the century-long descriptions of British 
recovery and decline. If anything, then, the period visibly 
grew in importance as time elapsed. Speaking to 
contemporary concerns, the "twilight zone" between the 
ending of news and the beginning of history was effectively 
closed(5).
It might be argued that the third objection to studying 
contemporary events has also fallen away, in view of the 
impeccably academic approach characteristic of most of the 
latest works. But this is a harder point to agree on. A 
lively debate about the achievements of Labour's six years 
in power stretches all the way back to the nineteen forties, 
and even before, fuelled in the main by internal party 
polemics, from which it is no easy task for the m o d e m  day 
historian to escape. Seen in this light, does the recent 
quantitative increase in published works also indicate a 
qualitative change in the nature of the historical 
discussion? Or can it be regarded as a further instalment 
in a much longer-running dispute spanning the political and 
academic worlds?
There is nothing unusual about the mixing of 
scholarship and polemic. It has to be recognized, even 
where it might be deplored. Many of the classic 
controversies of recent times have derived their impetus 
from just such a potent combination. It matches almost 
exactly the contrast between 'commemorative' (celebratory) 
and 'conceptual' history outlined by Furet(6). Each in 
turn represents a fundamentally different kind of attitude 
and approach to the subject in hand.
5 A.Seldon, 'Detachment myth and the up to date
taboo', in The Times Higher Education Supplement, 31 July
1987, p. 12.
6 F.Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (English 
edition 1981), Part I.
8One approach rests upon the view that complete 
objectivity on the part of the historian is in reality 
illusory, and that studying the past as an end in itself 
amounts to little more than antiquarianism. What matters is 
the duty to be involved and engaged, not any presumption to 
a bogus impartiality. History is not meant simply to 
entertain, but has the power to excite and instruct and 
deliver a call to action. Commitment is all-important, even 
commitment in the service of a political idea. Bias is 
inescapable. The truth is sometimes partisan. Hence the 
radical challenge.
As against this, others take a poor view of those who 
write out of indignation or identify themselves with a 
cause. History, according to this approach, should be a 
purely academic exercise, something that is intrinsically 
interesting but which is, of itself, of no practical 
significance. The ability not to take sides is cultivated. 
One must endeavour to stand apart from fashion, or 
prejudice, or topical relevance, all of which are 
distorting. Judging an argument according to the motives of 
those proposing it is a mistake. History is not then to be 
assessed by its utility - it is, in the strictest sense, 
futile. We can term this the classical ideal.
Taken together, these two approaches — sharpened for 
the purposes of argument - offer quite different 
explanations as to how it is that historical understanding 
advances: the former by implying that strongly-held beliefs, 
born of conviction, can do much to open up new lines of 
inquiry, the latter by suggesting that the possibility of a 
dispassionate viewpoint, and therefore the validity of an 
account, increases over time. The one seeks out, not 
agreement, but contradiction and the exchange of ideas. 
Competing interpretations do battle. Knowledge is seen as 
an ally of power. The other aims at the true essence of 
things. Good scholarship will drive out bad. The less
9'contemporary* the history, the better.
This commitment—detachment polarity, as it has been 
called(7), is a familiar one in other areas of the human 
sciences. The notion of intellectual detachment is said to 
have first arisen in response to a reform-minded 
intelligentsia in nineteenth—century Russia. It was defined 
as such by its opposite - as a reaction to somebody else's 
commitment, nourishing the idea of the free-standing 
scholar, equipped by training and temperament to fend off 
the tyranny of passing influences. But the wish to dispel 
all forms of special pleading had already helped in the 
emergence of earlier, objective scholarly disciplines.
A basic tenet of the classical view held that the intrusion 
of personal values into any scholarly field actively retards 
development. A key text in this regard was Julien Benda's 
La Trahison des Clercs, which first appeared in 1927(8). 
Benda extolled the virtues of men of learning in the past 
who had been entirely indifferent to the lure of political 
passions, or who had taken on the task of telling laymen 
about truths which were displeasing to them. The old 
clerks, he wrote, "put before the world a scale of values, 
in the spirit of philosophical reflection". The modern 
intellectual, by contrast, taught that the practical was by 
definition also the moral, having been won over by the 
craving for action, a preoccupation with desired ends, and 
the embracing of fixed ideas. The new clerks, in so doing, 
had betrayed their vocation. Although Benda found those to 
be "general characteristics of the present age", he attacked 
specifically the historians, many of them of German origin, 
who over the previous half century had begun to indulge in 
"fanaticism". Change in the social status of intellectuals 
was one of the causes of this, but there had also been 
changes in their thinking - a growing romanticism, the
7 J.Urry, 'Value-freedom in Social Science', The 
Cambr idge Review, 8 May 1970, pps.146-149.
8 J.Benda, La Trahison des Clercs (1927).
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exaltation of feeling at the expense of thought, and an 
overall decline in mental discipline. He emphatically 
parted company with those who wished for "the reign of the 
philosophers".
Benda's book was prophetic. Over the following decade, 
a large number of prominent European intellectuals 
voluntarily enlisted in the political struggle of warring 
ideologies, or else found themselves fatally compromised. 
Benda himself (a Dreyfusard in his youth), while lamenting 
the fact that "all the moderns, even the best of them, have 
respect only for action", succumbed to the urgings of the 
time, joining the anti-fascist camp. The dilemma that this 
involved, long appreciated on the continent, only came late 
to Britain(9). Even in the late 'thirties, and even at the 
London School of Economics, the prior 'claims' of 
politics(10) were energetically resisted. The hard 
classicist position was expressed in a variety of works. 
Robbins denied any normative status to economic 
generalisations, attempting to make it clear that statements 
about the way in which an economic system worked or could 
work did not in themselves carry any presumption that that 
was the way in which it should work(ll). Hutt, in a 
further development, tried to establish some principles of 
objectivity, arguing that intellectuals were peculiarly 
vulnerable to forms of “power-thought" associated with the 
actions of interest, propaganda and custom, thereby 
inhibiting the accumulation of indisputable knowledge. What 
was needed, he suggested, was the build-up of an expert body 
of opinion, reached by logical inquiry, which would 
gradually diminish points of difference and gradually
9 W.Laqueur, 'Literature and the historian', The 
Journal of Contemporary History, 5 (1967), p.12.
10 See 'The Claims of Politics', Scrutiny, September 
1939, pps.130-167.
11 L.Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance 
of Economic Science (1932).
11
increase areas of agreement(12). And Oakeshott, in his 
inaugural lecture at the LSE in 1950 (signalling an abrupt 
departure from the radical enthusiasms of his predecessor, 
Harold Laski) and in other writings, spoke out against what 
he called "practical" (ie. present-minded) history. 
Ransacking the past for moral lessons or treating it as 
"retrospective politics" were both non-historical traits 
which destroyed any basis for rational discussion. The very 
pastness of the past had to be insulated, just as much for 
the near—contemporary as for the ancient. Intellectual 
opposition to the ideologising of politics has been traced 
back to this Oakeshottian moment(13).
There is, however, one fundamental snag with this line 
of thinking: it is open to the charge that the denunciation 
of ideology is in some sense an ideology of sorts too - not 
least in the passionate commitment to detachment. This was 
indeed implied in Max Weber's original conception of value- 
freedom (the scientist is not uncommitted, but committed to 
science). Karl Popper, in The Open Society and its Enemies, 
found a way to surmount the difficulty. Aspiring to 
impartiality, he saw, all too often begets the counterclaim 
that pure objectivity is unachievable, an argument which 
leads nowhere since one can never know when every last 
prejudice has been eliminated- What both these outlooks 
neglected, he continued, were the social aspects in the 
advancement of scientific understanding. Objectivity 
springs not from the psychological attempts of individual 
scholars to be 'objective', but from the co-operation of 
many scholars sharing the common methodology and accepted 
standards of publicised exchange and debate. The creative 
impulse may be subjective; critical evaluation is not. 
Personal biases are ironed out in the mass. As a 
consequence, "the authority of scientific opinion remains
12 W.H.Hutt, Economists and the Public (1936).
13 H.M.Drucker, The Po1 itical Uses of Ideoloqy (1974),
p.118.
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essentially mutual; it is established between scientists, 
not above them" (Polyani, 1962)(14). Scientific knowledge 
was collegiate, and the product of a collaborative effort.
As in the natural sciences, so in the social sciences 
and the humanities. History too has its analogue, a 
'community of scholars' or confederacy of intellects, whose 
collective aim, however partial and selective their 
individual wishes may be, "is to climb to an increasingly 
comprehensive view of the past"(15), and whose works of 
positive scholarship are only likely to endure in so far as 
they are able to "rise above the mere expression of 
prejudice"(16). It is this group nature of the 
advancement of historical understanding which circumvents 
the problem of commitment and detachment and which is held 
to be the true mark of a maturing discipline.
To what extent is this picture of free-flowing argument 
a reality? The existence of competing schools of thought 
formed around ties of loyalty, of age, and of common 
disciplinary approach allied to distinctive understandings 
and interpretations can be said - by, for example, 
propagating inflexible orthodoxies — to interfere with the 
habit of open discussion essential to academic progress. 
Schools that subdivide and delimit a field of study can also 
be partial and one-sided, as Popper had already 
demonstrated. He had in mind in particular certain forms of 
"historicist" (mainly marxist) analysis. But the malign 
influence of academic coteries, made up of schoolmen and 
copyists who are unable to go beyond what they have imbibed 
from their masters, is well attested to. The academy, then, 
is always a contested one. How much more liable this is to 
happen in the realm of contemporary argument about events
14 M,Polyani, The Republic of Science (1962), p.14.
15 J.R.Hale(ed), The Evolut ion of British 
Histor iography (1964), preface.
16 6.B.Elton, The Practice of History (1967), p.105.
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which have just passed by, where dogmatic advocacy and 
persuasion outweigh the discriminating, and where all talk 
is conducted against a backdrop of partisan feeling.
The special nature of Labour history and politics, and 
of the significance of the Attlee governments above all, is 
a further complicating factor. The Labour party is a party 
with a keen sense of its own past, and the intellectual left 
has always played a large role in influencing the party's 
self-understanding. But the influence has not only been 
cerebral. Sympathy with Labour's aims has involved “feeling 
as well as thinking, loyalty as well as argument, 
aspirations as well as principles"(17). For many of the 
party's early evangelical publicists the truth and 
importance of socialism were sufficient to explain its 
impact. Later writers were inclined to judge the party's 
achievements in relation to, or in supposed departure from, 
an abstract, even sentimental, socialist ideal. These 
attitudes have been most apparent in the reactions to 
Labour's crowning occasion in and after 1945, when the party 
was presented with the opportunity to fulfill its historic 
purpose. The gap between the circumstances of political 
life and the political literature of 'the party of the book' 
was never closer. The view taken by an author of the Attlee 
governments is still apt to be regarded as a touchstone of 
(unarguable) personal faith as much as intellectual 
conviction.
It is no surprise to discover then that, for all the 
technical changes in evidence, perspective and 
interpretation, a dynamic, living history can also be shaped 
by polemical and partisan opinion. Rival schools promote 
rival descriptions and prescriptions. In this case, instead 
of a tidy evolution towards the true character of the recent 
past, and the conquest of historical myth by historical
17 M.Shock, ‘R.H.Tawney', The Listener , 20 October
1960, p.671.
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reality, changing representations circle in apparently 
aimless variation, swayed by an attachment to a favoured 
method, doctrine or faith.
The chief intention - with these considerations in mind 
- is to explore the continuing tension between the demands 
of partisanship and the pursuit of impartiality, and to 
describe their effects upon the changing face of 1945. A 
'second order' activity of this kind need not resemble a 
mere booklist spiced with comment, which generates nothing 
new, or a liberal evasion of the real stuff of history. A 
history of the histories is itself a legitimate contribution 
to the process of revising and refining an historical 
appreciation. The vigorous and voluminous output of studies 
on the immediate post-war period justifies such an overview. 
In what ways - and by what means - has the debate moved 
forward? What main schools have emerged and in what 
relation do they stand to each other? What have been the 
main thematic issues which have been argued over? What of 
the influence of fluctuating allegiances and passions? And 
what signs are there, if any, of the forming up of a 
critical consensus? Can a framework of historiographical 
change - along the lines of common scholarly endeavour 
conceived of by Popper - be satisfactorily constructed?
15
2: A History of the Histories
The dual purpose of this scene-setting chapter is to 
trace - in broad outline - the various traces through 
which the body of literature on the early post-war period 
has passed, and to identify, in the course of that 
evolution, the main currents of political, historical and 
other opinion out of which it has been composed. In so 
doing, the aim will be to point the way ahead to a more 
detailed examination of the most important themes and 
controversies, as and when they happened to arise, in 
Chapter 3.
The forces driving the argument (indeed any 
intellectual debate) along have been of several kinds. 
They have, in the first place, been technical — to do 
with the unearthing and compiling of factual information, 
the defining and refining of concepts, and the 
classifying and categorising of accumulated knowledge. 
They have been interpretative, involving attempts to give 
order and meaning to the receding past, influenced by the 
impact of topical concerns and changing historical 
circumstances. And lastly they have been subjective, 
reflecting the professional, social and cultural 
background of the principal writers and historians 
themselves. Put another way, some of the developments 
have been 'internal', thrown up from within; some have 
been largely 'external' in origin, but impinging upon the 
view of the past; and some have illustrated the way 
external events have been intemalised(18) . Though 
analytically distinct, these aspects are practically 
intertw ined.
These forces have not operated in the abstract.
18 T.Hutchison, The Politics and Philosophy of
Economics (1981), pp.23-24.
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They have shaped, and in turn been shaped by, "the 
emergence of distinctive disciplines and approaches, 
which have structured the subject-matter, established 
appropriate methodological ground rules and worked out 
which questions are most in need of explanation. The 
expansion and sub-division of the social sciences in the 
post-war period is the most notable development of this 
kind for the years with which we are concerned- It is 
the (often unphrased) presuppositions and assumptions of 
each of these ways of looking at recent history - which 
exponents do not so much 'see' as see the world 
'through'(19) - which sets them off against each other, 
encouraging the rise of alternative, even competing 
schools of thought vying for supremacy. Typically, the 
actual grounds for disagreement may well be factual (in 
so far as the available evidence lends support to a 
variety of assertions) or evaluative (assuming that facts 
and values are easily separated) or a combination of 
both, and many of the arguments to do with the years from 
1945 to 1951 fall within these terms. Progress is 
evident by open contradiction, as well as by more subtle 
shifts in the point of view. Wherever opposing schools 
share a common mode of inquiry, all such differences are 
deemed to be resolvable, so that, although the disputants 
are preoccupied with those matters on which they differ, 
the general intellctual tone is set by the accepted 
formulations on which they agree.
But this is not all. The debatable nature of the 
historical past is never exclusively confined to areas of 
evidence or interpretation. Differences may be not only 
logical or empirical but also philosophical. Approaches 
can be at such odds that they only begin to make sense 
once their underlying beliefs have been made explicit.
In such cases, clashes of outlook emanate from different 
forms of argumentation which are not just incompatible
19 TrE.Hulme, Speculations (1949), pp.50-51.
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but incommensurable, and incapable of being measured 
against any common, objective scale. Dialogue is barely 
possible. The point at issue is not — given these 
characteristics - whether opposing arguments are right or 
true; the respective schools have first to make 
themselves understood.
Fundamental polarities are often taken to be 
essential to the creative process. "Without contraries, 
no progress", wrote William Blake(20). To complain 
about the multiplicity of viewpoints is to complain about 
the many-sidedness of reality. The orthodox can point to 
standards of assessment which do allow for valid 
comparison—making — correspondence with the facts, 
comprehensiveness, parsimony, explanatory power. But the 
sceptic will always draw attention to the lack of 
acknowledged criteria for choosing among rival attitudes 
or interpretations. Without such criteria, it is held, 
it is not possible to maintain that the pattern of 
historiographical change is an improving, advancing one, 
or that movement is always eventually forward movement — 
the basis, after all, on which the new-found prestige of 
contemporary history ultimately rests.
Although the influence of the opposing strains of 
objectivity and engagement are commonly recognised, even 
the best, as one historian of ideas recently wrote, have 
only nibbled at the matter inconclusively(21) . In what 
follows, and in picking out and discriminating between 
the different senses to which they apply, it may help to 
establish what can be seen to be a fuller range of 
detachments and commitments, whose finer distinctions
20 'The Marriage of Heaven and Hell', in Selected 
Poems of Hilliam Blake, B. de Selincourt (ed)(1968), 
p.139.
21 J.Burrow, reviewing J.Clive's 'Not By Fact 
Alone' in The Times Literary Supplement, 2—8 February 
1990, p.125.
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need to be drawn out, before going on to explore how far 
and in what way they might be functionally related.
.19
The English Way
We have it from Messrs Coll ini, Winch and Burrow - 
in their discipline history of nineteenth century 
political science(22) - that the "noble study" of 
politics was always infused with mundane partisanship. 
The pioneers in the field (Sidgwick, Bagehot and Dicey 
were the best known exemplars) equated political life 
with the "magnetic pull" of the business of government. 
They behaved liked unacknowledged legislators, "alarmed 
at the boisterous and untutored energies of the new 
democracy" starting to take shape. Sound political 
judgement for them could only come from a firm grounding 
in history and philosophy, both of which brought the 
benefits of calm, intelligent reflection. The earliest 
Politics departments, in Oxford, Cambridge and London, 
were made up predominantly of historically-minded 
philosophers and theoretically-minded historians, 
presenting politics in a philosophical or historical 
light. This continued to be so until well into the 
twentieth century. There was little agreement as to 
whether politics as a sovereign, systematic subject 
actually did exist or not, even among those taking up 
Chairs(23). Coherent instruction stemmed from the fact 
that most teachers read the same small stock of classic 
books(24) and shared a distinct leaning towards the 
examination of institutions. Importance was placed on a
22. S.Collini, D.Winch and J.Burrow, That Noble
Science of Politics: a study in nineteenth-century
intellectual history (1983).
23. D.W.Brogan, The Study of Politics (1946): M.
Cole, The Life of G.D,H*Cole (1971), p. 207.
24. D.N.Chester, 'Political Studies in Britain:
Recollections and Comments' in Political Studies, 2 and 3 
(1975), p.163.
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sure grasp of the behaviour of real people in actual 
situations, of closeness to the texture of politics.
Most had been brought up - and brought their students 
up - in the English empirical tradition which eschewed 
preconceived ideas and imparted learning in a 
comfortable, non-ideological manner, a tradition which 
Denis Brogan said - reviewing Popper's The Open Society 
and its Enemies(25) - inoculated them against the lure 
of grand theory and absolutist creeds. In the hands of 
some, like T. D. Weldon (who had led the opposition to 
Quintin Hogg in the famous 1938 Oxford by-election) this 
could even extend to an abdication from discussion of any 
substantive issues at all(26). The way things had been 
in the 1930s and 1940s, however, had made it clear that 
there were some values that were at least worth 
defending. With the establishment in 1950 of the 
Political Studies Association (political "science" met 
with strong opposition), there was a marked reluctance to 
cut politics off from other allied subjects on which it 
had nourished, as well as a recognition of the place of 
commonsense wisdom with which to guard against erratic 
fluctuations in political opinion.
This was the context in which McCallum and Readman's 
descriptive case study of the general election of 1945, 
the first of its kind and a landmark in the observation 
of British elections, came to be written. It indicated 
the direction which the study of politics was to take, 
spawning its own secondary literature; and it hinted at 
the degree to which voting lent itself to sociological 
and statistical analysis. But it also (for its authors) 
reaffirmed the value of the older kind of philosophizing. 
Conveniently, the academic interest in the 1945 Labour 
government commenced with the 1945 election.
25. EconomicsI August 1946, pp.205 -207
26. T.D.Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics
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Forerunners
"The rival doctrines of the 1945 general election", 
Lance Beales asserted in the weekly magazine Leader 
towards the end of the campaign, "were derived from the 
London School of Economics"(27). Beales - Reader in 
Economic History at the University of London - was 
referring to the unexpected role that had been assigned 
to two of his LSE colleagues - Friedrich ('Fritz') von 
Hayek, the apostle of economic liberalism, and the Labour 
party activist, Harold Laski, "that rare quantity in 
Britain - the professor-politician". Hayek's celebrated 
bestseller The Road to Serfdom, which resurrected the old 
equation between socialism and slavery and condemned 
attempts at planning in all its forms, had found an echo 
in Conservative party pronouncements and had been 
denounced in a radio broadcast by the Labour leader 
Clement Attlee. Laski, for his part, and in his capacity 
as Chairman of the Labour party, had released a statement 
- seized upon by the Conservatives - announcing that a 
future Labour government could not be bound by any 
decisions entered into by Churchill at the three-power 
conference which was to take place in Potsdam. Shortly 
afterwards, he was accused, in suspicious circumstances, 
of having advocated the use of violence for political 
ends at a public meeting in Newark. In an apposite way, 
as Beales meant to indicate, their notoriety was well 
deserved. The sharply contrasting opinions of Hayek and 
Laski stemmed from a personal and political antagonism 
extending back into the inter-war years about the growing 
influence of collectivist ideas and the degree to which 
their spread might be hastened, deflected or averted.
The one was concerned to preserve the economic freedoms 
of the individual from governmental interference on which
27. Nathan Laski papers, Mocatta Library, 
University College London.
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all else depended; the other to bring about a wider 
liberty without which economic independence was 
meaningless. Both of these themes - of liberty and of 
planning - were carried over into the post-war years, 
providing the backdrop to many of the running 
commentaries on Labour in office. Both had to do with an 
overall conception of the interventionist state for which 
no modern theory had been devised.
One of the core beliefs behind the foundation of the 
LSE was what Beatrice Webb called the impulse to discover 
and apply "the truths about social organization"(28). 
Academics were to be encouraged in the disinterested 
pursuit of knowledge; having established the facts, some 
kind of obligation existed to act upon what had been 
revealed. A critical examination of capitalist society 
was needed, from a sociological standpoint, to correct 
the imbalance in conventional academic circles. Laski, 
appointed to the post of Professor of Political Science 
in 1926, stood four square in this mould. In his 
inaugural lecture, and still in his liberal phase, he 
dismissed any pretence at an imaginary impartiality - 
social inquiry had to be based on the freest possible 
circulation of thought(29). In an age of crisis, he 
felt, there was no honour to be found in a cosy 
detachment which excluded certain types of argument. His 
Oxford instructors - Dicey, Fisher and Barker - had been 
far too aloof. 1 Commitment' as he understood it meant 
not just taking up the public issues of the moment, but 
partisan commitment. In the supreme conflict between 
progress and reaction, the "crime" of the intellectuals
28. N. Mackenzie, ’The Diary as Literature', 
introduction to the Beatrice Webb diaries, British 
Library of Political end Economic Science (BLPES).
29. H.Laski, On the Study of Politics (1926), pp. 
16-18.
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was not (as Benda had thought) to go into battle; "it was 
the very different one of not knowing that a battle was 
raging or - worse still - of being willing to fight on 
the wrong side"(30). Laski liked to tell the story of 
how the nineteenth century historian von Ranke had 
advised a pupil who had taken up teaching "to serve truth 
first, and Germany afterwards"(31). There was no such 
inconsistency in Laski's own mind: the modern truths were 
self-evidently socialist. Once the iniquities of 
capitalism had been laid bare, the politically-aware 
could not fail to pass from neutral reflection into the 
practical realm.
Laski had started out with a precocious grasp of the 
actual working of political institutions, seen in their 
proper historical context. His earliest writings - on 
sovereignty and the decentralized state - were of a piece 
with tolerant English pluralism. Disturbed by the 
collapse of MacDonald's minority Labour government in 
1931, he sought thereafter to apply marxism to British 
conditions, doubtful that socialism could come about by 
parliamentary means. Abandoning the notion of government 
by consent, he took to playing the game of predicting 
revolution without actually endorsing it. He knew that 
reforms were feasible, and that Britain might travel on a 
path different from other countries. Like Bassett (with 
whom he clashed) his starting-point was the historic 
continuity of Parliament. But he rejected outright "the 
factual error of arguing that the State-power is neutral 
as between contending ideologies"(32). Even the
30. H.Laski, Faith, Reason and Civi1ization - an
essay in historical analysis (1944), pp. 104-105.
31. M.de Wolfe Howe, Ho lines —Lask i Letters - the
correspondence of Hr Justice Holmes and Harold J*Laskif
1916-1935, Volume 2 (1953), p.1280.
32. K.Laski, Parliamentary Government in Enqland
(1938), p.200.
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monarch had a part to play in frustrating radical 
intentions. An admirer of Sir Stafford Cripps in the 
late thirties, he switched during the war to Ernest Bevin 
as the "fighting leader" that Labour required, before 
taking up with Herbert Morrison. The European conflict 
with Fascism revived his hopes of a domestic advance for 
Labour, against which he saw Attlee as a main obstacle, 
and he wrote to him on the eve of the 1945 election 
asking him to stand down. Laski appears in Edmund 
Wilson’s account of his travels around liberated Europe, 
declaring to the voters in a North London constituency 
that "mass unemployment was incompatible with democratic 
institutions" and that they "must never again allow such 
a degradation of conditions as had occurred between the 
two wars"(33) .
The modesty of Labour’s subsequent achievements 
disheartened him. He had said that, if Labour did the 
right things, there would never be another Tory 
government. He lived to see, but was evidently perplexed 
by, the limits placed on the achievable, especially when 
it came to foreign policy. The 1945 victory might be 
hailed as a clear endorsement of Laski’s form of radical 
socialism. But it left him worn out and vilified, never 
quite able to effect a synthesis of liberal and marxist 
ideas, the ambiguity in his thinking skilfully brought 
out by the defence lawyer in Laski’s 1946 libel action 
against The Daily Express(34). He was the prime 
instance of the committed scholar(35), speaking in the 
radical accents of the day, able to state the dilemmas in 
aiming to "build a Socialist Britain" but incapable of
33. E.Wilson, Europe without Baedecker (1948), 
pp.132-135.
34. The Laski Libel Action, published by The Daily 
Express (1947).
35. J.Saville in Collets* 50 Years* 1934-84, pp.20-
21.
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solving them.
Friedrich Hayek, an Austrian whose early training 
was in lav/, originally came to the LSE as a Visiting 
Professor in 1931, remaining as the holder of the revived 
Tooke Chair in Economic Science and Statistics. No 
stranger to controversy, he was a firm advocate of wage 
cutting in the 1930s. Along v/ith Robbins, Gregory and 
Plant, he formed an island of old-fashioned classicism, 
though he v/as reassured to see that the bulk of the LSE 
staff were non-political(36). He noted, however, and 
gradually became fascinated by, the Webbian conviction 
that "a careful study of the facts ought to lead most 
sensible people to socialism", and the intellectual hold 
v/hich such progressive ideas obviously exerted(37). In 
their hostility to an open, liberal economic order, Hayek 
insisted, the leftist intelligentsia overlooked far too 
much that was good in it. Only capitalism made democracy 
possible. Any sort of planning necessarily became 
planning in favour of some and against others, which 
would have to be enforced by a dictatorial central 
authority. Already in the late 1930s he was indignantly 
firing off memoranda to William Beveridge, irritated by 
the common misinterpretation of Nazism as a last-ditch 
capitalist reaction to socialism. The similarity of 
Fascist and Communist regimes v/as to him steadily more 
obvious. With the wartime move of the LSE to Cambridge, 
Hayek - conspicuously not called into government 
service - decided to write a contribution to the war 
effort, an explicitly "political" book (as he wrote in 
the preface) dedicated to "the socialists of all parties" 
and warning of the perils involved in the conscious
36. F.A.Hayek, conversation with the author, 18 
September 1984.
37. F.A.Hayek, 'The London School of Economics 
1895-1945' in Economica, February 1946, pp.1-31.
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reshaping of society for egalitarian ends(38). He, 
too, called Benda to his aid, inveighing against the 
worshipping of false gods by "the totalitarians in our 
midst" who, however sincere, were endangering freedom.
It was the outspokenness of his endorsement of 
unfashionable opinions that shocked and delighted Hayek's 
readers, leaving his opponents to lament - as Beales 
elsewhere put it - this "reactionary trend of 
thought"(39). A copy of the book was sent by the Duke 
of Devonshire to Churchill. Laski took it as an attack on 
him personally, and said so in his lectures. Hayek has 
since made it plain that he questioned Laski's mental 
sanity(40). He actually spent the 1945 campaign in the 
United States, appearing on the front cover of Time, 
embarrassingly feted by economic tories and challenging, 
sometimes angrily, the new dealers on their home 
ground(41). The history of the influence of statist, 
progress-minded ideas - of how they came to be believed 
and of the harm that they had caused - not just in 
economics but across the whole range of the social 
sciences, formed the central topic of his later 
researches.
In contrast to these well-publicized differences, an 
alternative left-of-centre standpoint had been developing 
- out of the public eye - around a group of young 'New
38. The Road to Serfdom (1944). See also hi 
'Freedom and the Economic System' in The Con ternporar 
Review, January-June 1938, pp.434-442. .
39 H.L. Beales, The flaking of Social Policy (1946),
p. 8.
40. 'Hayek on Laski', letter in Encounter, June 
1984, p.80.
41. Washington Despatches 1941—1945 - weekly 
political reports from the British Embassy, H.G.Nicholas 
(ed)(1981), p.576; B.D.Karl, Charles E, Herriam and the 
Study of Politics (1974), pp.289-292.
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Fabians', presided over by Labour's Hugh Dalton. Evan 
Durbin - also an economics lecturer - had been busy 
throughout the nineteen thirties striving to map out a 
businesslike scheme of realistically attainable socialist 
objectives, grounded upon a firm base of financial 
expertise, which could command electoral support and be 
carried out within the lifetime of a single 
pariiament(42). Much influenced by Bassett, Durbin had 
begun by explicitly rejecting the class struggle analysis 
of political action(43). Laski, Durbin saw, was 
"obviously wrong" (thus on a visit to the Webbs in 
1937(44)) had strayed out of bounds. Mo genuine social 
reformer could be dogmatic, yet every marxist v/as.
Indeed Durbin claimed a better understanding of Marx than 
* most avowed marxists. Yet the classical approach v/as 
equally disappointing. Practical economics, Douglas 
Jay - a fellow 'New Fabian' - had written, contrary to 
the classical teachings, v/as not neutral between ends but 
had a built-in progressive intent(45). Durbin viev/ed 
with impatience other economists v/ho were content, when 
faced with the evidence of social inequality, to busy 
themselves with unilluminating diversions. He posited a 
natural alliance betv/een the yield of social service 
research and advancing socialism, which would lead to a 
"mastering" of the economic problem. The new social 
sciences were to be the great liberators.
The criticism of Hayek and Robbins - as Durbin 
recognised - had kept him thinking, but in reviewing The
42. E .Du rb in, The Po1itics of Democr at ic Socia 1ism 
(1940).
43. E.Durbin, 'Professor Hayek on Economic 
Planning', reprinted in Problems of Economic Planning - 
papers on planning and economics (1949), pp.91-106.
44. B .Webb diary, entry dated 15 July 1937, BLPES.
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Road to Serfdom (which he read through and extensively 
annotated) he reprimanded Hayek for failing to appreciate 
the work over the previous decade of his 'New Fabian' 
colleagues. There v/as no need to fear the growing power 
of the state, provided that there were only to be such 
controls as were necessary to overcome the lack of 
economic oversight and co-ordination. Planning did not 
imply "a Plan" introduced by an all-wise bureaucracy. 
Planning was "the distinctive tenet of his generation", 
making an important step towards fulfilling the 
democratic power of other common people for social 
progress, but it would always leave more to be done. 
Theirs was a philosophy of getting things done. As Hugh 
Gaitskell reflected in looking back some years later, the 
outlook of the group had been rational and practical, 
"suspicious of large general ideas which on examination 
turned out to have no precise content .... Above all, 
while accepting the ultimate emotional basis of moral 
valuation, they had great faith in the power of reason 
both to find the answers to social problems and to 
persuade men to see the light"(46). "Professor Hayek 
rejects reason", Durbin announced in 1945. "We accept 
it".
The relationship of the 'New Fabians' with the kind 
of ideas associated with John Maynard Keynes was an 
uncertain one. Keynes was obviously central to any 
discussion of employment policy - but his proposals were 
famously changeable. Besides, he was no friend of Labour. 
He envisaged a 'managed' rather than a fully 'command' 
economy. Nonetheless, and Jay was credited by Gaitskell 
with realising this(47). Keynes did provide a ready­
made rationale for increased state intervention. Others,
46. H.Gaitskell, Foreword to the second edition of 
The Po1 itics of Democratic Social ism (1954).
47. H. Gaitskell, Recent Dei'e lopments in British 
Socialist Thinking (1955), pp.30-31.
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like Cole, refused "to swallow Keynes whole" and doubted 
whether government manipulation of demand would do in 
place of a frontal assault on the key points of capital. 
What transformed the situation v/as the outbreak of war, 
and with it the introduction of a wide array of physical 
controls on imports, exports and the allocation of raw 
materials inconceivable in peacetime, conceding much of 
Labour's case in advance. The question then turned on 
how much - mindful of reconstruction - should be retained 
once the war v/as over. Hayek, for example, did not 
believe that the more in favour of greater intervention 
v/as pre-determined or even, as Schumpeter thought, likely 
but unwelcome - that was exactly his point. But the 
whole weight of scholarly opinion and the trend of 
wartime economic practice pressed in that direction.
Given this open future, the positions already outlined 
did not exhaust all the possibilities. Not all 
enthusiasts for planning v/ere self-proclaimed socialists, 
nor did all economists employed in Whitehall during the 
war draw the same favourable conclusions. Wartime 
planning was imperative. The argument was over whether it 
was also compatible - in view of the large bureaucratic 
apparatus it entailed - with the maintenance of a freely- 
functioning democracy in peacetime.
The State as Player
The planners' quarrel had its origins in the 1930s; 
but it v/as - the call for planning being only one 
manifestation of a general shift - also part of the 
playing out of a still older struggle about the onset of 
the enlarged state from the tail end of the Victorian 
era. From this direction came the other main contributing 
source to the growth of political studies - discussion of 
constitutional issues, couched in the form of legalistic
30
commentaries which, given the "special intimacy"(48) of 
law and politics in Victorian England, granted to Bagehot 
and others the status of high authority. These formal 
descriptions celebrated the activating principles and 
customs of the traditional constitution, thought to 
consist of the sovereignty of parliament, the importance 
of conventions, and the rule of law. This last tenet 
(which Dicey took from W.E.Hearn) governed the relation 
between the individual and the judicial power of the 
state, protecting the personal liberty and rights of the 
ordinary citizen. Departures from these constitutional 
principles might from time to time occur, in so far as 
everyday constitutional practice diverged from legal 
theory, but this only went to show the strength of the 
guarantees provided by a framework of living precedents 
that had arisen out of the common law of the land. The 
exercise of unchecked, arbitrary power by officialdom was 
the evil that most needed preventing.
The increasing practice - however - of conferring 
discretionary power on public boards and agencies, by 
allowing for administrative and quasi-judicial decisions 
to be reached outside the courts of law, v/as beginning to 
present problems. Infringements of personal liberty were 
all too likely to follow from rulings designed to 
equalize the impact of the law. The growth of a native 
body of administrative law Dicey regarded as an alien 
intrusion, v/hich predisposed him to mistrust any 
extension of government. A Diceyan influence was 
apparent in Lord Hev/art*s The Hew Despotism (1929) and in 
the deliberations of the Donoughmore Committee on 
Ministers* Powers, v/hich reported in 1932, both of them 
responses to the swelling delegation to Ministers by 
Parliament of legislative powers. They were much more 
than simply * footnotes to Dicey*. But they differed in
48. S.Collini, D.Winch and J.Burrow, ibid (1983), 
P . 359.
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that- the Donoughmore Committee - awkwardly attempting to 
distinguish the judicial from the administrative - 
collectively saw the rise of administrative law as being 
inevitable, subject to the "necessary safeguards(49) - 
the point being that Dicey's essentially static analysis 
had been overtaken, by the speed of events. The strict 
separation of lav/ and government v/as no longer seen as 
tenable. It v/as with this in mind that Ernest Barker was 
led to say that the lawyers had not been all that helpful 
to students of politics. Jennings, one of Dicey's 
strongest critics, was adamant that the growth of the new 
functions of the state had rendered most of his 
individualist assumptions irrelevant(50). To argue 
from history that new policies or actions were 
"unconstitutional" v/as to argue that they were contrary 
to tradition, when it was more pertinent to ask v/hether 
traditions had adjusted to the newer conditions. A new 
public philosophy was required to take account of the new 
'public service' state. Liberal-minded
constitutionalists looked elsewhere for their checks to 
offset the agencies of the state - in proposals for 
practical changes such as electoral reform, the 
encouragement of voluntary associations in civil society, 
and the general inculcation of government-by-discussion. 
As long as diversity of ideas and interests was 
maintained, the outcome would always look after itself.
To the extremists of left and right, as Bassett - in 1935 
- indicated, "there must be continuity of policy, even in 
'fundamentals', even with 'capitalism'"(51). One of 
the difficulties with this position was' finding the means 
to express the radical reshaping of modern government
49. Cmnd 4060, p.115.
50. I. Jennings, The La w an d t he Con s t i tu t x on (4th 
edition, 1952), Appendix II.
51 R .Bas s ett, The Essentia 2s of Par1x amen tary 
Democracy (1938), p .230.
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while shill employing the old liberal vocabulary.
William Robson's attack on Dicey's formulation of 
the rule of law(52)(his book came out just before 
Hewart's) encapsulated the difficulty, attaching a value 
to the separating of judicial and administrative powers 
all the while that he was rejecting its legendary 
import(53). But his breakaway signalled a decisive 
step. Absolute rights of property and interest had had 
to give way to qualified rights, conditional on the 
extent to which they were regarded as compatible with 
"the common good". Administrative lav/ had been formed to 
meet a need, and it was surely better to ensure that its 
operation was regularised. The way in which Robson 
expressed this was no less striking. Robson - according 
to his admirers - dispensed with the genteel, high-minded 
theory of the constitution in favour of the defensive, 
class-linked structure of the law, and the 'what actually 
happens' constitution that v/as not normally written 
about(54).
What lay at the back of all this was Robson's 
conviction that constitutional law and political science 
had failed to keep up with the widening reach of the 
state, which had - impelled by war and the pressure for 
reform - expanded almost beyond recognition, exposing the 
liberal-cum-socialistic accounts as inadequate. Change 
was so rapid that it was enough just to track the 
evolving scene, v/ithout standing back and explaining how
52. W. A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law - a 
Study of the British Constitution (1923).
53. M.J.C.Vile, Constitutionalism and the
Separation of Powers (1967), pp.235-237.
54. J .A.G.Griffith, 'Justice and Administrative Law 
Revised' in J.A.G.Griffith (ed), From Policy to 
Administration - essays in honour of William A , Robson 
(1976), pp.200-216.
the new institutions ought ideally to be functioning - a 
significant reversal of priorities. The new field of 
public administration ("there is no such subject in 
England", Robson was initially informed(55)) seemed to 
offer a more promising line of advance, examining the 
structure and functions of the new public authorities and 
the connecting link between politics and administration, 
of which constitutional law was only a subsidiary 
element. This did not mean that its raison d'etre lay in 
'training administrators'. That could only come with 
practical experience, through which public-spirited 
officials, acting (unlike politicians) in an expert 
fashion, would take on "the judicial mind". Tolerant of 
bureaucracy, service in wartime Whitehall reinforced 
Robson’s desire to change things broadly in a socialist 
direction(56). He was no centralist (nor - he pointed 
out - were the Webbs), advancing the merits of 
decentralised decision-making to regional and local 
government. He has been called "the last of the 
Fabians", representative of those confident of the 
"rational good pursued in relation to the ends of state 
action".
The state, then, existed to define the common good, 
to discover the general will and to bring it into being. 
But what if the state, claiming to speak for all and to 
extend rights to many, instead defended the class 
interests of a privileged minority?,. Many left-wing 
diagnoses of the events of 1931 came to this conclusion. 
Laski became one of the foremost advocates of the view 
that the constitution counted for nothing if property 
were at stake. Legal interpretation had grudgingly
55. W.A.Robson, ’The Study of Public Administration 
Then and Nov;’ in Political Studies, 2 and 3 (1975),
56. ’William Robson’ in A. Watkins, Brief Li\.'es 
(1982), p.153.
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adjusted to the process of social change, but liberty 
under the law could have no meaning save in the context 
of equality, a long-held notion(57). The extension and 
enlargement of social and economic rights was bound to 
lead eventually to a programme of reforms that would 
challenge "the very basis of capitalism", expending the 
British talent for compromise(58) . The basic issue was 
whether or not this new kind of social state would be 
allowed to take shape, unhindered by constitutional 
manoeuvring. Laski ' s marxism annoyed liberals, just as 
his liberalism exasperated marxists. Even so, Jennings, 
from a more moderate Labour viewpoint, wavered in his 
attachment to democratic values. Others, prominent in 
the Labour leadership after the fall of MacDonald, had 
seen no alternative to capturing the power of the state 
and the financial institutions and turning them to 
radical purposes(59). But much of this was short on 
specifics. The economic mobilization of war transformed 
the position, enabling Attlee (once well to the left) to 
deliver a quintessential Fabian riposte to Laski, judging 
Labour's progress "by the extent to which what we cried 
in the wilderness five and thirty years ago has now 
become part of the assumptions of ordinary men and 
women"(60). Planning was no longer scoffed at. Full 
employment was accepted. Big government had proved 
itself in adversity. Socialism and commonsense coincided 
more than Labour's opponents were prepared to admit. All 
the main parties were, to a greater or lesser extent,
57. B.Zylstra, From Plural ism to Collectivism - the 
development of Harold Laski ‘s political thought (2nd ed. 
1970), p.60.
58. K.Martin, Harold Laski — a biographical memoir 
(Paperback edition 1969), Chapter IV.
59. S. Cripps and others, Problems of a Socialist 
Government (1933); E. Bevin and G.D.H.Cole, The Crisis 
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60. K.Martin (1969), ibid, ppl50-153.
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collectivist. Britain had become accustomed to the 
strong state and the general election of 1945, in 
Attlee's terms, determined whether that future role would 
be more rather than less substantial in the first years 
of peace. Pride of place went to Labour's plans for 
bringing into public ownership a range of basic 
industries and utilities. Increasing public control was 
continuing the pattern of wartime." But nationalization 
also raised issues of constitutional and administrative 
significance of a wholly new kind, v/hich Robson set out 
to indicate. 'Friends'(61) of larger government 
insisted that the teething troubles of the new 
nationalized industries should not be allowed to detract 
from the way they were intended in time to work;
'enemies' saw in the development a line of thought that 
was fundamentally flawed. As in the opening shots fired 
in the debate on economic planning, the 'practical' 
argument made do as a substitute for the clash of grand 
ideologies of the type familiar on the continent.
Inside Views
The six volumes of Winston Churchill's history of 
the Second World War (1948-54) together amounted to an 
autobiographical substantiation of the author's own 
considerable part in the triumphant conduct of all-out 
military conflict. Churchill's version, one of his 
assistants confessed, v/as "rhetorical, romantic, 
exaggerated and to a meticulous critic somewhat 
inaccurate"(62); it was, moreover, carefully 
constructed so as not to impair post-war relations with
61. Used by L.Tivey, Interpretations of British 
Politics — the image and the system (1988), p.49.
62. M.Ashley, Churchill as Historian (1968), p.175.
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the United States(63). But it honestly conveyed 
Churchill's view that it had been an 'unnecessary’ war, 
brought on by a combination of folly and wickedness, out 
of which only the anti-appeasers emerged with any credit. 
This v/as indeed his own potent justification for 
accession to the highest office. Others opened out the 
indictment into a more generalised condemnation of the 
drift and v/aste of inter-war policy. The juxtaposition 
of Tory guilt with the national purpose and planning of 
wartime was the means by v/hich Labour - to Conservative 
charges of fraudulent misrepresentation - rose to power 
in 194-5.
Attlee, v/hen he came to write his own recollections 
of the war and post-war years, could not hope to emulate 
the literary force of Churchill's v/riting. Serialised in 
17 parts in The Star, and then in book form in April 
1954, the terse, unassuming style of As It Happened - for 
which he was lampooned in Punch - reduced the passing 
show, dramatic and mundane, to Attlee-sized proportions. 
His difficulty, working on several drafts from as early 
as 1951, seemed to have been in finding enough to say.
The account often consisted of little more than matter- 
of-fact notes and observations, unpressured by the 
sifting of his papers, something v/hich his publishers had 
specifically warned him against(64). There was not the 
v/riting for effect or the attempt to give powerful shape 
to the immediate past that was so characteristic of 
Churchill's prose. Attlee v/as not one for recrimination, 
history of the party. Besides which, Labour had its ov/n 
explaining to do on matters of defence leading up to 
1939. Service in the Coalition under Churchill pushed
63. W.F.Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: the 
complete correspondence, Vol.l (1984), pp4-5.
64. A.S.Frere (of Heinemann's) to Attlee, 28 
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all past disagreements to one side - the unity of the
politicians matched the unity of the country. As the war
approached its end, however, so - in A/ttlee’s view - the 
comprehensive plans for post-war reconstruction, worked 
out in common, began to be mysteriously blocked by 
hostile Conservative ministers, indicating that the 
coalition "formed to win the war would not survive its 
success". Churchill, he believed, meant to be returned 
at the head of a Conservative administration loosely 
committed to some measure of social reform. From his 
sketchy account, it v/as clear Attlee had had no inkling
of the scale of the change in public sentiment. His
description of the events of 26th July 1945 was a 
masterpiece of understatement:
"Lord Portal, who was Chairman of the 
Great Western Railway, gave the family tea at 
Paddington, and presently I v/as told by the 
Prime Minister that he was resigning. A summons 
to the Palace followed. My wife drove me there 
and waited outside for me. The King gave me his 
commission to form a Government. He always used 
to say that I looked very surprised, as indeed 
I certainly v/as at the extent of our success.
We went to a Victory Rally at Westminster 
Central Hall where I announced that I had been 
charged v/ith the task of forming a Government, 
looked in at a Fabian Society gathering and 
then returned to Stanmore after an exciting 
day"(65).
Of his ov/n government and its record, Attlee was 
blandly uninformative. Aside from a long disquisition on 
cabinet making, there was next to nothing about the 
interlocking of cabinet, government, party and
65. C.R.Attlee, As It Happened (ly54), p.148.
pari lament. Important, episodes were tantalisingly passed 
over in silence, or dismissed with one-liners. Platitudes 
- what was right in wartime v/as also right in peace - 
stood in for an exposition of the government's long-term 
objectives. The whole tangle of foreign affairs v/as 
dealt with in fewer than eight pages. Much the most 
space was given over to what Attlee regarded as his most 
important work, and in which he had taken the lead - 
paving the way for the independence of India, Pakistan 
and Burma. Otherwise, there was no reflecting on the 
overall idea of what his government had been about, other 
than to say that they had been dutifully executing (as 
the re-issue of his 1937 Left Book Club offering 
underlined) the party's long-standing aims. That so many 
changes had come into force in the teeth of acute 
circumstances only added to their timeliness. “Things 
happened to him", Bevan unkindly said after reading the 
book; "he never did anything". How Attlee had brought it 
off was never spelt out. Those left puzzling had to make 
do with his doodles.
That said, Attlee also won over some surprising 
admirers. Tories, for whom his very mediocrity had seemed 
a menace, found much to praise. G.M. Young, re-creator 
of the Victorian age, reviewed the book on the 
wireless(66), ready to forgive and forget "the grim 
Forties", and relieved that, having earlier taken fright, 
the upheaval had not been drastic as Conservatives had 
feared or radicals had wished. He was even happy to talk 
of "what might, with no exaggeration, be called a social 
revolution", a figure of speech that, in other 
circumstances, Young would have been more likely to apply 
to the coming of the railways, or a fall in the rate of 
infant mortality. Attlee's virtues -modesty and 
rectitude - typifying the Victorian idea of a Prime
66. Transcript in the BBC Written Archives,
Caversham (transmitted 11 April 1954).
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Minister, "an ordinary man in an extraordinary place", 
imply that Young found in him the model of probity that 
he had hoped but failed to discover in Baldwin.
Much more first-hand information could be gleaned 
from Roy Jenkins' "interim biography" (Jenkins senior had 
been Attlee's parliamentary private secretary) of a 
remarkably shy Attlee (1948) (67), v/hich ended with him 
returning from Potsdam, Vincent Brome's homely profile
(1949)(68) and - richest of all - The Triple Challenge 
(1948) by the newspaperman Francis Williams, who had only 
just stepped down as the prime ministers' public 
relations adviser. Charged with the presentation of 
policy to the national and international press, Williams 
pointed out how it had taken the alarms of 1947 (where 
government information campaigns failed) to instil a 
sense of social partnership and stimulate increased 
manufacturing output. Even with wartime paper 
restrictions still in force, a concerted effort v/as made 
by Labour-friendly journalists and pamphleteers to put 
across a sympathetic impression. Offsetting this were 
the reports of other, disillusioned former insiders: R.B. 
Thompson-Williams, one-time public relations officer at 
the Ministry of Supply(69), Ernest Watkins, who had 
been one of the 'New Fabians' before the war but now 
worked as assistant editor at The Economist, writing for 
Americans(70), and Alan Wood, an Australian journalist 
taken on by the Overseas Food Corporation, who was 
dismayed by "the failures, frustration, heartbreak, bad 
luck and bad blunders" that sealed the fate of the
67. R.Jenkins, Mr Attlee.
68. V.Brome, Clement Attlee — a pictorial
b iogr aphy.
69. Was I Rea 11y Necessary? (1947),
70. The Cant ious Revo1ution (1950).
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Groundnuts scheme in Tanganyika(71) . Crossman' s
account of the Anglo-American commission of inquiry to 
Palestine, and Moon’s re-worked narrative on the 
partition of India (which gave the first reliable 
estimate of casualties) fell into the same 
category (72) . Their value v/as in their on-the-spot, 
eye-witness immediacy, flavoured with the tang of crisis. 
In such cases, the fact of direct involvement, with the 
writer as his own best source, made up for the 
fragmentary or incomplete picture, providing an 
authenticity that no 3 library’ history could match.
The limited usefulness of the earliest memoirs and 
accounts v/as due - in the first instance - to the nature 
of the craft. Most of them were ghosted by professional 
writers (Eastwood, v/ho helped Attlee, had already written 
a life of George Isaacs, Kay worked on behalf of both 
Shinv/ell and Morrison), some were hindered by the laws of 
libel (Brome was held at bay by Sevan for several years) 
and all were subject to the Official Secrets Act. But, 
in the period after 1951, there was a further 
complicating factor - the internecine war inside the 
Labour party, which threatened careers and reputations, 
and gave a tendentious edge to the stories that began to 
go the rounds. The machinery of government had been 
Morrison's dry theme, to the exclusion of all else. But 
even he v/as constrained by his hopes of future leadership 
from saying too much. He had already pointed the finger 
for election defeat at Bevan’s 'vermin' speech, breaching 
the PLP rule against personal attacks(73). Morrison's 
part in the abortive compromise plan for public
71. The Groundnut Affair (1950).
72. R. H.S.Crossman, Palestine Mission (1947); 
P .Moon, Divide and Qu it (1961).
73. H. Morrison, 'Dangerous Illusions', Socialist 
Commentary} May 1954, p. 118.
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supervision of the iron and steel industry was now also 
authoritatively disclosed(74). Williams told - 
inaccurately - of a proto-Bevanite plot to unseat Attlee 
in 1947(75). Manny Shinwell returned, in his oddly- 
titled Conflict Without Hal ice, to the fuel crisis of the 
same year, maintaining that he had given the cabinet 
plenty of warning beforehand, blaming instead his 
official advisers, the poor collating of statistics, a 
legacy of private mismanagement, and finally the weather. 
He noted which of his colleagues had sprung to his 
defence at the time and which had not. Morrison (1960) 
was anxious to explain why he could not do so.(76) Nor 
did Morrison believe he had been at fault in the 1951 
budget clash, standing in for the hospitalized Attlee 
("he lost me three ministers", Attlee told John 
Mackintosh in 1958(77)). Thwarted and resentful, "a 
lament for a prize never within reach"(78), Morrison's 
version was of doubtful reliability. More than that, he 
added almost nothing about the inner workings of the 
government to As It Happened(79). Attlee himself called
74. 'Steel firms made pact with Labour', The
Manchester Guardian, 30 March 1955, p. 1, reporting a
speech by Sir Ellis Hunter, who v/as President of the iron 
and Steel Federation from 1945 to 1953.
75. In March 1954 in The People, as recounted in
The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, J.Morgan
(ed)(1981), p.300.
76. H .Morri son, An Autobiography {1960),
77. J.Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (1862), 
footnote p.402.
78. 'The Lord with the Quiff', Lord Stansgate, The 
New Statesman, 1 October 1860, p.478.
79. 'Herbert Morrison looks back', R.McKenzie, in
The Observer, 25 September 1960, p.8.
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it "a fine work of fiction"(80). Shinwell and Morrison 
joined forces to oppose the Gaitskellite turn in Labour 
policy in the later 1950s. And Leslie Hunter, a lobby 
correspondent for the The Daily Herald and a confidant of 
Morrison (until the latter spurned him after losing out 
in 1955) recounted many behind-the-scenes conversations, 
mainly from 1951 on, all of which had an authentic 
ring(31). Hunter was the first journalist in whom 
Attlee confided his intention to retire; Hunter in turn 
saw in the remote and indecisive leadership of Attlee a 
cause of the Bevanite discontent.
The memoirs which made by far the biggest impact, 
however - not least because they were anything but pipe- 
and-slippers reminiscences - were those of Hugh Dalton, 
the second volume of which appeared in 1957 and much to 
Morrison's anger(82). But it was Dalton's third and 
closing volume, finished just before he died in 1962, 
which v/as - in view of what had gone before - lively, 
boisterous and, more than all, indiscreet. Drawing on the 
diary and papers v/hich he had kept, and which his widow 
was to deposit with the British Library of Political and 
Economic Science, Dalton's window onto the Attlee years, 
from his central vantage point in the government, v/as 
unmatchable. He quoted from State documents, disclosed 
advice from officials, and delineated the alliances and 
splits among cabinet colleagues. He returned, initially, 
to the mystery of his appointment to the Treasury, and 
not the Foreign Office. He provided a blow-by-blow
80. Attlee letter to A. Moyle, his former PPS, 
dated 14 August 1965, recorded in K. Harris, Attlee 
(1982), p. 560.
81. L.Hunter, The Road to Higan Pier (1959).
82. H.Dalton, The Fateful Years 1931-1945. 
J.Freeman,in The New Statesman (1 Dalton by Dalton', 6 
April 1957, p.446) spoke of "the wall of complaint from 
Mr.Morrison and a good deal of peevish muttering in the 
undergrowth of the Labour party".
chronicle of the 1945 American loan negotiations, which 
had come close to breaking off, and one of whose key 
provisions - the full convertibility of the pound - he 
knew to be unworkable, adding to Harrod's life of Keynes. 
He revealed a rare instance of budget alterations made 
after ministerial pressure, but as to his main policy of 
cheap money, this had never been brought before the full 
Cabinet. But by the Autumn of 1946, he was warning of the 
drain on the dollar loan, and together with Cripps 
pressed for tighter controls on spending and a 
reallocation of the Defence Estimates, fearing (as he 
told Attlee in a memorandum) that they were “drifting, in 
a state of semi-animation, towards the rapids". Much of 
what he had at this stage to say about the taking of 
decisions belied Attlee's later claim that his aim in 
Cabinet had always been to "stop talk": there were too 
many "rambling" discussions for Dalton's liking, with 
Attlee for much of the time, as over what to do about 
India, "speechless". Even Bevin told Dalton that he 
found it hard to get anything out of Attlee. Many 
ministers were close to exhaustion, but compulsively tied 
to their work. Shinwell's "thunderclap" announcement of 
the need for electricity cuts, in January 1947, and in 
the middle of a cold snap, was set out for the reader to 
draw his own conclusions. This first big dent in 
Labour's confidence sparked off (in one reviewer's 
phrase) "the dance of Cabinet intrigue"(83), when 
Attlee's position came under threat, before he was able, 
forewarned by the swirl of rumours, to emerge unscathed. 
His own accidental departure he associated with the 
downturn in Labour's fortunes, the contrast between the 
annus mirabilis of 1945-46 and the annus horrendus of 
1947 occurring to him even as he sorted through his 
papers on leaving office. Despite the egocentric 
outlook, this periodization v/as convincing and, with
83. E.Powell, 'Those Fabian Follies', The Sunday 
Telegrapht 17 March 1985, p.14.
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newsreels lending it visual force, generally taken up. 
After 1947, his record lost much of its fascination, 
although there were still occasional insights - Cripps in 
1949, for example, wanting the new Governor of the Bank 
of England to be Sir John Hanbury-Williams rather than 
the eventual choice, the then Deputy Governor, Cameron 
Cobbold. Even as a self-confessed "exercise in egoism", 
Dalton was congratulated for having a keen sense of the 
goings-on around him(84), though it had long been known 
than the big five in the government had never really been 
"a band of brothers"(85). He did not, it now
transpires, strictly adhere to his maxim, 'When in doubt, 
Publish' - D.C. Watt, the first to draw on Dalton(86), 
indicates that Dalton cleared everything beforehand with 
the Cabinet Secretary(87). This has not stopped
historians from suggesting that passages of the book were 
in clear breach of the guidelines on confidentiality. 
Given that outgoing ministers have a distinct advantage 
in being at liberty to depict the way they saw things, 
the Dalton angle, rich in detail and mood rather than 
pedestrian, gained an early and deserved ascendancy.
Inflamed by these outbreaks of "ex-ministeritis" - 
and their all-embracing secretiveness - the boldest 
rejoinder came from two skilled controversialists,
Richard Crossman, and the Hungarian-born economist Thomas 
Balogh, once close to the Bevanites and an old foe of
84. R.Jenkins, 'The Exuberant Chancellor', The
Spectator, 9 February 1962, p.1977.
85. 'High Tide and Aditer', The Times, 15 Februarv
1962, p.15.
86. D.C. Watt, 'American Aid to Britain and the
Problem of Socialism, 1945-51', reprinted in his
Personalities and Policies (1965), pp53-80.
87. J.Naylor, A Man and an Institut ion - Sir
Maurice Hankey r the cab inet secretariat and the custody 
o f cabinet secrecy (1984), footnote p .392 .
45
Hayek. Balogh's scathing critique of the Whitehall 
mandarin - in a book castigating the English 
"Establishment" (a term v/hich had entered currency in the 
mid-fifties) - struck a chord(88). The institutional 
defects in economic policy-making, and the amateurism of 
policy-makers, went a long way towards accounting for the 
successive upsets after 1945 v/hich had whittled away the 
popular goodwill Labour had won for itself. So far as he 
could tell these shortcomings remained to be corrected.
In Balogh's eyes, it all v/ent back to the Lloyd George- 
Warren Fisher minute of 1919 v/hich had united the civil 
service under the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury.
He entered a plea for more outsiders v/ith drive and 
purpose to be brought into government. Something of this 
mistrust registered in Labour's brief attempt to 
dismember the Treasury in 1964.
Crossman's candid reappraisal, in a jubilee article 
celebrating "The New Statesmen" (Attlee's derogatory term 
for the self-regarding rebelliousness of that journal) 
v/as a more colourful and wide-ranging stab at hacking 
away "the jungle of complacent myth" which - in the long 
years in Opposition - had blunted criticism and obscure 
"the real record of the Attlee government from the eyes 
of the faithful"(89). Crossman took issue with 
Morrison's view that they had squandered support by 
attempting to do too much, and he pointed the finger at 
Attlee for going to the country in 1951 when, given that 
the economy soon picked up again, Labour might have 
stayed in for a decade. The upshot of these mistakes 
bore comparison with the after-effects of 1931, he 
asserted, if only because they had yet to be squarely
88. T.Balogh, 'The Apothesis of the Dilettante' in 
The Establishment, H. Thomas (ed)(1959) pp83-126.
89. Reprinted as 'The Lessons of 1945' in Towards 
Socialism, P. Anderson and R. Blackburn (eds) (1965), 
PP146-158.
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faced up "to. He went on to isolate three shortcomings 
which had contributed to Labour's undoing - lack of 
preparation in the period prior to achieving power; the 
failure to reform Whitehall and to bring in talented 
experts; and the damping down of grassroots party 
aspirations. His hurried mention, in a final paragraph, 
of the positive side to 1945, looked half-hearted.
Crossman embarked on other forays at dislodging the 
official view. 'Austerity', not 'vermin', had cost 
Labour the most in 1950 and 1951, he maintained(90).
The Bevanite attitude towards the rearmament budget still 
had, with hindsight, much to be said for it, having been 
(partially) corroborated by an independent study(91).
As for the concealment of the decision by Attlee to 
finance and develop a British atomic weapon - he had no 
doubt that it should serve as a key historical exhibit in 
the growing tendency towards 'prime ministerial 
government'.
In part, this greater openness reflected the freeing 
up of party debate after the death of Gaitskell and his 
replacement by Harold Wilson ("At last we have a leader 
who can lie", Crossman, his campaign manager, is supposed 
to have said). But there was more to it. Crossman 
nursed the ambition to write the definitive account of 
British government at the centre which would ~ as he 
delicately put it - blow Morrison's exaggerated 
respectability out of the water. He v/as much taken by 
John Mackintosh's Cabinet (1862), which upbraided. 
Morrison, and D.N. Chester, for following the established 
line of describing the machinery of the cabinet instead 
of - the real issue - "asking where power lies".
90. 'The Forties', The New Statesman , 13 October
1963, pp527-528.
91. 'Who was right in 1951?', The Listener , 18
April 1963, pp657-658.
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Bagehot's distinction between appearance and reality 
still had its uses. Others at this time sought to locate 
the essentially private nature at public affairs in 
British society. Although Crossman reaped a dividend as 
the outsider looking in, his efforts did not always 
universally impress. Oakeshott wrote in The Times 
Literary Supplement that the suggestion "that the only 
way to study politics is to lift the lid and look at the 
'works’ is a view of the matter with which we are 
familiar, but I think everyone who has anything to do 
with teaching 'politics' has long ago rejected it"(92).
In defence of 'Crossman's disease', it was the case 
that government was still, even in the early 1960s, a 
closed political world, bound together by informal ties, 
the exercise of power expressed socially as much as 
institutionally. Politicians could travel unnoticed in 
public, and swap stories with journalists without having 
their trust betrayed. Only a privileged minority were in 
a position to see and know. xAttlee, asked to review a 
set of affectionate essays by younger writers(93), 
found it difficult to understand the purpose of the 
exercise - most had still been at school when Labour was 
in power, and they all wrote from the point of view of 
comfortably-off, middle class Londoners; astonished by a 
character sketch of Cripps "by someone who never knew 
him", he specialised in giving the uninitiated the brush 
off(94). The earliest insight were intuitive and 
anecdotal, even (witness the Attlee 'enigma') apocryphal. 
Some mysteries began to be cleared up, especially when
92 The Times Literary Supplement, 12 October 1862,
p.793.
93 M.Sissons and P.French (eds), Age of Austerity
(1963). The New Look, by Harry Hopkins, a light social
history of Britain in the years from Dunkirk to Suez,
appeared in the same year.
94. C.R.Attlee, 'When Labour had the Whip Hand', 
The Sunday Telegraph} 13 October 1963, p.13.
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the memories of participants conflicted, but no real 
reconstruction of the course of events was possible - it 
v/as too soon to say, there was too little to go on, too 
much was still at stake. The working reporter and the 
new type of political correspondent had the advantages. 
Most wordspinning v/as immediate, accurate and - v/here it 
relied on intimate acquaintance - well-informed. It also 
displayed a keen and instinctive sense of the comic- 
serious untidiness and irrationality of political life 
(exemplified in Fairlie's 'account of Attlee deciding to 
let Turkey join NAT0(95)), an activity not really 
susceptible to academic theorising.
A More Equal Society ?
The ministerial presentation of Labour's six years 
in power - in speeches of the time as v/ell as in later 
memoirs - v/as one of dour, embattled achievement, brought 
about in the most forbidding of circumstances. 
Reconstruction was given the highest priority. Full 
employment was never endangered. To this v/as added what 
Cripps called "the greatest programme of social services 
ever undertaken in any country in so short a period of 
time". Labour's historic objectives - originally 
devised, it should be said, to combat conditions of slump 
- had reached fulfilment. The Opposition parties accused 
Labour of having dogmatically carried out changes wholly 
unsuited to the post-war realities. But v/hat nobody 
could provide was a comprehensive account of what the new 
social order of mixed economy (Attlee was already using 
the phrase while the war was still on) and public-
95. H .F a i r 1ie, The Life of Po1itics (1967), pp 78-
79.
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provision was leading towards. T.H. Marshall was one of 
the few to articulate an historical theory of the slow 
expansion of rights by the British state - civil and 
legal in the seventeenth century, political in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth, and finally social up to 
the present time, a process he regarded as still 
unf inished(96).
Marshall also contended(97) that, even in this new 
setting , the main dividing lines of philosophical 
opinion - marked out in late Victorian times and "deeply 
rooted in the very nature of modern society" - still 
persisted. In each case, moral conviction both informed 
and was reformed by social change.
Of the three prevailing schools, the fundamental 
socialist position, starting from the overriding 
importance of abolishing private ownership, contained the 
strongest ethical element. The elimination of poverty, 
an end to hierarchy and privilege, and the inauguration 
of a society without classes were all held to be vital 
aspirations in their own right, even leaving aside the 
belief that inequalities were also economically 
dysfunctional. ’Facts for socialists’ implied socialist 
facts. Firm on moral purpose, the socialist was 
otherwise wanting in detailed analysis of practical 
problems, since it was assumed that once the total 
changing of society had occurred, all manifestations of 
greed and injustice would disappear. The Labour party - 
imperfect instrument as it was - existed to bring this 
about.
Many leading Fabians, although initially of this
96. T.H.Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class 
(1950).
97. S o c i a l P o 1 i c y {1 y 6 5), Ch apt e r 2.
p; r\
mind, eventually came round to a more moderate view, 
unsure of just how far collectivist principles might 
carry them and persuaded that reforming legislation could 
do much to humanize capitalism without the impossihilist 
need for its complete overthrow. Identifying a wrong and 
pressing for it to be alleviated meant they could reach 
out to other progressives, but it left them open to 
charges of backsliding. Confidence in the slow 
supercess ion of the old economic arrangements by a hard- 
headed commitment to reform v,ras an attitude opposed to - 
and indeed in time actively antagonistic towards - those 
threatening revolutionary upheaval. But the 
progressivist cause was ultimately no less radical in 
merit. Beveridge, who wanted only the mildest of income 
transfers, stretched things to the limit in putting the 
right to work before all else. The strategy was one of 
tying acceptably moderate means to far-reaching ends.
The anti-collectivists, although declining in 
importance, set their face against an enhanced role for 
the state. They disliked the unrelenting pressure for 
change, convinced that every extension of government 
power entailed a further restriction on individual 
liberty. They attacked the confusion of poverty with 
inequality, a confusion attributed to leftists who wanted 
to blacken the present in order to strengthen the push 
for reform. They were hostile to what they saw as the 
Fabian assumption of. moral virtue and heightened 
intelligence. The anti-collectivist was convinced by the 
historically^-proven superiority of private enterprise and 
initiative, which no degree of market failure or social 
need could shake.
One effect of the reforms introduced after 1945 was 
that the revolutionary alternative to the left - briefly 
entertained in the 1930s - was closed off; Labour was a 
party for socialists, but it was not for all-out
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socialism. There was also a muffling of differences in 
outlook between liberals and conservatives, some 
recognising the dangers of bureaucratic bigness, others 
that there were social ills that had in the past been 
neglected. It was commonly accepted, and became an 
important element in the reformist thesis, that British 
society had been altered in fundamental, though as yet 
indefinable, ways, and in particular that there had been 
a substantial redistribution of income from the better to 
the less well off. An 'income’ revolution was the point 
from which all analyses - favourable and critical - 
started out, until in time this central tenet too was 
opened up to questioning, by a Fabian challenging other 
Fabians. The old socialist idea that the power relations 
in society covered and concealed class inequalities made 
its reappearance. Though cast in a statistical form, the 
issue always returned to the basic question of ultimate 
values, about which - since there was no principle by 
which to judge other principles - agreement was 
unattainable. Moral protest was enlightened by the 
findings of social inquiry, indicating a key stage in the 
increasingly sophisticated study of social policy. But 
academic discussion was also - and just as importantly - 
swayed by the urgencies of overt political 
argument(98).
American Influences
An interval usually follows the memoir-writing 
stage, during which time the leading protagonists, who 
have had the first say, are able to hold the field. Only 
with the opening up of the State archives can the 
received picture begin to alter. This interval is 
usually a lengthy one (when Hugh Dalton's last volume
98. M.Gowing, Richard Morris Titmuss 1907-1973 
(1975), P .21.
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appeared in 1962, the official papers on 1945-51 were not 
due for release until the late 1990s). But it is 
striking that, with the literature on the Attlee 
governments, there was no gap to speak of.
The primary reason for this was that interest was 
sustained by the growing number of American scholars who 
were drawn to post-war British politics and found in it 
both the subject-matter for research and a ready-made 
setting for the application - especially by the new breed 
of political scientist - of new approaches and methods.
Specialising in U.K. policies had many attractions. 
Some Americans had been Rhodes scholars before the war, 
or were stationed in Britain during it. Anglophile ties 
were strong. Overseas research, for American graduates, 
was increasingly well-funded. To the long-standing 
practice of comparing and contrasting British and 
American institutions was added a natural curiosity about 
a Britain embarked on 'building socialism'. Two main 
areas of interest were identifiable - Anglo-Americans 
bilateral links during and after the war, and the 
workings of the British party system.
i) Britain and American foreign policy
The first main body of writing took as its object of 
study Britain’s reliability as an alliance partner in war 
and peace, an issue still largely undeveloped in Britain 
itself. Indeed the earlier English studies were also the 
most American in outlook(99). Instead of an historical 
analysis of post-war changes, there had been an almost 
exclusive attention paid to the person of Labour's 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, lionised by Francis 
Williams for his obstinate single-mindedness in defending
99 See, for example, the writings of Max Beloff.
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British interests(100). That Attlee had given Bevin a 
free hand was already clear. There was - as Morrison had 
made known - no foreign affairs committee of the cabinet 
for Bevin to contend with. The only instructions he had 
were those he gave himself. Bevin - former Foreign 
Office officials revealed(101) - found no difficulty 
in carrying his colleagues, feared nothing from the 
parliamentary party (as long as the trade unionists were 
solidly behind him), paid no heed to unpopularity in 
Parliament and was oblivious to criticism in the press. 
This very fact made it harder for contemporaries to grasp 
what it was that he was trying to do. After his death, 
there was no Bevin *testament*, other than what was 
contained in his tidied-up House of Common speeches.
Much more could be had by way of American sources. 
James Byrnes spoke frankly in 1947(102), defending 
himself against allegations of lack of firmness in his 
dealings with the Soviet Union and the describing the way 
in which his growing confidence in Bevin came about. The 
Forrestal diaries confirmed the image of a Bevin who kept 
his word, but of an uncommunicative prime minister and a 
party over-influenced by its left-wing (Forrestal had a 
particularly irrational paranoia about Harold 
Laski(103). The Vandenberg papers (1952(104)), 
following Forrestal, established Bevin*s agreement to the 
stationing of American B-29 bombers in Britain in 1948,
100. F.Williams, Ernest Bey in (1952)*
101. Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (1956); Sir I. 
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■the revelation of which Attlee - until his attention was 
drawn to it - was unaware. Publication in 1955 of the US 
State Department documentary record of the Yalta 
conference went ahead in spite of British objections.
There was also a series of accounts, drawing on 
interviews with Marshall, Acheson and others, recounting 
the American accomplishment in pulling Europe back from 
the brink in the late 1940s - Jones’s racy The Fifteen 
Meeks {105), Mallalieu*s informative narrative of the 
winning of American public and congressional approval of 
the European Recovery Programme(106), and the account 
by Price of the operation and organization of the 
Marshall plan(107). In a self-styled study of 
"international economic diplomacy", Richard Gardener 
(using the papers of Harry Dexter White and Will Clayton) 
demonstrated the creative statesmanship on both sides of 
the Atlantic that helped to set up the post-war 
international and multilateralist economic order(108).
That American interest in Britain was driven by 
American foreign policy concerns was evident in the 
disproportionate coverage given over to the ■’problem*
(for it was seen as such) of the Labour party*s left- 
wing. Fitssimons, in his short and longer pieces, was 
unconvinced by slogans of internationalism and peace, or
by the attempt to rally democratic Europe as a third
force(109). Epstein, in an important case study of 
British political and public opinion in the years from
105. J.M.Jones, The Fifteen Meeks <1956).
106. W.C.Mailalieu, British Reconstruction and 
American PoIicy t945-55 (1956).
107. H.Price, The Marshall Plan and its Meaning 
(1955).
108. R. N. Gardner, Ster 1 in g-Do 1.1 ar D i p l o m a c y  (1956).
109. M.A.Fitssimons,
Br i t i sh Lahou r Go i/e r n men t (1953).
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1945 until 1952 - and sponsored by the Carnegie 
Foundation (which also at this time supported many 
institutes set up to research into Soviet and East 
European politics - carefully traced the fluctuations in 
attitudes and responses to foreign affairs, when American 
admiration for Britain was at a peak but the hostility of 
the left to the United States had been 
reawakened(110). British insecurity stemmed from its 
sharp decline in status relative to the U.S., and the 
humiliation of economic dependence. The difficulty for 
Labour's leaders was squaring party doctrine with actual 
necessity(111). Bevanism, however, was no more than 
"a bundle of objections", unlikely to win over the great 
majority. He referred to, without pursuing, the finding 
of another American study, which implied that trade union 
MPs, on their voting record, ’were more antipathetic to 
American policy than Labour's inteilectuals(112). In
the management of future relations’, Epstein concluded, 
greater sensitivity was needed in ensuring that allies 
would be able to carry party and public with them.
Meehan, lastly, in an unusual monitoring of left-wing 
views overseas by Bassett(113), examined the supposed 
violations of socialist principle levelled by the left at 
Bevin, and found their behaviour to be highly - and 
quantifiably - predictable, a consistent view of the
110. L.B.Epstein, Britain - Uneasy Ally (1954).
111. Rose was to point out that the left, in 
claiming a role of 'moral leadership' for Britain in the 
world, also took it to be a major world power: R.Rose,
The Re 1 ation o f Soc i alist Princip1es t o British Labour 
Foreign Policy, 1945-51 (PhD, University of Oxford
(1959)).
112. M.
Par1i amentary 
States in the
(1950).
113. E.Meehan, The British Left Ming and Foreign 
Policy -a study of the influence of ideology (I960).
Bremner, An Analysis of British 
Attitudes concerning the United 
Post-war Period, PhD, University of London
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world but only because it was a systematic distortion of 
reality. It was doubtful, in that case, whether the 
United States or the Soviet Union of left-wing ideology 
ever existed. Although, as each of these assorted works 
implied, the potential for future left-wing influence was 
there, the overall verdict as a reassuring one: the 
extent of left-wing activity had been talked up. Neither 
left-wing ideology, nor the left-wing as a loosely 
organized grouping, determined the conduct of Bevin’s 
Foreign policy. Indeed, Bevin’s occupancy of the post of 
Foreign Secretary helped, if anything, to minimise, the 
degree of opposition.
The insight gained from those mid-Atlantic accounts 
were valuable. The framing of official American thinking 
and judgements about Soviet intentions saw the light of 
day, suitably packaged. The relatively confined circle 
of opinion-formers and policy-makers in Britain 
simplified each author’s task, while allowing them to 
distance themselves (in a way, it was suggested, British 
observers could not(114)) from the attitudes of the 
English governing elite. But strong points imply weaker 
points. Many of them read like Department of State 
position papers. Key British interests - the colonies 
and the Commonwealth - were not understood. They were 
unavoidably Americo-centric, British viewpoints being 
conveyed only indirectly, so that the British side of the 
debate (with British academics still hindered by a 
restrictive policy on the retention of official papers) 
went begging.
When, in 1963, a homegrown account of one of the 
decisive turning points in post-war Anglo-American 
relations - the rearmament crisis of 1950-51 - was
114. A.King, citing A.Hacker in his introduction to
British Politics — People f Parties arid Parliament (1966),
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completed by Joan Mitchell, a lecturer in economics and a 
former civil servant in the Board of Trade, it developed 
out of a distinctly British point- of view, in the context 
of an altercation about the performance of the British 
economy in the nineteen-fifties(115). We can say that 
the economic growth debate was the real spur. The 
absence of sharp policy reversals after 1951 had 
persuaded many Fabians that the party battle was turning 
into one of governmental competence, particularly in the 
handling of the economy. Popular policies had come to be 
expressed largely in economic terms. Keynesian ideas 
held out the prospect of both increased output and 
greater welfare, since rising government spending could 
be used to offset social inequality. But the whole 
strategy necessarily depended upon a steadily expanding 
economy, about which Keynes had said little. Britain's 
growth record after the war had been remarkable, the 
'long boom' taking most economists completely by 
surprise. But its record did not compare so favourably 
with other West European countries which had had their 
own economic miracles and - as liberal commentators 
pointed out - with far less state control. Connections 
were made between the high costs attaching to the 
American alliance and continuing military and defence 
commitments, the turbulent American business cycle, and 
Britain's reluctance to join in the formative stages of 
the European Common Market. There began a period of 
national self-doubt, marked by a greater readiness to 
question the so-called 'renewal' of Britain after the war 
which, to many now seemed to be nothing of the sort. Tony 
Crosland - a leading revisionist - was an enthusiastic 
growthman, so that the growth debate was a searching test 
of revisionist precepts.
It should be noted that this new broadly Keynesian
115. J .Mitche11, Crisis in Er ita in (1963)
understanding of political economy - of economics 
explicitly tied to policy - entailed a particular view of 
the nature of economic thinking. While the central 
propositions of economics might well be value-free, their 
real importance lay in their practical application. 
Economics v/as conceived of as an exercise in working out 
the likely consequences of certain courses of action, out 
of which policy recommendations would flow. It was about 
the making of choices v/hich a self-correcting view of the 
economy had held to be unnecessary. Economics was in this 
sense utilitarian, action-oriented and operational. The 
object in mind was serviceable knowledge, a wisdom of 
diagnosis and cure. It was the pervasive influence of 
this brand of Keynesian thinking which caused many to 
speak of a new and unchallengeable economic orthodoxy', 
bolstered by a flattering biographical portrait of Keynes 
and the textbook distillation of his teachings, as well 
as ritual dismissals of opponents like Hayek who - having 
taken himself off to Chicago - had locked himself in a 
shuttered room(116). The only puzzle for Keynesians 
was why the new thinking had not been taken up more 
quickly than was in fact the case. Post-war difficulties 
were traced to the misapplying of the master's theories, 
or to misunderstandings on either side of the Atlantic, 
as Mitchell - covering the "strained anxiety" of British- 
American relations in her economic interpretation of 1951 
- set out. But that the revolution in economic theory 
had forged new instruments of policy was not any longer 
in doubt. Only the doctrinaire failed to see this.
ii) The American science of politics
The second tranche of American-inspired works, 
coinciding with the post-1945 development of the social 
sciences, v/as made up by the findings of political
116. D .Winch, in a review in The tconomic 
Vol. 77 1967, pp903-905.
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science - a science, that is, which purported to provide 
a comprehensive, general theory of political activity.
The political scientist used empirical observation and 
the comparative method to isolate the common 
characteristics of all political systems and to 
illustrate the different kinds of 'structure’ which 
performed the requisite ’ f u n c t i o n s i n  any given country. 
Progress consisted in forming well-defined hypothetical 
propositions which could be made to run the test of 
reality, proving or disproving their explanatory and 
predictive value. Evidence was systematically - or 
schematically - arranged, especially wherever it was 
readily quantifiable. For the large number of North 
American students and scholars (many of whom were to go 
on to greater things) visiting Britain, is provided a 
proving ground for verifiable theories of power and 
process in politics. This burst of intellectual energy, 
forming a captivating showcase for the newer methods, was 
what really got the discussion of 1945 off the ground.
The emphasis which political scientists gave to the 
informal aspects of politics was a sign of an important 
shift away from the older tradition of devoting attention 
to the formal, legalistic institutions of government per 
s e . Indeed, the drive to establish political science as 
a respectable - and progressive - form of inquiry derived 
in part from a reaction to the institutional and 
philosophical approaches to the study of politics, which 
were felt to have exhausted their usefulness(117) . A 
far wider range of political phenomena had to be ;
examined, in as impersonal and objective a way as 
possible- The difficulty, when it came to British 
peculiarities, was of generalising meaningfully from the 
well-known informality of British political arrangements
117. P.Abrams, 5 The Sociology of Political Life" in 
T . R . Fyvel ( ed-), The Fr on t i er s o f Soc i a I o qy (19B4 ) , pp41
73.
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(once "the "close-mouthed" discretion of the governing 
clan had been breached(118)) without losing sight of 
the pomp and ceremony of constitutional restraints which 
were always of much more than symbolic significance.
This problem was at the heart of the dilemma for those 
wishing to make of political science a subject of study 
in its own right. Politics was being regarded as a 
socio—cultural product, the outcome of the interaction of 
social forces and influences, but in the context of a 
long-run modernizing of the nation-state, implying the 
indispensability of a perspective on the past. The claim 
of political service to self-sufficiency was qualified, 
then, by its reliance on something outside of itself - 
and that something was a sociological and historical 
dimension.
Its leading exponents did not make the mistake of 
claiming a start from a position of ethical neutrality, 
however. Values could not, as Easton put it, be shed in 
the same way that one took off one's overcoat. In 
formulating a problem for research, in the selecting of 
evidence and in the interpreting of results, values 
steered the creative impulse. The ultimate value of any 
theory was its correspondence to the facts of the real 
world. But the political scientists’ outlook was 
strongly coloured by an affinity to democratic practices. 
The study of politics was ’American" as much as 
* scientific*(119), "a policy science in the service of 
democracy"(120). Democracy was not free of all 
imperfections. The "double commitment" of
118. E .Shi1s, The Torment of Secrecy (1955), p . 63 .
119. B .Crick, The American Science ' of Po1iti 
(1959).
120. M . C r an s t on, T h e fl a s k a f P o 1 i t i c s
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Americans(121) - their acceptance of scientific 
techniques and their attachment to democratic ideals - 
was seen as paradoxical wherever, as was often the case, 
research uncovered defects in the good society. The 
point was that these were remediable. The contrary pull 
of detachment and engagement meant that most political 
scientists could not be classed as guilty of innocence.
American attitudes to the British political system 
were clearly altered by these considerations. The rise 
of 'strong'’ parties, and most of all, the Labour party 
and movement, was an overriding preoccupation. Interest 
in the British party system was an old concern, phases of 
approval going hand-in-hand with periodic dissatisfaction 
with the state of A,merican politics. Britain was thought 
to offer the prototype of responsible and disciplined 
two-party system, even though it was unclear whether it 
was parliamentary devices or country-specific norms which 
fostered stability. Even so, the British and American 
forms of liberal democracy were both, in their respective 
ways, held up as models of consensual government - an 
exacting, decidedly Western standard by which less 
developed countries were judged.
To this should be added the growing inquisitiveness 
about the emergence and transformation of the British 
Labour party - a nominally socialist party for which 
there was no direct American equivalent - into a fully- 
formed party of government. Relating ideas to the life of 
party structures was one of the biggest problems 
confronting the political scientist(122). Making 
sense of party labels was a source of considerable Anglo- 
American confusion. The historical forces which had
121. D.Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science 
(1984), pp-24-25.
122. J . Gou 1 d , ' Common Ground' , The Ne« S't a. t e sm an , 3 
December 1965, p.883.
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shaped the Labour party, its organisation and its 
programme were factors calling for bold analyses of 
impressive interpretative sweep. But there was always 
the question of whether Brj tain vas coming to resemble 
the American pattern of ideologically-free party 
political conflict with its unstated premise - 
emancipation from ideology as an indication of the mature 
polity.
The ' McKenzie * thesis - that parliamentary 
requirements dictated the oligarchic nature of party 
forms because of the need to succeed ejectorally - was 
tht? best known of these analyses. In challenging the 
democratic credentials of, in particular, the Labour 
party, the McKenzie view was quickly established as a 
central point of scholastic discussion, setting in train 
what was to become one of the classic disputes. The sub­
division of the argument into separate strands - how 
party policy was made, what the exact role of the party 
conference was, and how influential the trade unions were 
believed to be - all came from the attempt to subject 
McKenzie's arguments to closer scrutiny. In the process, 
the actual 'testability’ of the thesis was thrown into 
doubt. The debate also carried normative elements, since 
the way the party was seen as working had a bearing on 
what it could be said to stand for. The discovery of 
pressure groups and the elaboration of pressure group 
theories, and the fusing of 'party' and 'group' into an 
integrated socio-historic-al account tracing the origins 
of the 1945 programme, eventually led to the stiffest 
objection to the McKenzie's line. The immediate issue - 
who had bested whom - was counterbalanced by an 
assessment of what had usefully come out of it, the 
invigorating merits of political science (with its 
assumption that what was new was also true) set against 
advocates of the older ways who still could see no final
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answers(123). Arguing as to what the Labour 
governments of 1945-51 had been about was also a means of 
finding out how far the scientific study of politics 
could be taken.
Ang1o-Marxism
The arrival of the 'New Left', as distinct from the 
"Old" (the newness of its ideas was always 
disputed(124)) coincided with the founding in 1959-60
(“ i f  "X  h  .o f - J ! : •  f a - f - b  t  n- >.! - i  +  r - p ]  "P r\-P  t v j p r f «=> v-'
t : : I ri I... I >■ 1 . ^ J- v- } j. L J C  J. 2. 2. ‘-'2. Ill ’ ‘--1 *_■> 2- VI iii‘_-2. gv C  i  J.
two earlier journals, The New Reasoner and the 
Universities and Left Review. Two impulses had been at 
work - the post-1956 exodus of many members from the 
Communist Party of Great Britain, and a more generalised
dissatisfaction with the complacent Fabian thinking of
the 1950s which had, it was felt, contributed to the 
deadening of partisan argument(125). A 'regeneration' 
of radical thought was required, a revival of 'socialist 
humanism' liberated from the stifling conformity of 
established political agencies and structures. Most of 
all it involved a polemically barbed description of what 
the Labour party - even now abandoning all radical 
pretence - had come to be.
One part of the loose and disputatious association 
which made up the 'New Left' was still attached to the 
bright, shining hopes of 1945, not least the unfulfilled
123 J.Barents, Political Science in Me stern Europe — a 
trend report (1961), p p .80-81; W.J.M.Mackenzie, The Study of 
Political Science Today (1966), p .34; M.Vile,
Constitutionalism and the Separ at ion of Powers (1967), Chapter
YTyv x -
124. G.L. Arnold, 'Britain: The New Reasoners' in 
Revisionism -■ essays on the history of marxist ideas} L. 
Labeds (ed)(1962), pp.299-312.
125. R.Williams, 'The New British Left', Partisan 
Review, Spring 1960, pp-3441-347.
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vision of a British middle way between capitalism and 
communism. Those who subscribed to this had lived 
through the war and post-war years, and had seen how the 
opportunity to dram yciety - a real
possibility given the popular will at the end of the 
war - had been ground down hy so1emn dec]arations about 
the dollar gap and finished off with the fall of the Iron 
Curtain. The expectations of 1945 and the downturn of 
1947-48 they saw as being of a piece with the struggles 
of the inter-war period. But they refused to go along 
with the subsequent despairing withdrawal from active 
politics, reduced by now to the be-all-and-end-all of 
electoral and parliamentary "psephopolitics". As for the 
revisionist alternative, this was little more than 
advanced liberalism, shorn of arg/ jacobin threat. ”My 
own view [of Cr os land’ s The Future of Social ism ] is that 
the book is thoughtful, well argued, stimulating - and 
wrong", Norman Birnbaum announced at the height of the 
1959 general election(126). What Cros land was engaged 
in was revising Fabianism, not marxism. The priority was 
to reassert and reinforce the old opposition to 
capitalism, not wonder at, its endless mutation. This 
’New Left’ strain shared with the old Tribunite left an 
acute sense of what the forties had represented ("Did 
Lord Attlee really free India ? Did Lord Nor r i son of 
Lambeth wrest the pits from the coal owners?"(127)).
Where they parted company was in their uncompromising 
indictment of the limitations of the Labour party’s 
radical ism.
Ralph Mi 1iband’s Par 1iamen tary Socia Iism - A Study 
in the Politics of Labour {1961) has been called "the only
126. B.Birnbaum, ’Ideals or Reality?’, Socialist 
Cowmen tary, September 1959, p .5.
127. E.P. Thompson, ’Revolution’ in Out of Apathy, 
E.P. Thompson (ed)(1960), p.307.
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genuine post-Laski book" (128). Miliband, "to recall; 
had been a junior colleague of Laski, wary however of the 
grand illusion that one could readily turn Labour into an 
authentically socialist party. Victory in 1945 had 
restored Laski's faith in the parliamentary road. The 
Attlee reforms would constitute the first stage in an 
eventual social transformation. Seen at a distance; from 
the other end of the 1950s; it was the earlier Laski - 
Laski at his most marxisant - that Miliband resurrected:
"It has long been the fashion to deride 
the fears Laski voiced as of no relevance to 
Britain. It has even been claimed that the 
experience of 1945-51 has conclusively proved 
how unwarranted these fears were. The claim 
rests on a naive misreading of what the Labour 
Government attempted to do. Its experience only 
proved that a genuine but modest degree of 
economic and social reform within the framework 
of capitalist society need not impose 
intolerable strains upon the parliamentary 
system"(129).
For Miliband, Laski's error had not been to explore 
in the wrong areas - the issues he raised continued to be 
of paramount importance. Where Laski had been mistaken, 
where in fact the entire parliamentary left had gone 
astray, was in assuming that Britain was more 'socialist* 
in 1950 than in 1945, and that Labour deserved the credit 
for this. The 'New Left' critique, so far as Miliband 
was concerned, sprang from the view that, in spite of 
Labour having held office, the basic nature of British 
society had not been profoundly altered.
128. N.Mackenzie, conversation with the author, 19 
November 1982.
129. R.Miliband, 'Voices of Socialism - Harold Laski', 
Tribune, 12 June 1964, p.12.
Miliband arranged his history of the Labour party 
around the history of a long-running argument about the 
party's fundamental purpose, an argument as old as the 
party itself, the dilemma of social reform or socialism. 
This inherent ambiguity of purpose made internal disputes 
unavoidable. The point about these ideological 
differences was that they concealed the true character of 
the party. For a one-time Revanite about to make the 
break with Labour, the party's record was hardly one of 
conspicuous radical accomplishment. The leaders were 
parliamentary-minded. Socialist intentions had gradually 
disappeared. Labour now seemed to be a most effective 
bulwark against fundamental change. This had its 
parallel in "the growing integration of the trades unions 
into the framework of modern capitalism". The term 
Miliband used to describe Labour’s role as a safe party 
of reform - its "Labourist” nature - was fittingly 
applied to the triumph of 1945.
The plot in Miliband was not, however, a 
conspiratorial one. If the leaders were bourgeoisified, 
if party programmes were emasculated, and if conference 
echoed to the cry of betrayal, this was only a symptom of 
a deeper malady, which the left would not begin to 
understand unless they first tried to connect Labour's 
attitude "to wider socio-economic forces which have had a 
determinant influence in shaping the reality of the 
party's role"(130). It was not that past Labour 
governments did not have the political will to impose 
their wishes, although this might (as the self- 
incriminating memoirs of Morrison and others made 
abundantly elear(131)) often have been the case. More 
profoundly, Labour lacked the power to dismantle the
capitalist economy; Willing to control industry and bend 
it to public purposes, the Attlee administration had had 
no real intention of going beyond an administered and 
regulated type of state intervention, enabling it to 
evade the more fundamental issues. The left, weakened by 
constant appeals to loyalty and unity, whilst 
simultaneously clinging to the forlorn hope that the 
parliamentary party could be won for socialism, needed to 
be told it like it was. The Bevan of legend was "the 
most glittering that the labour movement in this century 
has produced"(132), but, even so, his life was a 
"tragedy", full of the imperfections of leftism. The 
real enemy were the Gaitskel1ites and their new-fangled 
liberalism.
A full-length, solidly documented, linear party 
history - which upset a lot of people - allowed Miliband 
to track the creeping^paralysis of 'Labourism'’, feeling 
quite out of sympathy with "a BBC world of minor 
disagreements"(133). He also had something to say to 
those brought up on the McKenzie view. McKenzie had 
attacked a party constitution based on "an archaic 
doctrine of inter-party democracy" which facilitated "the 
perpetuation of internal party disputes". Miliband was 
certain that MacKenzie had missed the point. McKenzie, 
he reasoned, had made it into a structural problem of 
whether or not the Labour party .was democratic, arriving 
at this point by assuming that politics was rightfully 
the province of the elected few, that all party activists 
were extremist, and that the "basic issue" was how the 
one contrived to contain the other. For Miliband it 
was - to reinforce - primarily an ideological matter, to
132. 'The Reluctant Rebel' in Bui let iri of the Society 
or the Study of Labour History} Spring 1963, pp.37-41.
133. 'The Sickness of Labourism', The New Left Review 
January-February 1960, p.8.
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do with "the ideological division between leaders and 
activists" about the party’s ultimate aim. Structure and 
purpose were inseparable.
What Miliband had in mind in the way of ’direct 
action’ as an alternative to parliamentary politics was 
never spelled out. But as a further variation on the 
well-worn leftist theme of social democratic failure,
Eric Hobsbawrn - one CP stalwart who had stayed in the 
party - found it to be entirely effective. "The very 
misrepresentation of Miliband’s book by his critics 
demonstrates their embarrassment", he wrote(134). If 
anything, and much as it was passionately composed, it 
could - Hobsbawrn considered - have been even more 
strongly worded. This was not all. Labour, for all i-ts 
faults, did still have a socialist element, which could 
compete on more or less equal terms, and which "can never 
quite be extinguished". Whether Labour ever could be 
turned into an authentically socialist party the Miliband 
of 1961 - drifting out of the Labour orbit - left an open 
question.
The acrimonious takeover of The New Left Review by a 
newer 'New Left’ grouping in 1963 - spearheaded by Perry 
Anderson and Tom Nairn - had the effect of shunting their 
"archaic", populist colleagues off to one side(135). 
Fashioning a type of high-level theorising, based around 
Gramscian concepts, Anderson and Nairn sought to come to 
terms with the massive proportions of "Labourism" in its 
"historic totality" that others, both in and out of the 
Labour party, had not mar:aged to achieve. They 
introduced a private language of domination and 
subordination, of "vast impersonal forces" and
134. E.J.Hobsbawrn, ’Parliamentary Cretinism?’, The New 
Review. Novembar-Dao.enihar 1961- n,64.
135. B.D.Palmer, The Making of E.P, Thompson; marxism* 
ism arid history (1981), Chapter 4.
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"underlying social determinants" immune to detailed 
refutation(136). The peculiarly weak nature of the 
Labour left, scarred by "an infinity of compromises", had 
to be thought through afresh. Tom Nairn's two-part 
extended thinkpiece on the nature of the Labour party, 
publish as Harold Wilson's government took office in 
October 1964, was an imaginative tour de force{137) .
They were also, and this had to do with age as much 
as approach, free of any emotional attachment to the 
memory of 1945. "Untouched by the afterglow cf the war", 
Anderson explained, "we never knew the popular elan of 
the Forties"(138). Instead they had spent their 
formative years in the "awful decade" following the 
Attlee government, conscious of the paralysis in thinking 
on the left, and convinced that Labour's inner turmoil 
was a sign, not of ideological vigour, but of sterility. 
The 'Old Left' had plainly run out of things to say. The 
adolescent, pedagogic fervour of the Laski, Tawney and 
Cole of the 1930s was no longer of any practical 
use(139). Impressive moral stature could not hide the 
superficiality of their ideas. They had, when all was 
said and done, gone along with the flattering image of 
British political and historical uniqueness. Anglo-
136. P. An’derson, 'Origins of the Present Crisis', The 
New Left Review, January-February 1964, pp. 26-53; T. Nairn, 
'The English Working Class', The New Left Review, March-April, 
p p .43-57.
137. T.Nairn, 'The Nature of the Labour Party', The New 
Left Review, September-October and November-Deeember 1964, pp.
138. Quoted by J.Silverlight, 'Coming to the rescue of 
the free-born Briton', The Observer, 12 April 1981, p.27.
139. G.Stedman-Jones, 'The Pathology of English
History', The New Left Review, November-December 1867, p.37; 
A.Macintyre, 'The Socialism of R.H. Tawney', reprinted i n
Against the Self-Images of the Age (1971), pp.33-42; S.Hatch 
[pseudonym], 'Harold Laski*. An Old Reasoner?' , The New
~R e a s o n e r , Autu mn 1857, p p . 67-76.
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marxism was superseded by a dizzying Euro-marxist 
narrative. There were ’Mew Left* projects which embraced 
a variety of left-wing standpoints, especially when 'Old’ 
and 'Mew5 temporarily came together behind Harold Wilson, 
the "restorer" of Labour's self-belief, in the brief 
revival of 1964-65. But the methodological separation - 
to do with the radical interrogation of history in the 
present - ran deep.
All of this had a direct bearing on the commitment 
to the 'good old cause'" . For Thompson, praising the 
facility and virtuosity of Anderson and Nairn, it was 
their lack of attention to particulars - the essence of 
the historian's vocation - which found them 
wanting(140). High theory was all very well. An 
analytical model of the past was to be welcomed. But it 
should not be used to stretch and pull the historical 
fabric into a preconceived frame. "The real history will 
only disclose itself after much hard research". It was 
incumbent upon them to maintain an openness to evidence. 
Evidence should inform concepts, just as concepts lend 
significance to factual material. There was always the 
danger that facts would be pre-selected to order. But 
without the creative dialectic of model and actuality, 
"intellectual growth cannot take place". They had to 
submit themselves to the logic of the historical 
approach. Moreover, to argue a case was also to take a 
stand against present injustices, not retreat into 
profound obscurity. The programmatic implications of any 
analysis had to be followed through. The politics of the 
"long haul" (Miliband's expression) need not be 
incompatible with the injunction to "get in and push", 
whether it be CND or other organisations. Above all, 
they had to "engage", just because there was to much to
140. E.P.Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English',
The Socialist Register X965} in R. Miliband and J. Saville 
(eds), pp.311-362.
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oppose.
Anderson's reply and counter-attack fastened on to 
Thompson's "pseudo-empiricism"(141). History should - 
this was true - relate to theory, and hack again. But it 
had to be a totalizing account, a drawn-out meditation 
across time and space, not a fragmentary history split up 
by academic specialization. A vapid invocation of "the 
people", backed up by moralistic rhetoric, would not do. 
'Labourism' was cramping the imagination. A new 
socialist strategy had to be developed, abstracted from 
the immediate situation. The theory must be got right. 
Theory must precede action.
Miliband, and John Seville, who had - as he 
confessed - sat "open-mouthed" at the feet of Laski as a 
student before the war (and whom Kingsley Martin, quite 
wrongly, thought was the real author of Parliamentary 
Socialism) formed a new out1et with The Soc ialist 
Register , edited annually from 1964 onwards and in which
Thompson was first given space to strike out at the new
'New Leftists'. Saville rebuked the faithful who 
celebrated the 1945-51 government because of their over- 
sentimental reading of what was accomplished(142). He 
applauded Titmuss's handiwork in taking apart the 
inflated claims about the post-war redistribution of 
income and wealth, but pointed out that another 
conclusion could also be made: Labour's leading 
ideologists of the 1950s, heralding the advent of the 
'post-capitalist' society which Crosland had continued to
141. P.Anderson, 'Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism', The 
New Left Review, January-February 1966, pp2-42.
142. J.Saville, 'Labourism and the Labour Government',
The Socialist Register 1967, R. Miliband and J. Saville feds) 
(1967), pp.43-71.
propagate, had got carried away(142). Labour was a 
coalition - the pluralists were right. But it was one 
which the left might join but never lead. Attlee's 
alleged 'left-of-centre' views was a piece of 
misinformation. The left ought not to be afraid to look 
back for fear of being shown to have been wrong. The 
destruction of Tribunite legend, the stripping away of 
fanciful illusions and alibis, Saville regarded as an 
unavoidable first- step toward a reinterpretation of 
British history in marxist terms, a political rather than 
just a high-flown marxism. By the time of the Hay Day 
Manifesto (1968), Miliband's Parliamentary 1 "s / * ~ “Z* I T C * TV* -i. Cl -i- JL w  iiJ •
along with Thompson's 'Revolution Again', were already 
established as key texts in the New Left denunciation of 
Wilson's first and second terms in office. The Old 'New 
Left' enjoyed a second wind.
The distinction which Thompson made between marxism 
as a living tradition and marxism as (in his rendering) a 
sectarian method - a distinction between marxisms - made 
it difficult to talk in any^well-defined way about a 
'school' of Anglo-marxists as such. Others preferred, in 
Eric Hobsbawrn's phrase, to think of a family of 
interpretations, emphasizing 'history from below', the 
importance of social class and human agency, and, joining 
them to other historians welcoming the retreat of 
conservative ideas, a generalized belief in constructive 
progress in history(144). It is possible to argue that 
their similarities outweighed any differences, since they 
all shared the conviction that history was pre-eminently 
political, and that in understanding the turn of events 
one had to look beyond the superstructure of the state to
143. 'Labour and Income Redistribution’, The Socialist 
n gister 1965, R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds)(1965), pp.147-
Q
144. E .J .Hobsbawm, 'Progress in History', Marxism Today , 
February 1962, pp44-48.
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the power relations in the economy and society. The 
dearth of interpretative theories they ascribed precisely 
to a neglect of, especially but not exclusively, class as 
a determining factor in social change. It was this 
assertion of the primacy of a priori presuppositions over 
the specific and the particular which non-marxists found 
hardest to accept. But if was in these terms that the 
originality of the "c lie ;1 ive c nti ibution" of British 
marxist historians has been valued, in not only 
influencing the writing of history but also in attempting 
to alter the entire conception of the historical 
process(145). Examination of the concept of 
’Labourism' - an explanatory tool in the politics of 
Labour as well as the debilitating ailment of Labour 
politics - points up where marxist and non-marxist paths 
intersected and diverged.
Labour History
When The Society for the Study of Labour History 
came into existence in 1960, its links with the giants of 
the past, were clearly secured. Tawney was invited, but 
declined, to be the Society’s first Chairman. A volume 
of essays dedicated ~ in the event posthumously - to the 
grand old man of Labour history, Douglas Cole, had just- 
been completed(146). Files passed on by Margaret Cole 
to John Saville were to form the basis of the multi- 
decker Dictionary of Labour Biography (1972 etc). In an 
opening address to the Society, Asa Briggs*- already the 
author of several acclaimed recent histories - praised 
the earlier contributions made by the Webbs and the 
Hammonds, before going on to map out suggested lines of
145. H.J.Kaye, The British Marxist Historians (1984), 
p.231.
146. A.Briggs and J.Saville (eds), Essays in Labour 
History (I960).
future research and the preservation rpl til i lw-
historical records(147). Traditionalists were said to 
regard the subject as dubious and unworthy, as an avenue 
for special pleading(148). To become fully 
established, as Briggs pointed out, it was imperative to 
maintain the highest scholarly standards. At the same 
time, much of the earliest and -most outstanding work had 
been carried out outside the universities, written in an 
untutored, radical spirit. By the end of its second 
year, however, membership of the Society already had a 
pronounced academic learning. Most -though not all - 
subscribers were in bread sympathy with the left, 
including a strong 'New Left" contingent, so that from 
its earliest days the Society "brought together scholars 
from the old committed tradition with scholars who find 
this commitment strange or even improper"(149).
Many of the pitfalls of Labour history were 
technical ones. Archival sources were patchy, either 
through carelessness or out of reticence, some of those 
approached exhibiting "an aversion to publicity which 
almost rivals that of the bureaucracy at 
Whitehal1"(150). The whole field was encrusted with 
mythological beliefs about the past of Labour - 
unravelling these might lead to unpalatable conclusions. 
And there was no immediately identifiable scope to the
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institutions and leaders of the labour movement was 
increasingly offset by the counterattractions of class
147. Eul let i ti o f t he S o c i e i y f o r t h e S t u d y o f L a b a u r 
History, No.1 1960, p.3.
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150. F.Bealey and H.Felling, Labour and Politics 
1900-1906 (1958), p.vii.
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The unimaginative orthodoxy of labour history was an 
early bone of contention. Royden Harrison had, for 
example, been driven to distraction by the balancing of 
platitudes in Ben Roberts’s study of the early 
TUC(151). Stedman Jones complained, in dealing with 
Roberts and Magnificent Journey by Francis Williams, of a 
plebisn variant of the onwards and upwards of the Whig 
interpretation of history - "Cole and his followers", he 
added, "applied much the same approach to the history of 
trade unions and Labour movements that their predecessors 
had applied to the history of the constitution"(152). 
Roberts, on the other hand, was more interested in 
relating the past history and role of organised labour in 
the virgin field of industrial relations. He has 
attested to the importance of Goldstein's work on the 
Transport and General Workers Union (written after 
prompting from Laski, in 1952) which gave a disquieting 
description of widespread apathy, high membership 
turnover, and ballot box malpractices by an inner circle 
in the running of one London branch of the union, and 
which created a fuss at Transport House(153). Roberts 
had once been of the view that business-union conflict 
need not preclude a common interest in responsible 
behaviour, but that, as public concern mounted in the 
1950s, the unions should look to reform their own 
practices before the state was drawn in to imposing 
changes on them. Influenced by Bassett, Robbins and 
Oakeshott, he warned, in one of the first pamphlets from
151. R.Harrison, 'Practical Capable Man', in The New 
Reasoner , Autumn 1958, pp.105-119.
152. G. Stedman Jones, lThe Patholog:^ of English
History', The New Left Review, November-December 1967,
153. J .Go1dstein, The Government of Eritish Trade Unions
a study of apathy a nd the democratic proc ess in t h e
Transport and Genera I Norkers Union (1952).
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the Institute of Economic Affairs, that the modern union 
movement voj]d have - sooner rather than later - to face 
up tc the full, coercive implications of socialist 
ideology(154), his writings a perfect foil to the 
meticulous studies of strong but musclebound unionism 
prepared (when, Roberts wrote, the author was talking in 
a more serious vein that he did in Tribune) by V. L.
Allen, a former bricklayer and WEA student who held a 
research post in the Sociology Department at the 
LSE(155). It was Allen’s personal background in the 
unions, allied to his wide-ranging talks with former 
ministers and trade unionists, which most impressed 
reviewers, as in his recounting - using General Council 
minutes - of strains between the Labour party and senior 
union leaders in the run-up to the 1945 election. His 
accounts were written, it was said, "from the inside", by 
someone who knew their way around. The expression was a 
significant one. To be active, and not just interested, 
to be "of" and "for" the interests of Labour, was a badge 
of allegiance, entitling the holder to enlist in the 
democracy of the committed, from whence the distaste - as 
labour history opened up and diversified - for its 
growing professionalization. In its extreme form, it 
meant that only some could claim to be writing on 
Labour’s behalf. But this feeling of identification was 
not universal, or even considered inescapable. Briggs 
could commend Alan Bullock, Arthur Peakin’s (second) 
choice as the biographer of Ernest Bevin, for very 
different reasons:
"Apart from the novelty of the scale [of
154. Tr 3 Qe Union s iTi 3 Fr ee Soc ie>ty (1960 \ _
155. V . L. Allen, Po m .rr.-r n Ty Q t~f y> fjTi i o ns — a S t Lid\// o f ■hh e i r
o rgan izatio Ti i n Gr eat Br x4-c3i Ti f\ _1954) ; Tr ad e Un ion
(. ea <:l er s h x p b as e d o n 3 StLId y of Ar t h ur De a k i n (195 7 ); a ai i
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of this volume - the independence of the 
author. In many quarters the idea of such 
historiographical independence has long been 
suspect. The labour movement, it is claimed, 
can only be understood from within. Sympathy is 
no substitute for participation ... Mr Bullock 
has never been an ' insider*, and his own social 
background is quite difference from that of his 
subject. He has never been drawn far into the
world which he describes in this volume. On the
whole he makes good use of his 
independence"(156).
Bullock, in point of fact, had picked up a great 
deal about the way union business was conducted by 
attending several TUC and TGWU conferences. He had the 
good luck to see Bevin's use of the block vote to 
frustrate a- conference majority in December 1944(157).
But it was on the strength of his track record as a 
biographer that he had been asked to undertake Bevin's 
L if e .
Henry Felling, a student of Brogan at Cambridge and 
another founding member of the SSLH, also belonged with
those thought cf as having carved out "an area of
research rather than a type of commitment"(158). He 
was economical and workmanlike, not a 'worker- 
intellectual ’. History was to be found'in the detail, in
156. A. Briggs, 'Bevin and the Movement', The New
Statesman, 19 March 1960, p.419.
157. A.Bullock , letter to the author dated 9 April
1988.
158. Social Science Research Council, 
Economic and Social History (1971), p.77.
Research in
the facts so far as they could be authenticated (and 
Felling did all his own research), not in unwieldy 
abstractions. Labour^s origins were far less explicable 
in terms of socialist principle than Cole, for one, had 
made out. Nor could Fabian self-publicizing be allowed 
to pass. It was simply not very helpful to regard the 
Labour party as an ideological vessel. The final verdict 
on the rise of Labour could still be a favourable one, as 
Bealey - his co-author - put it; the mistake was to 
overdo t h e ."deliberateness" of its leaders* thoughts and 
actions. The remarkably wide and diverse range of 
motives and interests, and the success with which these 
disparate features were knocked into shape were of far 
greater note.
All the same, Pelling - and this was where some of 
Brogan's vigilance rubbed off on him - was not unused to 
controversy. He spent a year on sabbatical at the 
University of Wisconsin, the home of the school of 
American labour history, producing out of this American 
Labour and more pertinently America arid the British Left, 
which traced (with the help of Epstein) a line of descent 
from nineteenth century "aristocratic" to twentieth 
century "radical" attacks on America(159). Left­
wingers like Laski who had a prejudiced attitude came in 
for particular reproach. Pelling then attempted to bring 
the history of the British Communist Party out of the 
shadows, lending credence to many popularly-held 
suspicions about Soviet manipulation(160). Accused in 
The New Reasoner of "cold war trespassing" by John 
Saville (who had only just left the CPGB) Pelling stood 
his ground, countering that "Mr Saville is still too much 
of the politician that he cannot distinguish between a
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historical statement and a political judgement"(161).
"It is, of course, very difficult to be objective about 
problems of recent history", he granted. "But does Mr 
Seville's review suggest that he is a good judge of 
objectivity?". This was to be followed by a chapter in 
the American book of the Month Club The strategy of 
Deception, the gist of which was that Labour's federal 
structure and union connection made for vulnerability to 
far left infiltration(162). His slim compression of 
Modern Britain (1960) showed much cause for national 
satisfaction.
A brief, undramatic history of the Labour party, 
thereafter regularly updated, was similarly 
disregarding(163). Having locked horns with Robert 
McKenzie, Pelling rectified, with the historian's natural 
aversion to model—building, the picture of the true state 
of affairs in the 1930s when Labour — more than at any 
other time - had been "the General Council's party in 
Parliament. But, as recent work by Harrison and Allen 
had indicated, neither arm of the 'movement' - he too was 
much taken with the word - behaved monolithically. The 
ties that bound the parliamentary and trade union leaders 
at important junctures in the past, giving them effective 
control over the movement's many arms and wings, could 
not but be the principal theme - otherwise it was all but 
Impossible to explain how and by whom the party was 
actually 'run'. McKenzie's book, although of "great 
value", dealt with this "inadequately", he warned the
161. Letter in The Mew Re asoner . Autumn 1959 
r-,v, inq_nn
Trade Unions' in The Strategy of Deception } J,
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163. A Short History of the Labour Party (1961
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unwary readerf164}. Pelling also thought Miliband 
unhealthily "opinionated’' (sic) ; and his notion of the 
Labour left "i1I-defined"(165}. The essence of the 
party-union relationship he then filled out in the to-be- 
standard A /•/ i s t a r y o f B r i t i s h Trade U n ion ism (1963), a 
pull-together of secondary literature and studies of 
individual trade unions, rigidly historical in method and 
painting a portrait of a union movement acted upon as 
much as freely acting - a work composed without any 
desire "to influence what is happening now or in the 
future"(166), and tilting to the right the centre of 
gravity, as Pollard put it, of “this predominantly left- 
wing branch of historiography"(167). With A.J.P.
Taylor, he faulted him on factual grounds (for Pelling 
the; worst sort of offence), implying that entertainment 
should always take second place to accuracy. A succinct 
and astringent entry on the Trades Onion Congress was 
published in the Encyclopedia Britannica, at Roberts’s 
invitation. And the innate "good sense" of the ordinary 
working class Pelling then championed in a challenging 
book of essays(168), comparing popular attitudes to 
welfare and social change in 1900 and 1945 and noting 
some resistance to state action, a climate of 
indifference and xenophobia, and the slow formation of a 
class-conscious outlook, these traits together - in 
Pelling’s view - marking a shift from an attitude of 
revolt to one of passivity. None of these results were
164. Letter in The New Statesman, 7 July 1961,
P
165. Review in Political Studies, Vol.10 1962,
p.110.
166. A. Briggs, 'Ancient. City’, The New Statesman , 1 
N overrib e r 19 6 3, p . 6 2 0.
167. S. Pollard in History, 49 1964, p.101.
168. H.M. Pelling, Popular 
Late Victor i an Britain (19 68).
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likely to endear him to the left.
Describing without overtly taking sides, but mildly 
Labourish, Felling's meticulous, almost pedantic 
assembling of evidence did not mean that his prose was 
unobjectionably transparent. There was plenty of 
criticism, leftwards of Pelling, that charting the 
party's rise was also in some tacit sense to confer 
approval (a more unscholarly attitude Pelling could not 
imagine), and that the 'right-wing' emphasis on 
organization and machinery was to be regretted. Often, 
however, he was most revealing when reviewing the work of 
others. He would admit to errors of fact. He would not 
allow his standing as an historian first and foremost to 
be slighted(169).
The writings of Pelling, set alongside the 'Anglo- 
marxists', and this was true of the SSLH even in its 
early days, put the opposing values of political 
commitment and professional detachment at their sharpest. 
The 'New Left', in its various guises, was impatient, 
explicit, emphatic, and bound up with an historical and 
ideological project for which Miliband's book on 
Par 1iamentary Socialism was the last word{170).
Pelling - the exemplary scholar's scholar — was 
conventional, austere by design, starting out free from 
preconceptions, of a piece with the English empirical 
approach referred to quite genuinely by Brogan(171), 
above all, with no axe to grind, and an illustrator of 
the case best advanced calmly instead of outspokenly. He
169. See the exchange of letters with E. Genovese
in The Times Literary Supplement, 19 November (p.1457)
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170. 'Draft statement for May Day', May Day
Manifesto Committee, microfilm archive in the British
Library.
171. D.W.Brogan, ibid, August 1946, p.205.
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deployed these sttri buten in the field of labour history 
in the same way as in any other field, their deployment 
indeed being all the more important here. He set a 
standard by which all others were appraised. There was 
with Pelling a past to he unearthed, separate and apart 
from whatever one thinks of it, a history — in Acton’s 
ideal — independent of historians. With Pelling we reach 
the threshold of contemporary history, of history in its 
own time but academically objectified.
Contemporary History
Modernists, treating the modern period as a fit 
object of historical concern, first grew in numbers 
during and shortly after the Great War, when people were 
"thrown back upon the past" in search of the origin of 
recent troubles(172). The commercial success and 
'irresponsible' debunking of historical popularisers - 
like H.G. Wells and Lytton Strachey - added to the 
impetus. But contemporary history, according to one of 
its earliest detractors, only really began to flourish 
shortly after the end of the Second World War when the 
general public became more than ever before "history 
conscious"(173). Even though the edited documents on 
inter—war diplomacy then being published were hardly 
regarded as absolutely reliable, and the intrusion of 
moral judgements was all too evident, the clamour for 
topicality had proved irresistible, distracting serious 
scholars from their proper tasks. In due course, the 
author argued, this would reduce "the power of real 
history to pierce deep to the marrow of things". The 
pitfalls of officially-inspired history were no less
172. C.H.Williams, introduction to ihe Ho darn
Historian (1338), ppll-32.
173. B. Williams, '"Some Aspects of Contemporary
History’, The Cambridge Journal, September 1949, p.738.
apparent.. Because contemporary history - of all 
histories - was the most liable to drastic reshaping, to 
"large-scale structural revision", as first impressions 
slowly gave way to more mature reflection, so it was to 
be the least trusted(174). All too often the mistake 
was made of allowing present-day preoccupations and 
interests to determine a view of the recent, not yet 
fully historical past. It need not necessarily be a case 
of obvious partisanship, although the pernicious effects 
of committed writing were always a risk. It was more a 
matter of taking care to avoid "reading the past 
backwards"(175) or unwittingly allowing transient 
fashions to ensnare the researcher. The argument moved 
perceptibly on to the territory of the historian. This 
had been the gist of Butterfield's objection to E.H. 
Carr's Trevelyan lectures - that he had overlooked the 
discipline of training oneself to transcend the opinions 
of the moment. Without a ready-laid deposit of 
accumulated historical reflections, the modern historian 
was more than likely to be swayed by the passing show. 
There were clear dangers in this kind of history becoming 
too popular. Contemporary history, one young scholar was 
advised, ought not to be studied(176).
The availability of source material was anyway 
haphazard. Private papers were subject to the law of 
copyright, and also usually a lengthy embargo.
Otherwise, access was granted according to the discretion 
of the holders, leading to accusations of favouritism.
174. H.Butterfield, 'Official History: its pitfalls 
and criteria', reprinted in History and Human Relations 
(1951), p.210.
175. M .Oakesh ott, Rat iona Iism in PoIitics (19 62),
p. 47.
176. D.C.Watt, 'Contemporary History: problems and 
perspectives'. Journal of the Society of Archivists, 
October 1969, p.512.
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With the public records, an informal fifty year rule 
operated. The problem was the lack of an agreed and 
consistent policy covering all archives. The position 
was only formalized in the Public Records Act of 1958, 
which laid down a statutory fifty-year rule, the matter 
to be looked at again after five years or so. The 
restrictive time period was justified on the grounds of 
"the preservation of unselfconsciousness" on the part of 
ministers and officials in the drafting of Cabinet and 
departmental papers(177) .
Apparent breaches of this rule - most notably in the 
memoirs of Anthony Eden - led to the forming of a 
campaign by a group of historians from Oxford, Cambridge 
and London universities calling for a reduction in the 
closed period. Complaints were made that governments put 
"endless obstructions" in the way of scholars, while 
documents were spirited away by outgoing ministers.
After the elapsing of half a century, all that would be 
left was "dead knowledge". It might be that civil 
servants were being spared from embarrassment over, to 
take one example, the background to the Munich agreement. 
But silence, H.G. Nicholas (a noted Americanist and 
author of the second Nuffield election study) pointed 
out, meant that "our first version goes by default", 
leaving the door open to foreign researchers(178). 
Journalists, meanwhile undeterred, would carry on rushing 
into print with uninstructed, inaccurate and misleading 
but profitable accounts(179). If recent history was 
going to be written, come what may, it should at least be 
handled professionally.
177. R.Rhodes-James, 7 The Fifty-Year Rule', The
Spectator , 21 August 1964, pp.233-234.
178. The Times, 11 Julv 1964. r.R.
179. Eg. L.Mosley, The Last Days of the British Rai 
(1961).
85
Although the argument was addressed in the first 
place to the pre-1939 and wartime period, these 
strictures also applied with no less force to the state 
of the literature on early post-war Britain. Attlee, 
Shinwell, Morrison and Dalton, uninformative as many of 
them were, had scooped the pool ("Did you see he 
[Morrison] left £28,000!! How did he manage to acquire so 
much?" Attlee exclaimed in 1965(180)). There were no 
British sources to match the insider accounts of Byrnes 
or Forrestal; nor was it easy for writers who were not 
hand-picked or * friends of the family' to overcome the 
reservations of relatives. An unadventurousness in 
seeking out other archival material only began to be put 
right when the Nuffield project to locate and list the 
whereabouts of papers of prominent politicians and 
political organizations started life - with SSRC money — 
in 1967-68. Mitchell had shown, from a particular angle, 
what could be achieved, which was why Pritt's 
unreconstructed Stalinism was such a let-down(181).
To cap it all, the Britain of 1945 had taken on something 
of a remote look, almost forgotten and yet to emerge out 
of a "curious obscurity", which even novelists had had a 
hard time re-creating. Historians were slow to exploit 
the possibilities, and in no position to compete with the 
"massed typewriters" of North America(182).
180. Letter to Arthur Moyle, in K. Harris, ibid 
(1982), p.560.
181 D.N.Pritt, The Labour Government 1945-51
(1963). Pritt's was an historical curio which, along with 
his three volumes of autobiography, contained the views 
of an 'Independent' Labour MP who was also an 
unreconstructed and unrepentant fellow-traveller of the 
Soviet Union. His history disseminated the post-1948 
Moscow 'line' calling for outright condemnation of Labour 
for its anti-Soviet dealings, even though he had - in 
1945 - tried to re-join the party and voted for the 1945 
American loan.
182 S.Eunciman, A History of the Crusades (1951), 
preface.
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There was one compensating advantage which 
contemporary historians did have and which Alan Bullock, 
one of their number, was exploiting to the utmost. 
'History’ and ’politics', in his view, could not be 
separated by the mechanical application of a fifty-year 
rule. History was defined more by its method than its 
subject matter, a method just as useful in exploring 
recent events as distant ones (although, in this case, 
the "precocious disillusionment" of the Age of Austerity 
essays had not appealed to him<183)). Moreover, as he 
had found with his life of Bevin, which he was midway 
through, he had had the opportunity to question and 
cross-examine participants in the incidents he was 
describing:
"How much would the historian of the 
Nineteenth century not give to be able to 
question Metternich or Cavour, as — to take a 
personal example - I have been able to discuss 
with Lord Attlee the history of the post-war 
Labour government..."(184)
The great value of oral evidence, in Bullock’s mind, 
was that it taught the historian to be sceptical of 
written sources (these were plentiful in the case of 
Bevin) and this at a time when the argument was still to 
be heard that good history required full access to all 
the records. Bassett had made a point of not talking to 
the survivors of 1931(185). Norton Medlicott, charged 
with the documents on British Foreign Policy series, and
183. A.Bullock, ’Only Yesterday’, The Spectator, 1 
November 1963, p.564.
184. A.Bullock, ’Is it Possible to Write 
Contemporary History?’, in 0n the Track of Tyranny
e s s a y p r e s e n t e tf t o L G , M o n t e f i o r e , M . B e 1 o f f 
(ed) (I960), p.69.
185. R.Bassett, 1931 - Political Crisis (1958).
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Bassett's next-door-neighbour at the LSE, was by contrast 
a keen enthusiast for making contact with living 
witnesses, and using what was divulged — in conjunction 
with whatever other material was available - to provide 
"the first orderly and objective analysis of public 
events", the first rough draft of history(186). The 
practice of interviewing was, for some, the 
distinguishing feature about the study of the 
contemporary past(187).
That contemporary history presented a special 
problem to more traditionally-based historians was 
underlined by the unsettling effect of other voguish 
trends which threatened to do away with the conventional 
understandings of history. Developments in philosophy had 
called into question any assurance the historian could 
have in knowing an historical description to be true in a 
watertight, objective sense, without value-laden notions 
being consciously or inadvertently smuggled in. And 
social science — in its diverse forms - seemed to be 
predicated on the assumption that all constructive 
research, however esoteric or antiquarian, ought - if it 
was to have any use - to be guided by considerations of 
social relevance. The general fissiparousness of arts 
subjects contributed to the disorientation of older 
disciplines, history included, weakening their capacity 
to establish accepted orthodoxies. One consequence was a 
spate of books justifying history's old ways.
Antipathy to sociological theorising, to history-by- 
thesis, helps to explain in part how little use was made
186. W. N.Medlicott, introduction to A Reader's 
Guide to Contemporary History, in B. Krikler and W 
Laqueur (eds)(1972), ppl-12.
187. J.Barnes, 'Teaching and Research in British 
Contemporary History', in D.C. Watt (ed), Contemporary 
History in Europe (1969), p .4 0.
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by historians of the very substantial body of social 
science research on 1945-51 that by now existed. Even 
one of the best known examples, McKenzie's study, was 
felt to have been far too quickly hailed as a classic, 
while Beer's Modern British Pol it ics was not reviewed in 
any of the major historical journals. Pelling was the 
only one to take McKenzie at his word, and that was in 
order to point up the severe limitations of his argument. 
It was the historian’s truth — or conceit — that it was 
wrong to try and make history scientific. Besides which, 
historians already had what they took to be a well 
understood idea of sociology and politics, made up of 
narratives and episodes, which they saw no need to 
relinquish(188). Hence the declaration by Geoffrey 
Elton, in his pronouncements in 1970, that "old- 
fashioned" political history, because of its essential 
attention to the chronological storyline (and political 
history above all tells a story) must take precedence 
over any other form of history - history "need not stop 
there, but unless it starts there, it will not start at 
all“(189). The political side of the past needs to be 
known first. More crudely put, the historian’s job was 
to tell the social scientists when to shut up. The need, 
therefore, was to confront the new rivals by defining 
some principles of good practice and by reiterating the 
common, agreed criteria about the aim, validity and 
methods of historical study to which, as Max Beloff 
argued, "most of the historical profession would give 
assent"(190). His own preference, following David 
Thomson's Aims of History guidebook, was to re-emphasise 
the autonomy of history, by which he meant "the proper
188. D.Thomson, The Aims of History (1969), pp.79-
80.
189. G.E.Elton, Politica1 History - princip1es and 
practice (1970), Chapter 1.
"1 Q  P i M  "P. Ca 1 O  * f  "p * 0 VS T r i  V  *5 n  -p ]->  f S l  1 +■ P  <r* 4- ^j. sy . a-j . a.- v j. u 1 x j CVLyl-J ^ l* “ x c-x *-• tv 3
E Ti C  O  U Ti t G I" , 0 C t Ob6 T 1969, P . 4 3 .
89
freedom of historical inquiry from any subservience to a 
particular national or party objective". This was a 
characteristic, he went further, that held good - 
irrespective of schools or approaches - for "the Western 
intellectual community" as a whole.
The standard of measure was not one by which many 
would be excluded. Even so enthusiastic an advocate of 
the new history as Arthur Warwick, writing a lively book 
about the state of the art of history, had no difficulty 
in showing how variety and conflict contributed to the 
sense of dynamic, developing subject reaching out towards 
an enhanced understanding(191). But along with this
went a much less exalted view of a historian's
obligations- Writing about events that had recently 
occurred did not mean that all hope of objective 
discussion had to be set aside. Objectivity was still an
ideal worth aspiring to, even if it was not thought to be
largely attainable(192). Belief in "absolute truth" 
no longer held sway, as the editor of the pilot issue of 
The Journal of Contempor ar y History expressed it in 
1967(193). Bias could, in some circumstances, even be 
beneficial. It was possible to be too coldly detached. 
Commitment was really a non-problem. There was no reason 
why historians need be so disagreeable. With the era of 
1945-51 just becoming historical, it was now up to the 
contemporary historian, casting around for sources, short 
of perspective, and aware that his or her account could 
only be pi-ovisional, to be the first to construct a 
framework which colleagues and successors "must either
191. A.Marwick, The Nature of History (1970).
192. R.Morgan, 'The Writing and Teaching of 
Contemporary History - the historian speaks', in Since 
1945 - aspects of contemporary n o r 1d h i s t o r y , J.L. 
Henderson (ed)(1966), pp.11-24.
193. Editorial note, The Journa 2 of Contemporary 
History , Vol 1 No. 1 (1866 ), p .iv.
follow or controvert"(194).
1) General histories
One manifestation of the student-led popularity of 
contemporary history was the publication of several 
textbook surveys or ’general histories’ of Britain in the 
modern era. The main purpose of these general texts was 
to provide a lucid, balanced and dependable one-volume 
overview (often the last in a commissioned series) of the 
profound changes which Britain had undergone since the 
turn of the century, picking out an overriding theme or 
set of themes around which to construct the narrative 
flow.
General histories of this type do several things. 
They bring to a wider public the recent labours of 
historians, summarising the current state of research. 
They show how different phases or periods relate to one 
another, drawing attention to passages of continuity and 
discontinuity. They indicate the principal points of 
contention and the areas where issues are still 
outstanding. Because the problems of emphasis and 
selection are magnified, general histories also call for 
the strictest standards of critical training - openness, 
scepticism, a lack of dogmatism and never coming to the 
point with the mind already made up. It is through 
general histories that an orthodox aecoynt of the past is 
established and confirmed. They present a distillation 
of wide reading and rumination, all things considered and 
at a given stage in historical understanding.
194 C. L,Mowat, Great Britain Since 1914 (1971), pp.16—
17.
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It follows however that general histories, being so 
evidently products of their day, are always provisional, 
written in the certain knowledge that they will have to 
stand up to the disintegrating effects of later 
discoveries. This applies equally to points of detail 
and to the larger interpretative frame, the latter often 
deriving its force from prevailing political interests 
and preoccupations. It is these transitory influences 
which so clearly date a work. A Whig outlook is said to 
have coloured the histories of Victorian and Edwardian 
England, imparting to the narrative a stately advance in 
the unfolding of liberty and good government, aided by a 
happy blending of traditional institutions and national 
character. Other later writers, in the search for low 
motives or class struggle, did attempt to disturb the 
picture of unique progress. Although given to liberal 
despair by the disruptive impact of war and crisis in 
Europe, historians of a middling disposition were still 
inclined to regard the coming mass democracy and the 
growth in the scale of government as only the latest 
stage in a consoling success story, validating the 
British way of life, and vindicating - during and after 
World War Two - British values. Admiration for Crown, 
parliament and the common law protection of individual 
rights was joined to a welcoming for the enlargement of 
socio-economic rights guaranteed by the extended state.
In this way, Britain's diminishing world status and 
economic power could be balanced against its exceptional 
social stability and domestic social hairmony over the 
same time span. All were confident if chastened 
progressives.
An important assumption of the general histories 
written in the nineteen sixties - therefore - was that 
the main historical outlines of post-war British history,
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expressed in a kind of revamped Whiggery, were already 
evident and unlikely to be greatly altered. Even 
starting from scratch (since the bulk of what primary 
source material there was was often of the wrong sort), 
the impress of reduced foreign standing but social 
improvement at home, the rise of Labour combined with 
long periods of Conservative rule, and the binding of 
State, nation and people into an indissoluble whole, were 
truths which no serious historian could disregard. New 
imperatives operated, largely outside Britain's control, 
which there was little point in getting worked up about. 
Post-war governments had done the best they could, in 
testing conditions and with creditable results, in 
keeping with British traditions of gradualism and 
amelioration. Particular failures were excusable. The 
public rivalries of those years ought not to deceive.
All the bitterest controversies, which had decided 
Britain's fate, belonged to the years prior to 1945. The 
prosperity of the 1950s had pushed the war and immediate 
post-war period even further into a strange and 
unfamiliar past of discomfort and scarcity, before the 
onset of abundance; the war, as Sissons and French 
pointed out, had only really ended in 1951. It was left 
to the general historian - adopting the tone of cool 
(though not entirely non-judgemental) detachment - to 
recount events within his or her own lifetime which now 
meant very little to a younger audience. Praise from 
reviewers testified to the success they had In pulling 
off what, because the making of the new .Britain was 
closest in time, should have been the hardest to convey.
But reactions to A.J.P. Taylor's rousing, "populist" 
British history brought to life the question of the 
appropriateness of the received ideas of praiseworthy 
liberal advance. Wary of sliding into marxism, too much
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had been made of the virtue of Olympian
objectivity(195). The commonplace verities of British 
orderliness and civility were no substitute for a 
rigorous treatment of the social forces making for and 
holding back national advances. A contented account 
encouraged the exclusion of more disturbing alternatives, 
hindering necessary historical reappraisal. The textbook 
authors of a liberal descent could always argue that 
those taking a contrary view were allowing doctrinaire 
considerations to get the better of their judgement.
More radical historians, unencumbered by the objectivist 
ideal, saw a very different past leading up to the 
present.
ii) War
A second - and more telling - demonstration of the 
advent of contemporary history came with the 'Home Front' 
controversy, the first self-consciously historical debate 
to touch on post-1945 Britain. Its purely historical 
characteristics were several.
It had, above all else, a genuine historical problem 
to address: the civil and not just the military impact of 
war, and particularly the Second World War, on British 
society, which the general historians (Taylor included) 
had left hanging in the air. Did the war interrupt, or 
did it accelerate, Britain's long-run development? To 
what extent did the events of wartime dictate the course 
of post-war politics? How did Britain make the 
transition from the thirties to the forties? Asking such 
questions prompted a clear debating move on from the 
origins of the war - recently revived in the early 60s —
195. J.H.Plumb (ed), Crisis: in the Humanities
(1964), p.37.
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"to its immediate and 1 nnger-tenc economic and social 
effects. But they also signalled a rolling backwards in 
time from the six-year struggle of the Attlee governments 
on to the war years, the importance of which the earlier 
literature had largely obscured. There was a growing 
impression that what had happened after the war could not 
be understood without a fuller appreciation of wartime. 
This shift of interest had implications for both 
historical periodisation and ideas of causation.
War ~ in all its aspects - also had considerable 
cross-disciplinary appeal. Military historians, 
concerned with the conduct and campaigning of war, were 
joined by students of political history, covering 
leadership, coalition politics and public opinion, and 
economic history, looking upon war as an economic event. 
Most strikingly, the social history of war enjoyed 'pop* 
status (the first chair in social history was created in 
1967). War was recognized as having been crucial in the 
impetus for social reform, and ways were found to link 
the world of ideas of social reformers to the world of 
practical politics. Where a sociological influence was 
strongest, this encouraged the writing of history to a 
theory, and an attempt to attain a comprehensive 
understanding of the general relationship between war and 
social change in modern times. Not surprisingly, each of 
these approaches gave primacy to a different set of 
explanatory factors - even to the conviction that it was 
not the business of the historian to "explain" anything 
at all. Differences of interpretation often corresponded 
with rival kinds of history.
The history of the Home Front, finally, reflected 
the attitudes and assumptions of historians. Older 
scholars took the Whiggish view of war as a nasty,
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ruinous interlude. More junior colleagues, by (often 
radical) upbringing and outlook children in the 1930s and 
1940s, tended to took more at the constructive 
consequences of the conflict, to the good which came out 
of it, and - in some cases - to the thwarting of this 
energy with the coming peace. A new historical 
generation grew up less awestruck by figures of the past, 
and more insistent that history and social studies should 
serve a 'social purpose'. Taylor's much—quoted final 
passage ('England Arise') sat easily alongside the lyrics 
from 'Eleanor Rigby'(196). Contrasting attitudes were 
also very much age-related.
These characteristics help to account for the 
initial positions in the 'Home Front' discussion; they 
cannot be expected to have determined the direction which 
that discussion took. The fundamental test of the 
historicity of contemporary history could only be shown 
by the readiness of historians to observe the critical 
techniques and practices constituting historical 
inquiry(197). A model of the way historical reasoning 
works and historical argument typically proceeds was 
well-established, and was indeed being forcefully 
restated in response to various attacks throughout the 
1960s. The controlling logic and standards of the 
discipline of history, with its close attention to 
methods and evidence, dictates that, however a 
controversy may have originally started out, and whatever 
the attitudes involved, discussion will^eventually settle 
down to a detailed examination of their respective 
strengths and weaknesses. This does not mean that all
196, See Writing in England Today, K.Miller (ed)
(I960) .
197. M.Oakesbott, 'Historiography' in A Spectator 
Mi seel I any (1956), pp.32-34,
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viewpoints have to converge; it does mean that they are 
limited by, and have to be consistent with, a growing 
body of evidence. In so doing, the original 
predispositions (without which the opening questions 
might never have been posed) became incidental; they 
cease in time to matter. Recognition of bias is not then 
an insurmountable difficulty but a necessary step by 
which its effects are to be overcome. History - as a 
result - although the product of each historian, is also 
the common property of all(198). The authority of an 
historical account does not rely on the scrupulous care 
of individual historians; it resides in the processes of 
historical inquiry. Objectivity enters history through 
the common dialogue of its practitioners. It remained 
for contemporary historians to show that contemporary 
history was subject to, and definable by, the same sort 
of methodological conditions applying to history as a 
whole, whatever the particular subject matter or 
proximity to the present. The debate about Britain and 
the Second World War provided that first opportunity.
iii) H.M.S.O: the history of peacetime events
The lobbying efforts of the Oxford-Cambridge-London 
campaigners were crowned with some success when, in March 
1967 and in fulfilment of an election pledge by the 
Labour party, the Fifty Year moratorium on the disclosure 
of State papers was reduced to thirty years, suddenly 
bringing the recent, documented past within historical 
reach. The Prime Minister, Harold Wilson - for one - 
instead of, as had been suggested, wanting to live down 
some of his enthusiastic outpourings as a junior minister 
under Attlee, was only to anxious to be around to answer
198, G,Elton, The Practice of History (1967)
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his critics when the time came. There were also 
advantages to be had in advertising what an earlier stint 
of majority Labour rule had accomplished. At the same 
time, as well, the government announced its intention to 
extend the officially-sponsored histories covering 
military and civil affairs during the First and Second 
World Wars into “peacetime" areas of outstanding 
interest, "enabling important periods in our history to 
be recorded in complete and authoritative narratives, 
written while the official records could still be 
supplemented by reference to the personal recollections 
of the public men who were involved". In December 1969, 
in the wake of this earlier statement, the first three 
peacetime histories were put into commission - a study of 
the formative years of colonial development; a work on 
environmental planning; and a text entitled 
'Nationalization: An Analytical Account 1945-60', to be 
undertaken by D.N. Chester, Warden of Nuffield College, 
Oxford.
The initiation of a peacetime series was a novelty 
in several respects. In the past, various departmental 
memoranda had been prepared under the auspices of the 
Historical Section of the Cabinet Office, but these were 
meant purely for internal use, as a guide for future 
policy-makers. The lack of research into peacetime 
economic activities - as against diplomacy - was already 
the subject of comment. Some of the wartime civil 
histories had met with official disapproval (Titmuss's 
Prohlews of Social History sparked off a great row), 
there were no guarantees that the final work would be 
eventually published, and fears were expressed that the 
new project might founder upon official indifference.
This uncertainty matched the ambivalent attitude of
98
academics(199). Privileged and unrestricted access to 
the written record, in advance of the general opening of 
the government archives, had been used advantageously by 
qualified historians. But outsiders were kept in 
ignorance of the rules governing the status of the 
official historian. The official disclaimer 
notwithstanding, the HMSO wrappers suggested a cleaned-up 
account of past controversies. The written record was 
all too apt to be bland and uninformative, a "neat 
formula" in the minutes perhaps hiding sharp discord or 
helpless floundering. There was a natural tendency, as 
Pelling remarked, for histories to be written "from a 
predominantly administrative point of view"(200).
This was certainly the case with the purposefully 
inoffensive volumes of selected documents, edited by 
Nicholas Mansergh (one of the university campaigners) on 
the last years of British rule in India, which began 
appearing in 1970, catering for a growing historical 
interest In Indian sub-continent. The unfolding of high 
policy, and of what had gone into moments of decision and 
indecision, did not always make for cheerless reading, 
however. M.R.D. Foot's history of the SOE in wartime 
France had raised a storm. Margaret Gowing and Lorna 
Arnold, In their UK Atomic Energy Authority-commissioned 
account of the background to the development of British 
atomic power and the atomic bomb programme (two volumes, 
1974(201)) showed that, by "pulling no
199. On this see J.M.Lee's editorial on public 
administration and official history in Public 
Administration, Summer 1976, ppl27-131.
200. ELM. Pelling, ibid (1970), bibliography.
201. M,Gowing assisted by L. Arnold, Independence 
and Deterrence - Br itain and atomic energy 1945-1952, 
Volume 1: Policy Making Volume 2: Policy Execution.
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punches"(202), it was still possible to startle. They 
saw backfiles not seen by others, before or since, and 
confirmed that research into the manufacture of a British 
bomb had gone ahead in strictest secrecy, under the cover 
of the peaceful use of atomic power. There were, they 
agreed, sound strategic and 'status' reasons for this 
decision. But the manner in which it was reached, at a 
single, hurriedly convened ad hoc cabinet committee 
meeting in January 1947 which the scientists most 
directly affected knew nothing about, while the costs of 
the programme were hidden from parliamentary or public 
scrutiny, amounted to a distortion of constitutional 
government. It was one way of circumventing opposition 
from the economic ministers, Dalton and Cripps, who were 
known to be alarmed by the huge expense. But military 
considerations had been allowed to override all others, 
the enormity of the deception was such that George 
Strauss et al - though Gowing declined to say so in so 
many words - were quite mistaken. In so far as the 
relationship with the United States was concerned, the 
extreme secrecy had even been self-defeating, since the 
Americans assumed that British know-how was not all that 
advanced, "So now we know", John Barry exclaimed in The 
New Statesman, where the squabble with Crossman had 
originally broken out(203). One of the gravest of 
post-war decisions, claimed to be an "indispensable" 
action, was one which the country could ill afford and 
got little out of. As to the real motivation of 
ministers, most of them were now dead, leaving only a few 
surviving civil servants to pass comment.
202. 'Secret no more', The Economist, 14 December 
1974, pp92-93.
203. J.Barry, 'Bomb Squad', The Neu Statesman, 13 
December 1974, p.867.
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Secrecy should not - Gowing went to argue — be 
invoked as an all-purpose alibi for other recent policy 
failures, however(204). Critics of the British higher, 
civil service, in other words, would have to look 
elsewhere. The usefulness of official histories derived 
from their value as part of the "collective memory" of 
past choices and past events, illuminating present-day 
predicaments — but there was no requirement to point the 
finger of accusation. Others, less enamoured of the 
Whitehall view, drew their own conclusions. In addition 
to foreign and defence policy misadventures and 
miscalculations, confidence in the effectiveness of post­
war economic management was also, by the early seventies, 
on the wane, undermining the generally heartening picture 
of the recovery of the post-war British economy. The 
attitudes contained in the official wartime histories, 
dedicated to the greater glory of the wartime service, 
came under renewed attack. Modern problems, to which 
there seemed to be no satisfactory answer, could be 
traced to the confusions and uncertainties of policies — 
like the Labour government's nationalization programme - 
that were present at their very inception. The wish, 
expressed on the I1MS0 dust jackets, that the official 
histories might help towards a better understanding and 
solution of contemporary problems, was only one - 
diplomatic - way of putting it.
iv) Biographies and biographers
Further to the developments already mentioned, a 
final instance of historical activity arose - 
contemporary political history in the form of political 
biographies, relating the political life of a prominent
204, M,Cowing, Reflections on Atomic Energy History 
(The Rede Lecture)(1978).
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individual with the times in which they lived and worked. 
Often thought of as the English art, biography expresses 
an author's desire to do justice to the work of his or 
her subject, now in retirement or recently deceased. It 
is a memorial tribute from a small person to a bigger 
one(205). An 'authorised' biographer is granted a 
sight of private family papers which provide the means of 
entry to the closed period before government papers are 
opened. Biography also helps a writer to steer a course 
through the often unintelligible confusion of the 
immediate past. An exceptional individual who was at the 
centre of events over a prolonged period can even be said 
to have personified their epoch. History is not 
biography; it is not even the sum total of innumerable ' 
biographies. But the biographical mode can add an extra, 
and marketable, element to the activity of historical 
reconstruction.
Without gainsaying any of these attributes, past 
political biographers have also made clear that the 
composition of a biography is not as easy as it looks. A 
political biography treats with the substance of 
politics, but not quite in the same way(206). The 
subject needs to be singled out from and placed in the 
political circles they moved, the private and public 
aspects of their life being successfully fused. An older 
faithfulness to the facts (in which the biographer was 
plainly external to the person studied) had come to be 
replaced by the exploration and interpretation of 
personality and character, insight often coming straight 
out of a biographer's own powers of imagination. This
205. A.Bierce, The Enlarged Devil's Dictionary 
(1971), p.58.
206. R.R.James, 'Soldiers and Biographers', in B.C. 
Watt (ed), ibid (1969), ppl9-31.
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might open the door to the befogging influence of 
sentiment and prejudice; but the point was that even the 
taking of the interpretative approach to extreme lengths 
did not invalidate it altogether.
Political biography underwent something of a 
renaissance by the later 1960s, and had a direct bearing 
on the assessment of many of the key figures in the 1945 
Labour government- Helped by "lorry loads" of documents 
from Transport House(207), Alan Bullock's two volumes 
on Bevin had been published in 1960 and 1967. The tale 
had grown with the telling and he now envisaged a further 
book covering Bevin's time as Foreign Secretary. Apart 
from endorsing the value of interviewing, Bullock had 
also steered clear of any over-affection for 'the 
People's party'. Authorised profiles of Attlee (who had 
become slightly more talkative in old age), Cripps and 
Gaitskell were "in preparation"(208). Michael Foot's 
follow-up on Bevan - left poised on the threshold of 
office at the end of volume one - was also awaited. 
Shinwell, always garrulous, appeared as a senior witness 
of the 1945 administration in Thames Television's The Day 
Before Yesterday(Summer 1970) in which old newsreel 
footage was intercut with talking to the camera, allowing 
contributors to speak in their own words. As to the 
cause for this revival, an explanation was forthcoming: 
no other recent government (in the view of Roy Jenkins, 
also a successful biographer(209)) contained so many 
politicians of the front-rank, in an admittedly elderly
207. Lord Bullock, 'Bookends', The Times Higher 
Education Supplement, 18 November 1983, p.12.
208. A Guide to the Papers of British Cabinet 
Ministers 1900-1951, compiled by C. Haslehurst and C. 
Woodland (1974).
209. E,Jenkins, Nine Men of Power (1974), p.xi.
ministry of all the talents. The ’Big Five’ chose 
themselves. The difficult circumstances they had faced 
added to their aura, in comparison with the politics of 
earlier periods. "The curious thing", Medlicott wrote in 
& review of The Diet ion ary of Nat ion a 1 Biography,
"is that after 1945, when politicians were 
again struggling with adversity, and were no 
more successful than their predecessors, their 
reputations were evidently higher. The reason 
seems clear: the disparity between the nation’s 
objectives and its resources had at last been 
fully grasped"(210) .
The Dalton diaries apart - however - there was a 
basic shortage of private papers already available in the 
public domain. In Herbert Morrison’s case, the want was 
acute - D.N. Chester, his literary executor, had been 
taken aback to find that only a suitcase of Morrison’s 
papers survived him, to go alongside a plainly inadequate 
autobiography. With no time to lose, he approached two 
former Nuffield students then lecturing in Government at 
the LSE, Bernard Donoughue and George Jones, with a view 
to bringing together the recollections of those who had 
known Morrison or worked with him, so that the shortfall 
could be made up. Herbert Nor risen - Portrait of a 
Politician (1973), marking a breakthrough in the use of 
oral information, was the result. On all counts it was 
an object lesson in political biography..
Both Donoughue and Jones were knowledgeable about 
Labour and especially London politics and politically
210. W.N.Medlicott, ’Contemporary History as 
Biography’, The Journal of Contemporary History, 1 1972,
pp. 91-106.
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classifiable as young Gaitskeliites. Donoughue had 
worked previously for Political and Economic Planning, 
Jones stood as the Labour candidate at Kidderminster in 
the 1964 general election. They immediately put out a 
request for "letters, papers and reminiscences"(211) 
about Morrison, but did so "in some desperation and 
without any clear expectation of what benefit would be 
derived"(212) . As it turned out, more than 300 
interviewees were consulted, several important 
witnesses - Morrison's constituency agent, and the 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury - not having long to 
live. Only Ethel Donald, Morrison's confidential 
secretary for the best part of his career, refused to 
meet them, as Grigg was quick to spct(213). The 3/ield 
was invaluable. Revealing sections in the second half of 
the book, assigned to Donoughue and dealing with the 
years from 1940 to 1965, relied heavily on the memories 
of participants and protagonists - Morrison's working 
methods as Lord President, his part in the high-level 
plotting, an assessment of his unhappy showing at the 
Foreign Office - the information absorbed directly into 
the text. At times, oral was even favoured over what 
written sources there were, where there was room for 
doubt. Teaching the post-war period to undergraduates, 
Donoughue was in the position of having to write the 
books for himself as he went along. The biography of 
Morrison ("oral history at its b£st“(214)} provided
211. Socialist Commentary, February 1967, p. 23.
212. G.'Jones, letter in Oral History, Spring 1974, 
pp83-84.
213. J.Grigg, 'His lost secrets', The Evening
Standard, 2 October 1973, p.26.
214. A.Seldon and J.Papworth, By Nord of Mouth:
elite oral history (1983), p.142.
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the richest account up to that time and in cold print of 
how the 1945 Labour government functioned.
One of most intriguing puzzles was why, much as the 
victory in 1945 was masterminded by Morrison, and much as 
the programme then enacted was *Morrisonian’ in spirit, 
Morrison himself did not reap the political benefits, but 
was continually frustrated and outclassed. Never having 
got over his defeat against Attlee in 1935 provided a 
clue to his subsequent, restless behaviour. Even in the 
flush of Labour’s election triumph, his star could be 
seen to be on the wane, much earlier than historians had 
been accustomed to think, the attempt to push xAttlee 
aside (about which his autobiography had been less than 
candid) especially reflecting discredit- But the wide 
responsibilities allocated to him, making him the chief 
co-ordinating minister in the domestic field, meant that 
his guiding had was to be found everywhere. The hitherto 
"shadowy" network of cabinet committees which he oversaw 
and which carried the main burden of work - economic 
planning, the socialization of industry, future 
legislation - Donoughue brought out into the open. With 
his additional duties as party and parliamentary manager, 
Morrison’s exceptional energies were fully stretched.
Even a single-minded dynamo like Morrison could not carry 
the load indefinitely, and he was the first of the 
cabinet heavyweights to crack under the strain, in 
January 1947, removing him from the fray at a crucial 
moment. Spurning the offer from Cripps ,to join in 
unseating the prime minister, he then had his wings 
clipped in the reorganization of portfolios ("he easily 
gave up his empire") and was the chief loser.
Donoughue’s description of the confused and panicky 
intrigues of that year, in a situation in which no one 
was quite sure what was going on, was unassailable and —
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in one reviewer's opinion - unlikely ever to be bettered. 
But if memory had bo be taken on trust, Hugh Dalton's 
diary entries, deciphered from the original, added the 
necessary stiffening. Most of these moves, Jay has 
related(215), were unknown to those outside the 
government at the time, although Donoughue did dig up one 
press report from August 1947 predicting (wrongly) that 
Attlee as on the point of resigning. On the other hand, 
the detail involved lent substance to the growing view 
that cabinet relations at the highest level were anything 
but amicable(216). Deep-rooted rivalries meant that 
Morrison - but not only Morrison - did not emerge in a 
flattering light. All of which enhanced the abilities of 
Attlee, who - in Robson's observation, was unlikely to be 
seen in future "as the negative and futile figure 
presented in this book"(217).
Saddled with so much to do, and yet lacking a firm 
departmental basis from which to act, was ultimately the 
cause of Morrison's downfall- He had no well-defined 
sphere of responsibility and was easily outmanoeuvred by 
Attlee, who often (as with the attempted compromise over 
supervision of the iron and steel industry) encouraged 
him and then, when party opinion changed, left him 
holding the can. Had Attlee stepped down in 1950-51, the 
authors suggested, the leadership would still have been 
Morrison's "by natural right", despite evidence of his 
declining powers. There was no-one else to rival his 
mastery of the party and governmental machinery. But he
215, D, Jay, Change and Fortune - a political record 
(1980), p.165.
216, See also G,Brown, In My May (1971).
217, W. A. Robson, review in The London Journal, May 
1975, p.149.
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was distracted and out of his depth at the Foreign 
Office, and uncharacteristically hesitant, after the 
narrow election result in February 1950, about the timing 
of a new appeal to the country. His hardline handling of 
the 1951 budget dispute - an important note of his
hospital meeting with Attlee was among his few remaining
papers - came at a bad time, when he was exhausted and 
preoccupied by other pressing problems. His chance was 
already, in effect, slipping by. Donoughue’s case, that
Morrison lacked the ruthlessness to go all the way - at
least told us why Morrison so often lost his composure at 
the vital moment. It was also true that Morrison, being 
primarily a political fixer and operator, did not have 
the intellectual means to refurbish the Labour party’s 
policies. His call for the party to consolidate its 
gains was treated sympathetically in the biography — he 
"opened the battle to abandon traditional dogma". But he 
could not reach beyond this. He was not a proto­
revisionist (which begs the question of what the party 
would have done had it won again in October 
1951(210)}. That was the task of those who were to 
follow afterwards, in the Gaitskellite camp, among whom 
Donoughue could be counted. Morrison’s socialism was the 
socialism of the 1945 Labour government — he expressed 
it, but was unable to transcend it(219).
On all the issues which mattered, the Donoughue— 
Jones biography was praised. Morrison’s centrality was 
established. His relation to his times,,and his
218. The 1957 ’Industry and Society’ document he 
regarded as "the most revolutionary policy deviation in 
Labour Party history": Labour Party Annual
Conference Report 1957, pp.135-136.
219. D.Marquand, ’Mr Polly at Westminster’, The New
Statesman, 28 September 1973
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contribution to Labour politics, was firmly fixed. And, 
an aspect of which the authors were particularly pleased, 
his public role was linked to his private life and 
personality — an unhappy private life made up for in a 
frantic political drive. "Bernard Donoughue and I", 
George Jones later commented, "after long immersion in 
the written evidence and interviewing many who knew him 
in different settings throughout his life, felt that we 
had pinned him down, like a butterfly in a display 
case"(220). Sympathetic but discriminating, they did 
not let their attachment to the left cloud their 
judgement or go further than the facts seemed to warrant. 
Here was Morrison and the pre and post-war Labour party - 
his dead eye and all - "the best political biography of 
recent years"(221).
Bullock had already been commended for his lack of 
sentimentality. Donoughue and Jones were equally averse 
to glorifying the Labour cause. Moreover, the 
ideological overtones of Labour were not made too much of 
(the life of John Strachey, by Hugh Thomas, and not the 
ideas-only book that his widow was hoping for, came out 
earlier in the same year). Biography - including Labour 
biography - was moving to the academy. Biographical 
details had to be sourced and verified. The biographer 
was bound not to over-identify with the subject, or 
indulge in anything that smacked of partiality(222).
That was why Michael Foot’s study of Bevan, a work of
220. G .W .Jones, ’The value of recent biographies,
auto-biographies and diaries’, Par 1 i amen tar y Affairs, 34
1981, p.336.
221. G.K.Fry, review in Political Studies, 22 1974,
p.228.
222. V.Bogdanor, ’A deeply flawed hero", Encounter, 
June 1975, pp.69-77.
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unrestrained hero-worship, was frowned on. Volume two 
(1945-60) carried on in the same vein, Foot siding 
wholeheartedly with the philosophical creed he believed 
that Bevan had espoused. It was to be expected that Foot 
would return to the events of 1951, about which he felt 
Bevan to have been treated harshly. But his 
disfigurement of cabinet colleagues, in Bevan's favour, 
aroused old enmities. The sustained, point-by-point 
demolition of Foot's Bevan contained in the 1979 
biography of Hugh Gaitskell by Phillip Williams was a 
more academically punctilious - though no less committed 
- response. The rearmament dispute had not gone away, 
because so much of the later evolution of the party 
obviously hung on it, re-imbuing it with ideological 
significance. The difference now was that it was in a 
biographical context - pitting one biographer against 
another - that the argument was joined. To the clash of 
personality and principle were added contrasting 
appreciations of the biographers' art, even different 
kinds of biographical truth.
Three Types of Engagement
Over the Winter of 1973 and Spring of 1974 the BBC 
recorded a series of talks arranged around the themes of 
equality and inequality in modern society, assembling 
invited guests to examine the issues from an economic, 
political and sociological angle and steered by the 
economist, educationalist and Fabian reformer John 
Vaizey, who had lately been discouraged by the 
disappointing results of government welfare policy in 
Britain and America. All shades of opinion (barring ’’the 
most extreme") were represented in pursuit of what Vaizey 
said was "dialogue, not confrontation"(223). To open,
223. J.Vaizey, Whatever Happened to Equality? 
(1975), p.8.
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he turned tor an historical perspective cn equality to 
Lord Blake, the historian of the Conservative party, and 
the marxist academic Eric Hobsbawm, drawing out their 
respective readings of the evolution of an idea and an 
ideal. Hobsbawm, traced egalitarian tendencies in the 
labour movement to a striving for equality between 
classes rather than individuals, the more out-and-out 
socialist aspirations counterbalanced by the Fabian ethic 
of personal self-improvement. Alongside this had gone an 
argument on the left about the merits of practical, day- 
to-day reforms compared to a more grandiose restructuring 
of society on egalitarian lines. As to the former, 
Hobsbawn was not personally very impressed. The one 
exception to this was the Second World War - "on this I 
agree with A.J.P. Taylor". Wartime was the nearest the 
country had ever got to a form of war socialism which 
propelled Labour into power in 1945, after which the 
forward impetus was largely lost. But piecemeal social 
engineering, while it had removed the worst abuses and 
injustices, had no necessary connection to 
egalitarianism.
In the Conservative tradition, as Blake summarised 
it, greater emphasis was given to opportunity rather than 
equality, subject to the duty to alleviate the 
disadvantages of the less well-off. But one did not need 
to adopt the Webbian approach of the disciplined study of 
social questions in order to tackle poverty and distress. 
The Conservative party had - as it always must - made a 
realistic adjustment to political pressures. This was 
brought out in the, to Blake, puzzling contrast between 
the First and Second World Wars, the Second fostering a 
far greater sense of social egalitarianism across a wide 
field of policy and paving the way for the Attlee 
government. The Conservatives, in those conditions, had 
had no choice but to be seen to move with the times, 
recognizing that their electoral credibility was at
Ill
stake. The steam only eventually ran out of Labour's 
reforms because ordinary people grew fed up with 
shortages.
These two surveys, despite disputing the value of 
equality, could concur in the reasons for its, albeit 
attenuated, advance. They were reassuring evidence for 
Vaizey of civilised discussion, before, as he joked (a 
miners' strike, power cuts and the three—day week were in 
full swing) the lights finally went out. Closer 
inspection indicates that their likemindedness was more 
apparent than real and certainly open to a greater 
divergence of outlook than Vaizey was allowing for. 
Hobsbawm, although Vaizey chose not to notice, had 
clearly contrasted 1945—style Labour politics (which, 
however ambiguous, still had something to be said for it) 
with the more recent redrafting of the party's long-term 
goals which no traditionalist could conceivably 
entertain. "When Gaitskell and the Gaitskellites said 
socialism was about equality, what they meant was it was 
not about socialism". In other words, the nature and 
extent of egalitarianism, though it might cause 
difficulties for a Tory, was a far more divisive and 
unsettling issue on the left. It raised serious 
questions about the essential role of the Labour party 
and past Labour governments, and the effectiveness of 
policies of reform in a predominantly capitalist economic 
framework (those policies being based upon the findings 
of supposedly "detached social inquiry") that could not 
any longer be ducked. A strain of left-wing thinking 
involving a complete rejection of Labour's post-war 
parliamentary politics was already making inroads into 
the party's lower ranks. The full import of Hobsbawm's 
remarks was lost.
Changes were also afoot inside the Conservative 
party. Blake's description of post-1945 Conservatism had
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"the parity adapting in a rational and understandable way 
to the realities of increased government intervention, 
for much of which it had been the original sponsor.
There might be those maintaining that the move to greater 
equality should have gene further, and indeed - with 
Crosland and Titmuss -- that it still, should. But it was 
in his view neither practicable nor desirable. The 
English had always liked and embraced hierarchy. An 
urbane resistance te progressive ideas chimed with 
popular feeling. His analysis betrayed no hint of the 
more trenchant critique emanating from some liberals and 
conservatives to the effect that, since 1945, the 
Conservative party had in fact given up far too much, 
that if it was still opposed to socialism then it should 
openly say so, and that the whole post-war arc of 
government policy was to be condemned outright. The 
Conservative party's 1970 manifesto had, Blake agreed, 
been pretty rightish; but Powellite ideas had about them 
a “lunatic" quality(224). There was in all this no 
forewarning of the sea change in Conservative opinion 
that was about to break out.
To cap it all, Vaizey himself was having second and 
third thoughts, agonising over the scientific pretensions 
of the new social sciences(225). The cause of social 
democracy had been so brilliantly championed by Crosland 
that any account of his creed read like a chronicle in 
the development of the science of society. A democratic 
socialist "sees a choice between evils", capable of 
solution by gradual, intentional action; "he does not see 
a Utopia". 1945 had been "the high point of social 
democratic euphoria", but even with the fall of that 
government the record was not all that rosy:
224, Quoted in J.Wood (ed)(1970), Powell and the 
1970 Election, p.12.
225. J.Vaizey, Social Democracy (1971).
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"Thus Western European socialism lost its 
leading socialist government. Its achievements 
were solid - full employment, a welfare state, 
a move out of empire and a Western alliance.
But other European countries, notably Germany, 
achieved all these without a reputation for 
sanctimonious austerity and mindless 
bureaucratic controls. And it rapidly became 
apparent that Labour, by keeping Britain out of 
a European federation and involving It in 
enormous military programmes, had left a legacy 
which as to handicap the country for at least 
twenty years"(226).
Discouraged by student unrest (Titmuss, his guru, 
the heir to Tawney, was jeered during the ' troubles ’ at 
the L.S.E.), he was also frustrated by the UK's lagging 
economic performance. Under Wilson's leadership, Labour 
had lost all credibility. The original egalitarian goals 
remained, but how much more difficult they were to meet. 
The very process of change itself was inherently 
unequalizing. "Affluence created new distress at a rate 
possibly as fast as it was alleviated”. This drove him to 
conclude that the complexity of economic arrangements was 
beyond the capacity of economists to grasp(227). 
Forecasting was bunk(228). Wider education made no 
contribution to a country's economic growth. The 
sociological boom years were over, he declared.
Marxist and anarchist ideas were on the increase.
At the same time, the wave of opinion that had first come
226. J.Vaizey, ibid (1971), p.179.
227. J,Vaizey, 'Disenchanted Left', Encounter,
February 1968, pp.62-68.
228. J.Vaizey, 'Forecasting is bunk', The Sunday 
Telegraph, 12 January 1969, p.25.
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to the tore during and after the war - for which he 
recommended reading Paul Addison's fine account - was 
obviously withdrawing, in a once-in-a—lifetime shift of 
values of a fundamental kind.
Important consequences flowed from this. Vaizey 
presupposed that there were common understandings, and 
that the splintering of opinion in the 1970s was no more 
than disagreeable politics. But the rift went much 
further. There was a change not just in terms of the 
argument, but whether an argument was to be had at all. 
Participants increasingly talked past one another, 
discourse was internalised- Persuasion by discussion gave 
way to the authenticity of commitment.
i) The Mew Left
The New Left took off in the prolonged gap between 
the last Labour government, which fell in 1951, and the 
next. Wilsonian optimism in the run-up to the 1964 
general election caught on, even on the farther reaches 
of the left. There is no reason to suppose that this 
support, though conditional, was not sincere. The 
breaking point, when it came, was different for different 
groupings. But the landslide re-election of the Labour 
government, in May 1966, quickly followed by the outbreak 
of the seaman's strike in July, is generally taken as 
some kind of watershed(229). The derelictions of the 
Labour leadership were roundly denounced, what with 
traditional Labour goals being sacrificed for the 
convenience of the financial markets. With each round of 
public expenditure cuts, there seemed to be no limit to 
the tolerance of the parliamentary left in going along
229. D.Widgery, The Left in Britain 1956-68 (1974),
p. 208.
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with policy turns(230) . Estrangement of Labour's 
working-class support, the persistence of economic 
problems, and Britain's subservience to American 
interests were run together in a connected critique - "a 
whole position" - and infused with moral outrage.
Miliband had previously left open the question of 
whether Labour might yet be turned into a fully socialist 
party. As the 1960s wore on, his attitude distinctly 
hardened. Developing a neo-raarxist theory of state power, 
he saw the way in which governments of the left were 
forced to contain and subdue popular pressures, the 1945 
government - among others - proving his contention that 
executive power had never held any serious threat to an 
advanced capitalist economy(231). His 1972 postscript 
to Parliamentary Soc i ali sm now had an air of finality 
about it. Labour was evolving into a wholly functional 
manager of discontent. The party was not, and was not 
capable of being transformed into the chosen instrument 
for socialism - one roust say what one thinks. Eric 
Hobsbawm's disgust was equally evident. Even by the less 
demanding measuring rod of 1945, when it was still 
possible to believe in the historically ordained rise of 
Labour, there had been a disastrous retreat. Mo lasting 
legislative monuments were left behind by the 
administration of 1964-70. Wilson had not even had the 
good grace to step down(232). E.P. Thompson, 
reviewing Wilson's memoirs, spoke of the total 
devaluation of politics(233). The only problem for
230. A.Arblaster, 'The Limits of Loyalty - a
dissenting view', Tribune, 6 December 1967, p. 4.
231. E.Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society 
(1969), pp 96-102.
232, E.Hobsbawm, 'No entry for socialism', Wew
Society, 11 December 1975, pp.608-609.
233, E.P,Thompson, 'Yesterday's Manikin', New
Society, 29 July 1971, p.202.
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those starting to advocate a party of the independent 
left was that Labour was already there, taking up all the 
room.
The war years of 1939-45 took on - by extension - a 
different aspect. The reforming achievements of the 
Attlee governments were creditable, if limited. The 
popular mood had encouraged this, as recent studies were 
showing. But it was all the more certain, with the two 
decades that had since passed, that a dramatic shift in 
property relations had never really been on. It was not 
just that the party had failed fully to capitalise on the 
situation. It had never genuinely intended to. The 
assumption, then, strongly coloured by later, revisionist 
tendencies, was that Morrison and his colleagues had not 
been in earnest. Indeed, by war's end, the chance had 
probably already slipped away. The war - the mystic, 
resonant 'People's War' had been a "deep interruption". 
But by 1945 the revolutionary moment had passed(234). 
Wartime was the real danger spot(235).
Re—interpreting the recent past in this way plainly 
owed as much to Labour's experience in government in the 
sixties as it did to any rethinking about Attlee's own 
time. Events impelled New Left scholars in two main 
directions. Critically-minded accounts of Labour's past 
and present were extended to take account of the party's 
and the movement's absorption with an increasingly 
managed and regularized system of class collaboration, 
and greater notice was paid to the external, 
international scale of the capitalist economy within 
which Labour governments - all governments — were
234. S.Hall, 'The Social Eye of Picture Post', 
Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 2 (Spring 1972),
-y-, 1 0 7 - 1  OB
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235. G.Stedman-Jones, 'History in One Dimension', 
The New Left Review, March-April 1966, pp.53-54.
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required to operate.
Leo Panitch, reformulating the concept of 
'Labourism' in the light of incomes policy 
leg!slation(236), confirms the point. Under the 
guidance of Miliband, he cast doubt on the Labour party's 
ability to act as an integrating force. Panitch did not 
see Labour's ideological "self-confinement*’ to 
parliamentary politics as the deciding factor. It was 
rather the propagation of a view of "the fundamental 
unity of society”, and the stressing of class harmony by 
Durbin and others, allowing Labour to "shore up" some of 
the dominant social values. This ability was inhibited, 
however, by Labour's structural association with the 
trade unions. The strain between 'national' values and 
'sectional' demands had been most apparent in the period 
of Labour government leading up to "In Place of Strife". 
Yet it also went further back, to the prototype Crippsian 
pause "stumbled" into in 1048-50, which Miliband had 
passed over in silence. What Beer had called the 
"transformation" of Labour after 1947, because of trade 
union resistance, was in fact nothing other than their 
opposition to the planning and control of wages while the 
rest of the economy was being freed up. The Labour party 
both advanced the claims of labour and at the same time 
contained them. Beer's attention to the socialist 
rhetoric of the working class thrust for power therefore 
missed the mark:
"It promulgated the coming of a new system, but
it meant even then the humanization of the
236. L.Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial 
Militancy the Labour party, the trade unions and
incomes policy 1945-74 (1976).
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present one"(237).
Panitch regarded the incorporation of the trade 
onions into the fabric of capitalism, and the consequent 
turn, in Allen's viev?, to militant tactical 
bargaining(238), as a sign of incipient corporatism, 
first established by the '’settlement" of capital and 
labour in 1945, a settlement, moreover, on certain very 
definite terms - this was the key that unlocked the 
essence of the 'Labourite' contract. The role of the 
dedicated scholar was to reveal this ambiguity at every 
point, and so helping to further the intellectual 
prosecution of the class struggle.
Taking Labour's 1973 programme as his starting- 
point, David Coates - again out of Miliband - deepened 
the analysis in several ways, reaching back into Labour's 
past for the "how" and "why" socialism had failed to, and 
indeed was never likely to, come about by parliamentary 
means(239). He retailed many of the handed—down 
anecdotes of the establishment embrace. Where he “broke 
new ground was in drawing out the possibilities and 
limitations of the social democratic approach which, even 
in the years of success after 1945, when performance came 
closest to matching radical promise, was - for a witness 
to the Wilson governments -painfully obvious. The forces 
ranged against that government, "the interplay of 
American pressure, business opposition, civil service 
inertia and leadership conservatism", were too great to
237. L.Panitch, 'Ideology and Integration: the case 
of the British Labour party, in Political Studies, 19 
1971, p.192.
238. Y.L.Allen, 'The Paradox of Militancy, in The 
Incompatibles - trade union militancy and the consensus 
(1967), K.Blackburn and A.Cockburn (eds), pp.241-262.
239. D.Coates, The Labour Party and the Struggle 
Tor Soc i ali sm (1975).
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overcome. The favouring of a nation.-) 1 ac opposed "to a 
class based appeal, bu i It. around gradualist., 
par 1 ianientary politics. periodically endorsed by the 
electorate, severely hampered the party's vision. Later 
governments, lacking the power or the will to dismantle 
capita!ism, found themselves in a world emphatically a 
capital 1st world they had never made, but in which they 
were forced to act. Accelerating industrial 
concentration and intensifying international competition 
brought them into conflict with organised labour, and the 
collapse of Keynesian ideas made it even mere difficult 
for governments to govern(239). The Labour party was 
immovably 'Labourist', with only a reforming tint. The 
fault lay with its original article of faith in the 
compatibility of parliamentary socialism. The only 
answer was to "resurrect" its earlier, uncompromising 
radi calism.
The fully articulated 'New Left' view, left speaking 
exclusively unto left, brought Coates into notoriety.
His readiness to trade explanations was mistrusted, his 
assessment of Labour's reform tautological. His central 
charge that the party had been too dogmatic about the 
parliamentary system was thrown back at him by one 
middle-ranking Labour cabinet minister bent on launching 
an attack on Trotskyite influence in the party(240).
Not only did he fall foul of the curse of trying to 
distil the essential ideology of the Labour party. He 
also invoked a super-historical, ex post facto standard, 
wise to the Crosland-type revisionism which only came 
later, damning the party for deviating from an absolutist
239. D.Coates, 'Politicians and the Sorcerer: the 
problems of governing with capitalism in crisis', in Why 
is Britain becoming harder to govern ?, A.King(ed)(1976), 
pp.31-57.
240. S.Williams, 'Trotskyism and Democracy’, The 
Guard1 an, 22 January 1977, p.6.
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t it, "nothing human can 
owered whether the
movement, as a whole ever did embody solid 
col 1 ecti vist,ic va 1 uos ( 242) .
the complex, ma 
and its mixing 
much to the Tra 
him. Howe lids
eventual demise of "the social democratic perspective"
pre-eminently "constructive" politicians like Dalton, 
Morrison and Bevin, who could depend upon a loyalist 
majority in the parliamentary and industrial wings. The 
contribution that left-wing intellectuals made to the 
"practicalities" of policy framing was, according to 
Howell, negligible. However, Labour's much-vaunted 
commitment to a socialist commonwealth was left 
necessarily vague and indeterminate. When the Attlee 
government came to power in 1945, already rich in 
ministerial experience, this ready-made legislative 
programme was successfully enacted. Labour did what it 
promised it would do, and obtained a marked material 
improvement in the standard of living of the majority, 
even if the claim to having achieved a Substantial re­
distribution of Income was now questionable. "The
was, as he intended, historically specific and could on 
be approached historically.This perspective he saw as 
having grown out of the rethinking that had followed on 
from Labour's defeat in 1931. It was the brainchild of
241. B.Crick, 'After the fall', The Guardian. 24 
July 1980, p.8.
(1979)
243. D.Howell, British Social Democracy - a study 
in development and decay (1976).
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dualism of Labour's 1945 position", that of “moderate 
policies allied to potentially radical symbolism", was, 
however, inescapable. But much about 1945 remained 
supremely enigmatic. Pre-election support for a platform 
of 'progressive unity' was only narrowly fended off. In 
many city seats throughout the war the party had been in 
a very poor state - any electioneering improvements (much 
touted by others) had been made in realisation of this. 
The campaign itself had been indistinct and elusive, so 
that resort is often made to stirring images.
What ministers thought they were embarking upon, 
compared with the way history might judge them, "dogs" 
any interpretation of that government. The National 
Executive Committee minutes indicated to Howell that they 
had assumed, from their earliest moments in office, the 
continued existence of a sizeable private sector. It was 
the cultivation of a partnership between the government 
and private industry, grounded on the belief in the 
viability of Keynesian techniques in a largely free 
enterprise economy, which accounted for the change that 
came over the party's thinking- Labour discovered that it 
could secure most of its chief aims - full employment, 
higher production, and the alleviation of poverty - 
without the need for undue interference in the operations 
of the market. There was in all this no sense of the 
leadership not really "believing" in socialism as it was 
conventionally understood, or of a conscious stepping- 
back from the brink; it was an adjustment to the 
imperative of power, still perfectly compatible, at least 
over the short run, with the genuine declaration that a 
new society was in the offing.
Since Labour's acceptance of the mixed economy was 
already, in Howell's view, an accepted fact during the 
lifetime of the Attlee government, the post-1951 ructions 
appeared very much as a doctrinal afterword. Neither
1 2 2
left nor right were willing to push their thinking to the 
point at which they might begin to put in doubt the 
party's basic purpose. Only much later, clearly 
distinguishing the new revisionism, was the attempt made 
to drop the theoretical pretence of "socialist 
transformation". Coates had juxtaposed Labour's promise 
with its historical performance; Howell, by tracking 
ideas through the policy papers of the party, and 
charting the interplay of doctrine, policy, and electoral 
strategy, conveyed more clearly what it was in the 
original ideas that caused them to evolve in the way that 
they did. Recent experience, culminating in the 
"exhaustion" of social democracy, forced a change of the 
relatively benign view of 1S45 that Bevanites were once 
wont to propagate(244). None of this implied that 
Labour was at a disadvantage because it paid insufficient 
attention to the nuts-and-bolts of policy making(245).
The folk memory of 1945, he told Addison, was very 
different(246). It would not do to try and deny 
Labour's other, more radical face. Important questions 
about how labour history should be written were being 
raised here, "in that twilight where the empirical and 
the normative merge".
Release of the official papers allowed the larger 
picture to be filled out in greater depth, in a search 
for shaming antecedents. The early days of comprehensive 
schooling were re-examined, and Ellen Wilkinson's record 
as Minister of Education defended by Billy Hughes, her 
P.P.S., faced with the charge that - given her social 
origins, her civil service advisers and her time in
244. D.Howell, The Rise and Fall of Bevanism 
(Labour Party Discussion Series Mo 5)(1979?).
245. D.Howell, 'Understand!ng Social Democracy',
Government and Opposition, Summer 1979, pp.392 -296.
246. D.Howell, review of Addison in Government and 
Opposition. Autumn 1976, pp.110-114.
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office - she had "delayed and attempted to prevent [the 
introduction of such] a crucially important reform at a 
crucially important time"(247). The factors which went 
to explain her behaviour were understandable; but they 
did not excuse it. This was of a piece with the 
dismissal of the Labour left in the 1945-50 parliament 
for its general futility, "uncertain of its aims, 
confused about methods and weak in numbers"(248), 
several of its leaders - like the fiery ’Red Ellen*, of 
interwar - cocooned in their departments. In another 
study, the roots of a “racist Britain" were uncovered in 
the attitudes of ministers towards the influx of coloured 
immigrants in the first years after the war, officially 
to make up for a labour shortage, but also seen - in the 
debate on the 1948 Nationality Bill and in a cabinet 
committee review of 1950 — as an administrative and 
political "problem", justifying, should numbers continue 
to rise, tighter entry restrictions(249). In both
cases, contemporaneous concerns were projected onto the 
historical record. The onslaught on the post-war liberal 
trade and payments system - timed to coincide with the 
Labour party's exploration of an alternative 
(protectionist) economic strategy in 1980-81 - was the 
clearest expression of this,(250)
247. B.Hughes, 'In Defence of Ellen Wilkinson* and 
D. Rubinstein, 'Ellen Wilkinson Re-considered’, in 
History Workshop, Spring 1979, pps.157-1G0, 161-169.
248. D.Rubinstein, Socialism and *the Labour Party: 
the Labour left and domestic policy 1945-1950 (Labour 
Party Discussion Series No.3, 1979?).
249. S.Joshi and B. Carter, ’The role of Labour m  
the creation of a racist Britain’, Race & Class, Winter 
1984, pp.53-70.
250. T.Brett, S.Gilliat and A.People, ’Planned 
Trade, Labour Party Policy and United States 
intervention: the successes and failures of post-war 
reconstruction’, in History Workshop, Spring 1982, 
pp.130-142.
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It owed in part to the somewhat delayed impact of 
9 revisionist* histories of the Cold War, associated with 
protests against the increasing scale of American 
involvement In Vietnam in the late 1960s. A new wave of 
restive American scholars had denounced the American 
military-industrial complex which they held to have 
dictated U.S. foreign policy, polemically transferring 
the burden of guilt for the start of hostilities on to 
their own country. The American national interest was 
directed towards an imperial drive for overseas markets, 
concealed behind an anti-communist crusade on behalf of 
the free world, and episodes like the Yalta Conference, 
the 1945 Loan Agreement with Britain, and the 
inauguration of Marshall aid were re-interpreted 
accordingly. A new Internationa] economic regime had 
been constructed, reflecting - it was argued - the 
overwhelming bargaining power which the United States had 
come to possess and which, notwithstanding Soviet 
aggressiveness, was the ultimate cause of Cold War 
rivalry. One-sided revising though this was, it did not 
do away with the bipolar, East—West confrontation of 
mutual calculating advantage that was already an orthodox 
staple - it simply reversed roles. For students of 
international relations, the obsession with apportioning 
blame could only look like a backward step, exerting a 
psychological hold on the gullible in defiance of all the 
evidence to the contrary(251). But its effect was to 
invigorate large areas of the study of post-war political 
and economic diplomacy.
Britain had, according to British marxists and 
radicals, been able to maintain the semblance of 
independent action after 1945, but this was achieved only 
at the high price of assuming a new burden of 
responsibilities and commitments suited to American
251, A.B.U1am, The Rivals - America and Russia 
since Nor Id Nar Two (1973), pp.93-96.
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wishes, including support for the principles of a 
multilateral world economic order. The beguiling image 
of a ’special relationship*, which even orthodox 
commentators had found difficulty in deciphering, 
obscured more than it illuminated. It was this external 
constraint on Britain’s freedom of manoeuvre which 
explained much about the story of the 1940s and 
afterwards, as well as the compulsion by left-wingers in 
the Labour party to press for a reassertion of national 
economic sovereignty. The attention to outward 
developments - the move outwards, as capitalism itself 
had moved outwards - was, it was noted, a perspective 
almost entirely lacking from the established left-wing 
accounts of the period, most of which - as Jenkins, 
documenting the Bevanite surge of activism in 1951- 
53(252) - had come from the ’Milibanditti’. In 
Gamble’s analysis of economic slide, the whole view was 
couched in terms of Britain’s place as "the world 
island"(253).
The greatly changed - and changing - internal 
politics of the Labour party could not but reflect the 
movement in attitudes. When Lewis Minkin, a local party 
activist - turned - academic, began studying the 
Conference policy process at the end of the 1960s, he 
could find nothing new to say. He did not at first 
realize - not until the gradual re-assertion of 
conference authority soon afterwards - just how 
misleading McKenzie’s account of the Labour party had 
hecome(254). McKenzie had attended the annual, 
respectful gatherings of the ’forties. Minkin, twenty-
252 M. Jenkins, Be van ism - Labour's High Tide 
(1979).
253. A.Gamble, Britain in Decline (1981), 
especially Chapter 2.
254. L.Minkin, The Labour Party: image, myth and
reality, postgraduate conference paper, L.S.E., 1981.
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odd years later, looked down on to a less orchestrated 
scene. "The rows of empty chairs” reserved in the hall 
for P.L.P. members signalled the withdrawal of the 
parliamentary party from the ideological fray. Minkin's 
good fortune was to catch the institution of party 
conference at the moment of its changing, when Labour's 
attachment to "intra-party democracy" - a fiction for 
McKenzie was about to be re-established.
Minkin, a mature student at Leeds and, with his 
doctoral supervisor, David Coates, at York, started out 
with a model of oligarchic control, later discarded. His 
approach was analyt ICSl ; and written in the language of 
political science. The 'parliament of Labour', contrary 
to the imagination of delegates, was best thought of as 
"manipulatory", open to adroit handling by right or left. 
The party's federal structure and pattern of divided 
authority consigned it to a condition of perpetual flux, 
at one stage (as in the 1920s and early 1960s) the 
parliamentarians declaring their independence, at the 
next (after 1931 and post—1970) tighter limits being 
fixed upon their elitist tendencies. The ambiguous 
ideological orientation of the party was reflected in its 
organizational set-up, being "riddled with 
uncertainties”. In this sense, the doctrine of intra­
party democracy, which he took to mean the diffusion of 
power between a variety of policy-making bodies, Minkin 
saw as the structural counterpart of Clause IV, the 
distinguishing aspect of party life, "a cherished symbol 
of differentiation from the party's political opponents 
on Left and Right". The recurring motif of ambiguity 
went a long way towards accounting for the party's past 
history(255). The Labour Party Conference — a study 
in the polit ics of intra-party democracy, which caught
255. L.Minkin and P.Seyd, 'The British Labour 
Party', in Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe, 
W.Paterson and A. Thomas (eds)(1977), pp.101-147.
the 1978 conference season, represented eight years of 
interviewing, studying of documents and pounding of 
corridors.
The very title jarred. Take 1945 as the baseline. 
McKenzie, to recall, considered the Mikardo putsch as an 
exceptional if double-edged incident, which by no means 
disproved his general case - Attlee's stewardship of the 
party had marked Labour's adaptation to parliamentary 
norms. The tightly-controlled conference "occasions" in 
1945—51 showed that Labour had matured into 
responsibility. Minkin, conscious of the flouting of 
conference decisions by Wilson, cited the Mikardo case 
with admiration and was struck by the diligence with 
which Attlee and Morrison had carried delegates and the 
careful "non-assertion" of P.L.P. rights. They always 
spoke and acted as if conference was the sovereign body. 
But he recognized that it was the largest trade unions 
who had had the decisive voice at the turning point in 
1948. 'Consolidation' had, it was true, signified "a los 
of radicalism by the party leadership", yet it had also 
been "an expression of trade union satisfaction". When 
it came to the block voting of the major unions over the 
next decade, they registered heavily against further 
radical change. Some (he said in a 1974 article) were 
hypnotized by it:
"This pattern of support looked so rigid and so 
regular during the 1950s that both participants 
and observers often took it to be a feature 
endemic in the nature of the party. In fact, 
the support was always conditional even when it 
appeared to be automatic, which always left 
open the problem of what would happen if either 
that conditional support was removed or the 
party leadership chose, or was driven, to 
advance into the closed [i.e. no-go policy-
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making] areas"(256).
The recent but fairly swift swing of the party away 
from revisionist precepts raised some doubts in his mind 
about the extent of the original conversion, particularly 
since he found it to have been largely a paper victory. 
The public disintegration of the "stable loyalist 
majority" only became evident after 1966, when key areas 
of trade union industrial freedom began to be infringed 
upon. These new configurations "were bound to have long­
term consequences for the distribution of power in the 
party as a whole", he signed off. In a 1980 epilogue, the 
extent of the springing back took him by surprise. "The 
party's power relations have proved to be much more 
dynamic than once supposed...".
There was in Minkin a belief in the party activist 
that would have been unthinkable to the conference— 
watchers of former times. Miliband, Panitch and Coates 
assumed the fundamental weakness of the Labour's left- 
wing. Minkin could confirm that the activist did after 
all matter. The gulf between conference and the 
leadership had to be closed. Labour's constitution means 
what it says. The party, in the last resort, belongs to 
its members.
Although in need of revision, McKenzie never got 
round to finishing a new edition of his book that would - 
as he used to inform Tony Benn - keep pace with the havoc 
the 'Bennites' had wrought(257). In letters to the 
press, and in the last piece he wrote (published after
256. L.Minkin, 'The British Labour Party and the 
Trade Unions: Crisis and compact', in The Industrial and 
Labour Relations Review, October 1974, p.15.
257. D.Butler, 'Bob McKenzie, tutor of the British 
scene', The Guardian, 14 October 1981, p.2. Also the 
transcript of his B.B.C. interview with Benn reproduced 
in T.Benn, A Mew Course for Labour (1976), pp.2-5.
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his death), he did not refer to Minkin directly, but 
talked of unspecified "political theorists of the left" 
who failed to see that leaders must - again the 
characteristic use of the injunctive - escape from any 
intra-party doctrines if they are tc perform effectively 
in an increasingly pluralistic political system(258). 
Others could see that times had changed since McKenzie 
had been writing in the 1950s. Trade union allegiances 
had altered. Many local Labour parties had swung to the 
left. And there had been a weakening of the party system 
itself, an inconceivable development in earlier decades. 
Party, in corporatist circumstances, was becoming 
"irrelevant"(259). Minkin gave to this line of thought a 
stronger leftist slant, codifying Bennism. The world 
(for that was now the size of it) was not socialist 
enough. To change the world, one had first to change the 
party.
A special case ?
It was fundamental to many of these contributors 
that they were not just putting forward ' another view* - 
an alternative politics also brought with it an 
alternative rationality. Positivist social science, for 
the New Left intellectual, far from supplying a hard body 
of evidence and methodological precepts unsullied by 
political position or value judgement, was infused with 
presuppositions about which its exponents were only dimly 
aware. Facts and values were inseparable, as there could 
be no realm of facts separate and apart'from the theories
258. The Times, 3 August 1981, p. 11 and 4 September 
1981, p.13; and 'Power in the Labour Party: the issue of
'intra-party democracy', in The Politics of the Labour 
Party. D. Kavanagh (ed)(1982), pp.191-201.
259. H.M.Drucker, 'The Evolution of the Political 
Parties' in British Politics in Perspective, R.L. 
Borthwick and J.E. Spence (eds)(1984), p.114.
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by which to select them and determine their 
meaning(260). An aversion to explanatory theorizi ng, 
such as of a marxist kind, had taken political forces out 
of their economic and social context, promoting academic 
conventionality and conformism. A 'community of 
scholars' existed only in the sense that ideas were 
employed to legitimize and control. The only 'schools' 
to be discerned were those schools propagating varieties 
of bourgeois scholarship, conditioned by the 
institutional dominance of consensual ideas. Even the 
stoical liberal reformer, by refusing to think in wholly 
new ways, lent resilience to existing modes of thought, 
furthering the notion that society had advanced into 
post - cap!talist, ideologically-free affluence. Rival, 
contrary, 'conflict' models were marginalized. Since no 
synthesis between such incompatibles was possible, the 
only course of action was to expose ideas not for their 
truth-content but for their functional use in upholding 
established values. The argument had to be argued out 
from within a framework which contested the prevailing 
outlook(261). It was impossible to be agnostic or 
indifferent or noncommittal, least of all at a time when 
the country was in turmoil(262). Commitment - there was 
no getting away from it, however able or well-qualified 
the observer. Detachment by all means, but detachment 
from an orthodoxy which smothered free discussion. The 
committed and the detached were in a state of
260. R.Blackburn, introduction to Ideology in 
Social Science — readings in critical social theory, 
R.Blackburn (ed)(1972).
261. A,Gamble, The Conservative Nation (1974), 
p.vii.
262. E.Miliband, 'Teaching Politics in an Age of 
Crisis', University of Leeds Review, 18 1975, pp.129-145.
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"dialectical tension"(263}, vying for pre-eminence and 
driving the debate forward, only to be resolved by 
which - in ideological terms - was the stronger. In 
place of a natural selection of ideas, made up of 
defensible propositions (which could be refuted and 
discarded(264)) there was only a clash of mighty 
opposites between closed, self-maintaining, self­
validating systems of thought. V.L.Allen's journey from 
the LSE of Hayek, Robbins and Laski in the 1940s, through 
the sociological radicalism of the fifties, and on into 
the full-hearted alternative rationality of the early 
1970s, provided an autobiographical delineation of the 
New Left turn of mind(265).
ii) A Science of Society
The marked rise in unemployment, combined with an 
even more distressing growth rate in the years from 1964- 
67, as well as the regular resort to deflationary cuts in 
spending, shook the self-belief of many staunch 
Labourites. Loyalists argued that the government had 
been attempting to do too much in unfavourable 
circumstances. Long-time critics Insisted that, in 
addition to Britain being the most highly taxed nation in
the world, employment was still dangerously over-full. A
report commissioned by the Brookings Institute, reviewing 
the past performance and future prospects of the British 
economy, dismissed the truth of this last claim, saw the 
principal problems of trade and growth very much as
263. A.Arblaster, 'Ideology and Interests' in R. 
Benevick (ed), Knowledge and Belief in Politics — the 
problem of ideology (1973), pp.115-129.
264. E.Gellner, 'Myth, Ideology and Revolution' In 
B. Crick and W.A. Robson (eds), Protest and Discontent 
(1070), pp.207-209.
265. V .L .A1len, Social Analysis - a marxist 
cr it i que and alternative (1975).
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of policy had been the outcome of policies geared more to 
correcting balance of payments deficits than the needs of 
domestic economic activity. It was net that Britain had 
fallen short of other nations; it was rather that they 
had outstripped her otherwise average rate of 
expans3 on(266). That said, the standard
justifications to explain away slower growth (namely that 
Britain was less prone to social upheaval) were plainly 
beginning to wear thin. Growth had to be given the 
highest priority, Crosland maintained. But 
redistributing existing resource only provoked further 
inflation which as, he agreed, "becoming more and more 
our central problem"(267). Following Labour's defeat 
in 1970, he denied that revisionism needed substantially 
updating, even when - as old sympathizers pointed cut to 
him - the income-levelling trends of post-war had been 
countered by Titmuss (whom Crosland cold-shouldered) so 
that firm statements about equality of incomes were no 
longer prudent given the state of present 
knowledge(260). And yet the conviction that a greater 
levelling had been taking place than was in fact the case 
had dampened down but not entirely removed a cense of 
"relative deprivation" among the manual working 
class(269).
Stephen Baseler, who had made a special study of the
266. Extracts from the report carried In The Times, 
24 June 1968, pp.25-27.
267. C.A.R.Crosland, Socialism Nowf and other 
essays (1974), p.56.
268. B.Walden, 'A Critique of Revisionism', The New 
25 June 1971, pp. 874-875.
269. W.G .Eunclman, Relative Deprivat ion and Social
Just ice - a study o f attitudes to social inequality in
twent ieth—century En gland (1966).
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less glamorous right-wing of the party(270), the 
"core" of the movement, saw a way of rekindling the flame 
with a populist spark. Morrisonian socialism, dependent 
on the unthinking loyalty of the main trade unions, was 
"dull but safe". It was doubtful if Morrison himself 
"saw clearly the changed nature of capitalist society, 
and the irrelevance of much of traditional socialist 
thinking". Gaitskell's election encouraged this "attack 
at the level of theory", though at the outset only 
cautiously, since his supporters continued to speak the 
language of socialist reform. A redefinition of aims, 
not their abandonment, was the intention. The showdown of 
1960-61, proving that “Sovereignty resides at 
Westminster, not at the seaside", settled the issue, even 
if the actual part played by the Campaign for Democratic 
Socialism (he had not been able to gain access to their 
papers) had been over-rated. As a by-election candidate 
in 1965 and in the full election in 1966, Wilson's party 
was still his kind of party - forward-looking, "non— 
gimmicky", prepared for power, "a modern, revisionist 
Labour party in every respect. Briefly, he aspired to 
Crosland's eminence, but they had a falling out. New 
difficulties had arisen which Crosland, it was thought, 
declined to consider(271). The ultra-liberal Haseler 
of the 1970s was a changed man. The growing menace of 
the Mew Left was now joined by a Powellite return to 
first principles among discontented Conservatives, making 
it necessary to meet the challenge with arguments and not 
(as Winch had once dismissed Hayek) with jibes(272).
In a movement "starved of theory", Marquand - a Roy
270. S. Haseler, The Gaitskel lites - revision! sir, in 
the Labour party. 1951-64 (1969).
271. See D.Eden, letter in Encounter , April 1979,
P P . 91-93.
272. D. Collard, The Net* Right (1968).
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giving vent to their prejudices{273}. Public 
expenditure was nearing the point of maximum reach. The 
party goal of equality was compromised by the value the 
main, class-based trade unions attached to the 
maintenance of wage differentials. The load of 
expectations on the central authority of the state had 
become over bearing. That governments had to cope with 
problems that had only arisen after Keynes's death did 
not thereby invalidate Keynesian assumptions. But there 
was not enough time for an academie-cum-politician to 
take on the task of a new analysis. In any case, it was 
unlikely that the kind of synoptic, all-embracing 'world 
in a book' that Crosland bad written in the mid-1950s 
could still be brought off(274). The social science 
literature was so much broader, the problems of economy 
and society so much more intractable.
Uncongenial discoveries abounded. Attention was 
drawn to the perverse, counter-productive effects of 
welfare measures. Moderate affluence was by its very 
nature unequalizing. The spread of urban bureaucracies 
stifled those who they were supposed to aid. Educational 
expansion - on which Tawney had pinned most hopes - had 
not led to a more rational egalitarian society. Contrary 
to the Wehbian project, much social research was 
defeating the initial purpose of the I.SE's founders. 
Radicals who had been the main providers of intellectual 
ballast were thrown into disarray, having to argue 
against fundamental change (aside from schemes for 
institutional reform of the machinery of government) when 
change was all too obviously needed.
273, D.Marquand, 'Clause Four rides again', The
Times Literary Supplement, 26 September 1975, p.1095.
274. A.King, 'Never Another Crosland', Socialist
Commentary, May 1977, pp.3-4.
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The career path of one maverick social scientist 
captures the loss of confidence in the liberating 
potential of social knowledge. As head of the Labour 
Party Research Department, Michael Young had had a hand 
in drafting the 1945 election manifesto, "packing into it 
as many P.E.P. ideas as I could decently get past Herbert 
Morrison"(275). He stuck it out until 1951, took 
another degree (at the L.S.E.) and styled himself from 
then on as a sociologist, becoming one of the first 
lecturers in the subject. He tried, and failed, to turn 
the Labour party away from being a 'producer's party' in 
the age - this was in 1960 - of the consumer, going on 
instead to set up Mhich? magazine. Founder of the 
S.S.R.C. and sponsor of the Open University, Crosland 
made him one of his advisers at the Department of 
Education, to whom - it is said - Crosland was inclined 
to defer(276). Nevertheless, "the tragic failure of 
the last [1966-70] Labour government to do more than 
tinker with the problems of social justice" ranked for 
him alongside Munich as one of the two greatest political 
setbacks in his lifetime(277). No-one, he complained, 
now looks at the grand design of society. This did not 
hinder him, when the break with Labour finally came, from 
appropriating Tawney for the fledgling Social Democratic 
Party's think tank in 1981. To the charge that this was 
dubiously promiscuous, and that what the new 
'Americanised' party was really about was expunging 
radicalism from politics, Young was unmoved: the 
political agenda of 1945, and he had been "as much at 
fault as anyone", was through-and-through "statist", in
275. M.Young, 'The Second World War', in Fifty
Years of Political _and Economic Planning____— looking
forward p. 96.
276. J.Vaizey, in Anthony Ci Oo 1 and and SocI a _l .i. sm,
Encoan ter, August 1977, p .87.
277. M. Young, Is equality a dream? (Rita Hinden 
memorial lecture, 1972), p.10.
1everything from we]tare to the economy; the modern day 
Labour party still clung to this kind of thinking, in 
defiance of everything that had since come to
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However contrived it ma:/ have 1 ooked as 
hi story{279), a new view of the receding past was 
being rcanuf actured. The historic bargain of 1945 had 
certainly closed off the route to revolutionary politics, 
just as the New Fabian essayists had realised. But in 
retrospect the basic ambiguity about the Labour party's 
aims and objectives was never resolved. Social democrats 
should have faced up to this, and broken away in 1959-60 
when the chance had presented itself. The revisionists 
were not, after all, pure milk-and-water socialists, so 
far as the term was traditionally construed, and they had 
never pretended otherwise. 'The party of Attlee and 
Gaitskell', the one they had originally enjoyed, was 
invoked in order to justify leaving it. The post-war 
settlement, seen in the longer view, had been a good 
recipe for a quieter life, characteristic of a time which 
now had about it an unreal, unimaginable tranquility; but 
it was also the period when Britain had fallen further 
and further behind. The economic shocks of the seventies 
had demonstrated the need for greater cross-national co­
operation in an ever more interdependent global economy, 
just as it had (for those unconvinced that external 
threats represented the major worry(280)) highlighted
278. M.Young.
of Tawney's libertarian legacy', The Guardian, 10 May
1982, p.8, replying to E. Samuel's two-parter on 'Tawney 
and the SDP', The Guardian, 29 March (pp.8-9) and 5 April 
1982 (p.9).
279. D.??att, 'British Socialism Re-defined', radio 
broadcast, 26 February 1984.
280. T.D.M.Littlc, 'Social Democracy and the 
International Economy' in D. Lipscy and D. Leonard (eds), 
The Socialist Agenda - Crosland's legacy (1981), pp.63-
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“the need to strengthen institutions that could cope with 
the distributional conflicts in society. Unparalleled 
world prosperity had been undermined by a combination of 
external crises and the failure to come to terms with 
trade union power, for which a new governing philosophy 
was required. But Keynes’s economic teaching was still 
valid and "in turning our backs on it, we have turned our 
backs on one of the most hopeful intellectual constructs 
of the century"(281). Social democrats had not 
abandoned their commitment to the ideological activity of 
social inquiry followed up by social action. It was just 
that the central economic claims which they had come to 
take for granted had been undone, leaving the old 
defenders of the 1945 consensus - the believers in the 
capacity of governments to do good — without a firm 
philosophical grounding.
The Gould report
Lacking the intellectual tools to combat the 
assertive left-wingery (and reduced on occasion to 
squabbling over what Crosland had and had not said in 
1956), social democrats were also alarmed by what they 
saw as the subversive denigration of reasoned academic 
discussion. The universities were engulfed by sit-ins, 
demonstrations and unofficial curricula. John Vaizey 
answered his own question ("Ought not moderates to be 
tough?"(282)) by helping another old Gaitskellite, 
Julius Gould - who had first seen the signs In America 
to mount a defence of the "scholarly mode" of teaching 
against radical and extremist infiltration in higher
281, D,Marquand, 'Koyneaian International9, The 
London Review of Books, 5-19 July 1984, p.6.
282, J.Vaizey, ’Hail and farewell', The Times 
Education Supplement, 26 December 1975, p.4.
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education(283). The Gould report documented the 
spread of ideas which its author held to be inimical to 
an open, plural society, detailing the stratagems 
marxist-influenced writers adopted to exploit academic 
freedom in order to undermine and destroy if. Where the 
Old Left of Strachey had accepted "the canons of 
rationality" and objectivity", the New denied any 
validity to these, playing on their "difficulty" and 
preying on the timidity of their softer academic 
colleagues. Freeform discussion was "pre-empted" by 
imposing conflict-centred frameworks studded with code 
words and emotive terms, in preference to liberal open- 
mindedness, creating confusion whenever these 
incominunieah!e outlooks operated together. Without a 
belief in facts independent of theory, no theory could 
ever be falsified or need be discarded, spawning an 
unsettling relativism. Marxist texts were "cascading" 
from the presses, in some cases being stuffed down the 
throats of students (Miliband was on all the reading 
lists) in what was put down to a politically—motivated 
campaign. Names were named in the report, which was 
publicly endorsed by Lord Robbins, alerting readers to 
what constituted "a clear and present danger".
Widely judged to be tendentious and intimidatory, 
even by those who shared its concerns(284), the Gould 
report arguably did more harm to the liberal case than 
good. The conviction that some frameworks of 
interpretation were acceptable and others not, allied to
283. J,Gould, The Attack on Higher Education -
marxist and radical penetr at ion (1977). Other consultants
included Ken Minogue, David Martin and Stephen Haseler.
284. R.Rabrendorf, * Witch-hunting alien to
freedom', The Times Higher Education Supplement, 14
October 1977, p.7; E. Boggart, 'Extremism in Higher
Education', The New .Statesman, 14 October 1977, p.505.
ii u f  i?Lr rr ij u- x u  i. j.,/ r » u o  u  u  l u c -  i.j U  f  u  ^  jl
Education - where does it come from? (1977).
the call for clean, uncorrupted concepts - the while 
dressed up in alarmist i>olenical garb - was regarded more 
as an index of anxiety. Some editorialists favoured a 
plurality of biases, or instead defended tolerance 
towards a wider section of progressive opinion. On the 
Tory right, it was brushed aside as a faction-fight 
amongst those who had lost out in the battle for the 
minds of the young. The attack on 'truth-in-doctrine* 
was a further pointer to the collapse of the common 
centre.
iii) Anti-progressives
"Social students as a class are 'progressives'.
They look to the future; they are usually m e l i o r i s t s . - «
The one development which seems to take them by surprise 
is reaction of any kind"(285). The "almost slavish 
subservience" to the works of Maynard Keynes was - the 
feud went back a long way - R.B. McCallum's particular 
bugbear, for which "the Conservative party [McCallum was 
still a Liberal voter] have much to answer for in their* - 
endless struggle to be up-to-date, intellectually 
fashionable, election—worthy". Ours was a "state- 
intoxicated" age(286) . Only one person, he noted, was * 
willing to shake the reigning orthodoxies and he, the
285. R.B.McCallum, Universities « end the State,p 
Unservile State Paper (1964), p.11.
286. R.B.McCallum, 'Why I Will Vtfte Liberal^r  The 
Observer, 4 October 1959, p. 16.
Conservative M.P. Enoch Powell, was a former Classics 
don.
Although the reaction took many forms, two "broad — 
tendencies came to the fore. An older,-philosophically- - 
derived disposition had made doubt - and not faith - the 
grounding for a commitment. Some uncertainly was honest, 
and need not imply a heartless indifference, still less a 
sneaking regard for the established order of things. But 
there was (no contradiction intended) a high value to be 
placed on authority and tradition; which provided their 
own justification. Ideological writing, all writing to' 
order, was necessarily bad writing. Scepticism of 
organized doctrines remained the wisest course. In the 
modern age, reason had been commandeered by rationalism, 
pushing for unrelenting change in the name of abstract 
ideals whose real basis was actually emotional.
Unwilling to or uninterested in talking about economics, 
this High Tory conservatism found its affirmation instead 
in the restating of the ancient truth of what the 
progressive liberal finds hardest to abide : the paradox 
of material advance bringing spiritual impoverishment.
Adherents of the 'New Right' - the term was in use 
as early as 1965(287) - were of a very different 
stamp. Their interest was mainly to do with the market, 
the free economy providing the best guarantee for the 
free society. They concentrated their fire on exposing 
the political expediencies which governed each 'planned' 
extension of government interference in economic life.
The overloading of the economy by unsustainable defence 
spending had concerned Shonfield and others in the 1950s; 
the expanding welfare burden of the 1960s attracted the 
attention of economic liberals. While intelligent 
socialists - renowned for their intellectual facility and
287. J.Blumler, 'New Left and New Right', Socialist 
Commentary, September 1965, pp.15-17.
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occasional lack of scruple - were having to adjust to the 
breakdown of their favoured policies, there was no- 
certainty that Keynesians would be brought low by their 
own shortcomings. The harm perpetrated by social 
engineering required actively undoing.
In this changed climate, the writings and warnings 
of Hayek, made to seem eccentric when state intervention 
was riding high, enjoyed a new - and to their author, 
pleasing -vogue. Hayek, unhappy with the connotations- 
associated with continental Conservatism, had long since 
opted for the party of liberty(288). His objections 
to "the Keynesian delusion of everlasting prosperity" now 
gained a fair hearing(289). But Hayek's case did not 
stop at the economics of politics, ranging instead across—  
many disciplines and forming an organic whole, built 
around an epistemological argument - reformers had 
neither the knowledge nor the competence to remake 
society from design. Socialism was simply in error:
Given his premises, the logic was irresistible.-
It has been said 4:hat there was very little that 
united these contrasting position - old Toryism and a 
newer libertarian outlook(290). Some found it a • 
marvel that the two groups could, even within the 
confines of the L.S.E., co—exist and stay on speaking • 
terms(291). Celebration of the marketplace was-not 
easily reconciled with those for whom capitalism was -
288. F. A. Hayek, 'Why I am not a. Conservative' in 
The Constitution of Liberty (I960), pp.397-411.
289. S.Brittan, 'Hayek, New - Right and Old Left' , 
Encounter, January 1980, p. 31.
290. A.Ryan, 'Left Standing', New Society,- ^ 2 8  
November 1984, p.334.
291. E.Gellner, ibid (1980).
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"the supreme irrelevance"(292). The one
characteristic they had in common was their oppositional 
stance, accentuating the negative, impartially against 
everything to do with advanced, metropolitan opinion.
More recent well-publicized converts to the anti­
progressive cause added polemical brio.
Crossing the floor was an individual act(293).
For some, rejection of earlier attitudes was unqualified. 
Norman Mackenzie, graduate of the L.S.E., a dedicated New 
Statesmanite who had written large parts of Kingsley 
Martin's Laski memoir, told his audience that he had "now 
[in 1978] come to criticize the Webbs for ideas which I 
once admired them"(294). The Harold Laski of his 
youth also came very badly out of it. Other prophets 
were toppled. "The rush to engage" by liberal 
reformers - Barbara Wooton(295), or Titmuss, his 
economics and sociology "purpose-built" for the 
attainment of questionable political and moral 
objectives(296) - had run its course.- Keynes was blamed 
for having been blind to the possible misuse of economic 
finance, and there was condemnation for versatile left- 
wing Keynesians like Shonfield and Dow who had "straddled 
the borderlines between academe, journalism and the civil 
service"(297). Crosland - recently departed - had
292. M.Oakeshott, 'Conservatism: Foundations and 
fallacies', The Daily Telegraph3 29 June 1978, p. 18.
293. See the contributions to Right Turn, F.Cormack 
(ed)(1978).
294. N.Mackenzie, Socialism and Society — a new 
view of the Mebb partnership  (1978 L.S.E. lecture), p.26.
295. D.Martin, 'Superior Savagery', radio
broadcast, 26 July 1986.
296. D.Martin, 'Speaking for Welfare', The Times 
Literary Supplemen-t, 2 December 1977, p. 1400.
297. R. Pringle, The Growth Merchants  (1977), 
p.viii.
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recently departed - had simply "taken too much for 
granted" (298). The Fabian legacy was, in blunt terms,  ^ ~.»
riddled with "treachery"(299).
Vaizey, a Wilson peer, moved in the same direction? 
making a full recantation in 1979 in an appeal to voters^ 
to endorse the Conservative party, blaming the country's 
economic ills on high taxation and excessive union 
influence. As for his own version of the social 
democratic creed - of theory preceding action in an 
ordered progression - "this process now seems to me to te 
fundamentally misconceived"(300). He had ceased to 
believe that a coherent body of social knowledge existed • 
which was capable of securing a better tomorrow. The most- 
spectacular failure was in his own field of economics - 
where leading economists had been unable to agree about 
the principal causes ef unemployment or inflation, or how 
they could best be remedied. In the intellectual contest 
which had been raging, Norman Stone later wrote:
"Vaizey himself recognised, after more 
than three decades, that his powerful voice had 
been used on the wrong side"(301).
But he did not, in rationalizing his switch of 
allegiance, go on to embrace Hayekian liberalism. He 
made the more pessimistic leap towards disbelief, with 
nothing but hunch and adjustment, in Oakeshott's 
thinking, to stand in its stead. His change of front was
298. C.Welch, ' Crosland' Reconsidered',in
Encounter , January 1979, pp.83-95.
299 G.Hutton, in The Emerging Consensus? f A.Seldon 
(ed)(1981), footnote- p. 6.
300. J. Vaizey, ^Inquest on a Movement' , Encounter , 
January 1980, p. 84.
301. N.Stone, 'Turning from Experience', The* Sunday 
Times, 25 January 1987, p. 58.
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also - therefore - a change in the form of commitment* 
and away from certainty. He set about applying the power 
of reason to show up the falsity of the ideas of 'the 
famous five', the best of their generation whose views 
Vaizey had once upon a time shared, for their misguided 
dogma that they could maximize human happiness through 
state benevolence(302).
Quite why the bulk of the Conservative party had 
been ready to go along with the major changes in society 
during and after the war occasioned increasing comment. 
The academic neglect of the Conservatives and of 
Conservatism was something of a mystery. The lack of a 
serious modern history of the party had been, when 
McKenzie was writing up his doctorate, "an appalling 
gap"(303). Hoffman's book on the Conservatives in 
opposition, concentrating on the tactical and strategic 
outlook of the party from the point of view of various 
current "theories of opposition", had only highlighted 
the void(304). He had also argued that Woolton's 
reorganization and Butler's reorientation of the party 
made little contribution to restoring the Conservatives 
to office in 1951. Beer provided some new details, 
especially for the later 1950s, but was not so 
persuasive. Some of the most notable studies of the 
post-1945 party were exercises, from the left, in 
demystification(305). But there were inherent 
difficulties - difficulties which did not apply to the ' 
parties of left-wing reform - in understanding the open,
302. J.Vaizey, In Breach of Promise  (1983).
303. R. McKenzie, ibid (1955), p.vii.
304; ■•J. D. Hof fman, The Conservat ive Party in
Opposition 1945-51  (1964).
305. N.Harris, Competition and the Corporate 
Society  (1972); B.Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservat ism 
and British Political Culture  (1973); A.Gamble, 
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sceptical and uncommitted attitude of the right poised " 
between conservation and change. The standard view, put ~ 
by Robert Blake in his Ford lectures (306), did not try 
to over-explain the party's transformation. The forties 
were "a bleak period as all who have lived through it can 
attest". But the historical lessons had been learnt. 
Historically the party had always been pulled leftwards/' • 
making it a test of character of the party leaders in 
negotiating this transition; above all, rt was important,- 
in the Disraelian manner, to prosper by adaptation. The 
pressures of war had made many of the larger changes 
necessary, changes that were perfectly acceptable to the 
party without in any way carrying an endorsement of 
socialistic or egalitarian aims. Gilmour responded to 
the growing clamour by underscoring how, in practical 1 
terms, Keynesianism was made "imperative". That the 
party had not been on the wrong track*since the war was 
his main thrust(307).
The columnist Patrick Cosgrave, writing without  ^- 
rancour or with a taste for shocking American 
sensibilities, administered a sharp jolt to such 
"superficial" beliefs(308). Cosgrave uncovered-"three - **
reasons that could account for the change of front by the - 
Tories, after their heavy defeat in the 1945 election.
They could rightfully claim part of the credit for the 
introduction of welfare reforms. The mood of the country 
in 1945, artificially magnified by the electoral system, 
was such that they were bound to accept Labour's 
proposals, and even look to improve upon them. On
306. R. Blake, ibid (1970), p.264.
307. I.Gilmour, Inside Right  - a study of 
conservatism  (1977), Chapter 1.
308. P.Cosgrave, 'The Failure of the Conservative 
Party', in The Future That Doesn't Hork  -  social 
democracy's failures in Britain,  R. Emmett Tyrrell (ed)
(1977), pp.95-125.
146
returning to office again, they appreciated that the main- 
body of legislation should not be overturned. All of 
these reasons, convincing at the time of asking, made the r 
party leadership predisposed to adjust to the new 
situation. The "massive intellectual rethink" that was 
really called for never came about. The party yielded 
too much ground, lapsing into drift and surrender, 
avoiding making any clear repudiation of the principles 
behind the extension of the state. The same had been - 
true in the years after 1964, though Heath had promised 
differently. This was not Macmillan's fault, any more 
than it had been Churchill's. Formed out of paternalist 
and radical wings(309), it remained the case that 
theirs was a socialist party, with Conservative grandees 
in charge. After the false start in 1970, Cosgrave had 
grown weary of the debilitating sameness of each party's 
response to the country's underlying economic problems.
A powerful, up-to-the-minute, counter-history was 
volunteered, dovetailing with his story of the rise of ~ ‘ 
Mrs Thatcher (a life and an attitude shaped by the 1940s 
privations(310)), coinciding with, in the words of his 
academic mentor, the business of formulating a 
distinctive Conservative political position(311).
It fell - however - to Msec Beloff, a refugee from 
the modern Liberals, to count the full cost of post-war 
collectivism. A distinguished international scholar and 
ardent Americanophile, Beloff had to his name an 
extensive range of works devoted to the loss of Britain's 
international power and prestige - what he regarded as
309. P.Cosgrave, 'Musical Chairmen', The Spectator, <
22 June 1974, p.758.
310. P.Cosgrave, Margaret Thatcher: Prime Minister
(1979), especially Chapter 5.
311. M.Cowling, 'The Present Position', in M.
Cowling (ed), ibid (1978), pp.1-24.
the dominating fact of his adult life(312) - which, 
when (anno 1964) medium power pretensions still 
prevailed, he could see did not owe entirely to factors 
"largely or wholly external to Britain itself".
Prosperity rested upon empire; but the empire in turn, 
being artificial and precarious, was an expression of the 
determination and the means to preserve and defend it.
The combination of fortuitous circumstances which had put 
Britain at the centre of a world-wide network of trade 
and finance began to alter, and with the installation of 
democratic government came a turning inwards to domestic 
affairs. The World Wars, but especially the Second, 
destroyed the imperial state of mind for good. But no 
less seriously, the philosophical divide between 
traditional liberal and socialist strands of thought had 
become confused, wakening the realistic appraisal of 
national standing(313). To centralize in the name of 
entitlement was to magnify all errors by creating a 
parasitic state, the late Lords Keynes and Beveridge the 
two individuals who had done most to damage the interests 
of their native country(314). Britain's relative 
decline having become unmistakeable, the ameliorative 
left-leaning intellectuals who had championed the 
extension of state control would have to take a large 
share of the responsibility. Populist welfare, once 
celebrated by latter-day Whigs as more than adequate 
compensation for the UK*'s reduced world influence, had 
facilitated the breakdown of social cohesion at 
home(315). The problem of describing and analysing
312. M.Beloff, Imperial Sunset  -  " Vol. 1 Britain's 
Liberal Empire 1897-1921  (1969).
313. 'Facing the World', in P . Cormackr(ed), ibid
(1978).
314. 'The Future of the State: Why it should
wither', Wew Society,  9 October 1975, p.74.
315. 'Britain since Beveridge', Encounter, June 
1978, pp.49-56.
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events just past was also an opportunity, in that the 
"angle of vision" was constantly changing, as the 
indirect consequences of events and actions made 
themselves felt(316). The pungency of Beloff’s 
observations belied the diffident tone with which he had 
started out(317). The jettisoning of controls 
alongside the fostering of an enterprise culture, and the 
popular attitudes to go with them, had had to wait until 
the 1980s; but he wrote in the conviction that, with the 
election of Mrs Thatcher’s Conservatives, the post-war 
era was finally over.
Although Beloff’s distilled history dealt 
ostensively with the years from 1914 until 1945, he was 
blunt in his denunciation of the increasing room for 
state action that the Second World War had made the space 
for, and how great "the underlying shift in political 
power and social values" that had resulted. Popular 
participation in war was the central influence in this; ' ' 
but he wished only to look at the internal politics of 
the situation. The public mood at the close of war was 
wildly "exhilarated" and "utopian", the ttigh moral tone 
and uplift disguising deeper trends that would only 
become manifest much later - above all that government 
was to be increasingly control-minded, welfare-conscious 
and interventionist. Materially and economically 
exhausted by the war - losing by winning,, in Vaizey’s 
phrase - Britain’s difficulties were compounded by the 
strong position which the forces of the left obtained. 
Hayek was not listened to. The social histories of 
consensus and improvement typical of the mid-sixties 
overlooked the fact that raised living standards had been
316. M.Beloff, Wars and Welfare - Britain 1914—1945 
(1984).
317. ’Mandrake’, The Sunday Telegraph,  16 December 
1979, p.8.
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■the product not of the creating of new wealth, but the 
redistribution of old. Organized labour was brought 
unimpeded into the very heart of central administration, 
sharpening still further the conflict over resources, so 
that the unreformed political system corresponded less 
and less to the real centres of command and influence. A 
fashionable ideological priesthood, the unquestioning 
propagators of the new creed, held sway, “clasped to the 
bosom x>f the Establishment". Optimism now hardly 
appealed to any serious student of the contemporary 
scene. Not all reforms were positive, or all reformers 
sincere. There was much to be said for the anti's, even 
the diehards, like G.M. Young, who had resisted the 
advance of 'progress'. Howarth's account of educational 
folly and, had it not been for North Sea Oil, economic 
ruin, sang the same tune(318). Blake embraced the 
neoconservative message wholeheartedly. He never had, 
and never could have voted for any other party, but in 
hankering after change, it had ceased to be Conservative 
at all(319). Only with the rethinking of recent times 
had it transpired that the post-war course had been a 
deviation from long-standing beliefs - an impression no 
one could gain from his earlier Ford lectures. Macmillan 
had done them all a great disservice. The 1945 landslide 
had been caused by the conversion of opinion formers to 
Keynesianism, which dominated British politics for a 
quarter of a century before only recently breaking down. 
Conservative acquiescence had helped mask Britain's 
economic decay and inability to compete, which is what 
Thatcherism was attempting to correct(320). The 
longer the perspective one took, the more revolutionary
318 T.E.B.Howarth, Prospect and Reality - Great
Britain 1945-1955 (1985).
319. R. Blake, Censer vat ism in an A<je of Revolut ion 
(1976), pp.19-21.
320. 'The Meaning of Thatcherism', The Daily 
Telegraph, 29 May 1987, pp.iv-v.
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1979 and after appeared to him to be.
The bias towards the study of ’party’, and in 
particular of the Labour party - a partiality first 
established in the heyday of McKenzie and Beer - worked 
to the detriment of any historical understanding of the 
"long dominance" in this century of the Conservatives.
The wide currency given to mainstream pluralist theory 
contributed further, Miliband and others had argued, to 
the poor theorizing capacity of students of British 
politics. Keith Middlemas, Reader in Modern British 
History at the University of Sussex, in a much praised 
outline sketch of Pol it ics in Industrial Society, sought 
to remedy the deficiency(321). Profoundly
dissatisfied with existing approaches to recent political 
history, whether of the journalistic, descriptive or 
case-study type, Middlemas intended, as he explained in a 
lengthy introduction, to view the past as a whole and 
all-at-once. A grand theory of governance was proposed, 
to be empirically validated.
Alone amongst the European industrial nations in the 
first half of the century, Britain had managed to avoid 
the turbulence of social disorder. Did falling back on 
evocations of "the British tradition" of wise tolerance - 
so beloved of Whig and transatlantic admirers - account 
sufficiently for this? Middlemas thought not. The form 
of parliamentary government elucidated by Bagehot may 
have endured, but the actual operation of power and 
policy had carved out new channels, robbing the ancient 
constitutional arrangements of their validity. The 
"extended state" lay at the heart of an answer.
State interference, in the years up until 1914, 
began as a means of ensuring industrial harmony. With
321. K.Middlemas, Politics in Industr ial Society - 
the experience of the British system since 1911 (1979).
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the coming of war, the trade unions were given a measure 
of involvement in the political process. Faced by the 
threat of revolution, this new arrangement was carried 
over into the postwar period, creating a “distinctive 
form of triangular collaboration in the industrial 
sphere, between government, trade unions and the business 
class". There was periodic discontent in the 1920s, but 
so too a slow-moving, unending pattern of co-operation 
and accommodation built up to contain it. The “avoidance 
of crisis" took priority, kept in being by an informal, 
always mutating and interdependent, consciously willed 
yet largely improvised, tripartite brokerage. Fashioned 
in the years of 1919-26, it reached a point of supra- 
ideological equilibrium in the time of Baldwin and 
Attlee, "enabling governments of the 1930s and 40s to 
maintain order and consent and to survive the Second 
World War as no other European state did". This system 
was not corporatist, but one where - his term - 
"corporate bias" predominated, a hidden code detectable 
at all levels of political activity and as pervasive a 
phenomenon, Middlemas asserted, as the oligarchic 
tendencies identified long ago by Michels. The state, in 
all of this, did not hold the ring; it exercised an 
important directing function, not least in the 
manipulation of popular opinion, so as to conceal the 
essential fragility of the relationship. In return for 
which, capital and labour became "governing 
institutions", enjoying enhanced power and status. By 
sheer good fortune, it lasted intact, he believed, until 
the mid-1960s.
The practical outcome had been a lessening of class 
antagonism, the exclusion of the left, and - he saw a 
connecting link - the bypassing of party and parliament. 
This rejection of the primacy of party, dating its demise 
back to the 1920s, was one of the bolder statements. 
Industry and labour, he suggested, had typically looked
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"to the state, not the political parties. Representation 
was now effectively functional (Whitehall) rather than 
territorial (the Commons). The parties themselves were 
rivals only in the sense that they competed for the prize 
of manning part of the government machine. Oratorical 
disagreements had long since ceased to reflect the real 
politics of the nation. Earlier analysts had been 
looking in the wrong place. "Party is now king", Beer 
(in 1965) had Herman Finer saying. Middlemas dethroned 
party.
This idea of the neutralising of class conflict was 
an important element in the corporatist analyses of 
Britain that were flourishing. Social equilibrium was 
built around the mutual dependence of the government and 
organized employers and unions in reaching an informal 
concordat. The weak, centre-less state (in pluralist 
accounts) became stronger by incorporating rival 
institutions into the governing process. The state ceased 
to hold the ring but entered as an active player in the 
game. In so doing, however, the influence of powerful 
vested interests restricted the limits of the possible.
So that there was a further result, which had only 
recently become fully apparent - a drawing back, over the 
same period, from the making of hard choices, at the cost 
of "political compromise, industrial feather-bedding and 
low overall growth". -But Middlemas was careful not to 
press the point too far. The revival of party forms in 
the seventies was a symptom of decline, left and right 
moving to an adversarial confrontation in an apparent 
attempt to "destabilize" the political order. Middlemas 
drew reassurance from the fact that, at least as far as 
the Conservative party was concerned, crisis avoidance 
had not been rejected in favour of ideological purity. 
After 1979 (when he acted for a time as an unofficial 
adviser to James Prior, the Secretary of State for
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Employment), the tripartite understanding came unstuck. 
This did not alter the truth for him that it was the 
scope and not the fact of state intervention that was 
being decided, once that a minimal role for the state was 
conceded(322). It even helped, in what was regarded 
as the split in the Conservative party between upholders 
of the post-war settlement and the advocates of a growth 
strategy, in defining what was still "the real 
constitution"(323).
Although only a preliminary essay, taking the story 
as far as he could reasonably go without the official 
papers for the post-1945 years, Middlemas argued that his 
opening hypothesis had much to commend it, fusing (all 
too rare an experiment) political science concepts with 
the study of contemporary history, and with enough 
precision to make stringent testing feasible. But the 
enthusiasm shown by some reviewers for his model of 
"corporate bias" was strongly tempered by other 
reservations. His approach was said not to fit for 
particular policies in particular periods(324). It 
was said to have ignored the welfare side of the 
corporatist bargain(325). It was said, lastly, to 
have uncritically accepted, and therefore been led astray 
By, 'power’ theories of political behaviour(326).
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Even allowing for the insightful purchase on the past 
which Middlemas afforded, history - the specialists told 
the generalist - is simply the wrong place to try out 
large-scale model building.
But the spectacle of an eclectic Conservative 
adopting a state-centred outlook was an intriguing one. 
Instead of envisaging the state as an abstract 
construction around which the political community is 
constituted, as the conventional Tory might have done, 
Middlemas cast it in the form of an involved agent 
pursuing aims of its own (survival, system maintenance) 
in partnership with other largely economic estates of the 
realm. Then again, he made no use of new 'public choice' 
arguments of liberal provenance which see the state 
composed of expansionist and exploitative bureaucracies - 
arguments which could have given his account a sharper 
cutting edge. It was a structural view of the state, and 
consequently an appealing one for the left - Middlemas's 
"Tory marxism", one commentator said(327), leading to 
the reflection that what was new about some of the New 
Right was that they had read the New Left(328). To 
this extent, opposites conspired in a beguiling symmetry, 
left and right combining to do down the post-war middle 
ground of the golden mean which had merged intellect with 
power and created - for its spokesmen - positions of 
authority and influence. The New Left were, in the shape 
of E.P. Thompson, "outside the whale". The New Right took 
up no less unyielding an opposition to the modern 
Leviathan. From this springs the strongest evidence for 
saying that their disparate writings - turned in on
327. F.Mount, 'The triangular economy', in The 
Spectator, 24 January 1979, pp.13-14.
328. R.Williams. 'The Politics of Poverty', The 
Guardian, 5 April 1984, p.18. See also B. Schwartz, 
'Conservatives and Corporatism', The New Lett Review, 
November-December 1987, pp.107-128.
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themselves and self-referential - were part of a pattern. 
Both were responding to the rise of a professional, 
corporate society geared to reward and efficiency, but 
with modernizing dilemmas that left it vulnerable to 
criticism; it does not follow that they cancelled each 
other out(329). This energizing of the political debate 
found its way into the historian's inquest that was - by 
the late 1970s - in full swing. From one vantage point, 
it was an unwelcome return to dogmatics; from the other, 
a very necessary liberating effect if the understanding 
of post-war Britain was to move forward.
Keynes
Of all the disputations, none was more keenly fought 
than the controversy over the political and economic 
consequences of John Maynard Keynes.
The literature on what Keynes really said and meant, 
and the relation in which his work stood to the classical 
teachings of his predecessors, had developed into the 
paramount concern of historians of economic thought. The 
General Theory departed from traditional ideas of 
political economy in suggesting that self-correcting 
economic equilibrium at the level of full employment - an 
axiomatic presupposition to the classicists - was only a 
special case; but his thinking could also, as early 
critics noted, be quite easily grafted on to the existing 
corpus of economic doctrine. Designed to combat the 
inter-war conditions .of industrial depression and mass 
unemployment, it was unclear whether his message would be 
applicable in the very different circumstances of excess 
demand brought about by the war. Oriented towards 
operational use in the real world of economy, its 
activism attracting those who favoured the investigation
329. H.Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society 
(1989), pp.516-519.
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of economic phenomena by the route of abstract 
speculation. Keynes' own intellectual fluency and 
shifting of ground - and the obscurities and 
inconsistencies in his writings - did not make the task 
of interpretation any easier; his obvious importance 
added to the competition to show how his ideas lent 
support to particular courses of action. The reaction to 
Keynes provides a useful indication as to how and why it 
is that economists disagree. The argument about the 
Keynesian apparatus of thought (his phrase from the 
introduction to the Cambridge Economic Handbooks) has 
also been an argument about the developing and refining 
of the discipline of economics.
Practically speaking, however, the theoretical force 
of Keynes's General Theory - a discussion mainly confined 
to fellow economists and economic historians - has 
spilled over into his influence on the shaping of wartime 
and post-war economic policy, an issue of far wider 
interest. The use and abuse of Keynesian economics has 
gone to make up what has been described as one of the 
major intellectual "tangles" of recent times(330). 
Policies approved by the disciples of Keynes are said to 
have gone far beyond anything Keynes himself would have 
countenanced. Keynesians have replied by maintaining 
that even Keynes did not seize the full import of his 
ideas. He helped to transform economics into a master 
science in the science of society that carried 
potentially revolutionary implications; but about this 
ultimate end Keynes avoided committing himself. For a 
long time, the view prevailed that there had indeed been 
a post-war revolution in economic management and that 
Keynes had shown governments how to achieve this - two 
decades of unparalleled expansion drove it home. The 
contrasting claim, that the revolution was neither
330. J.Vaizey, ibid (1983), p.10.
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'Keynesian', nor especially 'revolutionary', grew in 
strength as the economy began to falter. Misgivings 
about the outcome of Keynesian economics happened to 
combine with a more generalised disquiet over the 
direction of post-war,, state-inspired public policy, re­
opening fundamental questions. Limitations in the 
Keynesian approach were used to promote a reversion to 
older, once discredited ideas. The incompleteness of the 
revolution left it wide open to economically informed 
attack. It also demonstrated that economics is lacking 
exact empirical grourid-rules with which to discriminate 
between rival schools of thought, leaving room for 
considerations of a non-economic kind, unamendable to 
reasoned discussion. This was the striking paradox : the 
sharply differentiated explanations of economists which 
gave rise to the argument about the 'Keynesian 
revolution' were the very same reason preventing the 
matter from being argued to a finish.
Detail as _a Unity
The awakening of interest in the Labour governments 
of 1945-51, beginning with the combined efforts of the 
'Home Front' historians and numerous biographers, and 
helped along by the calendar, television and radio, and 
publishers' hyperbole, reached a peak in the middle 
1980s, by which time a long-awaited biography of Attlee, 
the concluding volume of the life of Bevin, two major 
studies of the government 'in the round', and the first 
full-length account of its economic policies since J.C.R. 
Dow, had all appeared, backed up by an incoming tide of 
subsidiary monographs and articles. This intense 
coverage of an under-appreciated prime minister, a hard- 
pressed reforming administration, and of the permanent 
mark which it left on the wider society, Vas of a quality 
and a quantity to suggest nothing short of an historical
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fascination- What had provoked such an academic 
effusion?
Political and economic circumstances - and the re- 
emergence of ideological controversy - had made the late 
nineteen-forties a flashpoint of contemporary debate. 
Conservative attacks on the statist trend after 1945 were 
countered by Labour's revivalist feelings for the one 
Labour administration around which the party could unite. 
But distance also lent disenchantment. The dashing of 
post-war expectations (for Marwickwho was no longer a 
Labourite) had not been apparent beforehand; even in the 
general histories of the sixties there was little inkling 
of the shattering events to come. The revised accounts 
of the second and later editions, in which the country 
was "absorbed by anxiety and resignation' (Havighurst) 
and preoccupied with "the agony of eclipse" (Robbins), 
displayed a far clearer idea of what had happened 
next(331). Left and right lamented the missed 
opportunities and wrong turnings of the immediate post­
war years, their strident criticisms rejecting all claims 
to neutrality. Competing visions of the national past 
put a radically different slant on 'our island story'.
The opening up of the official archives - released 
in annual batches running to one mile of shelving, those 
on 1945 first appearing in 1976 - was the second main 
cause of the quickening of interest. The instant 
impression of events crowding in on the government 
excited journalistic attention. The austerity notepaper 
was itself evocative for scholars starting to work 
through the files(332). Quite early on it became 
possible to show up the inadequacy of the reported news
331. A. Havighurst (1979), pp.621-623; K. Robbins, 
The Eclipse of a Great Power (1983), p.342.
332. M.Charlton, The Price of Victory (1983), p. 9.
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of the time, contrary to the view that everything can 
normally be deduced - or intelligently reconstructed - 
from a careful reading of the public prints(333). In
several instances, access had already turned the 
argument, the documents imposing their own factual 
discipline. Their limitations did not pass without 
comment. Many papers remained closed, as Shinwell, 
referring to Palestine, guessed they would be(334), or 
were, as happened with the 'atom bomb' minute, 
temporarily withheld(335); others had been 
indiscriminately destroyed. Differing departmental 
standards in sifting papers for retention, and important 
gaps in an overwhelming mass of documentation, convinced 
several former civil servants - reading back over their 
thirty year old drafts - that a fully authenticated 
record could no longer be obtained(336). Scholars were 
anyway on their guard against an excessive or exclusive 
reliance on the public records. Growing private 
(including windfall) and oral sources ensured that, in 
addition to having a through knowledge of the current 
state of the secondary literature, there was a need to 
master a widening range of primary materials. On this 
basis the central claim was made that, possessed of an 
overview of the period in all its aspects, which no 
contemporary had had, the time had now come to present a 
mature, authoritative and historically considered account 
of early post-war Britain.
333. P.Hennessy, Nhat the Papers Never Said (1985).
334 'Cabinet papers "were withheld to protect 
Bevin"', The Times, 4 January 1977, p.2.
335. P.Hennessy, 'Cabinet's atom bomb minute 
restored to file', The Times, 21 July 1980, p. 3.
336. Lord Greenhill, quoted in Contemporary History 
- practice and method, A. Seldon (ed) (1988), p.81; J.G. 
Pater, The Making of the National Health Service (1981), 
introduction; A. Robinson, review in The Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 10 1986, pp.165-185.
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The claim was advanced, it is worth remarking, in 
full knowledge of the spate of highly politicized 
verdicts on the 'new past', and of the way in which a mix 
of styles, the "scholarly" and the more "engaged", had 
jointly contributed to forming the present picture. The 
attitude which historians took to this showed how far 
thinking had changed. Mindful of the bewitching appeal 
of a partial truth, many were also much less exercised by 
fears of contaminated history that an earlier generation, 
inbred with the dogma of impartiality, would have been. 
Aware of the truism that the past is socially constructed 
(that it is invented and discovered) did not mean that 
understanding never improved. The commitment - 
detachment polarity was a false opposition, because the 
tug of war of objective and subjective influences is one 
that affects all writers. Allowing for the 
individualistic reluctance among historians to join 
forces, however, made no difference to their common 
submission to the techniques and practices of historical 
research, of historians working independently together in 
pursuit of the same goal, the whole process aiding the 
shaking off of distorting prejudice. The' influence of 
commitment was plainly, even boringly obvious. The more 
interesting issue was how a reputable, detached outlook 
comes to be established(337).
This should not be taken to mean that the 
historians, contrasted with the ideologues, did not 
revise the history that they wrote. 'Splitters' 
outnumbering 'lumpers', the professional delving into the 
microscopic detail of what could be shown to have been 
the case necessarily broke up old and introduced new 
interpretations. It was a frequently observed point made 
by those coming to the archives on the Attlee years that 
they had acquired a retrospective dramatic unity they had
337. P. Addison, 'When Neil Kinnock was in his 
pram', The London Review of Books, 5—18 April 1984, p.3.
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not possessed at the time(338). The incoherent, hand-to- 
mouth, often fumbling governmental reaction to events 
belied the idea of planned economic recovery or an 
orchestrated policy of decolonisation. Scholars alighted 
on an intricate tale of mayhem that was both complicated 
and confusing. The Attlee governments, from the word go, 
had been overwhelmed by so many difficulties on such a 
broad front, that it become all but impossible to divine 
any central purpose or guiding thread.
That so much was eventually and eventfully 
accomplished, the interconnectedness of foreign, defence 
and economic affairs adding up to an overall sense of 
success punctuated by failures, only served to enhance 
the heroic scale of the era. Today, as one Attlee man 
could assert, there were grounds for arguing about 
whether the achievements of those years were good or 
bad - but there was no denying that the total effect had 
been one of fundamental change.
But the making of this judgement - measuring by 
results - needs to be seen by the manner with which it 
was conditioned. With few exceptions, it was reached on 
the basis of the standards of historian's history, 
adopting a governing perspective of 1945 which compared 
Attlee with other prime ministers, the government with 
other (and not just other Labour) governments, and its 
record in terms of previous reforming administrations.
It was no longer a history of Labour, but a top-down view 
of that government and that period reminiscent of the 
'high politics' approach, itself a corrective reaction to 
Whiggish uplift and sociological schema. One sure sign 
of this conventionality was evident in the reluctance to 
take up the tools of other disciplines. Others were far 
more conscious of the differentness of 1945, the
338. K.Burk, review in The Political Quarterly, < 
October-Decmber 1984, pp.450-452.
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consequences of its actions reaching deep down into 
society and stretching far into the future - aspects 
which the critiques of left and right made much greater 
play with. The larger the impact, in their eyes, the 
more severe the mistakes and misjudgments. It was an 
argument about the best way of proceeding. The new 
abundance of evidence favoured a traditional historical 
approach, just as it enabled critics to stigmatize the 
type of history that tended to get written, bearing out 
the accuracy of the assertion that the Attlee governments 
of 1945-51 were, of all recent governments, the "most 
discussed and least understood"(339).
Consensus and Decline
The academic roundtable on the post-war consensus - 
developing only late on and clearly impelled by current 
politics - brought the debate to a culminating point, 
uniting several disciplines and approaches, illustrating 
the stages through which the literature had passed, and 
providing a further opportunity to set out political 
persuasions. But what gave it added impetus was its 
tying in with a very much older and long drawn out issue: 
the controversy of controversies about Britain's relative 
economic decline. This double theme absorbed many other 
concerns.
Consensus was clad originally in the garb of "Mr 
Butskell", a composite figure of fun popularized by an 
editorial in The Economist in February 1954(340), and 
later on in a Vicky cartoon. The author of the phrase 
was Richard Fort, the Conservative M.P. for Clitheroe who
339. Dustjacket comments, K.O. Morgan's Labour in 
Power 1945-1951 (1984).
340. 'Mr Butskell's Dilemma', The Economist, 13
February 1954, pp.439-441.
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had been among the new 1950 intake, had contributed to 
the ’One Nation’ group’s pamphlet on the social services, 
and was at the time Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
the Minister of Education. He had remarked over lunch 
with Norman Macrae - home affairs editor of The Economist 
- and the journalist Ian Trethowan that Butler and 
Gaitskell, both of whom he approved of, were beginning to 
resemble each other in manner and approach(341). 
Suggestions for a name to describe the phenomenon were 
tossed around, and Mr Butskell was the result. It 
implied, in Macrae’s final formulation, a form of 
constructive and moderate centrist politics, the two 
front benches admonishing their more extreme and 
"irresponsible" backbenchers. But whatever disturbed one 
half of Mr Butskell was likely to redound to the 
electoral advantage of the other - hence "Mr Butskell’s 
dilemma". Gaitskell knew who had written the article and 
rather enjoyed it; Butler, on the other hand, is thought 
to have felt that the nickname was detrimental to his 
reputation in the Tory party. It was a throwaway line 
from the journalistic, dinner table world of Westminster 
and Whitehall.
In the hands of the political scientist, "consensus" 
was transformed into a convergence of party structures 
and ideologies, a merging for electoral reasons that was 
in marked contrast to the heightened party struggle of 
the inter-war period. It was simply the way parties 
behaved in a predominantly two-party, parliamentary 
system. Conflict was to be found instead within each 
party (fuelling the academic interest in" Labour’s left- 
wing) rather' than between them, or in the process of 
negotiation and bargaining with interest groups. Largely 
a broad-brush sociological generalization, and not easily 
verifiable, it was also highly normative. The agreement
341. N.Macrae, letter to the author, 23 February
1981.
about fundamentals at the political level was one that 
was thought to reach down into the shared values of 
society. In comparison with other - especially other 
European nations - this made Britain unusually blessed. 
Even those pushing an adversarial view of party politics 
in the 1970s had to concede that party differences had 
been far less pronounced prior to 1964(342).
The earliest contemporary histories also took up the 
term as an expression of the mood of postwar, and non- 
ideological writing about the 1945 settlement grew up as 
a consequence. A middle way was traced back to the 
1930s, discerned in the morale-building of wartime and 
then - in Addison - rolled forward from the ending of 
military conflict. It was to Addison that the notion of 
consensus owed its permanent influence(343).
But the presumed demise of that same bipartisanship 
had a releasing effect upon political debate. Improving 
doctrines were satirized and postwar idols humbled. 
Consensus was elevated into a totemic abstraction, 
symbolizing the triumph of misrule.
The indisputable reality of decline - political and 
economic as well as moral - became the "leading 
problem"(344), and a "declinist" benchmark the one by 
which the performance of all post-1945 governments were 
measured(345). This, in time, influenced the consensual
342. S. E. Finer (ed), Adi'er sary Politics and 
Electoral Reform (1975), p.12.
343. D.Kavanagh and P. Morris, Consensus Pol itics- 
(1989), p.l.
344. M.Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of 
the Industrial Spirit (1981), p.3.
345. D.Walker, 'The First Wilson Governments 1964-
70', in P. Hennessy and A. Seldon (eds), Ruling
Performance (1987), p.189.
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outlook of an earlier vintage. A consensus-view had been 
a way of looking at the past; now it turned into a facet 
of that past. The full, scholarly histories of the 1980s 
- which had nothing but praise for Attlee's laying down 
of the main lines of domestic and foreign policy that had 
lasted over the next two or three decades - began to 
appear inveterately nostalgic and insufficiently 
disapproving.
Gradually these "vast" amorphous constructs" were 
taken apart and analyzed, by political historians in the 
first instance, but also by interested academics from 
other fields who took exception to the double-hit of 
consensus and decline being used as a question-begging 
premise. The range of understandings of the terms, the 
duration of the periods to which they could be said to 
refer, and their causal connections and consequences all 
invited review. Discussion of the work of Marquand, 
Gamble and Middlemas carried out under the auspices of 
the Institute for Contemporary British History (formed in 
1986 to encourage research and analysis of post-war 
British history) showed the degree to which, in talking 
about the same concepts, rival meanings were derived from 
different value judgements, drawing on contrasting 
empirical evidence and implying competing prescriptions 
for policy(346). Though not methodologically 
innovative, the argument had great political 
significance.
Several historians of social policy were the most 
active in chipping away at the 1945 edifice. Smith's 
volume on War and Social Change contained a number of 
short case studies covering life in wartime Britain which
346. Contemporary Record, Autumn 1988, Spring 1989 
and Winter 1991. The "difficulties" of consensus are 
examined in R. Lowe, 'The Second World War, Consensus and 
the Foundation of the Welfare State', Twentieth Century 
British History, Vol 1 No 2 1990, pp.152-182.
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contested the assumption of war as a radicalizing 
force(347). Wartime effects often only reinforced 
existing structures or ideas, were restricted to special 
areas, or else left traditional practices untouched. 
Continuity with pre-war was much more apparent than with 
the years after 1945, where many fresh departures had 
been only marginal or short-lived. The warfare-welfare 
thesis was a major historical "misapprehension". In 
Webster’s official history of the origins of the National 
Health Service(348), folklore was similarly swept aside 
by a carefully documented historical analysis in which 
the image of the NHS as the unique product of wartime 
agreement was redrawn. It had been the accidental 
outcome of a series of negotiated compromises struck by 
different interested parties agreeing to a temporary 
settlement which satisfied none of them, 'but around which 
a "spurious consensus" was subsequently erected, 
investing the NHS with the aura of a national institution 
and quite inadvertently legitimizing the expansion of the 
state. Webster did not go along with the new ’Tory’ 
history aimed at blackening the past (he rejected the 
charge that resource had been wastefully directed away 
from productive investment(349)). But his findings 
fitted in with the historiographical fashioning of an 
unintended, ambiguous post-war legacy - of capital and 
labour held in an uneasy state of suspension, the social 
services enlarged without a philosophy of welfare, and 
reconstruction effected without thinking through the 
dimensions of public power. The artificial solidarity of 
the war had been carried over into peacetime, encouraged
347. H.L.Smith (ed), War and Social Change —
British Society in the Second Nor Id Har (1986).
348. C.'Webster, * The Health Services since the Har
Vol 1 The NHS before 1957 (1988).
349. C.Webster, ’Is the health service safe ?’ in
The Times Higher Education Supplement, 6 October 1989,
pp.13-14.
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by a vague but self-serving consensus(350). There was 
no accord on basic values. It was more a case of an 
inconclusive stand-off between warring interests. There 
had been an historic confluence of ideas (after all, 
Laski, Keynes and Hayek were all Liberals of one sort or 
another) bringing to command a new political class allied 
to the representatives of organised labour, but the 
extent of the 1945 project was neither as great, nor the 
retreat - currently underway - from it as complete as had 
been asserted(351). It was just that the post-war 
mood of heightened expectancy had made do in place of a 
firmer theoretical basis for reform, exposing it to 
longer-term attack(352). Victory in war had enabled 
Britain to escape the questioning that other defeated 
countries had had to confront, a process of national 
introspection and evaluation - about nationality, 
statehood and citizenship - which the British were only 
now embarking upon.
The toughest-minded of these studies was the work of 
a military specialist, Correlli Barnett, who, in a book 
given wide publicity in 1986, fastened on to the 
shambolic state of Britain's wartime production as a 
metaphor for the country's misplaced priorities after 
1945. Explicitly relating consensus with decline,
Barnett offered his own recipe for the kind of state-led 
modernization that ought to have been pressed with vigour 
immediately the war was won. Written with verve and 
conviction, the book was hard to ignore, even to those
350. R.Silburn, 'Beveridge and the war-time 
consensus', Social Policy and Administration, March 1991, 
pp.13-14.
351. K.Young, 'Where did the ideals of the class of 
'45 go ?', The Listener, 10 July 1986, pp.11-12.
352. J.Harris, 'Political ideas and the debate on 
state welfare, 1940-45', in H.L.Smith, ibid (1986), 
pp.233-263.
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who found its conclusions unpalatable. Because the whole 
thrust of the case, in defiance of accepted opinion, was 
inseparable from the author, it revived once more the 
doubtful nature of historical argument. It confronted 
full on the very claim to dispassionate impartiality 
which the historical profession had been making for its 
latest contributions to contemporary history. If one of 
the most balanced books - McCallum's - was also one of 
the earliest, the most hostile reception was reserved for 
an account that was closest to our own time.
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3: Stepping Stones
We began this account by introducing the idea of 
an - admittedly contrived - antimony between a pure, 
presuppositionless, uncommitted form of inquiry and the 
contrary notion that all viewpoints are more or less * 
committed, value-based elaborations of rhetoric. It was 
suggested that these rival outlooks were in fact 
reconcilable once it is accepted that an objective 
representation of the historical past is capable of 
arising out of a multitude of subjective versions of 
history, each of which is open to the critical and 
controlling effects intrinsic to the historical 
approach - that, to rephrase Edmund Burke, although the 
individual historian may be foolish, the historical 
species is wise.
A popular - Popper calls it the decisive(353) - 
way to measure intellectual- advance-is in-terms of - “• • 
progress by disagreement, the frontiers of a^subject - 
being marked by disputes and altercations which, in time 
and as more evidence is unearthed,-give way to greater 
comprehension as differing viewpoints come into closer 
conformity and outdated ideas are modified or discarded. 
In such a 'developmental' frame, it matters not from 
which quarter or for what reason an argument is first 
proposed, providing that the argument can be made to 
withstand the test of rigorous scrutiny. The creative 
urge, which may well be inspired by values or interests, 
is superceded by a critical, objectified testing, in what 
are not two opposing but "two successive and 
complementary episodes of thought that occur in every 
advance of scientific understanding"(354). In this
353 K. Popper, in conversation with B.-Magee, Modern 
British Philosophy (1971), p.176.
354 P.Medawar, The Art of the Soluble (1967),
p.118.
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way, it is held, good theories are replaced by still 
better ones, each of the stages in the discussion acting 
as a stepping stone to an improved, and increasingly 
agreed-upon, appreciation of the past. Objectivity 
equates with a significant or marked degree of scholarly 
unanimity; it is not the source but rather the result of 
the socially organised objectivity of any subject.
This might, as sceptics like to point out, be a 
convincing account of how the academic study of history 
ought to proceed; but in practice it seldom does.
Instead of a purely logical spur to knowledge, others 
draw attention to the different and ineradicable values • 
which inform the work of different members of an academic 
community and which lead them to think differently, these 
values being what they they bring to and use to interpret 
the information they have collected. Without such 
variations in value-outlook, all profitable dialogue 
would cease(355). The core values themselves may be 
not only beyond dispute; they may also imply widely 
varying estimations of what can be said to represent 
constructive intellectual advance, or whether indeed such • '
a thing is possible. Incompatible explanations cry out 
for resolution; incommensurable accounts are, to all 
intents and purposes, incomparable. When truth is at 
issue, on this view, the majority principle plays no 
part.
From the foregoing history of the histories (Chapter 
2), it should have become apparent that each of the most 
important ways of approach and modes of- inquiry manifests 
and embodies - in and of itself - the alternating pulls 
of the detached and the committed, the descriptive and 
the normative, the factual and the evaluative. Each
355 T.Kuhn, 'Reflections on my critics', in
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, I.Lakatos and 
A.Musgrave (eds)(1970), p.262.
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embraces and illustrates, in other words, the possibility 
of and the limitations placed upon an enhanced historical 
understanding. A review of some of the major stages will 
remind us of this.
* the naive descriptivism of the traditional English 
approach to the study of politics, which 'took the world 
as it found it', while imparting hidden liberal
asssumptions;
* the quarrel - beginning in the 1930s - over the 
leftist belief that objective reason (employed to plan 
the nation's resources or define the public good) 
necessarily assisted the progressive cause;
* the closed politics of 1945 and after, confined to 
the eye-witness immediacy of the first autobiographical 
and biographical accounts, qualified by party political 
considerations and motives of self-justification;
* disputes about the philosophical meaning and 
statistical measurement of abstract values like equality;'1
* the double-edged nature of political science, and
of the new social sciences in general (pure and
scientific, applied and policy-oriented);
* the Anglo-marxist insistence on theory being only 
a preliminary guide to action;
* the sharp distinction between labour historians ‘ 
sympathetic to the left, and those whose authority was 
thought to derive from the insignificance of their * 
sympathies;
* the rise of the early contemporary histories, and
the arguments over relevance and perspective, the
influence of younger, more engaged scholars, the 
ambiguity of official history, the dangers in the over­
identification of biographer and subject, and the 
capacity of history to hold other disciplines (like those 
making up the social sciences) to account by having 
recourse to historical particulars;
* the impact of partisan debate from the late 1960s
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on, which made objectivity into a bias, spawned an 
alternative rationality, and fostered competing but 
exclusively self-validating outlooks;
* in its wake, the appearance of fully authenticated 
historical accounts which, in recognising and exploiting 
the radical perspectival shift, showed how great a degree 
of detachment was still realisable;
* the inter-disciplinary debate on post-war 
consensus and decline, and the role (if any) for the 
maverick historian.
To automatically assume a 'developmental' growth of 
the literature would be to adopt an as yet uncorroborated 
assertion. The purist will inquire whether, given the 
special difficulties attaching to the history of the 1945 
Labour governments, an increasingly objective view of the 
recent past has indeed obtained - though this carries 
with it the unanswerable requisite of what a truly 
objective description would look like. But, although the 
influence of pre-formed attitudes is readily acknowledged 
on all sides (if only to be later discounted) it may also 
happen that the essential assumptions and opinions of a 
school or approach are hammered out in the course of 
debates about relatively specific issues at the time when 
they are being argued over. Controversies which are 
futile to some are fertile for others. Rival values 
might then form not just the start of an argument, but 
also be the motive force in determining the direction 
which an argument takes. Any assessment of the actual 
effect or non-effect of prior values and preconceptions 
must come down to a matter of empirical' investigation of 
what can be shown to have been the case in particular 
contexts and instances.
The fifteen case histories which follow are taken as 
having constituted some of the salient points of 
contention between and within differing schools of
173
thought which have had a bearing on the historical debate 
surrounding the Attlee governments. They have been 
arranged in rough chronological sequence, with cross- 
referencing wherever individual themes overlap and 
interpenetrate, reflecting the importance given to the 
circumstances in which they were first brought to life. 
Although any attempt to impose an artificial pattern on 
the chaotic vitality of more than forty years of writing 
must appear somewhat arbitrary, it may be helpful to 
think of a succession of 'problems' with which the 
principal contributors have been dealing, the 
concentration on a genealogy of problems promoting cross- 
disciplinary exchange. Sharing the common aim of 
reaching an understanding about the recent past, the 
diverse outlooks and approaches unite in a joint 
historical enterprise.
1945
It was by good fortune - as much as astute foresight 
- that the "sensational reversal" in the general election 
of 1945 should have been the object of the first serious 
academic study of an electoral campaign in 
Britain(356). R. B. McCallum, Fellow of Pembroke 
College, Oxford, had been casting around for a research 
proposal to justify funding from Nuffield College and hit 
upon the idea of examining the imminent election, as it 
was lived through and as a guide to future 
historians(357). His suggestion at once accepted, 
McCallum, with his main collaborator Alison Readman, and 
a team of volunteer students, immediately set about 
amassing the published party literature and propaganda 
(including election addresses) and a selection of the 
local, regional and national press reports - supplemented 
by sketches of the electoral fight in a few hand picked 
seats - out of which a detached record of the six weeks 
of electioneering could be composed. But McCallum, a man 
of strong convictions, also had before him the harmful 
myth-making perpetrated by assorted radicals and writers 
of advanced opinion, including John Maynard Keynes, after 
the last 'Khaki' election, in 1918, which had - in 
McCallum's view - greatly contributed to the fatal 
denigration of the Versailles treaty(358),. Concerned 
to thwart the emergence of similar misrepresentations 
after 1945, he wanted to photograph the election "in 
flight", as he later put it, before any falsehoods could
356. R.B.McCallum and A.Readman, The British General 
Election of 1945 (1947).
357. D.Kavanagh, 'On Writing Contemporary Electoral 
History' in Electoral Studies, 1 1982, pp.117-118.
358. R.B.McCallum, Public Opinion and the Last Peace 
(1944).
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•take hold. Disavowing any attempt at a full-scale work 
of electoral sociology - of the kind pioneered in France 
by Andre Siegfried - he nevertheless brought into being 
the inaugural volume in the post-war series of Nuffield- 
sponsored election surveys. Psephology (McCallum's half- 
serious word from the Greek for the casting of a pebble 
into an urn) was born.
Convinced that the ending of the war in 1945 marked 
a decisive turning-point, McCallum and Readman were 
otherwise suitably circumspect in their judgements, 
wishing only to provide a reliable account and 
commentary. If the great turnover was a surprise, 
reasons could be foiind for it. They discounted the 
importance of the Laski affair as an election stunt, 
arguing that, rightly or wrongly, the contest had been to 
a large extent a retrospective verdict on the events of 
the inter-war years. The popular perception of the 
recent past was what had mattered, although the ultimate 
justice of this charge would have to be left for others 
to determine later. Churchill's prestige had not proved 
sufficient by itself to overcome Labour's widely 
propagated and devastatingly effective denunciation of 
the 'Old Gang'. The issues which most exercised the 
voters - namely housing and reconstruction - were ones 
which enabled Labour to point up the broken pledges after 
1918. The majority of the electorate, and even the 
younger parts of it, appeared to have been "fully 
resolved" long in advance, and were not swayed by any 
late appeals. As for the Services vote, blamed at the 
time by the Tories for their defeat, this had been 
relatively low, at aCround sixty per cent. Gallup polls 
taken during the campaign were reasonably accurate, but 
these aside (and they were not taken too seriously) the 
election forecasters had fared badly - it was their 
'Waterloo' also. In terms of party politics, the authors 
saw the election as being on a par with the earth-moving
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outcomes of 1832 and 1906, but they were unsure which 
would prove to be the more telling - Labour's rise to 
unshared office, or -the historic conservative reverse.
The squeezing out of the Liberal vote - McCallum's own 
party - had worked in Labour's favour. Either way there 
was no cause for concern. There had been a reassertion 
of “the two-party antithesis". With the peaceful and 
remarkably speedy changeover of government, the working 
of the parliamentary system was endorsed.
Finished so soon afterwards, the Nuffield study bore 
all the tell-tale signs of an 'instant' account.
Something of the flavour and excitement of the hustings 
was conveyed to the reader, as when Churchill rose to 
address his audience in Glasgow. Good use was made of 
ephemeral election material that would soon have 
vanished. An account now existed of the climax of the 
democratic process. That it was impossible to arrive 
prematurely at a view of the longer-term importance of 
the election was no surprise. Historical 
reinterpretations were bound to follow. They would now 
at least have to accord with some basis of fact. This 
factual core was not, however, all that statistical. The 
national 'swing', as a rough measure of the changeover of 
votes from one party to another, was introduced in an 
appendix, in an attempt to point out how much less of a 
chance result it was and how little was needed to create 
a landslide. But the science of voting was still in its 
early stages. Judged by the original aim of nipping new 
myths in the bud, McCallum and Readman could claim some 
success. "Not all elections have labels", they wrote.
The 1945 election remained thereafter "unnamed", 
incapable of easy encapsulation.
For all its novelty, the Nuffield monograph was not 
altogether cogent. Reviewers found it hard to 
distinguish between indisputable fact and the more
personal of the authors' observations, so closely were 
the two entwined(359). Insufficient attention had 
been paid to the important pre-election period, and to 
the manoeuvrings which had preceded the drama of the 
campaign itself. More discussion of the evolution of 
party strategy would have been helpful. Most seriously 
of all, there was next to nothing about the background 
influences which had driven the voters to vote in the way 
that they did. C.S. Emden - in arguing that the 1945 
election was the straight 'man' or 'measures' contestpar 
excellence (showing that he accepted the primacy of 
policy over personality in all but the most exceptional 
of circumstances) pointed out that "no convincing 
explanation has yet been given of the choice that the 
people then made"(360). This was not, it is true, an 
aim that McCallum and Readman had intended to 
pursue(361). But the absence of this aspect, and of 
what Lewis Namier called "the class element"(362) in 
voting, was evidence of the drawbacks in the Nuffield s 
method.
The reasons for this reticence stemmed from * 
McCallum's basic approach as much as from his own 
political outlook. McCallum was a rationalistic liberal 
of the John Stuart Mill type, entertaining a notion of 
the enlightened voter doing his civic duty, critically 
weighing up the issues, not to be looked at 'in the 
mass', and able - as the wartime sacrifices had shown - 
to rise above material considerations. The subdued mood
359. For example,' L. Beales in The Political Quarterly 
Vol 18 1947, pp.268-270.
360. C.S.Emden, The People and the Constitution 
(2nd ed 1956), p.243.
361. R.S.Milne, 'The Study of Parliamentary Elections'in 
The Cambridge Journal (August 1952), p.690.
362. L.B.Namier, 'Two General Elections: 1945 and 1950 
in Avenues of History (1952), p.187.
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of 1945 matched the hour. The pity was that most voters, 
although liberal, were not always Liberal. The motives 
of the voting public were not, however, something he 
wanted to delve too deeply into. He did not intend 
pushing the study of voting very far, nor did he think 
that it should be(363). To do so would be to take 
away some of the charm and mystery of what was still an 
"infinitely complex" process.
Even so, the development of electoral sociology 
towards regional and even constituency-level analyses was 
the next logical step. Campbell and Birch examined the 
political and social character of the North-West of 
England, homing in on Stretford in the 1950 
election(364). Studies of Glasgow and Greenwich - 
hitherto a weathervane seat - were also carried 
out(365). More precise efforts were made to classify 
and quantify the gradations of social class along the 
lines of research in the United States. Out of all this, 
the survey results did little to confirm the ideal of the 
reasoning voter. Voting, in Birch’s eyes, came about by 
force of habit rather than deliberate choice. Elections, 
it appeared, were not won or lost "on the issues". The 
vital floaters, who comprised anything up to one-fifth of 
the total electorate, proved to be relatively uninformed 
and uninterested. Voters were in some sense non- 
rational. The effect of these findings made the failure 
of the second Nuffield survey, written by H.G. Nicholas 
for the campaign of February 1950, to suggest what had 
caused so many voters to change their minds over the
363. R.B.McCallum, ’The Study of Psephology’ in 
Parliamentary Affairs, Winter 1955, pp.508-513.
364. ’Politics in the North-West’ in The Manchester 
School of Economic and Social Studies, September 1950, pp.217- 
243.
365. S.B.Chrimes(ed), The General Election in Glasgow, 
February 1950 (1950).
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previous parliament still more apparent(366).
Interested students had to wait until the 
publication of Bonham's The Middle Class Vote (1954) for 
a clearer idea of what kind of voters had voted for which 
party in the elections of 1945, 1950 and 1951. Using 
sampling data collected by the British Institute of 
Public Opinion (a Gallup affiliate) in those earlier 
elections, Bonham was able to make a rough but better 
estimate of voting affiliations than could be derived 
simply from the voting returns. Although his class 
categorization was disconcertingly loose(367) - the 
middle classes being defined as all those other than 
manual wage earners and their dependants - he succeeded 
in knocking on the head what The Economist called "that 
old and dubious cliche"(368) that middle class voters 
held the balance of power at election time. The Labour 
party had certainly broadened its appeal in 1945 to 
attract white collar workers and lower professionals/ 
particularly in the suburbs and the South, making up to 
20% of its total vote, and helping it to forge a broad- 
based coalition of support. But those who floated were 
drawn from all the social strata. There was no such 
thing as a typical 'Labour' or 'Conservative' voter-;- —
Numerically the Conservatives commanded almost as many 
votes from the working class (6,200,000) as from the 
middle (6,500,000). If anything, it was the distribution 
of the by far larger working class vote Which determined 
the outcome of an election, so that an investigation of 
the working class deferential seemed most needed. It 
followed that neither of the main parties was
366. H.G.Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950
(1951).
367. See the review by J.F.S. Ross in The Pol it ical 
Quarterly, April-June 1955, pp.198-199.
368. 'The Results Analysed' in The Economist, 4 March
1950, p.468.
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predominantly a class party in the way that had always 
been taken for granted (though many voters saw them as 
such). Thus it was - as others concluded - that party 
rivalry modified rather than exacerbated class animosity, 
indicating that class conflict "had not eaten too deeply 
into the British soul"(369).
In truth, the use of sample surveys could only be 
taken so far. An overall understanding of voting had 
necessarily to be impressionistic. As David Butler - who 
took over the Nuffield series in the 1950s — remarked 
about Bonham's study, "by* themselves his statistics prove 
nothing":
".....  It is highly suggestive that the
suburbs and the middle class swung 
disproportionately heavily against Labour 
between 1945 and 1950, yet, on its own, it 
remains merely an interesting fact. It only 
assumes major significance in an explanation of 
the events of the period that must perforce be 
based on qualitative observation and even 
intuition"(370).
In other words, the historical description of an 
election, of its antecedents and its circumstances of the 
kind which McCallum had initiated could not be dispensed 
with - this was the ultimate justification for the 
Nuffield works of contemporary history. To those seeking 
safety in the figures, there could be no "final answers", 
"no immaculate version of the swing". The subject had 
not developed as quickly as many had hoped, its
369. Variously, R.McKenzie in The Twent ieth Century,
July 1955, pp.82-83; 'Who Floats ?' in The Economist, 15 ■ 
January 1955, pp.169-170.
370. D.Butler, The Study of Political Behaviour (1958),
P. 63.
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limitations, in spite of the resuscitation of the idea of 
the 'party image', had not been overcome. Notwithstanding 
these disclaimers, the sceptics were adamant. William 
Pickles, a former speech writer for Attlee and Reader in 
Political Science at the London School of Economics - was 
foremost among those in arguing that the pollsters had 
taught very little, the psephologist even less, beyond 
providing “more systematic confirmation of things we 
already thought we knew"(371). The country was far 
more differentiated than students of voting implied. The 
problem was that too many veered off into punditry, which 
may - by making voters most conscious of what they were 
doing - by influencing opinions. This was not to suggest 
that experts were allowing their own preferences to 
intrude. It was simply that they were always trying to 
make more out of it than could be safely substantiated. 
They had fallen into the trap of assuming the statistical 
to be scientific. * The poor record of the polling 
organizations in predicting election results in advance 
was sufficient proof to show how hazardous it was trying 
to measure the imponderable. The rise and fall of 
psephology, the Master of Sidney Sussex College, 
Cambridge, wrote, was an appropriate cautionary tale for 
traditional historians(372). No doubt the factors 
that affected voting behaviour were important; it was 
just, as Pickles lamented, that disappointingly little 
real progress as to why people vote the way they do had 
been made in the time since the Nuffield series had got 
underway - "And on that we are 'just as ignorant, or very 
nearly so, as we were in 1945'(373), which is where it
371. W.Pickles, 'Psephological Dyspepsia' in The
Twentieth Century, July 1955, p.31.
372. D.Thomson, ibid (1969), p.85.
373. W.Pickles, 'Psephology Reconsidered in The
Political Quarterly, October-December 1965, p.466. See also
the discussants in The General Election of 1964 by H.
Berrington et al, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
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Planning: For and Against
Although the idea of economic planning of the 
nation's resources initially meant different things to 
different people - generating a highly structured 
argument(374) between protagonists in the course of 
adapting, revising and even abandoning their respective 
points of view - the so-called post-war debate of 
'planners' and 'anti-planners' narrowed down to a 
convenient shorthand : planning was what the Labour party 
had promised in its 1945 manifesto and planning was what 
it had set about doing. It was Herbert Morrison's - and 
Labour's - proudest boast. Britain was to be the first 
major country "to attempt to combine large-scale economic 
planning with a full measure of individual rights and 
liberties"(375). The efficient direction of essential 
commodities implied nothing more than putting "first 
things first". Many of the wartime physical oontrols 
remained in place, simplifying Labour's efforts, but 
something less drastic than out-and-out wartime 
regimentation was required. Commitments had to be 
considered in relation to existing resources, and targets 
set by which to guide production. The government, the 
1947 Economy Survey cautioned, could only do so much;
"the tasks were for the nation as a whole, and only the 
combined efforts of everyone could carry them 
through"(376).
Arguments about The Road to Serfdom had not abated. 
After Barbara Wooton"s~quickfire response(377)(Hayek
374. T.Smith, The Politics of the Corporate Economy 
(1979).
375. The Peaceful Revolution — speeches by Herbert 
Morrison (1949), p.13.
376. Economic Survey for 1947 (Cmnd 7046) p.32.
377. B.Wooton, Freedom under Planning (1945).
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had shown her the manuscript prior to publication),
Herman Finer weighed in with the U.S. Edition of Road to 
Reaction (378), complaining that Hayek's slippery slope 
premonitions squeezed out all the moderates - a book 
whose release in England Hayek threatened to block unless 
certain references were removed. Dalton, now Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, could rag the Conservatives with being 
"slaves to Hayek", but there were few stout defences of 
individualism. John Jewkes (previously the head of the 
Economic Section of the War Cabinet) was one of the few 
to detail the absurdities of the new planning 
restrictions, believing as he did that Hayek's arguments 
had never been confuted(379). Still, as Schumpeter 
remarked, his was not an'attack on the philosophical * 
plane. Jewkes seemed to be bothered not by planning but 
by bureaucracy(380). Nor had he made any mention of 
high taxation, which left to itself would herald the 
march into socialism and could, as Clark had warned in 
1945, if the tax ratio exceeded the "iron barrier" of one 
quarter of the national income, be in the long run 
inflationary. Richard Law - the son of Bonar Law and a 
Conservative front-bencher - also followed Hayek in 
pointing to the uncertainty of planning on the basis of 
poor information(381). But the very weakness of the 
resistance to left-wing thinking was itself taken to be 
symptomatic. Michael Oakeshott's contribution stood out 
in this regard. Unimpressed by Durbin's case for 
democratic socialism(382), he launched a broadside at
k__________________________________________
378. H.Finer, Road to Reaction (1945).
379. J.Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning (1948).
380. J.A.Schumpeter, 'English Economists and the 
State-Managed Economy', The Journal of Political Economy, 
October 1949, pp.371-382.
381. R.Law, Return from Utopia (1950).
382. M.Oakeshott, The Cambr idqe Review, 19 April 
1940, p.348.
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the growth of two legends, one about mass unemployment 
and the fear of a new slump, which the Conservative party 
had swallowed, the other about the beneficial effects of 
war upon society which it had not. In two contentious 
articles in The Cambridge Journal(383), of which he was 
editor, he displayed an urbane scepticism of the human 
addiction to "rationalism”, made incarnate by the Attlee 
regime. Works of party doctrine, whether of the left or 
the right, he saw as manifestations of the same 
rationalist creed. Of the assault by Hayek, and others, 
he was equally scathing - "A plan to resist all planning 
may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the 
same style of politics".
Even so, events after 1945 confirmed Hayek in his 
belief that, in von Mises' crisp formulation, all welfare 
is tyranny(384), and that the end result of a social 
service economy, such as Labour had been introducing, 
would eventually turn out to be no less traumatic than 
had the older, fully fledged, ’hot' socialist ideals 
prevailed(385). It was a distinction to him without a 
difference. This change of tack certainly makes it 
harder to assess the validity of his original, elusive 
notion of the ever-expanding state(386). But he cited 
Labour's flirtation with the "conscription of labour" in 
1947 as proof of the way in which socialist governments 
could be driven, unwillingly and yet because of the logic 
of their whole thinking, in the direction of increased
383. 'Scientific Politics' and 'Contemporary 
British Politics', The Cambridge Journal 1947-48,
pps.347-358 and 474-490.
384. See, for example, -his Bureaucracy (1945).
385. F.A.Hayek, Foreword to the 11th impression of
The Road to Serfdom (University of Chicago 1956), pp.iii- 
xix.
386. N.Barry, 'Is There a "Road to Serfdom"?',
Government and Opposition, Winter 1984, pp.52-67.
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coercion.
The case in point was a telling one. The Labour
government had been caught unawares by the coal shortage
\
which broke in February 1947, leaving manufacturing 
industry paralysed, exports plunging, and - for a few 
brief weeks - unemployment reaching as high as 1,900,000. 
The 'Keep Left' group of Labour MPs took the opportunity 
to demand an intensification of planning, urging the 
establishment of a Minister of Economic Affairs with the 
power to override the normal interdepartmental 
machinery(387). A further setback came in July, when 
the pound was made convertible, speculation against the 
currency rapidly expending the American credit loan. The 
cabinet was reluctant to use compulsion to steer labour 
into seriously under-manned industries, before finally 
resorting to the emergency imposition of the Control' of 
Engagement Order in August. Evan Durbin, Parliamentary 
Secretary in the Ministry of Works, defended the decision 
as mild and temporary, privately clashing with Hayek at 
the time. In fact, Durbin almost resigned over the issue 
but could not tell Hayek, who later found out and wrote 
to apologize(388). Machinery and materials were 
controlled; labour had to be persuaded. It was, Durbin 
considered, the single most important problem confronting 
the government and its entire economic strategy - "when 
this problem is resolved - but not before - the 
practicability of combining economic planning with 
individual liberty will have been demonstrated"(389).
With the resignation of Dalton, and his replacement
387. 'Keep Left', a New Statesman pamphlet (1947).
388. Letter to the author from Elizabeth Durbin, 25 
June 1985.
389. E.F.M.Durbin, 'The Economic Problems Facing
the Labour Government' in Social ism: The British Way (D.
Munro, ed)(1948), p.29.
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by Cripps, planning ''targets' were replaced by a much 
looser range of 'forecasts', increasing attention was 
paid to budgetary policy as a means of managing the level 
of demand, and the Treasury - after uneasily co-existing 
alongside the short-lived M.E.A. - established a leading 
role(390). This was not, to those implementing the 
changes, seen as an abandonment of planning. At first 
sight, as Worswick described the turn of events(391), 
there had indeed been relaxation of wartime controls over 
the six-year period up until 1950, the burden of which 
was taken up by tax and monetary policy. But the trend 
fluctuated, the bite of some controls (such as price 
controls, part of the 1948 package of wage restraint) 
even tightening over time. Without direct controls, he 
believed, employment could not have been maintained at 
its post-war high. More generally, Keynesian theory 
addressed itself to conditions of excess demand just as 
well as it might have to a situation of demand 
deficiency.
The truth of this last proposition was the most 
contested of all, the argument about exactly where Keynes 
had stood (Keynes died in 1946) being brought to a head 
by Roy Harrod's life of Keynes (1951)(392). The 
central charge, popularized by The Economist, was that 
post-war Britain was plagued by chronic inflation (stoked 
up by Dalton), an excess of misdirected planning and an 
aversion to thrift - with all of these the fault could be
390. D.N. Chester, 'Machinery of Government and
Planning' in G.D.N. Worswick and P. Ady, The British
Economy 1945-1950 (1952), pp.336-364.
391. G. D. N. Worswick, in Worswick and Ady, ibid
(1952), esp.310-312.
392. R.F.Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes 
(1951).
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laid at the door of Keynesian doctrine(393). Keynes 
may have been waking up to the dangers - Harrod printed 
some of his favourable comments about The Road to Serfdom 
- but his disciples were divided and his inheritance 
disputed. Harrod's own propensities were felt to have 
clouded this issue(394). Hayek it was who added the 
intriguing story that Keynes, shortly before he died, 
vowed to swing round public opinion should the use to 
which his ideas were being put get out of hand(395). 
Dalton wrote in person to the editor of The Economist to 
rebut any false impressions:
"I speak with a degree of knowledge shared 
by very few, when I say that in the last nine 
months of his life, when he was with me at the 
Treasury, he never wished, as you did and still 
do, to see money less cheap or employment less 
full"(396).
In cooler moments, a more balanced view could, 
emerge. One finds it said - in the same journal only a 
few weeks later(397) that, compared with the wrangling 
of the nineteen thirties, the range of economic opinion 
had distinctly narrowed, blurring the theoretical line 
between the left and right. Some central planning was 
accepted, even if its extent was not. The reduction of
393. 'John Maynard Keynes', The Economist, 27
February 1951, pp.182-184.
394. H.D.Henderson, in The Spectator, 26 January
1951,pp.116-118.
395. F.A.Hayek, in The Journal of Modern History,
June 1952, p.198.
396. Letter in The Economist, 2 February 1951,
P . 256.
397. 'The Basis of Agreement - Economic Literature 
Since the War', unsigned, The Economist, 17 March 1951, 
P P . 609-611.
inequality was assumed, although discussion continued 
about how far it could be practically reduced. Public 
and private interests combined, without being in any way 
fixed. Occasional outbursts aside (from Balogh as much 
as from Jewkes), most economists had been chastened by 
"the Keynesian explosion", their sharp differences behind 
them - a development which was, to the anonymous 
commentator, all to the good.
If it was the economists who had made a head start 
in discussing the course of Labour and its policies, this 
was because the language of politics was now largely 
economic, turning on economic criteria. The habit of 
dealing with the economy in the aggregate rather than at 
the level of the individual or the firm followed Keynes.
It made manipulation of economic trends largely a matter 
of technique, the economic problem an "unnecessary 
muddle" that the power of critical reasoning, inspired by~ 
the movement in favour of social reform, was within reach 
of conquering. This did not mean that ultimate values 
were forgotten (Robbins's classical emphasis on the * 
separation of economic description from political 
prescription was widely misunderstood). Roll pointed out 
that Keynesian theory carried possibilities for both good 
and evil(398). The conscious repudiation of laissez 
faire alienated many traditionalists. On the other hand, 
the "greatness" of Keynes to a more junior economist like 
Crosland lay in the fact that Keynesian ideas, concerned 
in the main with economic stability, "[did] not bear on 
the fundamental issue of capitalism versus 
socialism"(399). When it came to specific issues of 
policy, economists were more them likely to divide on
398. E.Roll, A History of Economic Thought (4th 
impression 1949), pp.503-506.
399. Tribune, June 24 1951, p.6.
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economic grounds, and economic grounds alone(400).
A clutch of American studies grappled with the 
difficulties of describing an economic system that was 
"increasingly both socialist and capitalist, both 
democratic and bureaucratic, both planned and 
unplanned"(401). R.A. Brady's Crisis in Britain - 
Plans and Achievements of the Labour Government, sent to 
the printers in July 1949, pointed the way. Brady, from 
the Bureau of Business and Economic Research at the 
University of California, had known Laski in the 1930s 
and had written for the Left Book Club series(402).
As an analyst of American business power, he was 
recruited to the Federal Office of the Price 
Administration in 1941. J.K. Galbraith, a past student, 
defended him before a hearing by the House of 
Representatives into alleged subversives on the O.P.A. 
staff(403). Brady's text read like an industry-by- 
industry statistical manual. Laski's contacts had also 
been of help. Brady talked with many MPs, academics and 
even civil servants (Robert Hall read through the 
manuscript), as well as Labour Ministers, including 
Cripps, trying to discover at first hand Labour's real 
intentions. The parallels he drew with the American New 
Deal were instructive. He emphasized the non-socialist 
antecedents of the 1945 programme, referring to the 
wartime coalition reports recommending public control,
400. See the discussion on the merits of
devaluation in the late 1940s in T.W. Hutchinson, 
Economists and Economic Planning in Britain 1946-66 
(1968).
401. R.A.Dahl, 'Hierarchy and Democracy' in
Research Frontiers in Politics and Government (1955), 
pp.46-47.
402. R.A.Brady, The Structure and Spirit of German 
Fascism (1936).
403. J.K.Galbraith, A Life in Our Times (1981),
P . 141.
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and the strand of pragmatic thinking which this 
suggested. The same or similar reforms, heralded in 
Britain under the socialist banner, had been enacted in 
pre-war America as a means of salvaging, not 
substituting, free enterprise, and elements of a rescue 
operation were apparent in Britain too. Planning was 
restrained, while the newly nationalized industries had 
become the suppliers of services to business. Labour's 
'middle way', though it hardly constituted a definite 
philosophical position, seemed to be tending in the 
direction of "the correction of the abuses of economic 
power in the interests of effecting a symbiosis between 
political democracy and efficient private' enterprise". 
Worker's control, as Dahl had shown, had been expressly 
rejected(404). The general structure of British 
society was not being seriously altered. War had been the 
prime redistributive agency, welcoming in a form of 
'humanized capital'. Adam Ulam, in his useful but scarce 
treatise on The Philosophical Foundat ions o~f British 
Social ism (1951) said much the same thing, only 
differently. The ascent of the British Labour party had 
come about as a response - and a characteristically 
pragmatic one - to the drawbacks and scarcities of an 
industrial system losing its dynamism; it reflected the 
needs and interests of its working-class base; and it had 
given rise, over the course of time and with increasing 
agreement, to government supervision of the economic life 
of the nation. A question of principle had been turned 
into a matter of balance. This was what set British 
Labour apart from continental social democratic parties.
The New Deal analogy also formed a central theme in 
the S.S. R.C.-financed research of another American 
scholar, Arnold Rogow, and the book he co-wrote with
404. R.A.Dahl, 'Worker's Control of Industry and 
the British Labour Party', The American Political
Science Review, Vol 41 1947, pp.875-900.
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Peter Shore, head of the Labour party's Research 
Department at Transport House(405). In many respects, 
Rogow did not depart from the view of Brady. He too noted 
the establishment of the planning machinery in wartime, 
and its retention, much less creation, afterwards. Its 
chief purpose had been to oversee the emergency co­
ordination of scarce resources. There was nothing 
specifically 'socialist' about it. Nationalization was 
no different in this respect. So that policies, 
elsewhere associated with New Deals, Popular Fronts and 
suchlike, just happened in Britain to have been ushered 
in by Labour. This did not prevent the Conservative 
party, Shore wrote in a propaganda sheet, from seeking to 
capture the slogans and symbols for their own 
cause(406). Where Rogow had the advantage over Brady 
was in witnessing the subsequent "loosening" of planning 
controls over industry of Cripps's Chancellorship, and 
the opportunity this gave him to answer some of the 
forgotten questions of pre-war Laski vintage - chiefly, 
the extent and effectiveness of likely business 
opposition to an incoming Labour government. Rogow 
endeavoured, in effect, to put to the test the rival 
"working hypotheses" of Laski, Hayek and the 'New 
Fabisms' which, although recently pushed to one side, had 
shaped so many preconceptions.
Rogow's assessment of Labour's "partial revolution", 
a task begun on but not completed, expressed many of the 
anxieties of the British left. But if Labour had fallen 
short of its stated goals, he ruled out any idea of 
leadership betrayal. The answer was to be found in the 
structural limits on how far a reforming government could 
go in transforming the country's industrial base. Many
405. A. A. Rogow gind P. Shore, The Labour Government 
and British Industry 1945-51 (1955).
406. P.Shore, The Real Nature of Conservatism 
(Labour Party Educational Series, September 1952).
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Labour leaders, in his eyes, had been "increasingly 
persuaded that the objectives of private industry 
harmonized rather them conflicted with the aims of the 
government". The exchange of personnel between 
government and business, and the use of joint 
consultation and profit sharing, were indicative of the 
belief in placing co-operation ahead of compulsion.
Added to which, the range of planning had been vastly 
exaggerated - the "unplanned" sectors (including 
movements of foreign exchange) far outweighed the 
"planned". Detailed economic forecasting and regulation 
had not really been tried. The machinery of physical, 
financial and manpower controls was largely ad hoc, 
liberal and experimental. Shore called the notion of the 
publicly-owned 'basic industries' a post- 
rational iz at ion ( 407 ).
Yet the gradual retreat from planning, as the 
economy began to pick up, was also, to some degree, 
forced upon Ministers by the position they had put 
themselves in. Up until 1948-49, the essence of Labour's 
programme had been that of "reform without essential 
change", in line with what was commonly acceptable to 
influential elements in industry, so long as this did not 
reach beyond the "carefully marked frontiers" of the 
welfare state. Iron and steel nationalization had proved 
to be so contentious (and not simply symbolic) an issue 
because it threatened to disturb the new post-1945 social 
and financial equilibrium, broadly tolerable to both 
capital and labour. His account of the 'Mr Cube' 
campaign, much of it new information, chronicled the 
obstructive tactics adopted by the sugar producers.
Faced with "disagreeable" change, powerful industrial 
groups would, Rogow asserted, without their having to 
undermine the democratic process, enter the political
407. P.Shore, 'Capitalism and Equality', The New 
Statesman , 8 October 1955, p.416.
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arena:
"The steel dispute, at least, suggests 
that some of the effective limits of planning 
are determined not at the ballot box or by the 
planners themselves, but by the power interests 
of affected groups"(408)
Such was the dilemma confronting the Labour party in 
the 1950s. Having pushed up to the limits of 
redistributive 'fair shares' within an unavoidably 
'mixed' economy, it could not now press leftwards 
without, very soon, endangering the continued existence 
of free enterprise. Rogow believed that, between 1945 
and 1951, Labour "came in fact very near to this point". 
They had only been held off by the falling away of public 
backing. John Strachey, who saw that Keynes - for all 
his blind spots - had supplied a means by which to 
transform democracy, confessed in an introduction to the 
book that the pursuit of democratic reform was "of a much 
higher order of complexity than could have been realised 
in advance". "It is just because I realise something of 
the intricacy of the mechanism, and of the determination 
of the resistance", he had written to Gaitskell, "which 
we shall meet at this key point, that I don't believe 
that we can keep quiet about it or treat it as something 
too 'hot' to talk about in public"(409).
On the principal issue, some kind of provisional 
answer could now be given. The old marxist theory of 
outright political resistance to state regulation needed 
revision. Business, when its vital interests were at 
stake, will join the political struggle, but this need
408. A.A.Rogow and P.Shore, ibid (1955), p.171.
409. J.Strachey, letter to Gaitskell, 11 February 
1954, Strachey papers.
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not take an anti-democratic form. But neither was the 
assumption made beforehand by moderates, of sound and 
sensible government-industry links, completely valid 
either. As for the "anti-planners", their case was still 
unproven. The type of 'negative' planning adopted by 
Labour hardly implied any radical re-shaping of economic 
relations. The fiscal threat - to which attention was 
moving - had more substance to it, though it fell largely 
outside his remit. Labour's major mistake lay, he felt, 
in its relative neglect of restrictions (few in number 
and in need of toughening up) over the private sector, 
which clearly, he ventured, "circumscribes the effective 
authority of the state". Exactly where the boundaries of 
government should operate had still to be decided.
Rogow made a great play of readdressing the central 
concerns of the inter-war years, criticizing the turn 
towards the study of forms, structures and historical 
description, and of "major research into minor problems", 
which he attributed to the disillusion with, and collapse 
of, liberal and radical thought(410). To emulate the 
likes of Weber, Veblen and Laski, he urged, 'engaged' 
academics had to confront contemporary developments. But 
this was to recognize, if not actually to adjust to, the 
very changed terms of the argument. The nature of the 
Laski-Hayek debate had already been altered by post-war 
circumstances, even as Rogow was writing. Shore and 
Strachey had counted Labour's 'quiet victory' in 
converting the Conservatives to the new conditions as the 
most significant recent change, even though they still 
remained at heart a 'class' party. Others, remembering 
the climate of the inter-war period, saw quite the 
obverse - the historic, but unannounced adaptation of 
Labour. More to the point, the moderate success the
410. A.A.Rogow, 'Comment on Smith and Apter: or, 
whatever happened to the great issues ?', in The 
American Political Science Review, 51 1957, pp.763-775.
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wartime and postwar planning had made a greater degree of 
state intervention more tolerable, without providing a 
justification for the retention of controls once economic 
conditions started to improve again. A new type of mixed 
economy had come into being, about which there was no 
satisfactory theory. This did not account for all the 
remaining ideological differences; it did necessarily 
diminish them. Political economy was under-theorized.
But political scientists, attempting to make sense of the 
constitutional and administrative consequences of the 
strong state, had hardly fared any better.
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Constitutional Theory and Administrative Practice
The growth of modern government - in its 
institutions, its functions and its powers - dates from 
the advent of mass democracy, and the stresses and 
strains which they placed on existing parliamentary 
arrangements. State involvement extended into areas of 
economic and social welfare, bringing with it a huge and 
growing system of governmental direction in the interests 
of maximizing the war effort. All of these 
developments - by enhancing the competence of the 
executive at the expense of parliament - could be seen to 
have had important, but immeasurable consequences. To 
this a new factor was added after 1945 - an exceptionally 
heavy (and contentious) range of legislative proposals 
outlined in Labour's 1945 election manifesto, pushing the 
role of the state into new areas of responsibility. It 
was a paradox of the 1945 programme, however, that very 
little in the way of constitutional reform was envisaged. 
Institutions and procedures tested in wartime had fully 
proved their worth.
This was a far cry from the foreboding of the Labour 
party in the 1930s, haunted by the downfall of the 
MacDonald government. The passage of time and the duties 
of office in the War cabinet, combined with the changed 
climate of public opinion during the war years, 
encouraged Labour's leaders to make the most of their 
constitutionality. During the 1945 election, Churchill 
had tried to exploit the opening, caricaturing the party 
as totalitarian-minded and in thrall to extra- 
parliamentary influence, casting doubts on Labour's 
democratic credentials. But from the very outset, while 
making it plain that its whole programme would be passed 
into law, ministers were anxious to show that the main 
reforms were moderate and limited. That the
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parliamentary system could cope with the unparalleled 
burden of post-war demands was, as Morrison - Leader of 
the House of Commons - claimed, testimony to its great 
flexibility. The ancient forms adjusted to changes of 
real substance. Labour was also helped by the lack of 
obstruction from the House of Lords and the recognition, 
"new among Labour leaders", that the Lords could take up 
some of the law-making load(411). There were periodic 
alarms - in the summer of 1947, when the Supplies and 
Services Bill was passed* in emergency session, "the 
King", Attlee later disclosed, "felt that I had not 
explained the matter sufficiently. The King was under the 
impression that we were seeking dictatorial powers which 
might have justified the 'Police State' stunt which Sir 
Winston had tried to run in 1945"(412). But it was 
also true to say that many of the transformations were 
constitutional only in the widest sense. New Ministries 
were created. Administrative tribunals multiplied.
There was a broadening of the welfare state. The 
cumulative effect of such steps, accordingly to one 
observer, was "to redefine the scope of government and to 
entirely transform the nature of the British 
state"(413).
Laski's head-to-head with Leo Amery was one 
confrontation. Amery, a veteran Conservative with a 
philosophical gift, was asked to give the Chichele 
lectures in 1946 and used the occasion to present an 
exposition of the traditional constitution, balanced by 
the demons of the Crown and the nation and meeting in the
411. H.R.G.Greaves, 'The British Constitution in
1949'in Parliamentary Affairs (Summer 1950), p.431.
412. C.R.Attlee in The Observer, 23 August 1959,
p. 12.
413. J.A.Hawgood, 'The British Constitution in
1948', in Par 1iamentary Affairs (Autumn 1949), p.338.
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arena of parliament(414). It perfectly combined, he 
believed, the dual requirements of initiative and 
control, of responsible leadership and responsible 
criticism, that had carried Britain safely through recent 
troubles. In this scheme of things, the ordinary voter 
played no active part and did not confer a mandate on a 
government:
"Our system is one of democracy but of 
democracy by consent and not by delegation, of 
government of the people, for the people, with, 
but not by, the people"(415).
The chief danger came from the menace of the party 
machine, "directing Government from outside Parliament 
and using it merely as an instrument for carrying through 
policies shaped without reference to it". In the recent 
past, he noted, prominent Labourites had flirted with the 
idea of party government. Happily, after 1945, the 
Labour government had pushed through its legislation 
expeditiously - "some may think too expeditiously" - but 
certainly on normal constitutional lines. There had been 
no violent breaches in continuity, and this despite more 
changes in the immediate post-war period them in the 
whole of the preceding generation. Constitutional 
principles could tame even the most revolutionary 
intentions. None of this altered , to his mind, the 
threat from liberal misconceptions about popular or party 
sovereignty. As Wiseman remarked, the appeal was to a 
past golden age of parliamentary equipoise(416).
414. L.S.Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution
(1947).
415. Amery, ibid (1947), p.53.
416. H.V.Wiseman, Parliament and the Executive - an 
analysis with readings (1966), p.27.
200
Laski, stressing efficiency in government, was more 
concerned to ensure that constitutional arrangements 
conformed to the requirements of the will of the 
majority(417). Two years into the government, civil 
servants wedded to precedent and lacking in originality 
presented an additional stumbling block. In his last 
considered thoughts on the subject, contained in 
Reflections on the Constitution (1951), Laski, although 
still marxist-influenced, confronted the Amery view full 
on, denying that the historic constitution would be 
broken by the power of party. Public respect for 
parliament was higher than at any time over the previous 
twenty-five years. The real threat to the supremacy of 
parliament came from elsewhere:
"If there is a danger ahead, it seems to 
me to lie in the use of great financial and 
industrial power to prevent the will of the 
electorate being made effective by the 
government of its choice"(418).
Admitting to some embarrassment when he came to 
review the book (since it set out to refute what he had 
said in 1947), Amery marvelled at "the remarkable 
transformation which could turn the revolutionary 
Jeremiah of 1938 into the Pangloss of 1950"(419). On 
the bull point of popular sovereignty, however, he had 
not - he felt - been contradicted. The voters did not 
hold the initiative, let alone the party activist. Laski 
indeed in 1947 - as party chairman - had urged a radical 
overhaul of the Labour party constitution in order to
417. H.J.Laski, 'Efficiency in Government' in
D.Munro (ed), ibid (1948), pp.49-64.
418. H.J.Laski, Reflections on the Constitution 
(1951), p.93.
419. Review in Parliamentary Affairs (Winter 1951), 
pp.236-237.
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render it more suitable to a party which now produced 
governments. Changing circumstances had forced changing 
judgements. The actual working out of the constitution 
had settled all arguments.
For the academic observer, less prone to look for 
justifications, the "actual working" of the constitution 
in its post-war setting was by no means apparent, so 
rapid were the changes. William Robson, on being made 
Professor of Public Administration at the LSE in 1948, 
mapped out a research conspectus covering the relations 
between parliament and the executive, central and local 
government, and the operation of the new public 
corporations - the latter by far the greatest
constitutional innovation of all - that amounted to what
he termed "a formidable task", made easier only by the 
links kept up by university staff with Whitehall(420).
Robson's revisions of Justice and Admin istr ative £.aw 
(1947 and 1951) drew on his own assiduous reading of 
parliamentary and other public sources, showing how, with 
the extension of the law into health, housing and 
insurance, judicial powers were being exercised "not" with 
the object of enforcing individual rights but with 
furthering a policy of social improvement", adding a 
moral dimension to the administration of justice(421). 
Where information was not readily to hand, however (and 
the Official Secrets allowed for little leakage) it had
to be hunted down and collected. Ascertaining the facts
took precedence over any formulae of administrative 
science. The older kind of prescriptive, speculative 
theorizing - with its personal touch -was also pushed to 
one side. The earliest studies were, as a result,
420. W.A.Robson, Public Administration Today
(1948).
421. Justice and Adm in i str at ive Law (3rd edition, 
1951) p.557.
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"outspokenly and almost aggressively ' 
descriptive"(422).
Surveys of the organization of central government 
and the main departments of state, either singly (in 
Beer's study of the Treasury, right down to the 
organizational chart(423)), by policy area (Beloff, 
1960(424)) or in sum(425) began appearing. The new 
administrative bodies were classified, the origins of the 
public corporation model established, even the correct 
way of spelling "socialized industry" settled(426).
This rush of activity helped to make Nuffield and 
Manchester the leaders in the field, the 'Manchester 
school' under Mackenzie becoming especially prominent. 
Chester and Mackenzie, like Robson, were both 
"knowledgeable insiders"(427), acquainted with the ways 
of the higher civil service. This was the saving grace 
of what was, to many, their excessively formal approach, 
that research was carried out with a view to improving 
the working of government. But there were limits.
Chester for one stopped well short of worshipping the 
"great new god" of public administration, and rebuked *
422. J.Blondel, The Discipline of Politics (1981),
p. 58.
423. S.Beer, Treasury Control (1956).
424. M.Beloff, Ne« Dimens ions in Foreign Policy
(1961).
425. W.J.M.Mackenzie and J.W. Grove, Central
Administration in Britain (1957); D.N.Chester and F.M.G. 
Willson, The Or gan izat ion of British Central Government 
1914 to 1956 (1957).
426. D.N.Chester, 'Public Corporations and the 
Classification of Administrative Bodies', Political 
Studies, 1 1953, pp.34-52.
427. A. H.Birch and R.N.Spann, 'Mackenzie at 
Manchester' in WJtlll: Political Questions (1974), p. 16.
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those who he thought did(428).
Chester's most notable contribution in this period, 
however, was to. encourage and assist Herbert Morrison in 
writing Government and Parliament, which was published 
with a splash in 1954(429). Billed as the new Bagehot 
("Bagehot with a quiff" - Dingle Foot(430)), and 
leaning on Morrison's recent experiences as a senior 
Minister of the Crown, it made public, in a discursive 
and understandable way, a great deal about the inner 
operation of the cabinet and of government departments, 
the problems of party management, and the administering 
of the nationalized industries, the last having raised 
particular difficulties to do with accountability and 
efficiency. But, although at times dealing with 
controversial matters, Morrison was always discreet, the 
general tenor of his remarks reinforcing - as a good 
House of Commons man - his reverence for the institution 
of parliament, "as (Amery wrote) he has himself worked it 
and in various details improved it to his own 
satisfaction"(431). A constitution which had allowed 
for the peaceful legislative revolution of 1945 could 
have very little wrong with it.
This was, as one critic wrote, "procedural 
conservatism" of the purest kind(432), though not 
without a good deal of astuteness to it. The
428. See his review of S.E. Finer's Primer of
Public Administration in The Manchester Guardian, 9
June 1950, p.8.
429. H.Morrison, Govern ment and Parliament (1954).
430. D.Foot, in The Observer, 2 May 1954, p.18.
431. L.S. Amery, 'How we are governed' in The
Manchester Guardian, 29 April 1954, p.9.
432. A.H.Hanson,'The Purpose of Parliament' in 
Planninq and the Politicians (1969), p.12, (originally 
1964).
/
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adaptability of British government - its workability - 
had been borne out by events. There had been no final 
crisis. The Labour government succeeded, without having 
had recourse to emergency legislation, making substantial 
amendments to procedure or meeting with "sabotage" - in 
giving complete effect to its domestic programme. The 
ordinary methods had sufficed. The experiment of 
socialist rule from 1945 to 1951, together with the 
suffocation of wartime aspirations by rising affluence, 
"made such views too irrelevant to seem even dangerous". 
The apocalyptic fears of Cripps, Laski and others died a 
natural death(433).
What of the other line of attack - descended from 
Lord Hewart - stressing the eclipse of parliament?
Keeton, Hollis and Einzig all made this a central 
charge(434), Keeton pointing to the degree of 
untrammelled control exercised by a new corps of 
administrators. Kelf-Cohen, who had only just retired 
from the post of Permanent Under-Secretary in the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power (where he had overseen the - 
nationalizing of the gas*and electricity industries) 
identified a more deep-seated problem - that no 
government was able effectively control the industries, 
whose growth had been unchecked and whose activities were 
unaccountable(435). Co-ordination was non-existent, and 
commercial decisions politicized. Government departments 
were not technically competent to do the work with which 
they were saddled. The British constitution, he argued,
433. A.H.Hanson, 'The Labour Party and House of 
Commons Reform' in Hanson, ibid (1969), p. 65 (originally 
1957).
434. C.Hollis, Can Parliament Survive? (1949); G.W. 
Keeton, The Passing of Parliament (1952); P.Einzig, The 
Control of the Purse (1959).
435. R.Kelf-Cohen, Nationalization - end of a 
dogma? (1958).
205
was simply not designed to accommodate such huge 
extensions of the state. The immoderate tone common to 
these works sought to suggest that the intensity of their 
argument was a fair indicator of their validity. The 
realists saw only a good case, spoiled by tub- 
thumping ( 436 ) ; once parliament had devised 
satisfactory arrangements and objectives, the pattern of 
new public bodies would become clearer. The difficulty 
was that the early achievements of the publicity-owned 
services were hard to assess. Economic benchmarks (such 
as pricing policies) were hard to come by. Party 
political divisions on the issue created further 
confusion, notably with the argument promoted by the 
revisionist wing of the Labour party maintaining that 
state ownership was immaterial so long as state control 
applied.
These disputes notwithstanding, Robson's 
Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership (1960) was the 
first non-partisan progress report to look back over a 
decade of nationalization with the benefit of a full 
range of information and the latest currents of thinking. 
Robson had edited some pre-war essays about what did - 
rather than what ought or might have been expected to - 
happen when industries were brought into public and semi­
public ownership, but even he could not have anticipated 
the criticisms of the nineteen-fifties(437). The 1960 
study was a serious and unflagging investigation of the 
theory and practice of nationalization, sympathetically 
viewed.
436. Chester's review in Pol it ical Studies, October 
1959, pp.314-315; Hanson's review in Parliamentary 
Affairs, Winter 1958-59, pp.128-130.
437. M.Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism (1961), 
p.236.
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For every objection raised, Robson found a measured 
reply. Each newly nationalized industry had its own 
teething troubles, but he was in no doubt that they had 
all done better than if they had been left in private 
hands. The public corporation, with a Minister and a 
Board, was the only way of reconciling direction with 
independence. Labour relations had noticeably improved. 
Commercial criteria were still important, but public 
industry, since it was expected to fulfil wider social 
objectives, was not really analogous with private 
enterprise. As to the differences of opinion within the 
Labour party, he did not believe that the 1945 model was 
exhausted, nor that there was any virtue in 
nationalization for the sake of nationalization. The 
fundamentalist case might have gone, as one essential 
Fabian work suggested(438). But there was a sense of 
faith in Robson's views which made of public ownership 
more than just an administrative improvisation. It was 
this which led one reviewer to say that the book was a 
blend of-objective study and personal statement(439). 
Whether the separate stands of his argument knitted 
together, as he intended, was less certain. Those who 
questioned the whole basis of the public board (Robson 
believed) were starting from false - antediluvian - 
premises. The key point was not in confusing public 
enterprise with the economic state, but in failing to 
grasp the closeness of their connection. Nationalization 
amounted to something greater them a mere measure of how 
well each industry or service had been performing. There 
were political as well as practical, economic motives to 
consider.
Society had moved - then - beyond the old antithesis
438. M.Shanks (ed), The Lessons of Public 
Enterprise (1963).
439. E.Davies, review in The Pol it ical Quarterly, 
January-March 1961, p.84.
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of individualism and collectivism known to Dicey without 
any new public philosophy taking their place. Elements 
of the Conservative 'tradition', the Liberal 'outlook' 
and the socialist 'idea' - the terms are taken from 
Ginsberg's overview of law and opinion since Dicey's 
time(440) - formed an uneasy blend, at once both 
conservative and progressive, facilitating and at the 
same time containing the new balance of social forces.
But the purposes of the state, whether in mobilizing 
economic resources or in exercising administrative 
authority, had evolved under practical pressures rather 
than firm abstract principles. There was no clear 
conception of the proper limits of state action, other 
than an historical description of how the outlines of the 
modern state had come to be. The state could and had 
become socially responsible, and it had done so for 
pragmatic reasons. The philosophical argument remained 
inconclusive.
440. M. Ginsberg (ed), Law arid Opinion in England in 
the Twentieth Century (1959), to which Robson contributed 
an article on administrative law.
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Two Controversies
C.L. Mowat has shown - in his investigation of the 
Zinoviev letter - how the evidence about past episodes of 
controversy slowly accumulates by degrees, without 
necessarily clearing up all points of obscurity or debate 
(441). The nature of fragmentary information is such 
that it can, at least in the earliest stages, be used to 
lend support to a variety of assertions, the elementary 
state of knowledge meaning that almost any statement can 
be made without fear of decisive contradiction. Nowhere 
is this mingling of fact and legend more apparent than in 
the obsession with prime ministers and the prime 
ministership - Bonar Law allegedly playing bridge every 
evening throughout the Great War, Ramsay MacDonald, "a 
peg built to hang myths on“(442), the Baldwin 
"confession". The mysteries of 1945 and after were no 
less intriguing, two of which went to cultivate the 
'Attlee enigma'.
The King's Commission|
Attlee's first task, after going to the Palace to 
accept the King's commission to form a government, had 
been to decide on his main cabinet appointments, before 
returning again to the conference at Potsdam. On both 
counts, the apparent formality of his actions concealed a 
great deal of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring.
That Attlee had originally intended to make Ernest 
Bevin Chancellor of the Exchequer and send Hugh Dalton to 
the Foreign Office became public knowledge soon after the
441. C.L.Mowat, ibid (1970), p.199.
442. F.Williams, A Pattern of Rulers (1965), p.68.
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official announcements (with Bevin as the new Foreign 
Secretary) were made. The possible reasons for his 
change of mind were widely discussed in the English and 
American press. ‘'For two hours in the morning of July 
27th 1945", as Francis Williams wrote three years 
afterwards and speaking as a former member of the prime 
minister's entourage, Bevin "had the Treasury", the post 
which he told Attlee he most wanted(443). Dalton, 
instructed to pack his bags for Potsdam, was also pleased 
by the outcome. Summoned back after lunch, Attlee told 
them that he had had second thoughts and had switched 
their jobs. Williams made it clear that while the cause 
for the change was "a private secret of the prime 
minister's, his own guess was that Attlee already 
appreciated the importance of a friendly but firm 
negotiator who would stand up to Russian policy. At the 
same time, other unconfirmed rumours circulated pointing 
to the influence of named individuals who had taken, or 
been given, the credit for getting Attlee to reverse his 
earlier choice - Williams himself (which he took the 
trouble to deny), Churchill, William Whiteley (Labour's 
Chief Whip), Sir Edward Bridges (Permanent Secretary to 
the Treasury), Sir Orme Sargent (Permanent Under­
secretary at the Foreign Office), Sir Alan Lascelles (the 
King's private secretary), all the way up to and 
including George VI. The story of the King's 
intervention was revived, however, in February 1952, 
following his death. Attlee, contacted by The Daily 
Herald about reports that the King had "insisted" on the 
selection of Bevin as Foreign Secretary^ strove to kill 
them off, stating in no uncertain terms that it had been 
entirely his own decision. But the rumours continued to 
flourish, puzzling even Dalton. It was his piecing 
together of what he knew and had heard from others - 
tying it to another tale that had been going the rounds -
443. F.Williams, ibid (1948), p.65.
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which formed the basis of an account in the second volume 
of his memoirs in 1957(444).
Dalton took the story back to early on 27th July 
1945 when, travelling down to London where he was unable 
to see Attlee straightaway, he had called on Bevin at 
Transport House. There, Bevin informed Dalton of a move 
by Morrison the previous day - supposedly supported by 
Stafford Cripps and Ellen Wilkinson - to delay acceptance 
of the King's commission until, under the party's own 
leadership rules, the Parliamentary Labour Party had met 
to decide on its leader. Laski had also written to Attlee 
along the same lines. Arthur Deakin had approached 
Bevin, his old boss, urging him to take over, which Bevin 
had angrily rebuffed. After this, Bevin had telephoned 
Morrison warning him (in words Dalton learnt of much 
later) that if he carried on “mucking about" he would not 
be in the government at all. Attlee, however, had 
scuppered Morrison by going off to the Palace. It was at 
this meeting in the early evening on July 26th that the 
King was said to have expressed his preference for Bevin 
as the new Foreign Secretary, decisively influencing 
Attlee, a charge which many years later Attlee told 
Dalton was simply untrue: he had thought of it "all by 
himself". On the morning of the 27th, Morrison - 
undaunted - continued to press his case, now asking for 
the Foreign Secretaryship. He was finally persuaded by 
the Chief Whip to accept the post of Lord President of 
the Council, and in effect Attlee's deputy. When Dalton 
did eventually get to see Attlee, just .before lunch on 
the same day, he gave him his backing and was told that 
he would "almost certainly" be going to the Foreign 
Office. Called back at 4pm in the afternoon, Attlee said 
he had reconsidered and wanted Dalton to swap places with 
Bevin, giving as one of his reasons the need to keep the
444. H.Dalton, Memoirs 1931-1945: The Fateful Years 
(1957), pp.467-475.
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quarrelling Bevin and Morrison apart.. Dal-bon saw no 
reason -to suspect any outside influence on this decision, 
either from the King or anyone else. Possible royal 
prejudice against him only caused him amusement. But he 
awaited the publication of the official biography of King 
George VI with some interest.
Until now, Morrison had said little about these 
events, mentioning only, in Government and Par 1iament in 
a passage on the constitutional role of the monarch, that 
there was no doubt that it was "the Leader of the Labour 
party" who was rightly sent for by the King in 1945. But
he had been offended - after Dalton's first volume came
out - by Dalton's breaking of party and private 
confidences. When advance extracts of volume two were 
carried in The Evening Standard, to the effect that 
Morrison had worked to supplant Attlee back in 1945,
Morrison was outraged. This "personal attack" in a
"Conservative newspaper", he reported in a prepared 
statement, was "very inaccurate and unreliable", to do 
with "discussions of an intimate and confidential 
character concerning the formation of the Labour 
Government of 1945". He did not, however, propose to
answer the allegations point-by-point: "The Labour Party,
which I have sought to serve loyally, selflessly and to 
the best of my ability for many years, would be likely to
be hurt as a result of the first-class row which would be
inevitable". Dalton, asked to reply, defended the diary 
as a serious piece of history which he hoped Mr Morrison 
would read in full(445).
Wheeler-Bennett's extracts from the King's own diary 
for 1945 reopened the whole issue in 1958(446). They
445. '1945 Disclosure Challenged', The Times, 12 
March 1957, p.8.
446. J.Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI His Life and 
Reign (1958), pp.637-639.
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suggested that at his first audience Attlee had told the 
King he was going to make Dr Hugh Dalton his Foreign 
Secretary and that (as the King recorded) "I disagreed 
with him & said that Foreign Affairs was the most 
important subject at the moment & I hoped he would make 
Mr Bevin take it. He said he would but he could not 
return to Berlin till Sunday at the earliest..." The 
contemporaneous memorandum kept by Sir Alan Lascelles - 
also quoted by Wheeler-Bennett - had the King begging the 
prime minister to think carefully about this, suggesting 
Mr Bevin would be a better choice. The King evidently 
believed he had swung it round, all this demonstrating to 
Wheeler-Bennett the monarch exercising the prerogative 
power to advise. Attlee writing in The Observer shortly 
afterwards was unimpressed(447). Too much was being 
made of it. The King was "inclined" to prefer Bevin and 
Attlee had taken this into account, but this had not made 
the difference. The key consideration had been that 
Bevin and Morrison would not have worked well together if 
both held domestic jobs." Nevertheless, this confirmed 
all the worst fears of radicals about royal partiality.
Dalton's "personal spite" Morrison mentioned 
obliquely in the preface to his memoirs a couple of years 
later. There had been no question of his attempting to 
"snatch" the leadership, he asserted. He had only wished 
to see that the democratic safeguards of the party - 
worked out after MacDonald's departure by Attlee among 
others - were observed. Bevin had not rung up to warn 
him off. And the King had played no part in Attlee's 
hesitation about who was to fill the most important posts 
in the government. Morrison himself suggested that 
Dalton's many temperamental defects debarred him from 
diplomatic work. Attlee had agreed, "and so the
447. C.R.Attlee, 'The Role of the Monarchy', ibid, 
23 August 1959.
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appointments were made"(448). It is fair to add that 
new evidence, hidden away in V.L. Allen's Trade Unions 
and Government (I960), indicated a far more serious 
challenge to Attlee's authority emanating from a number 
of trade union leaders than had initially appeared. 
Attlee's last comments - to Francis Williams and then in 
another short talk in 1967(449) - were
characteristically blunt. "If you're invited by the King 
to form a Government you don't say you can't reply for 
forty-eight hours". As for Morrison's activities, he 
simply noted: "We worked perfectly well together, and a 
great deal of this didn't come out until long afterwards. 
I didn't realize that the poor little man' was full of 
seething ambition".
It only now remained for Alan Bullock, drawing on 
conversations with Attlee and Morgan Phillips, and cross- 
referencing the memoirs and recollections, to draw 
together an account as congruent as possible with the 
known facts(450). With an interest that was solely 
historical, Bullock demonstrated that the story was best 
recounted from the point of view of Bevin, the only one 
who had not been able to speak for himself. Bevin it was 
who had foiled Morrison and stood by Attlee, urging him - 
while Morrison was out of the room - to go immediately to 
the King, after which Attlee had received a standing 
ovation at a Victory Rally, before, a situation rich in 
irony, leaving Morrison to officiate. Although Bevin too 
had been bemused by his last-minute switch, he was ready 
to knuckle down to business without further fuss, the
448. H.Morrison, ibid (1960), pp.245-248.
449. F.Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers (1961); 
Clem Attlee - the granada historical records intervlew 
(1967), p.53.
450. A.Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevinz 
Volume Two — Minister of Labour 1940-1945 (1967), pp.391— 
395.
214
balance of power and position in the new government 
arranged around him. If-not conclusive, this was at 
least consistent, providing what was thought likely to be 
as much as would ever be known about what Geoffrey 
Goodman, writing in Tribune, termed "this strange 
incident"(451).
The Bomb \
When, in the Spring of 1951, the Press Association 
carried a report that Britain was to manufacture the 
atomic bomb, there was, as The Economist described it, "a 
stunned and embarrassed silence in Whitehall and 
Washington but, as yet, no official disclaimer". The 
editor found it difficult to believe, if true, that the 
U.K. might be running an atomic bomb programme given the 
huge financial strain this would place on already 
stretched resources. Churchill's repeated suggestion 
that such a project should be undertaken was "one of his 
least responsible acts"(452). The McMahon Act of 1946 
had anyway prohibited American sharing of nuclear 
information with foreign countries. It was not until 
February 1951, after Churchill had returned to office, 
that he was able - to his great astonishment - to reveal 
to the House of Commons that the late "Socialist 
Government" had not only pursued the research and 
development of an atomic weapon but had also gone into 
production, at immense cost, preferring to conceal the 
vast operation from parliamentary scrutiny. When he had 
told the United States of this, he added, it had created 
quite a new atmosphere. The first testing of the British 
weapon then took place at the end of the year in 
Australia. When the news broke, following the American
451. G.Goodman, 'Bevin's role in wartime', Tribune, 
21 April 1967, p.8.
452. 'Atom bombs', The Economist, 24 March 1951, 
p.673.
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•testing of a hydrogen bomb in 1954, that Britain was 
likely to follow suit, a group of Labour MPs campaigned 
to ensure that the* decision to go ahead should not be 
taken without prior discussion and approval in 
Parliament. The Government's 1955 Defence White Paper 
made mention of the proposal, placing emphasis on the 
deterrent effect of possession of nuclear weapons, and 
prompted an Opposition vote of censure. But the Bevanite 
contingent abstained, after which they had the party whip 
withdrawn. Bevan was not, however, a thorough-going 
unilateralist, and in his speech to the 1957 Annual 
Conference rejected the left-wing call for British 
nuclear disarmament because it would deprive any future 
Labour Foreign Secretary of all negotiating influence.
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was formed in 1958 
dedicated to renouncing British ownership of nuclear 
weapons and attracted many Labour supporters, bringing 
the issue to the point at the time of the Scarborough 
Conference in October 1960. In discussing the party's 
defence policy in a newspaper article, Emmanuel Shinwell 
drew attention to the circumstances in which the British 
bomb has first been commissioned. Only one failing had 
blunted Attlee's quiet tenacity, he argued:
"If Attlee had any defect as Prime Minister it 
was his reluctance to confide in all his 
Cabinet colleagues. I was Minister of Defence 
in 1950 but knew nothing of how the decision to 
manufacture the atom bomb was reached. Only 
recently, as a result of my investigations, did 
I discover that the decision to undertake 
research and development was taken in 1947 in 
consultation with a few of my Government 
colleagues. So far as I am aware the subject 
was never mentioned at any of the Cabinet 
meetings. And apart from the Minister of 
Defence, A.V. Alexander, who held the post in
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1947, none of the other Service Ministers was 
taken into confidence. In his own book Earl 
Attlee omits any reference to the subject and 
gives no details of how this momentous decision 
came to be made'*(453).
Richard Crossman, in his introduction to a new 
edition of Bagehot's The English Constitution (1963) 
cited the "common knowledge" of Attlee's concealment of 
the decision, without any prior discussion in Cabinet, as 
a key historical exhibit in the growing tendency towards 
what he called "prime ministerial government", a 
revelation about the new reality of power since Bagehot's 
own day (and quite a different criticism from the old 
'Keep Left' charge that Attlee, as prime minister, had 
lacked 'grip'(454)). In an exchange of correspondence
that was carried on in b6th The New Statesman and 
Encounter, his argument was challenged by George Strauss, 
the Minister of Supply from 1947 to 1951. Strauss had 
been a strong public defender of possession of the bomb 
in the 1950s, and - in an interview with a researcher 
from Nuffield College - mentioned that ministers like 
Bevan had known all about the decision. According to 
Strauss, Crossman's interpretation was wholly 
incorrect(455). Development of an atomic bomb, which it 
had been his responsibility to carry out, was "endorsed 
by the Cabinet" and, further, that this had been 
announced in Parliament in reply to a parliamentary 
question in 1948. Crossman had in the meantime discussed 
the matter with half-a-dozen or so other members of the
453. E.Shinwell, 'The Anatomy of Leadership - 2', 
The Sunday Times, 18 September 1960, p.25.
454. A point recalled by D.J. Heasman, ''My Station 
and its Duties' - The Attlee Version', Parliamentary 
Affairs, Winter 1967-68, p.79.
455. G.R.Strauss, letter in Encounter, June 1963, 
pp.91-92.
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Attlee administration, none one of whom was in agreement 
with Strauss. The parliamentary question to which 
Strauss referred was only brief and peremptory, and 
hardly befitting such a grave. As to any discussion in 
Cabinet, he referred back to Shinwell who had, in 
drafting his Observer article, consulted Sir Norman Brook 
(the Cabinet Secretary) who had looked up the records of 
the time and could not find any reference to it. That, so 
far as Crossman was concerned, was that, unless Strauss 
could add anything further. Strauss, in a two-pronged 
reply, was not to be shifted, and only amazed at 
Crossman's denigration of a past Labour prime minister.
If, as Crossman alleged, Attlee had been pursuing a 
policy of concealment, he would not have allowed the 
announcement in parliament. Shinwell's evidence was 
inadequate - he was not present in Cabinet at the time, 
whereas he, Strauss, was. Brook's contribution was 
irrelevant. The decision had been taken in the Defence 
Sub-Committee, over which Attlee had presided. "I have 
questioned five of the seven surviving members of the 
Cabinet and they have all told me they were fully aware 
of [it]", he insisted. There never was a deliberate 
intention to withhold the information from other 
colleagues. And he rounded off with the clinching point 
that -
"... if my evidence is insufficient, I am 
authorised by Lord Attlee to say that there is 
no truth whatever in Mr Crossman's 
allegation"(456).
Crossman, in Strauss's view, wanted to prove a case, 
and the case was a good one - only the example he had 
used did not sustain it.
456. G.R.Strauss, letter in Encounter, August 1963, 
pp.90-91.
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In the second impression of the Bagehot 
book(457)(three months later) Crossman expressed his 
gratitude to George Strauss for his help in 
reconstructing publicly what had happened, and 
incorporated the fact that the atom bomb decision had 
been made by a Cabinet committee. But he was struck by 
how this undiscussed and unrecorded decision illustrated 
the modern day transformation of the idea of collective 
Cabinet responsibility. For the curious student, he 
directed readers to the letters in The New Statesman, 
showing both "how little is normally revealed of what 
goes on in the modern Cabinet, and how much information 
is available about these secret proceedings, if only 
someone who knows the truth can be stimulated to divulge 
it".
457. R. H.S.Crossman, The English Constitution 
(Fontana - September 1963), second impression.
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The War and Post-War Redistribution of Income and Wealth
A keynote in Labour circles after 1945 was a sense 
of Fabian triumphalism. A Fabian had had a hand in the 
drafting of the party's election manifesto. No fewer 
than 224 out of the 394 MPs elected for the party were 
members of the Society. Membership was also at an all- 
time high. "The next five years will see", Douglas Cole 
had promised, "the practical working out of the Webb 
thesis"(458). His wife, much to the irritation of 
Laski and R.H. Tawney, took on the job of editing 
Beatrice Webb's diaries(459). And when the Webbs were 
re-interned in Westminster Abbey in 1947, the prime 
minister was there to deliver the address, remarking on 
how everything they had worked for had now come to pass. 
"It was altogether a goodly company", one journalist 
wrote in hindsight, "with no evident intimations of 
proletarian affiliations"(460).
'The people' had entered parliament, taking their 
egalitarian ideals (including the idea of reward based on 
merit) with them. "Socialism is about equality"(461), 
the economist and Fabian Arthur Lewis confidently 
asserted, the one thing which united all socialists and 
divided all opponents. The uncertainty arose in not 
knowing, from the income levelling trends of war and 
post-war, to what extent this long-term aim - translated
458. G.D.H.Cole, 'Sidney Webb', Fabian Quarterly,-Winter 
1947, p.5.
459. R.Terrill, R.H.Tawney and His Times - socialism as 
fellowship (1973), pp.77-78.
460. M.Muggeridge, The Infernal Grove (1973), p.301.
461. A.Lewis, The Principles of Economic Planning
(1948), p.10.
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in practical terms into the reduction of inequality - was 
in the process of being realised.
Several studies already existed on which to form a 
judgement. Clark (estimating the share of wages in the 
national income) and Barna examined the position prior to 
1939(462). Jay reviewed the evidence again in his re­
issue of The Socialist Case in 1947. Rowntree and 
Lavers, returning to York, found a sharp reduction in the 
number of those living in conditions of poverty, a 
finding which was seized on at the time of the 1951 
general election(463). Seers contributed a chapter to 
Worswick and Ady on the real, purchasing value of post­
war incomes(464). Comparing war and post-war with the 
immediate pre-war period, a number of observations seemed 
justified: a greater proportion of post-war income had 
gone in the form of wages, reinforced by both steeply 
progressive taxation and the effect of food subsidies; 
primary poverty had been all but eradicated; a great deal 
of the redistribution had happened during the war, 
following which the equalitarian drive was at least 
maintained. Though the picture was more blurred for 
peacetime, a modest levelling could be detected 
thereafter. There was, as a result, more than enough in 
the way of fragments of evidence from White Papers and 
Inland Revenue figures to justify the conclusion that 
Britain under Labour had become a fairer Britain. At the 
same time, however, there was an appreciable sense of a 
failure to instil new social values over the same period, 
with consequences that would not show up in any official
462. C.Clark, National Income and Outlay (1937); T. 
Barna, The Redistribution of Incomes through Public Finance 
(1937).
463. B.Rowntree and M.Lavers, Poverty and the Me Ifare 
State (1951).
464. Later expanded into The Levelling of Incomes since 
1938 (1955).
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or unofficial adding and counting.
Nor should it be surprising that it was the critics 
of 'redistribution' who were among the first to complain 
about what was being lost in the equalizing process. 
Bertrand de Jouvenel, the French economist and man of 
letters who knew England well, made it one of is guiding 
themes. Brought up in a political milieu in Paris (he 
was the stepson of the novelist Colette(465)) De 
Jouvenel had, up until the outbreak of war, worked as a 
diplomatic correspondent. He interviewed Hitler in 1936, 
reported on the 'white terror' in Andalucia, and briefly- 
joined Doriot's P.P.F., only to leave after the Munich 
agreement. He stayed on-in occupied France, and 
associated with collaborationists(466), as well as 
accepting, in a controversial book, the unification of 
Europe under German hegemony(467). Subsequently he 
made amends. Raymond Aron, who gave evidence in his 
defence in a court case in 1983, pointed out the awkward 
choices that had faced those who had stayed behind in 
1940(468).
Visiting England again after the war, he made 
contact once more with old friends, dining with Hayek at 
the Reform Club, where they bumped into Beveridge, and 
visiting the party conferences. He looked with 
admiration and envy at the English, who had been "spared 
the neuroses" of invasion. This insularity he considered 
an unqualified boon. The English dir igiste experiment, 
already underway, carried lessons - he .felt - for the
465. A.Massie, Colette (1986).
466. M.Cotta, La Collaboration 1940-1944 (1964), p.17.
467. B.de Jouvenel, Napoleon et 1'Economie Diriqee — 
le blocus continental (1942).
468. E.Shils, 'Raymond Aron', in The American Scholar, 
Spring 1985, pp.177-178.
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rest of the continent. His noteboook of "reflections"
(on the problems of socialist England(469)) was the 
outcome.
The domination of enlightened opinion was strikingly 
apparent to him. All roads led to socialism, even Tory 
ones. Government and Opposition acknowledged the same 
prophets, Beveridge and Keynes. "It is", he said, "the 
expression of the general tendency of the nation". The 
real difficulty was the public's inability to appreciate 
the seriousness of the country's predicament - forced to 
bring in conscription, attacked abroad as 'imperialists', 
and yet undeniably "a subsidized power", dependent upon 
American credit. Furthermore, the reigning ideas were 
products of a doctrine forged to meet an entirely 
different situation. "...Not unemployment but the 
shortage of manpower, not the danger of slump but of 
underproduction, are the characteristics of England in 
the after-war period". It followed that, for all the 
claims about fulfilling electoral pledges, the solutions 
being adopted were actually designed for a bygone era.
De Jouvenel recorded the slow intellectual 
adjustment to reality with interest. The intelligentsia 
he expected to exercise foresight and clear the path 
ahead. There was praise for Cole for his independence of 
thought. But de Jouvenel took from Schumpeter the remark 
that "Socialism is on the way, but the Socialist will not 
like it". No new scale of values had evolved. Instead, 
individual liberty had been eroded by the onset of 
"bigness", not just with the nationalized industries, as 
Jewkes maintained, but with all economic "kingdoms", 
large management union bodies included. The new society 
was thus a throwback to the old notion of public 
paternalism. Only the deep-seated restraints of British
469. Problems of Socialist England (English 
translation, 1949).
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life had so far held back the inherent dangers.
Three lectures at Cambridge in 1949 on the 
unintended consequences of collectivism, later published 
as The Ethics of Redistr ihut iori (470), pressed home the 
leitmotif of disregarded values. “Contributions to 
civilization", he counselled, “cannot be rightly assessed 
in national income calculations". Inequality was a 
universal fact. The egalitarian ideal of a floor-and- 
ceiling 'society of equals', propagated by those sitting 
in judgement on others, had undoubtedly led to the 
lopping off of the highest incomes. But the transfer of 
relative satisfactions from richer to poorer was not 
capable of comparison. All it had done was to eliminate 
the elites, upon whom the hope of progress depends. More 
than this, redistribution had been strongly centralizing, 
making possible the tremendous growth of taxation and 
public expenditure. The net effect of reapportionment 
was not so much horizontal as vertical:
"The more one considers the matter, the 
clearer it becomes that redistribution is in 
effect far less a redistribution of free income 
from the richer to the poorer, as we imagined, 
than a redistribution of power from the 
individual to the State"(471).
- a comment applauded by Oakeshott in The Clare 
Market Review(472).
In this way, the backward-looking nature of equality
470. B.de Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistr i'bution 
(1951).
471. B.de Jouvenel, ibid (1951), p.73.
472. M.Oakeshott, The Clare Market Review, Lent 
1952, pp.4-5.
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as an aim was exposed. It took the power to consume as 
the only true measure. It took, in other words, its cue 
from the acquisitive instincts of the society which 
socialists were seeking to reform. It was nothing but 
the last gasp of nineteenth-century utilitarianism. *
While others might stress the destruction of 
Christian virtues, the plight of the English middle 
classes - the best part of the nation but the part which 
had connived at its own downfall in 1945 - was also 
championed(473). The new society was an equal 
society, all snakes and no ladders, in which the 
professional could not win. There was no guarantee 
either, for two young Conservative Research Department 
employees, that the return of a Conservative government 
would restore their position. The corrosive effects of 
the egalitarian creed had already gone too far, 
instigating the subject ©f Lewis's follow-up guide, Sha11 
I Emigrate? (1950)(Maude later went off to edit The 
Sydney Morning Herald).
Unease on the left about what had gone wrong after 
1945 was no less prevalent. The seeing through to * 
completion of Labour's programme, and the consequent need 
for a fresh declaration of the Fabian case - drew 
attention, in Crossman's eyes, to the party's current 
"booklessness". Cole and Laski had considered a set of 
new Fabian essays in the early 1940s. Cole now revived 
the idea, only to go his own way when the discussions, in 
the course of 1950, took on an anti-Soviet tone.
Crossman, an unclassifiable talent, was left to edit the 
final contributions, most of which, far from being self- 
congratulatory, displayed considerable disquiet at the 
alarming loss of direction of the late government. All 
the obvious things had been done, Crossman acknowledged.
473. R.Lewis and A.Maude, The English Middle 
Classes (1950).
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The means to a good life had been established. But these 
things by themselves were not enough. Fair shares was 
not "a statistical concept"(474). Mental attitudes 
remained unchanged. The efforts of the 1945-50 
government, in so far as they took a legislative shape, 
"marked the end of a century of social reform and not, as 
its socialist supporters had hoped, the beginning of a 
new epoch"(475).
In one important respect, the Fabian view of post­
war was expounded with some vigour. To the ’new 
thinkers* ranged on the centre-right of the party who 
were exasperated by Crossman's "dialectical 
gamesmanship"(476), the lesson to be drawn was clear 
enough. The pre-war prognostications of Cole, Laski and 
Cripps had been decisively refuted, though this had yet 
to be conceded. A peaceful and gradual reform of the 
economic system had been achieved, as Labour had shown. 
Power was neutral, "like electricity"(477). The new 
arrangement had ceased to be capitalist in all its 
essentials. The spell of marxism was at last broken.
John Strachey, one of the few outgoing ministers to 
participate, was -although he retained elements of a 
quasi-marxist outlook - a major reformist convert. 
Interestingly, and in comparison with Laski, his 
inconsistency was not taken as a sign of tortuousness. 
Laski*s service, he suggested in 1950, lay in stating the
474. R.H.S.Crossman, Socialist Values in a Changing 
Society (1950), p.12.
475. R.H.S.Crossman, ’Towards a philosophy of 
socialism* in New Fabian Essays, R.H.S. Crossman 
(ed)(1952), p.6.
476. Letter by Roy Jenkins to Hugh Dalton, October 
1950, amongst papers to do with the Fabian Conference at 
Oxford. Dalton papers, File 9/1, B.L.P.E.S.
477. A.Fremantle, This Little Band of Prophets: The 
British Fabians (1959), p.231.
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dilemmas without necessarily solving them(478). As for 
himself, he had, he said, been convinced by "the 
experiences of office" that greater scope existed for 
"Fabian tactics" than he had realized(479). . A "way 
out" of the capitalist/communist stalemate did exist, 
along the lines first envisaged in Roosevelt's 'New 
Deal'. A non-revolutionary transformation had been 
effected, he told North American readers, an 'economic 
1832' well in keeping with the British pattern of 
seamless social adaptation(480).
It was left to the Labour party's two surviving 
figures of real intellectual authority to move the 
discussion onto a higher plane. R.H. Tawney wrote two 
extended papers directly'commenting on the achievements 
of the 1945 government(481), as well as adding an 
epilogue to his classic on Equal ity(482), dealing with 
evidence for changes in the distribution of income and 
wealth since 1938, with all the usual scholarly apparatus 
employed. All of these pieces bore the stamp of his 
inspirational style. Tawney agreed that Labour had acted 
on its promises with "remarkable fidelity" and 
"impressive success". He classified its work under three
478. 'Laski', reprinted in J.Strachey, The 
Strangled Cry - and other unpar Iiamen tary papers (1962), 
pp.196-200. Astor asked Strachey to review the Martin 
memoir for The Observer , instructing him that Laski was 
to be condemned for his softness towards the Soviet Union 
(Strachey papers).
479. J.Strachey, Labour's Task (Fabian Tract No
290) (1951), p.2.
480. J.Strachey, .'Britain's Peaceful Changes'
in Current Historys November 1952, pp.273-279.
481. R.H.Tawney, 'Social Democracy in Britain'
(1949) and 'British Socialism Today' (1952), both 
reprinted in The Radical Tradition, R. Hinden (ed) 
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482. R.H.Tawney, Equality (Fourth Edition 1952).
227
main heads. There had been an extension and improvement 
in welfare provision. Anti-unemployment measures were 
combined with a re-drawing of the boundary between public 
and private industry. And lastly, active steps had been 
taken to foster the deliberate regulation of state 
investment. This had to be judged by results, he 
insisted, and although the time had not yet come for a 
final verdict, it was clear to him that a distinctively 
new "social order" was in the making. Not least for 
Tawney was the common ground now shared by the main 
parties:
"Just under thirty years ago, the 
recommendation that the mines should be 
nationalized, which was advocated by the 
majority of the Coal Commission presided over 
by the late Lord Sankey, aroused a storm of 
opposition. When, in 1946, that proposal became 
at last an Act of Parliament, not a dog 
barked"(483).
The move, then, towards a greater equalization of 
income (but not capital) he considered an unambiguous 
good, since the reduction in liberty of the few was more 
than made up for by the increased freedom enjoyed by the 
many. Once upon a time dismissed as ' impractical', 
socialism was now said to be 'vicious' - it was to these 
latter objectors (like de Jouvenel, with his acceptance, 
for argument's sake, that equality was no disincentive to 
economic effort), and their reproach that culture and 
freedom were the fruits of social distinctions, that the 
fullest reply had to be made. Hayek's vision of an 
"authoritarian nightmare", appealing to the uprooted and 
the nostalgic, was inapplicable to a mature democracy 
such as Britain. The more serious concern had to do with
483. R.H.Tawney, ibid (1949), pp. 159-160.
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the age-old incompatibility of equality and liberty. The 
cause of liberty had been advanced most when the less 
privileged had exercised the freedoms they already 
possessed to further their interests; it was the holders 
of wealth who took the restrictive view of liberty to 
mean the right to enjoy their advantages unhindered. 
Political conceptions were for use. Measures diminishing 
inequality "have turned [equality] from an irridescent 
abstraction into a sober reality of everyday life".
Douglas Cole (a reluctant candidate at the 1945 
election) took a more individualistic line. Ever the 
freethinker, Cole had embarked on a lifelong pursuit of 
"revolutionary reformism"(484), holding to a set of 
personal beliefs which he assumed applied everywhere and 
for all time(485). Prepared at first to go along with 
the favourable view that a democratic route was now open, 
and that the answer to marxists was "in the 
facts"(486), he feared even so that the government's 
legislative proposals were not - by themselves - going to 
be advanced, or sufficiently comprehensive, enough to 
cultivate a new social ethic of community, releasing new 
energies and so bringing about a genuine sense of 
structural change. Reforms were being pressed for on a 
piecemeal basis, and not as part of an overall strategy. 
Willing to articulate the case for consolidation(487), 
he did not want to see full-scale nationalization 
dispensed with altogether; it was a symbol of Labour's 
radical intent. In 1945 the Labour party had asked for a
484. A.Wright, G.D.H. Cole and Socialist Democracy
(1979).
485. See his The Intel 1igent Man's Guide to the 
Post-Mar Uorld (1947), 'Taking Sides', pp.37-38.
486. Cited in Wright, ibid (1979), pp.159-160.
487. G.D.H.Cole, Labour's Second Term, Fabian Tract
No.273, May 1949.
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first instalment, in spirit identical with the platform 
of 1918; the party programmes of 1950 and 1951 called for 
very much less. "The fire and fervour are dying out 
fast", he despaired(488). His subsequent verdict, 
contained in the shilling pamphlet Is this Socialism?} 
made uncomfortable reading(489). In spite of the 
party's best efforts, Cole began, the society that had 
evolved out of it resembled only a "partial embodiment" 
of their hopes, a half-way welfare state. This ought, he 
granted, to be a step on the way to full socialism, which 
he defined as a society rid of all class distinctions; 
and yet it was only "socialistic - if even that". The 
rich, because the ownership of capital was largely 
untouched, were "still among us". But so too the growth 
of a more prosperous manual working-class had created a 
more subtly stratified class structure. It might now be 
the case, he suspected, that they had, in a new version 
of a very old difficulty, unwittingly set up new barriers 
sind greater resistance to any bolder steps. The reforms 
of 1945 would then represent a formidable obstacle to 
further advance, and not a springboard. Labour had gone 
as far as it could along that road, so much so that 
many - though they were not ready to say so publicly - 
had begun to mistsLke the transitional means for the final 
goal; they had "given up". "Is this Socialism?" he 
therefore rephrased by asking "Is the Labour party 
socialist?" Attlee's elevation to an earldom dismayed 
him(490). The only hope was to press on in other 
directions - comprehensive education, industrial
488. G.D.H.Cole, The Development of Socialism in 
the Past Fifty Years, Webb Memorial Lecture (1952).
489. G.D.H. Cole, Is this Social ism?} New Statesman 
pamphlet (1954).
490. "How on earth could he wish to be degraded in 
these ways?": World Social ism Restated, New Statesman 
pamphlet (1956), cited in L.P.Carpenter, G.D.H._ Cole - an 
intellectual biography (1973), p.212.
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democracy. Whether this would in the short-term prove 
acceptable to the party leadership he could not say.
It was only near to end of his life that Cole was 
able to look back calmly, recognizing the period as one 
of historical progress, if politically 
disappointing(491). The chance that all could be 
reversed was the price paid for taking the non­
revolutionary road. Despite everything, and to his 
relief, the achievements of 1945 had not in fact been 
unravelled.
Both these afterthoughts stood the test of time, and 
were reprinted elsewhere. Pitched at the level of 
ultimate ends, they transcended the "mere surface of 
politics"(492). For this reason they were also clear­
headed where others, still dedicated to the old cause, 
were plainly confused by the outbreak of apathy and 
indifference(493). Each of them had their sticking 
points(494). Cole, to the last, never wavered in his 
view that "labour is always right"(495). Tawney had the 
firmest of (partly Anglican) beliefs, about which he did 
not care to argue. Tawney, especially, has been singled 
out as an ’ideal type' labour movement intellectual, 
influential precisely because he identified himself so 
closely with, and managed to give expression to, a body 
of practical convictions without which no political force
491. G.D.H.Cole, ’The Growth of Socialism’, in M.
Ginsberg (ed), ibid (1959), pp. 79-96 and ’Phases of
Labour’s Development in Great Britain 1914-1958’ in
Essays in Jewish Sociology? Labour and Co-operation, 
H.Infield (ed)(1962), pp.99-124.
492. M.Shock, ibid, 3 November 1960, pp.671-672.
493. Eg. N .Mackenzie (ed), Conviction ( 1958) .
494. L.P.Carpenter, ibid (1973), p.228.
495. Obituary in The Times, 15 January 1959, p. 13.
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can hope to succeed(496). Beales, saluting Tawney the 
octogenarian in the 1961, said of him that he was “no 
mere theorist or mere scholar"(497). Their primary 
attachment was to strongly-held core values which 
overrode party loyalty. It was the argument and not the 
academic trappings that really mattered, faith and not 
research, an emotional commitment that was imaginatively 
rather than systematically persuasive. Saintliness 
conveyed moral force.
Both, in the same way and to many of their peers, 
stood condemned for, their emotionally derived 
certainties, their moralizing, and their misuse of 
scholarly standing for extra-curricular activities.
Their judgement was saturated by personal ideology, 
"smudging" different forms of discourse. Cole and Tawney 
were useful for understanding what it was that socialists 
were talking about, but they exhibited all the flaws to 
which dogma is prey, their presumption of the ethical 
desirability of equality impeding a veritable estimation 
of post-war change. They fell outside the normal 
channels of disinterested inquiry, and had to be 
evaluated by other than scholarly standards. To these 
adversaries, personal 'goodness' was no excuse(498).
The full-blown 'revisionist' case, set out in C.A.R. 
Crosland's panoramic The Future of Socialism (1956),
496. J.A.Hall, 'the roles and influence of 
political intellectuals: Tawney versus Sidney Webb' in
The British Journal of Sociology, September 1977, pp.351- 
362.
497. H.L.Beales, 'Three Octogenarians' in
The Political Quarterly, January-March 1961, pp.62-70.
498. Thus, G.R.Elton in a letter to The Times 
Literary Supplement, 11 February 1977, p.156; J.D.Rayner, 
'The Uses of Ideological Language' in D.J. Manning (ed), 
The Form of Ideology (1980); J.P.Kenyon, 'Tawney and 
Social History' in The History Hen (1983), pp.235-250.
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sought to think anew "what socialism is now about" and to 
draw out the likely implications for future policy. The 
work had long been in preparation. Its origins lay in 
the animated debates of the pre-war Oxford University 
Labour club and in Crosland's intention, as he put it in 
a private letter, to become the modern Bernstein(499). 
Elected to Parliament in 1950, after teaching economics 
at Oxford, Crosland was no fan of the Webb tradition, 
which, "despite Margaret Cole's brave attempt at 
whitewashing", remained "hideously unattractive" - "we've 
all learnt to be practical and efficient, and too many of 
us have been to the L.S.E."(500). He also earned 
himself a heretical name by delivering an attack on the 
"utter impracticability" of "vast lists" of industries to 
be nationalized, against a backdrop of booing and 
heckling, at the 1953 party conference(501). By the 
following year, the manuscript had begun to take shape, 
spread in piles across his study room floor. Sixty-four 
pages of an early draft were lost on the train from 
Paddington to Bristol(502). Crosland also drew, like 
Durbin before him on the latest sociological findings, 
particularly from a trip to the United States, with its 
attractive blend of abundance and classlessness. Losing 
his seat in 1955 enabled him to put the finishing touches 
to his argument. His assessment of the Attlee 
reforms(503), which rounded off - in his view - two 
decades of social democratic achievement, he put at the
499. Written in 1940. See S.Crosland, Tony Crosland 
(1982), p.13.
500. Notes of a Fabian conference, October 1950, op 
cit, Dalton papers.
501. Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1953, 
P . 117.
502. The Times, 9 August 1954, p.4.
503. The following is a summary in the main of 'The 
Attack on Poverty, Inequality and Instability', pp.42-55 
of The Future of Socialism.
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centre of his analysis, gently mocking those who had 
started to overlook exactly what had been attained.
The "revolutionary" economic and social changes of 
recent times, he recalled, had been absurdly 
underestimated by the pre-war marxist left. These 
changes, to do with the totally altered nature of private 
power, had been associated with, and in some cases 
accelerated by, the implementation of Labour's 1945 
programme. Primary poverty had declined, as a result of 
a general rise in working class living standards (the 
Rowntree study of York was crucial in this respect); a 
vertical redistribution of income had come about, 
strengthened by a steeply progressive regime of direct 
taxation; the share of wages as a proportion of national 
income had risen dramatically, narrowing the gap between 
richest and poorest; and the fullest of full employment 
had been maintained in conditions of economic stability - 
on each count, as Crosland emphasized, the outcome was at 
least in part due to the deliberate effects of Labour 
rule. Full employment above all, he added, "constitutes, 
as a moment's recollection of pre-war debates will show, 
a major victory for the Left..." Certain propositions 
followed on from this line of thinking. Not only did 
these gains outstrip even the boldest of 'thirties 
outlines. Crosland also believed the essential fabric of 
reform would remain untouched even in Conservative hands, 
guaranteed by a new social climate. Ownership of the 
means of production, however, did not figure large in the 
balance sheet, not - that is -if equality was made the 
primary aim. Put another way, 'Is this still 
Capitalism?' The Britain of the planned, full employment 
welfare state ceased in all its essentials to be 
'capitalist'.
Modern developments were rationally and coherently 
set out, and related to the traditional body of socialist
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principles. Labour, he believed, had largely fulfilled 
•the 'welfare* aspiration in its thinking, through the 
introduction of a wide range of universal social 
services. As to the future, it would not suffice just to 
settle for a defence of the 1951 position, "with 
occasional minor reforms thrown in to sweeten the temper 
of the local activists". Only the egalitarian ethic 
continued to have any relevance. They were "poised 
halfway". At some point the goals of equality and 
efficiency must collide. But this frontier had still to 
be reached.
The book was the making of Crosland, and quickly 
became a Gaitskellite reference point in party 
infighting. His welcoming of economic growth offended 
fundamentalists. Even so, he saw the need to sever the 
party's lingering identification with "austerity, 
rationing and restrictive controls" which may have been 
right for the time but were, in an age of opportunity, 
unsettlingly anachronistic. There was nothing "bogus" or 
"phoney" about mass living standards. Prosperity was 
giving rise to new issues that cut across class lines. A 
protege of Dalton, Crosland was an elegant exception to 
rule that all progressives were killjoys. There was a 
poignant sequel. In the early 1960s, with the printing 
of an amended second edition of The Future of Social ism, 
the main section on 1945-51 - which "shaped, summarized 
and gave order to the whole project of the Attlee 
government"(504) - was deleted altogether.
It is beyond doubt, nevertheless, that a large part 
of the revisionist case rested on the documented claim 
about the dramatic redistributive effects of higher 
taxation, full employment and the movement of prices 
(including subsidies) in the years from 1939 down to
504. F.Inglis, Radical Earnestness: English Social 
theory 1880—1980 (1982), p.142.
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1951, after which there had been something of a relapse, 
but all the same amounting to a permanent change in class 
relations. Emphases of course varied. Strachey, in a 
long disquisition on the history of economics and the 
contrary influence of Marx and Keynes, used this to show 
how it was only by democratic pressure that the innate 
tendency towards ever growing inequality was held at 
bay(505). Jay, reviewing the literature on social 
justice, hammered home the point (a very pertinent one in 
1959-60) that taxation and not public ownership, which 
entailed compensation, had had the greater redistributive 
impact(506). Jenkins argued that steadily increasing 
affluence was the best redistributor of all(507). But 
it was Crosland - if only because he was read more widely 
- who became the main spokesman for the view that the 
traditional, redistributionist welfare goal should now 
give way to constructive policies of social reform 
designed to widen opportunities and expand liberties, 
that the Labour party should indeed adjust itself to the 
very changes which it had helped to initiate.
The issue turned - as Anthony Wright has put 
it(508) - on the coupling of welfare and equality. It 
was to the second of these values that Crosland and 
others now looked, just as it was the extension of 
welfare to redistribution that anti-collectivists (citing 
Beveridge) now contested, arguing that increased social 
spending, for questionable social ends, had made Britain 
one of the most heavily taxed countries in Europe, in hoc 
to a law of increasing state activity. - Rising incomes
505. J.Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism (1956).
506. D.Jay, Social ism in the New Society (1962).
507. R.Jenkins, The Labour Case (1959).
508. A.Wright, *Tawneyism Revisited : equality, 
welfare and socialism* in B.Pimlott (ed), Fabian Essays 
in Socialist Thought (1984), esp. pp.90-96.
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turned the national provision of benefits along 
comprehensive Beveridgean lines into a needless 
extravagance. A social service economy had developed, 
but it was wholly unsuited to. the new economic 
conditions. But in both cases the notion of welfare - 
redolent of the 1940s - was burdened with a host of 
unwelcome associations. The attempt to rescue 'welfare* 
was taken up by Richard Titmuss, Professor of Social 
Administration at the L.S.E.
Titniuss's volume in the HMSO civil history series on 
Problems of Social Policy during the war years (on the 
strength of which he had joined the LSE) was an important 
text in substantiating the idea that if dangers were to 
be shared then resources too should be shared, and that 
the sharing and solidarity of the citizen's war was a 
valuable social good(509). Rapturously reviewed by 
Tawney, it joined his evident social concern and mastery 
of statistical technique with an intuitive insight into 
the process of wartime government. The coming of peace 
for him, while re-opening the issue of social priorities, 
also presaged an "approaching reaction" and, after 
Labour's departure from office in 1951, a sustained 
intellectual attack on the principles of 1945, most of 
all in the stereotype social ills attributed by critics 
to something called 'the welfare state', a polemically 
convenient but - to Titmuss - meaningless expression. In 
his 1951 lecture on 'The Social Division of Welfare', 
Titmuss dpenly rebutted the charges levelled by liberal 
conservatives and 'One Nation' Tories, -pointing instead 
to new kinds of fiscal (tax allowance-based) and 
occupational (fringe) benefits not normally included in 
official welfare calculations, which had grown up 
alongside the social services and were threatening to 
overshadow them. He already saw a new, largely
509. R.M.Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950).
237
unaccounted division of inequality opening up, "dividing 
loyalties", "nourishing privilege" and "conflicting with 
the aims and unity of social policy", warranting deeper 
study. Social mobility had not become easier, as David 
Glass demonstrated(510). It was almost impossible to
measure "subsistence". The middle, not the working 
classes, made the greater demands on the social 
services(511), while maintaining their advantages 
owing largely to non-economic factors(512). Armed with 
this realization, students of Titmuss were sent out to 
staff the new welfare agencies.
The limitations of the whole Beveridge outlook - 
geared to poverty and mass unemployment - formed the 
inspiration behind the Labour party's National 
Superannuation Plan of 1957, devised by Titmuss and two 
researchers, Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend, the 
"skiffle group" as a Tory minister dubbed them. Townsend 
had detailed some harrowing case histories to show what 
had been happening among the least advantaged since the 
war(513). By 1960, when he delivered a Fabian lecture 
on 'The Irresponsible Society', Titmuss had come to see 
that they had put too much faith in universality, having 
mistakenly linked it with egalitarianism. Injustices 
were less glaring but no less deeply felt. New 
concentrations of private power and privilege were now in 
place, forcing reformers to rethink what they meant by 
equity and fairness, and to put right the lack of hard 
information which was impeding their efforts.
510. D.V.Glass, Social Mobility in Britain (1954).
511. B.Abel-Smith, 'Whose Welfare State?, in N. 
Mackenzie (ed), ibid (1958), pp.55-73.
512. B.Wooton, The Social Foundations of Mages 
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513. P.Townsend, 'A Society for People' in N. 
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The culmination of this task came with the 
publication of Titmuss*s Income Distr ibut ion and Social 
Change3 in late 1962(514). The book had its origins 
in a determination to critically examine the official 
statistics on the pre-tax pattern of income distribution 
over the 1938-58 period, pointing to the difficulties in 
defining * income* and 'wealth*, and 'income unit* and the 
number of such units, the measurement of family income, 
and the flow of income-spending over time. By itself, 
his painstaking dissection clarified to him the severe 
deficiencies of the existing data, raising questions 
about the widespread assumption of a strongly egalitarian 
trend brought about by economic and social policy over 
the last two decades. The framework of the official 
figures ttttuld ne-bj in hi& eatplortt-fcion of the way in which 
they were compiled, admit of such certainty. But much 
more than this was what the figures left out of account - 
the "manipulation" and "rearrangement" of income-wealth, 
the provision of tax-free covenants and benefits in kind, 
company pension schemes and organized tax avoidance - the 
total effect of which was impossible to quantify. The 
tools of social research, as the Webbs had known them, 
were no longer up to the task. Together, these 
imperfections were increasingly presenting a false 
picture of the economic structure of society, concealing 
the emergence of new centres of corporate power behind 
the mesmerizing language of the 'Welfare State*.
It followed that many of the authoritative 
pronouncements made during the 1950s, and which had 
shaped the public and policy-making climate, had no firm 
grounding in fact. It could not be maintained that there 
was, as some insisted, a 'natural* equalizing tendency in 
post-war Britain, because the "statistical darkness" made 
it so hard to track "the changing equation of
514. R.M.Titmuss, Income Distr ibut ion and Social 
Change (1962).
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inequality". The distribution of political power saw to 
that. The most that could be said - Titmuss concluded - 
was that "we know less about the economic and social 
structure of our society than we thought we did". 
Unconstructive as this seemed, and it was important to 
first understand how little they really understood.
In one way Titmuss narrowed the matter down to a 
technical question of factual evidence - of definition 
and calculation. As a number of reviewers regretfully 
remarked, he did not come forward with anything new. He 
had only subjected the available figures to a more 
rigorous examination, and found them wanting, so "ending 
the unanimity" as to the reliability of the officially- 
provided data(515). Everybody else up to that time, he 
implied, he had been arguing on the basis of wrong 
information(516). That Titmuss (and his collaborators) 
had already prejudged the issue, having long contended 
that post-war income levelling had been overstated, was — 
on this strict reading --of no consequence. Instead, the 
point was whether he had included all that was 
immediately relevant (e.g. fiddling in lower income 
groups) and why he had not stopped to consider the 
proportion of labour's share of national income(517).
Even those like Barna, who shared Titmuss's outlook, 
stuck to technicalities(518), or else praised the 
usefulness of showing how fundamental notions like 
'poverty' and 'welfare' had no fixed meaning, except in
515. 'Full and empty purses', The Economist, 13 
October 1962, p.153.
516. B. Magee, 'The . Fraudulent Society', The 
Spectator, 5 October 1962, p.459.
517. C.Clark, 'Soaking the New Rich', The Listener, 
25 October 1962, p.679.
518. T. Barna, 'How equal is more equal?', New 
Society, 11 October 1962, p.35.
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relation to the totality of resources(519). But 
Titmuss did not, and could not(520), refute the 
generally accepted view. He could only throw it open to 
reconsideration, the long and complex work involved in 
going over the ground again now requiring a collective 
effort.
That said, it would clearly not suffice to regard 
Income Distribut ion and Social Change as one more work in 
the long line of the "social book-keeping" tradition of 
British sociology, which had arisen in "a generation 
whose main preoccupation was with poverty and 
inequality"(521). True, the facts about post-war 
redistribution were in dispute, even disputed by fellow 
Fabians. But values could not be treated as if they were 
facts too, and the equality debate had been not just 
about one value, but many, none of which were reducible 
to an easily quantifiable measure. Nor could values be 
considered dispassionately - to breathe is to judge. No 
matter how complete and all-inclusive the factual 
understanding, it would never be enough to resolve a 
value-elash which surpassed the realm of facts. For 
Titmuss, as for Tawney and Cole, equality was an 
aspiration to do with how far there was still to go 
rather thad with how far they had already come(522). 
Revered on the left, the right found them unbearably, 
sanctimonious moralists - but they saw what it was that
519. R.Wollheim, in The New Statesman , 26 October
1962, p.584.
520. A.Peacock, in The British Journal of
Sociology, March 1964, p. 89.
521. J.Rex, 'Which path for sociology?', New
Society, 6 October 1966, p.530.
522. H.Rose, 'Analysing the past, influencing the
future', The Times Educational Supplement, 7 November 
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was at stake. By doubting the widely-held impression of 
an evolutionist, welfare ascent, Titmuss was also casting 
doubt on the configuration of value assumptions around 
which this impression had gained support. The argument 
about post-war equality and inequality, while statistical 
in form, was value-laden in content.
1951
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A unifying theme in the 'State of England' 
compositions of the early nineteen-sixties was the 
conviction that most of the troubles said to be 
afflicting the country --educational infirmity, 
conservatism in industry, nostalgia for Empire, 
amateurishness in government - were traceable to, and 
indeed aggravated by, Britain's economic weakness 
(523). That Britain's economy was a slow-growing one, 
relative to its main economic competitors, was already 
painfully evident. "The old scourge of the trade cycle 
and mass unemployment have been scotched", Douglas Jay 
affirmed(524); governments knew how to manipulate 
total demand so as to correct recessionary or 
inflationary trends. This had not proved enough, 
however, to prevent alternating periods of relaxation and 
restriction, of stop-and-start, as rising consumption 
strained the balance of payments and interrupted 
expanding output, a policy cycle that had been the 
uniquely British experience over the past decade. How 
much of this halting expansion was attributable to 
mistaken policy aims, and how much to (avoidable) defects 
in policy-making, was very much at issue. One popular 
argument- was that British industry suffered from chronic 
under-investment. A more penetrating case was put for 
saying that there had been too much misdirected 
investment in the wrong, largely protected industries.
But both schools of economists could not ignore the 
succession of policy shocks in the outside world which 
had hit Britain since the war and to which the British 
economy was peculiarly vulnerable. Any considered
523. 'Suicide of a Nation?', Encounter special 
number (July 1963); Rebirth of Britain (1964); whereas 
Chapman, British Gover njnen t Observed (1963) found that 
economic decline was "only half the story".
524. D.Jay, ibid (1962), p.136.
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judgement had to weigh up the influence of internal and 
external factors on economic trends.
One such study, by Christopher Dow, carried out on 
behalf of the National Institute for Economic and Social 
Research and spanning 1945-60, took the overall 
effectiveness of government measures as its central 
topic(525). Dow, in between spells at the Treasury, 
sind after a long and careful sifting of the evidence, 
found that trying to ascertain which policies had had 
what results was not a straightforward matter, even when 
reflecting on them long afterwards. The assessment of 
past experience was also hampered both by differing views 
amongst economists over fundamental questions like the 
causes of inflation, emd by the tailoring of policy to 
political requirements (economics, as Sir Robert Hall, 
who wrote the preface to Dow, remarked, began as an 
attempt to clarify the issues of political 
dispute(526)). The lessons of the recent past were 
sadly not as good a guide to present policy as they 
should be. With this large proviso in mind, Dow was able 
to assert that fluctuations in economic growth, at least 
during the time of Conservative rule, "were due in large 
part to fluctuations in policy". Not that all cyclical 
trends could have been smoothed over. But "so far from 
countering such basic causes of instability, the 
influence of policy seems rather to have exaggerated 
their effects". Policy was actually destabilising. Too 
elementary a view was taken of how the economy 
functioned. It should not have been inferred from this 
that this made things worse than if the government had
525. J.C.R.Dow, The Management of the British 
Economy 1945-60 (1964).
526. R.Hall, "Reflections on the Practical 
Application of Economics", The Economic Journal, December 
1959, p.649.
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done nothing. The return towards planning in 1960-62 he 
saw as a disillusioned recognition of past errors and 
inadequacies. The disturbances of the late 1940s - on 
the other hand - were a very different matter.. Problems 
like the fuel and convertibility crises had been 
needlessly mismanaged. Hugh Dalton's advisers "can 
hardly escape all blame". But by the time Cripps took 
over, the awkward transition from war to peace had been 
successfully negotiated, opening the way for a general 
reorientation of policy. The production and export 
targets which Cripps set himself had, in turn, been met, 
in spite of the continuing difficulty of excess demand in 
the economy. Only a level of still greater austerity 
could have quickened the pace of recovery. It was Hugh 
Gaitskell's misfortune, in view of his sophisticated 
grasp of the new wisdom, to be hit by the violent 
external blows following upon rearmament, of a magnitude 
which - Dow believed - no internal precautionary steps 
could have withstood. Dow's presentation of Gaitskell as 
the first fully formed 'Keynesian' Chancellor was one 
that was to persist. Taken as a whole, on the broadest 
questions the decisions taken in 1947-51 had been 
generally justified, although the finer points of 
forecasting and timing could be faulted. Primitive pre- 
Keynesian ideas about economic planning had slowly been 
supplanted, over the course of the five years, by 
piecemeal - and generally effective - government 
intervention. It was all too easy to overlook how novel 
the commitment to full employment had been, and how 
historically high the British growth rate actually was in 
the immediate post-war period. Economic policy, he 
urged, had "revolutionized" social conditions.
Other Keynesian interpretations of the economic 
record after 1945, even in the shape of dissenting 
histories like those of Shonfield (1958) and Brittan 
(1964), successively economic correspondents with The
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Financial Times(527) evinced a greater degree of 
disquiet. Excessive welfare spending had held the 
economic progress of the country back, but so too had 
overloading military expenditure, set in train by 
"extraordinary cavalier" decision-making. Brittan 
reviewed for the publishers(528) and had then drawn on 
a full-length case study by Joan Mitchell of one, still 
disputed, past episode - the rearmament crisis of 1950- 
51, "the last and most severe of the crises of post-war 
maladjustment"(529). About the inception of the arms 
programme, much still needed explaining, even for 
Shonfield, who had been able to follow events 
closely(530). There was already a handful of books 
about the Attlee governments, Crossman told his listeners 
on the Third Programme(531) - "a group of laborious 
doctoral theses by American sociologists and economists", 
one or two pieces of "sensational journalism", and some 
not very revealing memoirs. But Mitchell's study was - 
he said - the first of its kind, a work of "contemporary 
history".
Mitchell's primary purpose was to prepare a 
practical analysis of government control of the economy 
in the unprecedented circumstances of the late 'forties. 
She was only secondarily interested in the spilling over 
of economic problems into political conflict inside the 
government. In essence, her approach was to scrupulously 
separate out what was known at the time, and the
527. A.Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the
Mar; S. Brittan, The Treasury Under The Tories 1951-1964,
528. Seeker and Warburg Ltd archive, Box 384
(Mitchell), University of Reading.
529. J.Mitchell, Crisis in Britain - 1951 (1963),
P.9.
530. A.Shonfield, ibid (1958), pp.91-94.
531. R.H.S.Crossman, ibid, 18 April 1963.
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information ministers (and commentators like 
herself (532)) had had to go on, with the evidence, 
such as revised and backdated balance of trade and 
payments figures, available only at a much later date.
She then used this disjunction between the facts at the 
time and as they finally turned out to assess the wisdom 
of the background assumptions which had gone into the 
main decisions. As to what went on inside the main 
economic departments, she could only conjecture. But the 
reader was presented with a convinced advocacy of the 
essential correctness, whatever the practical 
difficulties, of the Keynesian approach to modern 
economic management.
Mitchell contended that, taking each step at a time, 
the case for rearming - fixing, doubling and then 
trebling the budget allocation for defence - as a 
response to the advent of war in Korea, had a certain 
logic to, it. Decisions viewed in context appeared "not 
unreasonable" to those involved, although the total 
effect was impossibly and incredibly over-extended. The 
initial mistake, not repeated, had been to suggest that 
the burden of rearmament would not impair the country's 
economic strength. The government had never been 
committed to rearming "regardless" of the economic 
consequences. Given the statistics provided for him, and 
the existing state of economic knowledge, Gaitskell's 
testing time as Chancellor had much to commend it. Only 
much later on did it become plain that estimates of 
future growth had been too high, that the Treasury had 
been swamped by other spending claims, and that - taking 
rearmament as a whole - the Cabinet had been "asking too 
much". Even so, it was better to base judgements on a
532. See her articles in Socialist Commentary for 
April and May 1951 and March 1952. Mitchell worked in the 
Board of* Trade in the 1940s before joining the Department 
of Economics in the University of Nottingham.
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poor set of statistics than none at nil. Of f'i oi a I r. hod 
been badly caught out by the sudden rise in (especially 
dollar) imports, obviously affecting other nations but to 
which Britain was especially prone. 1950-51 could now be 
seen (1963) as an important lesson in coping with 
inflationary pressures.
She drew on the memoirs of Attlee, Morrison and 
Dalton to deal with the political repercussions. Who had 
been in the right? Bevan’s resignation claims could not 
be checked. He had forced the issue. He did not invent 
it, but exploited it, magnifying any differences. The 
fact that the pace of rearmament did not in the end prove 
to be sustainable was not an argument against rearmament 
altogether. Gaitskell's attitude had been to make the 
best of a bad situation, insisting on rearmament not 
because he wished to call a halt to Labour's social 
revolution or to harm the N.H.S., but because of the need 
to signal allegiance to the Anglo-American alliance at a 
time of mounting international tension. This was a 
political calculation. Wilson's contribution was more 
interesting, not least because it was so unusual for a 
minister to resign in protest at U.S. policy (Wilson 
voted for the NHS charges). Time had been on the side of 
the Bevanites. By the end of 1952, with the crisis having 
passed, the economy was at a "standstill". Nobody 
emerged with very much honour. Yet both Gaitskell and 
Wilson, leaders in the years ahead, had for the first 
time been pushed into the limelight. They were paragons 
of the new style, economically literate politician, not a 
clash of left and right but a dispute about the 
assessment (as Crosland said) of "future production 
prospects". Not surprisingly, both Gaitskell, who died 
shortly afterwards, and Wilson, approved her book in 
draft.
In the end, so much had been unforeseen and
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unpredictable that it was more accurate to speak of "a 
crisis of the Western alliance as a whole", rather than 
of Britain alone. But Treasury shortcomings (most of 
which had since been rectified as a result) added to the 
uncertainties. Later reprocessing of the official 
statistics further confused the issue, making it all but 
impossible - in her judgement - to make precise economic
sense of the events of 1951. One could no longer be
certain about what was to count as a 'known' fact in the 
given situation. Historiographically, the more that had 
come to be learnt, the less anyone could be certain of - 
a warning indeed that economics was not readily amenable 
to non-economists(533).
Unlike Dow, however, who was inclined to look back 
on 1951 as a one-off special case, Mitchell was still 
irked by and wanted to put an end to the Tory
accusation — put about in the closing stages of the
Attlee government - of Labour's financial
irresponsibility, which had left the party with an unfair 
reputation for mismanagement and robbed it of the credit 
for having established a sound basis for economic 
recovery. A convinced planner, she still had memories of 
the way in which, after Cripps had become chancellor in 
1947, the government had begun to plan its way out of 
trouble, fusing the planning and financial departments in 
order to overcome the earlier delay and division, and not 
a moment too soon, representing "a prima facie claim to 
some success for real policies"(534). This was of a 
piece with Jay's recollection of Gaitskell's saving role
533. P.Einzig, 'The Financial Crisis of 1931', in
M.Gilbert (ed), A Century of Conflict 1850-1950 (1966).
534. J.Mitchell, Groundwork to Economic PlanninQ 
(1966), p.108.
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in the 1949 devaluation of the pound(535), and 
Marquand's realization of how surprisingly unkeynesian 
Cripps since looked in comparison (536). Labour's 
overall record on leaving office was very much better 
than it had been painted. Gaitskell had simply been 
unlucky. Had it not been for the Korean war, it would 
have been Labour and not the Conservatives who would have 
reaped the rewards of the economic upturn, and so much 
else besides. Post-war politics would have taken an 
entirely different turning.
Her confidence in Keynesian stabilizing policy, 
aimed at avoiding short-term turbulence, was undiminished 
and, in April 1965, she was recruited as a part-time 
member of George Brown's National Board for Prices and 
Incomes, resuming her earlier contact with Whitehall,
combining the lives of social science academic and public
servant, a member of the same managerial elite of the
N.B.P.I. that was to interest the political
sociologist(537).
One final point is worth making. Mitchell, as we 
saw, considered the 1951 crisis to be the "last and most 
severe" of the emergencies that the Attlee government had 
to deal with. But no cataclysmic slump ensued, as some 
continually warned. Instead, after a short recession, 
the North American and West European economies embarked 
on the most rapid uninterrupted period economic expansion
535. D.Jay, 'Government Control of the Economy:
defects in the machinery', The Political Guar ter 1y .
April-June 1968, pp.136-138.
536. D.Marquand, 'Sir Stafford Cripps', in 
M.Sissons and P.French, ibid (1963), pp.173-195.
537. C.Crouch, 'The Ideology of a Managerial Elite: 
The National Board for Prices and Incomes 1965-70', in 
The British Political Sociology Yearbook, I.Crewe 
(ed)(1974), pp.55-88.
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in recent history, from which Britain, even though 
lagging behind the European average, also benefitted. 
Reconstruction was succeeded by an ever-widening 
prosperity, so that Samuel Brittan, in his sketch of the 
longer view from 1945 until the early 1960s, saw Korean 
rearmament as the start in a series of recurring post-war 
battles about the level of public expenditure in an 
economy growing by fits and starts, and a direct 
consequence of the tax-and-spend Keynesian package. Full 
employment, trade union power and universal welfare had 
transformed the post-war situation. But as earlier 
writers had already found out, the changes to do with 
increased scope of and administrative adjustments to 
'economic government' were in the main ad hoc and unco­
ordinated. The 1945 Labour government had certainly 
not - this was Shonfield's view of the matter(538) - 
been averse to state action as such, only that it should 
be of a strictly limited kind, the array of direct 
controls being regarded as essentially temporary 
instruments in conditions of scarcity, and gradually to 
be done away with. Labour's reluctance to use the full 
powers of the newly-established Development Councils made 
this clear. Had the government stayed longer in office, 
it might well have been called on to intervene more and 
more frequently. Labour never, in Shonfield's eyes, 
married economic efficiency with democratic control, or 
public power with private enterprise, expressing a 
politico-economic justification for the developmental 
state upon which the hopes of more sustained economic 
growth, on European lines, finally rested. It was 
fashionable* in view of this theory vacuum, to look upon 
Keynesian thinking in a rational and technical way, using 
intelligence to sort out muddles. But many neo- 
Keynesians, aware that classical economic theory had 
pretended to have nothing to say about justice or
538. A.Shonfield, Modern Capitalism - the changing 
balance of public and private power (1965).
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fairness in the distribution of economic resources, were 
far readier to look upon high and stable employment as a 
good thing and much more disposed to shape policy towards 
desired ends. By eliminating the impersonal but 
imperfect mechanism of the market, priorities could be 
laid down as to what was socially just or economically 
efficient "in the public interest". Planning assumed the 
availability of superior knowledge of a supposedly 
objective kind. Many planners, Mitchell included, 
disapproved of the consumer boom that went with greater 
affluence, since they had a conception of how things 
should be otherwise. Advocates of freer markets could 
only see that decisions were now being made for their 
political acceptability or administrative convenience. 
Either way, "how to" questions were thought to be 
inseparable from "what to do" issues. Technical advice 
was indistinguishable from judgements made according to 
taste, temperament and value-preferences.
The McKenzie Thesis
'System' implies the interdependence of parts. A 'party 
system' suggests that the behaviour of any one political party 
affects and is in turn affected by the actions of other 
parties. The 'system', moreover, could be said to mould the 
structures within it. To the trained observer, Labour's 
gradual acceptance of, in Bassett's words, "the traditional 
form as well as the essential principles of British 
parliamentary democracy“(539), had greatly eased the 
functioning of the democratic process. Colleagues at the LSE 
concurred. In office, neither Labour nor the Conservatives, 
according to Ben Roberts (Reader in Industrial Relations), 
were as extreme or as dominated by sectional interests as some 
critics would have people believe(540). Kingsley Smellie, 
in his U.N.E.S.C.O. guide to The British May of Life(1955), 
cited Bassett approvingly, referring to "the seeming paradox 
in a two-party system" - each party implies the annihilation 
of the other and yet each depends upon the other. "It has 
been a great debate and high argument will continue to be 
heard", he commented, but the-two main parties were now so 
evenly balanced, and there was so little basic disagreement 
about the ends of political action, that the sting had gone 
out of the contest(541). All of this was quite at variance 
with pre-war expectations. Robert McKenzie, a Canadian 
research student with a background in the Canadian Labour 
Party who had come to England as an army captain and settled 
after the war, joining the staff of the L.S.E. Sociology 
Department in 1949, was already delving into the unexplored
539. R.Bassett, 'British Parliamentary Government j
Today', The Political Quarterly, No 4 1952, p. 3-37. j
540. B.Roberts, 'Trade Unions and Party Politics’, The 
Cambridge Journal, March 1953, pp.387-402. |
541. KJB.. Smellie, The British May of Life C1955), p. 158,
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area of political parties. Laski had kept an open house, and 
McKenzie had been one of his most frequent visitors, but the 
pupil soon superseded the teacher:
“One hesitated to press Laski on these issues but in 
conversation he readily conceded that the war had 
modified the course of British politics in a way he 
had not anticipated. He referred mainly to the 
unforeseen circumstances in which Labour came to 
power in 1945. The old fears of a flight of capital, 
of ’economic sabotage’ by the City, proved 
groundless, he argued, not because of the high­
mindedness of the ruling classes but because their 
freedom of action had been almost completely 
circumscribed by the straitjacket of war-time 
controls inherited and retained (his italics) by 
their new Labour masters.
But there is more to it, I think, than this.
The fact is that the ’abyss’ between the parties 
which Laski thought he saw in 1938 certainly did not 
exist in 1945 and is even less visible 
today"(542).
Laski, McKenzie went on, had romanticized about the 
crusading force that Labour might represent, when, through a 
combination of domestic and international factors, and a sense 
of bipartisan responsibility, "the social thinking of the 
whole community" was now very much at one. "Labour was less 
militant than Professor Laski hoped; the Conservatives, for 
whatever motive, have been nothing like as reactionary as he 
feared". A half-formed view was taking shape, not, as Richard 
Rose suggests, differing from the conception then prevailing
542. R.T.McKenzie, ’Laski and the Social Bases of the 
Constitution’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol 3 1952,
pp.261-262.
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at the L.S.E. (or among fionift see hi onn) (542) r.o much sr, 
giving expression to a new version of it, with the main cue 
coming from Bassett.
McKenzie delighted in the good-natured, politically 
informed discussion of the L.S.E. Senior Common Room, between 
Smellie, D.G. McRae (his doctoral supervisor), Ralph Miliband 
and others(544). The Oakeshottians, by contrast, took 
little part - Gellner spoke of their philosophy of 
"abdication" and non-commitment, robbing all academic 
discourse of its critical facuity(545). As a reaction to 
Laski, McKenzie believed(546), there was a new found 
reluctance by academics to become involved in matters of 
public policy, a reluctance which he did not share - he 
conducted fieldwork, broadcast on the radio, and invited 
practising politicians to a successful postgraduate seminar. 
Politics was the ultimate spectator sport; McKenzie was 'le 
spectateur engage'.
The germ of an idea was evident in his 1951 essay in a 
Hansard Society publication on the British party 
system(547), examining the formal structure of the 
Conservative and Labour parties, the analysis already forming 
in his own mind. He then went in search of supporting 
evidence. The gap in the literature meant him having to fill 
in the historical background, pulling together material from
543. R.Rose, The Problem of Party Government (1974), 
p.334.
544. D.G.Macrae,. conversation with the author, 30
June 1983.
545. E.Gellner, 'Contemporary Thought and Politics' in 
Philosophy, 32 1957, pp.336-357.
546. R.T.McKenzie, in My LSE, J.Abse(ed)(1977), 
pp.83-103.
547. Par 1iamen tary Affairs, Winter 1951. Special issue 
on the British Party System.
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disparate sources. He also took on board sociological 
theories to do with the rise of political organization. He 
refused to take phrases like 'the labour movement' at face 
value. McKenzie, as he put it, was determined to "probe 
behind the facade" of the propaganda of the parties, taking 
them to pieces to see how they really worked. The length of 
time he took infuriated his other supervisor, W.A. Robson. 
Finally the thesis was submitted in 1954, uniquely in a 
publishers' proof copy.
British Political Parties — The Distr ibution of Power 
within the Conservative and Labour Parties(1955) was not just 
a thesis, more a set of interlocking theses. His primary aim 
was to assess the accuracy of the proposition first put 
forward in the early 1900s by Roberto Michels to the effect 
that, as a political party grows in size and complexity, the 
exercise of power inevitably concentrates in the hands of a 
few leaders, in what he formulated as an "iron law of 
oligarchy". A sub-theme was to explain why, as a result, the 
worst fears of Ostrogorski and others about the coming of 
'mass' democracy had never materialized. He did not mean to 
provide a complete history (the Liberal party was relegated to 
a one-and-a-half page appendix). But each institution of each 
party, from the leader and the parliamentary party to the head 
office, conference and the local party structure, was treated 
historically in order to substantiate the claim that, in spite 
of the very different historical origins of the Conservatives 
and Labour, and whatever they might say about themselves or 
caricature their opponents for, they had grown to be 
fundamentally alike in the way they were organized, above all, 
because of the pre-eminence of the parliamentary leadership, 
when in office and power. The Conservative party was arranged 
very much as had been assumed, though even here he had some 
important things to say. Right from the start, however, he 
realised he had more to divulge about the Labour party - its 
most central ideas were being challenged full on.
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Furthermore, he was caught up (his disclaimer to the 
contrary(548)) by the special character of the politics of 
the Labour party, since - to an extent unknown with the 
Conservatives - the way in which one saw the Labour party as 
operating had implications for what it did or might claim to 
represent.
The glaring contrast between Labour's professed 'inner- 
party democracy' and its actual working had come about through 
the evolution of various, largely unacknowledged devices which 
enabled the party's leadership to evade the institutional 
restraints placed upon their power and authority. Labour was 
hesitant, whereas the Conservatives were forthright, in 
admitting that, while their followers always needed cajoling 
and convincing, the leadership enjoyed the undisputed right to 
lead. The chief, though not sole, purpose of the mass 
organization outside Parliament was to sustain those leaders 
in their positions. Labour was not, therefore, subject to the 
kind of external control levelled against it by Churchill in 
the 'Laski affair' back in 1945. The emergence of the Leader, 
as a potential or acting Prime Minister, was the dominating 
fact of party life. At every level, and on a whole range of 
matters, there was no significant organizational difference 
between "the two great parties in the state". The 
similarities were so "striking", "strange" and "overwhelming" 
that McKenzie was amazed they had not been commented on 
before.
Labour's experience as a 'party of government' after 1945 
was conclusive, he felt. The events of that period only made 
sense from this perspective. The stronger the P.L.P., the 
weaker the mass organization of the party, as a general rule. 
To be sure, 'Let Us Face the Future' had gone part of the way
548. "The scope of this book is indicated by its sub­
title; its purpose is to examine the distribution of power 
within . the two major British political parties. It is not 
concerned with party ideologies or programmes ..."(page vii).
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to acceding to the wishes of the Mikardo Conference resolution 
in 1944 that an explicit commitment be made about the 
nationalizing of basic industries, but even this had been ' 
watered down in the final document. Thereafter, Conference 
had in the main been treated to "full-dress expositions" of 
Government policies by the relevant ministers, and seemed to 
like it that way. The stabilizing influence of the trade 
unions was stressed (without being expanded upon). Only the 
backbench revolt over military conscription stood out as an 
example of loss of control. Much of the credit was put down 
to Attlee (a notable guest at the L.S.E. seminar) and 
McKenzie's writing bore the imprint of his tenure. Attlee 
had, McKenzie argued, ruled the country over that five-year 
period with as much authority as any Prime Minister in any 
preceding Conservative or Liberal administration. 
Organizationally, and indeed ideologically, the big two were 
matching. There was an "agreement on fundamentals" which made 
the party dogfight somewhat contrived and unreal, with the 
result that
"Two great monolithic structures now face each other 
and conduct furious arguments about the 
comparatively minor issues that separate 
them"(549).
This did not add up to an "iron lav/ of oligarchy", so 
much as a strong, historically-revealed tendency, qualified by 
the need on the part of all leaders to mobilize and maintain 
support. It was only anyway of rough application because of 
"the conventions of the parliamentary system" itself, wherein 
responsibility was owed not to the party machine but to the 
electorate. The party was the vote-getter. All other 
functions "are, and must" remain subsidiary. The voters did 
not initiate policy but were there to choose from among 
competing teams of leaders. At this point, 'is' turned into
549. R.T.McKenzie, ibid (1955), p.586.
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'ought', as McKenzie moved from the assembling of evidence to 
a judgement of value. It was not only necessary that leaders 
should emerge and retain their position; it was also desirable 
that they should do so. 'Party' no longer acted as a 
potential threat to the sovereignty of parliament. The main 
two parties were admirably suited to the role of ventilating 
class animosities end integrating the enfranchised mass of the 
population into the political process. As a description of 
the realities of power during a time of social harmony, this 
was exceptional.
Instantly acclaimed as a masterpiece, McKenzie's book was 
enormously stimulating, as muGh for the bold way in which it 
was put forward as a work of the first importance(550).
W.J.M. Mackenzie agreed that, in elaborating upon Michels, 
McKenzie was "of course" quite right (although, he added, the 
myths each party shared were nevertheless functional - they 
were the parties)(551). To others it was "a brilliantly 
evocative account" which shone with scholarship, a "memorable" 
and "profoundly exciting" study replete with insight and 
analysis, fit to rank alongside the only other landmark work 
on British parties by Ostrogorski and Lowell. Even though his 
presentation of the argument, from the centre outwards, 
presupposed the validity of the hierarchical party model, and 
even though the sub-division of chapters, jerking forwards and 
backwards in time, detracted from the fluency of the case, 
these were only seen as minor blemishes. "Nothing like it has 
been written in English for fifty years", Bill Pickles 
declared, "and we shall be lucky indeed if we get another book 
as good when the next half century has gone by"(552).
Heartened by its reception as.a piece of first-class research
550. D.W.Brogan, review in The Political Quarterly, Vol 
26 1955, pp. 188-190.
551. W.J.M.Mackenzie, 'Mr McKenzie on the British 
Parties', Political Studies, Vol III 1955, p.158.
552. All comments taken from the backcover of the second 
(revised) edition, 1963.
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on a major subject, it confirmed McKenzie in his conviction - 
according to McRae - that he v/ould change the study of 
politics(553) .
The doctrine of intra-party democracy
The first serious skirmish in which McKenzie was involved 
occurred in the pages of the journal Pol it ical Studies in 
1957-58, going to the very heart of his Schumpeterian analysis 
of parliamentary leadership. Saul Rose, briefly international 
secretary of the Labour party at Transport House who had 
returned to academic life, drew on his own recent experience 
to pick McKenzie up on the danger of generalizing about the 
Labour party(554). He recalled, on the basis of Labour's 
actions in opposition from 1952-55, the "binding" nature of 
Conference decisions, the shifting and competing centres of 
authority inside the party, and - most of all - the style and 
temperament of whoever chanced to be leader. Over the short 
period with which he was acquainted, the leading 
parliamentarians, the annual Conference and the N.E.C. all 
from time to time moved into greater prominence, often 
behaving totally at variance with one another. On one 
occasion, indeed (German rearmament), Conference had come 
close to overturning a major front-bench policy, an 
unthinkable happening in the immediate post-war years. Power 
was therefore relational; it made no sense to seek after 'one 
focus of power' within the party. "Perhaps, after all, what 
the Labour party believes itself to be is a better guide to 
what it is".
McKenzie's rejoinder was to say that the events after 
1951, as Rose had recounted them, far from making his - Rose's 
- case, endorsed the general tenor of his own arguments. Out
553. D.G.McRae, ibid, 30 June 1983.
554. S.Rose, 'Policy Decision in Opposition', Political 
Studies, Vol IV 1956, pp.128-138.
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of office, the authority of the parliamentary leadership had 
been disrupted, along with the loss of several elder 
statesman, by a severe outbreak of internal party warfare, 
jeopardizing its ability to resemble an Opposition-in-waiting. 
The moment Attlee's parliamentary team lost control over the 
affairs of the party, it no longer became clear "where 
effective policy decisions were being made or indeed whether 
they were being made at all". Warfare between the Bevanites 
and their rivals raged at all levels of the party - defeated 
in one arena, the battle was renewed in another. But this 
need not be translated into a free-for-all. The only reason 
why the divide opened up to begin with was because the 
leadership of the party had lost the initiative. The real 
problem was the kind of attitude epitomized in Rose's view 
that the extra-parliamentary party and especially the 
Conference, a 'democracy' made up of a few hundred thousand 
political activists, should presume to instruct the party 
leaders in what party policy should be. The Labour party 
would continue to be at risk as long as it clung to a party 
constitution which was based on "an archaic doctrine of intra­
party democracy which was in fact incompatible with 
parliamentary democracy". It was high time that everyone in 
the party reconciled themselves to this. His reply was a 
reiteration of the original argument, brought forward to 
account for the intervening years, and topped off with a major 
but inarticulate premise of that same earlier work : the 
absolute necessity of parliamentary elites, so as to best 
safeguard liberal democratic values.
But it was a reply in two halves, the back half of which 
was a much more forcefully presented view, switching the 
grounds from the positive (i.e. what the position had been in 
the Labour party in the early part of the decade) and a 
normative statement of how the party ought to see itself. It 
was on these terms that a sharply-worded response was drawn
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from Ralph Miliband(555). Miliband, Lecturer in Government 
at the L.S.E., was another former student of Laski, but more 
clearly part of the marxist left. His thinking exhibited none 
of the "deep tensions"(556) so apparent in his old mentor. 
Laski used to reassure him, when they were on the staff 
together after the war, that Attlee and Morrison, whom he knew 
well, were to be trusted, and for a while Miliband had also 
been optimistic about Labour's accomplishments, joining in 
with the Bevanite 'Second XI' of activists and parliamentary 
hopefuls in the early fifties(557). But as time passed-he 
came to regard party politics as "a decreasingly meaningful 
activity, void of substance, heedless of principle, and rich 
in election auctioneering". Rose and McKenzie's discussion of 
the precise role of annual Conference was of interest to him, 
and as an active member of the left he shared many of 
McKenzie's suspicions that Labour's leaders had been 
deradicalised; what interested him even more was McKenzie's 
open display of aversion to the doctrine of intra-party 
democracy. McKenzie had objected to it on two counts - an 
active but unrepresentative minority had no right to tie the 
hands of elected representatives; and such a state of affairs 
would be "incompatible" with the tenets of parliamentary 
government. This implied, in Miliband's view, "a narrowly 
restricted conception of politics", symptomatic of a growing 
professionalization, which was doing away with what little the 
politically interested could contribute to the vitality of 
democratic life. Intra-party democracy at least ensured that 
there was dialogue between leaders and followers, preventing 
the complete degradation of mass politics. Direct, extra- 
parliamentary action also had its place. Politics - and
555. R.Miliband, 'Party Democracy and Parliamentary 
Government', Political Studies, VI 1958, pp.170-174.
556. R.Miliband, 'Voices of Socialism - Harold Laski', 
Tribune, 12 June 1964, p.12.
557. R.Miliband, conversation with the author, 25
February 1983.
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especially Labour politics - was about real issues of vital 
importance. It could not be reduced to a popular spectacle. 
Amicable as their relations were, there was no common ground 
linking the partisans of parliamentary and party democracy.
Group theory
The establishment of ’party’ as a central category of 
political analysis was followed in short order by the 
application of pressure group theory - very much an American- 
led innovation -to British politics. British authors had been 
slow to incorporate the idea of a constellation of interests 
pressing on and influencing government policies into the 
framework of the parliamentary-central approach. Potter, 
Stewart and Finer sought to make up for lost time, the latter 
wading through the dusty files of the Federation of British 
Industry, examining the political power of private capital, 
and the denationalization of the road haulage association, 
before calling for "more light" on the lobby(558). Even some 
American observers — like Epstein (1954) - had explicitly 
ruled out an emphasis "bn economic interest groups, already 
familiar back home, as being inappropriate to British 
surroundings, while Rogow, although aware of powerful 
sectional interests, was still thinking in Laskian terms of 
capitalist obstruction. Returning to Britain in the early 
1950s(559), Samuel Beer, Professor of the Science of 
Government at Harvard University, was able to compare British 
with American practice, and became one of the first to talk of 
"a kind of pressure politics"(560), beyond considerations of
558 A.M.Potter, Organised Groups in British National 
Politics (1961); J.D.Stewart, British Pressure Groups (1958); 
S.E.Finer, Private Industry and Pol it ical Power (1958) and 
Anonymous Empire (1958).
559. Beer was at Balliol College in the early 1930s. He 
first crossed paths with Laski in 1934.
560. S.Beer, ’The Future of British Politics - An 
American View’, The Political Quarterly, Vol 26 No 4 1955,
p.33043.
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class or social philosophy, that - in his view - had been 
waiting to be discovered, and that had contributed greatly to 
the (wholly unexpected) absence of conflict. He saw only 
"satisfied" powers, nurtured by the welfare state and the 
quasi-corporate relations of government and the economy, 
buttressing an enviable social stability. "No visitor who 
remembers the Britain of the thirties can fail to mark today's 
contentment, the relaxation of tension, the return of 
consensus. Something of importance", he added, "has happened 
in social standards and ideals". In as much as this happy 
state of affairs had its roots "deep in the past", based 
around the powerful remnants of traditional, ancient, 
hierarchical, pre-Victorian society, an historical explanation 
was called for. Beer's answer to this problem was to sketch 
out "the cultural context of politics", centring on various 
deeply-entrenched philosophical clusters - Old Whig, Liberal, 
Radical, Collectivist, and predating them all, Old 
Tory(561) - which had, by restraining the rule of money and 
moulding mercantile habits, led up to "the anglicized 
socialism of Mr Attlee". This application of a culturally- 
based group theory of politics was a clear advance on earlier 
attempts. It also allowed him to break free from the kind of 
"watered down Marxism" of earlier vintage(562). Many 
organized interest groups now held what amounted to a virtual 
veto over public policy, Beer indicated, not just through 
'capital flight' but equally by the larger trades unions, 
without this ever leading to - borrowing the Weimar analogy - 
a position of "pluralistic stagnation"(563).
561. S.Beer, 'The Representation of Interests in British 
Government: Historical Background', The American Political 
Science Review, September 1957, pp.613-650.
562. Letter to the author from Samuel Beer, 7 November
1933.
563. S.Beer, 'Pressure Groups and Parties in 
Britain', The American Political Science Review, March 1956, 
p. 123.
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Beer's appreciation of the significance of traditional 
authority infused his 1956 study of the emergence of the 
British Treasury as the lead agency in economic planning and 
co-ordination, a work overshadowed by his contemporaneous 
journal articles and criticized by some for excessive 
deference(564). He approved of the institutional bias 
towards agreement and Compromise, and commented on the 
remarkably subtle way in which Treasury 'control' was actually 
enforced. The convertibility episode of 1947 was the only 
instance where unequivocal blame could be attached to 
.officials. In return for being allowed to speak with Treasury 
administrators, however, Beer had to show them his draft prior
to publication. "These pages are too much like undressing in
public", Sir Edward Bridges, the Permanent Secretary, wrote of 
one passage(565). Beer had over-emphasized the 
responsibilities of officials as against ministers, and given 
the impression that the Treasury was somehow open to public 
inspection, both of these errors stemming from "the clear 
difference between British and American custom"(566). He 
made too much of recent and still touchy budget discussions 
gnd did not understand "the position of public servants in 
this country". "Draw down again the veil", Burke Trend 
minuted - an early lesson in the impenetrable nature of 
British decision-making which was only breached a decade-and- 
a-half later.
Interests, as opposed to parties, had not found a place
in British Political Parties, except in so far as the history
•of the Labour party dealt with the emergence of a pressure 
group aspiring to political power. In introducing a special 
issue of Pol it ical Quarter ly de.voted to the important part
564. S.Beer, Treasury Control - the co-ordination of 
financial and economic policy in Great Britain (1956); T 
Balogh in H.Thomas (ed), ibid (1959), p.97.
565. 'Publication of a book by Professor S.H. Beer - 
Treasury control' (1954-57), T199/516, Public Records Office.
566. P.R.O., ibid (unnamed official), 27 April 1955.
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which pressure groups were now recognized as playing,
McKenzie took the opportunity to make full amends, greeting 
the "belated" recognition of the pressure group approach, and 
claiming it as perfectly consistent with his central thesis 
about modern party government - if it was true that the 
parties only performed a minor and supporting role, 
imperfectly refracting* the popular will through the machinery 
of the electoral system, then organized groups could act as 
important channels of communication with the electorate, 
"filling in the gaps", so to speak(567). Standard textbook 
accounts had, on the whole, done little to disseminate this 
view, allowing far too much hostile comment and holding back a 
realistic evaluation of their legitimate purpose. Despite 
obvious reservations, these fears were wide of the mark. The 
pressure group system was "an inevitable and indispensable 
concomitant of the party system", facilitating popular 
involvement in decision-making and elevating new elites into 
power. In this way, McKenzie brought pluralist thinking into 
line with the oligarchic tendencies of modern politics. But 
he made no attempt to integrate these elements into a fully 
rounded explanation. He saw the rise of 'big* government and 
the expansion of pressure group activity, as well as the new 
and powerful factor of trade unionism; the declaration that 
all politics had become pressure politics he pointedly 
rejected.
Beer, to begin with, was inclined to agree with him. "At 
the present time", he wrote, 'convergence' in British party 
politics was matched by an unmistakeable ' consensus' in social 
and political values, attributable to the "pluralized" 
dispersal of power among a new range of interest 
groups(568). Parties and pressure groups were complementary 
features of the post-war balance of social forces. The job of
567. R.T.McKenzie, 'Parties, Pressure Groups and the 
British Political Process', The Political Quarterly,
*January-March 1958, pp.5-16.
568. S.Beer, ibid, March 1956.
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the political scientist was not - in the case of Britain - 
that of understanding transformation and upheaval, the path to 
modernity of most other nations. Instead one had to account 
for the long-run persistence of institutions that had adapted 
and survived. British government did not, as Beer knew, yield 
up its secrets easily. A start could be made with a formal- 
legal institutional description, which the British had long 
excelled at. This was a precondition for any subsequent 
classification of those institutions according to type and 
function, out of which explanatory generalizations might then 
be formulated. The "variables" of power, interest and policy 
were to be the building blocks, over and above an 
understanding of the cultural foundation of a society. The 
fruits of this enterprising attempt to arrive at reliable 
explanatory hypotheses about political behaviour were 
contained in the major, cross-European study, Patterns of 
Government, first published in 1958(569).
The British system of government was said, by Harry 
Eckstein, to whom the chapter on Britain was assigned, to be 
made up of a compound of the "pre-modern" and the "modern", 
the "cultural" and the "structural", the result of careful 
"grafting of new upon old and ancient principles". Parties 
and pressure groups were of the same standing in the pattern 
of interest aggregation and articulation, but were instruments 
for the channelling of influence as much as articulators of a 
definable party oj: political doctrine. The operation of the 
welfare state after 1945 illustrated his point. The expansion 
in the scope of government, circumstantial as much as 
anything, into the fields of welfare and planning, had both 
weakened the extent of ministerial control over policy and 
strengthened the effectiveness of outside interests, 
thoroughly transforming the basics of political life.
Objective factors, chief amongst which was the impact of the 
Second World War, had pushed Britain into adopting a new
569. S.Beer and A.Ulam, Patterns of Government - The 
Major Political Systems of Europe (1958;1962).
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social programme largely acceptable to all shades of opinion. 
The blocking off of out-and-out laissez-faire doctrines 
smoothed the way. The current of ideas, "powerfully 
reinforced by * circumstances ' ", made for party differences of 
degree but not of kind. As such, social changes were not 
explicable solely by reference to some kind of ideological 
impulse. Labour and Conservative offered a clear-cut choice 
to the voter, but were not fundamentally opposed. Both, in 
the terminology, were 'systemic'.
Eckstein's parallel studies of the evolution of the 
English Health Service (1958, but finished four years 
before(570)) and of the British Medical Association 
(1960)(571) illuminated the practical effect of these 
developments in one area of post-war government policy - the 
form, extent and effectiveness of pressure group activity in 
the realm of medical politics. Out of the apparent diversity 
of Labour's 1945 reforms - planning, nationalization and 
social welfare - he found a single unifying thread: the 
recurring motif of "rationalization", by which he meant the 
re-ordering and re-organizing of existing government 
activities, not to supplant them but to make them function 
more efficiently. Although he said little about the first two 
of this tripod, he was insistent that it was wrong to see 
Labour's Health Service reform as a "social welfare" measure 
at all. Instead it had been a means of improving, as far as 
possible, an inefficient and inadequate set of current 
services. The agitation for reform had played its part. Then 
again, much pressure had also come from within the medical 
profession. Wartime had revealed the inadequacies. By the 
date of its inception, there was almost complete acceptance on 
all sides. In view of the pre-history, the socialist 
.contribution had come'last and been the most half-hearted:
570. H.Eckstein, ,The English Health Service — its 
origins^ structure and achievements .
571. H.Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics - the case of 
the British Medical Association .
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"Once this is understood much that is puzzling about 
the history and objectives of the Health Service 
becomes comprehendible. In a very real sense the 
institution of the Service marks a triumph of 
nonsocialist over socialist ideas, however much we 
have become used to calling systems like the 
National Health Service 'socialized’ 
medicine"(572).
Enough time, therefore, had elapsed to judge the 
operation of the new service, by way of a calm exposition of 
its origins and aims (a balance sheet, drawn up by Lindsey, 
similarly dismissed stateside reports of extravagant 
socialized medicine(573)). As to the large perfectionist 
claims being made for group theory, he was doubtful - it was 
merely "a useful tool". A pressure group theory would always 
leave the larger number of circumstantial factors out of 
account. That was why any comprehensive explanation had to 
include the determinants of political agreement which allowed 
that pressure groups would be at their most effective.
McKenzie had been right to say that party competition was now 
joined to the aggregation and articulation of pressure group 
interests. But the argument could be taken a stage further by 
locking them together in an overarching description of 
continuity and change in modern Britain, the two main parties 
at the heart of a complex universe of pressurised politics, "a 
pluralization" of power that had reshaped the working of 
cabinet government without altering its essential form.
Herein lay the appropriateness of the assumption that every 
system, but especially the British, had a self-maintaining 
tendency. As Beer summarized it:
"In Dr. Eckstein's analysis the main patterns
572. H.Eckstein, ibid (1958), p.x.
573. A.Lindsey, Socialized Medicine in England and Males 
- the National Health Servicef 1948—61 (1962).
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of “the system do indeed seem to interact with one 
another in such a way as to maintain each in its 
existing form. In Britain during the past decade or 
more, for instance, there has been a great decline 
of ideological conflict and little innovation of 
major issues in the field of domestic policy. This 
consensus in the interests and purposes pursued in 
the political arena has undoubtedly been promoted by 
the highly bureaucratic structure of power, not only 
in government, but also in parties and interest 
groups. Similarly, the policies carried out by 
government have tended to support first this 
consensus and second this bureaucratization of power 
- for example i) by easing the economic insecurities 
from which ideological conflict might arise and ii) 
by a policy of economic management that requires the 
co-operation of sectional economic interests. In 
this way three sectors of the system - the patterns 
of interest, power and policy - tend to be mutually 
supporting. Disturbances in any one pattern may 
occur, such as the attempt to radicalize certain 
political issues, but the weight of the system as a 
whole tends to iron out these disturbances and 
restore the previous equilibrium"(574).
It was in these terms that the operating method of 
hyperstable British government - bringing 'party' and ’group' 
into close relation - was unfurled.
'Putting to the test
The Clause IV and unilateralist controversies which 
threatened to split the Labour party wide open in the wake of 
its third election defeat in-a-row - in October 1959 - turned 
the 'McKenzie thesis' from what was a thought-provoking but
574. S.Beer, in Beer and Ulam, ibid (1958), pp.26-27.
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•academic curiosity confined to the specialist journals into an 
matter of great topical importance. It was made so by 
McKenzie himself, who regularly gave prominence to his views 
in The Observer and on BBC current affairs programmes; but it 
was also brought up and discussed by other scholars working in 
the field (not all of them political scientists) who - in 
appreciating that McKenzie had advanced the understanding of 
party politics - took a very different view of the inter­
relationship of structure and ideology in the Labour party.
It was an unusual illustration of academic opinion feeding 
into the party argument, and, »in view of the way the thesis 
had come to be so closely identified with its author, a 
rigorous trial of the reliability of McKenzie's propositions 
about the party's internal distribution of power. The well- 
known drawback to covering laws and generalizations in the 
social sciences was that they were held to be experimentally 
untestable. The events of 1959-61 provided as good an 
opportunity to check the validity of a working hypothesis as 
•the rival camps were likely to get.
McKenzie fired the opening shots(575) on the weekend 
immediately after polling day. The public image of the Labour 
party, surveys showed, was that it was of and for the working 
man, that it believed in nationalization, and that it was, in 
comparison with the Conservatives, less 'fit to rule'. 
Traditional deference could explain part of this last 
impression. A larger cause of this presumed incompetence, 
however, was the outcome of “the fantastically archaic and 
cumbersome policy-making procedures required by the party's 
constitution", and most of all the dogma of intra-party 
democracy, "which is grossly inappropriate to a system of 
Cabinet and parliamentary government". In a parliamentary 
democracy, effective power must be focused "and be seen to be 
focused" in the team of parliamentary leaders whose task it is 
to offer an attractive electoral alternative. But Labour, its
575. R.McKenzie, 'Labour's need for surgery', The 
Observer, 25 October 1959, p. 10.
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endless quarrelling squandering the inheritance of 1945, 
risked becoming the party of perpetual opposition. Hugh 
Gaitskell had now to force the party to realize that it was 
sick to the point of death, and could only recover by setting 
up a Commission to decapitate its hydra-headed constitutional 
monster, starting with the deletion of Clause IV. McKenzie's 
plain speaking expressed his sympathy with the revisionist 
claim that Labour's organizational deficiencies were wholly 
out of keeping with the notion of a modern, power-seeking 
political party.
A necessary element in the autonomy of the party 
leadership, as McKenzie also asserted, was having to show to 
the electorate that the union leaders did not have the final 
say over the policies of the parliamentary party, a need 
heightened by the accession to office of a new cohort of 
General Secretaries who were far less minded to support and 
sustain agreed party policy, further weakening Labour's 
electoral appeal. The publication, slap bang in the middle of 
1960, by Martin Harrison (a young research student at 
Nuffield) on the Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945, 
furnished the results of an examination of the party-union 
link which, in disposing of common myths, cut the ground from 
under McKenzie's feet(576). Harrison had analysed the 
financial support of the party that came from the unions, an 
area which even party officers knew little about. He 
calculated the rise in union political funds at the national, 
regional and constituency level. Without question they were 
"the financial mainstay of the party". In terms of actual 
policy-influencing, however, the position was not so clear- 
cut. The major ubions were usually divided in their attitudes 
to policies sponsored by the parliamentary leaders, and could 
not be treated as a monolithic voting bloc. It was wrong to 
posit a clash between largely right-wing trade unionists and 
militant local parties. The conflicts were multi-dimensional,
576. M.Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labour Party 
(1960).
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in all wings of the party. For fhir. rear.nri, Harrison 
suggested that McKenzie's view was "heretical" but far too 
"sweeping"; "the party had to live with its constitution". As 
the anonymous special correspondent of The New Statesman 
(probably Crossman) reported, the first and inestimable merit 
of the Harrison book was that it "exploded" McKenzie's "pet 
theory"(577).
McKenzie, seeing only confirmation in the breakdown of 
cohesive leadership, was unimpressed(573). Harrison was 
stimulating and praiseworthy, "one of the most important 
contributions since the war", and in preparing a second 
edition of British Pol it ical Parties he intended to take it 
fully into account. At the same time it was, as he put it, 
"strangely complacent". In office, to repeat, the power 
structure of the main parties was very nearly identical. This 
was not the same thing as saying the party machinery by which 
the ascendancy of the parliamentary leaders was secured was 
equally similar. In opposition, he granted, Labour leaders 
were in a far more exposed position, unless and until they 
were able to retain the co-operation of a parliamentary team 
and rely on the working alliance with a group of leading trade 
unionists. This was the main contrast between the Labour 
party and the Conservatives. The collapse over the past few 
months had created all the problems, robbing the party of its 
electoral potential. Harrison appeared to regard the party 
constitution as if it was sacrosanct. If, at that late stage, 
the party could not face up to realities, then they were all 
witnessing its demise. The approaching party conference of 
October - at which Conference and the PLP seemed likely to be 
at odds on the issue of defence - underlined to him how 
vitally important it was for the leadership to assert its 
independence from extra-parliamentary dictation.
577. 'Labour and the Unions', The New Statesman, 11
June 1960, p.850.
578. Letter in The New Statesman} 18 June 1960, pp.893-
894.
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Crossman returned to the attack in his review of Henry 
Pelling's short history of the Labour party, which came out 
after the very public platform defeat in October 1960(579). 
Although disappointed by its slightness, Crossman said that 
the book did at least recognize the distinctive role of the 
trade unions in the deliberations of the Labour party and the 
eternal struggle of parliamentary and extra-par1iamentary 
forces which had made the party what it was and which better 
explained what had happened the previous October. The 
substitution of centralized authority for party democracy, the 
gist of McKenzie's account, might have seemed to fit for the 
six years when Labour was in government after 1945. But ever 
since McKenzie's book had appeared, history had conspired to 
make nonsense of it, McKenzie preferring to rebuke the party 
for failing to fall in with his theories. Its'
"wrongheadedness" was now plain for all to see. Tiring of 
Crossman, McKenzie's reply letter brought the issue to a 
head(580). The Scarborough decision had been "an almost 
perfect test case" for his central argument that the final
■n,
determination of party policy (whatever the constitution might 
say) must rest with the parliamentary party and its leaders, 
and that Conference could not direct those leaders to adopt 
policies to which it was opposed. Had he not - he asked - 
proved his point?
At this, both Crossman and Pelling weighed in(581). 
Crossman did so by remarking on the easy acceptance of 
McKenzie's views as "gospel truth" in most Departments of 
Politics, proposing instead the counter-thesis of a loose, 
ill-defined but divided sovereignty in the party,
> theoretically unworkable but in practice made to do so by the 
skill of all sides in never pressing the argument to the point
579. 'Socialist Cerberus', The New Statesman, 23 June
1961, pp.1009-1010.
580. Letter in The New Statesman, 30 June 1961, p.1044.
581. Letters in The New Statesman, 7 July 1961, 14-15.
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at which deadlock ensued. That was his interpretation of 
Scarborough. McKenzie's assertion in the press that this 
uneasy division of powers should be ended by resting absolute 
control of the party with the PLP leaders was, Crossroan was 
convinced, the surest way of destroying it. Fortunately no 
one at Westminster had taken any notice. Pelling, cheered by 
the news that a second edition was on its way, tried to point 
McKenzie in the right direction, first praising and then 
finding fault with "the absence of effective treatment of the 
role of the trade unions, and especially the trade union 
leadership", a serious defect which "tends to vitiate the 
general conclusions about the power structure of the party". 
McKenzie had, according to Pelling, seriously overlooked the 
power of the extra-parliamentary check upon the leadership's 
room for manoeuvre, of a kind wholly absent with the 
conservatives. The works by Bassett, Bullock, Allen and, he 
tentatively suggested, his own writings, would, if McKenzie 
cared to, rectify matters. But by the time McKenzie had done 
all of this, Pelling was unsure how much would be left of his 
original thesis. McKenzie, as many observers must have.felt 
all along, "had never got the Labour party quite right".
Back came McKenzie, criticizing Crossman's equivocal role 
in the defence debates and his black-is-white insistence that 
a tiny group of party activists should have final authority 
over a parliamentary party representing millions of 
voters(582). He agreed with Pelling about the trade union 
factor - it was just a matter of emphasis. And he again asked 
the bull question: what would happen if Conference, asked to 
think again, still readopted unilateralism? Would the party 
leaders be won round or would they step down? What would 
Crossman say then? To this "knock-out" question, Crossman 
repeated his earlier view that, since all the other possible 
outcomes were so much worse, a compromise just had to be
582. Letter in The New Statesman, 14 July 1961, pp.49-
50.
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worked out. The fact that the leadership had not felt able to 
openly disregard a Conference resolution conclusively 
demonstrated a party operating on two axes of power, 
Westminster and Conference, the one counter-balancing the 
other. Pelling, noting McKenzie's concession, asked a 
question of his own - was McKenzie now alleging (amongst other 
things) that the leadership could survive conference defeats 
indefinitely? If he genuinely meant this, then British 
Political Parties was more "lopsided" than ever(583).
This flurry of correspondence was closed with a final 
letter from McKenzie(584). In it, and in ignoring Pelling, 
he agreed that power was divided, as it was in varying 
proportions in all political parties, requiring the leaders to 
carry their followers with them. But he stuck defiantly to 
his exposure of Labour's "myth" of extra-parliamentary 
authority which got it into constant trouble. This did not 
make him an "opponent" of the Labour party, as Crossman had 
charged. And he was happy to.quote in his support an 
editorial in The Guardian newspaper pronouncing that "the 
aftermath of Scarborough#has shown that Mr McKenzie was right 
... the real significance of Mr Gaitskell's victory is that it 
has enormously increased the power of the parliamentary 
leadership and made the party conference less important than 
it has ever been". The emphatic reversal of the 1960 decision 
at the Blackpool conference in 1961, after a year-long 
campaign, proved beyond any doubt to him the one essential 
truth - the undisputed right of the party leadership to lead.
A mouement
McKenzie's differences with his critics boiled down
583. Letters in The New Statesman , 21 July 1961, pp.82-
83.
584. Letter in The New Statesman 3 28 July 1961, p.118.
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to different understandings of the Labour party as a part 
of a wider 'movement' - a combination of associations and 
loyalties, of industrial and political wings, of 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary elements, founded 
in an earlier age but still providing the interests of 
labour with actual and symbolic force. McKenzie made 
short work of much of the mythologizing cant of 'this 
great movement of ours'. His onslaught on the doctrine 
of intra-party democracy fitted in with this. Words like 
solidarity and brotherhood he regarded as verbal traps. 
The point was not ter be taken in by the signs and symbols 
of the 'movement', but to examine how the party in fact 
worked - and what it had to do to make itself electable. 
It could not be helped if, in the process, Labour had 
come to embody a vote-gathering, leadership-sustaining 
vehicle, a party-as-machine, domesticated by the 
electoral contest for power.
British observers, it must be said, had a far keener 
sense of the new factor which Labour brought into the 
body politic. This was understood by partisans of Labour 
("Socialism is an idea", Cole said, but it is also, of 
course, a movement(585)) as much as by saddened 
Liberals ("McCallum, asked ... why he had never joined 
the Labour party, replied that he could never join a 
'movement', which it was, and is, but only a 
party" (586)) . Pelling, in a milder way, and Harrison, 
used the word 'movement' quite deliberately. The Labour 
party was many-centred and multi-purpose; it was not 
simply a political party like all other political 
parties. It was driven by informal, inexplicable motives 
which could not be weighed and counted. What the party 
believed mattered as much as anything else. It followed
585. G.D.H.Cole, 'The Growth of Socialism' in M. 
Ginsberg (ed), ibid (1959), p.79.
586. J.Critchley, Heseltine — the unauthorised biography 
(1987), p.14.
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that McKenzie, on this view, would have done better to 
begin with the dissimilarities of the Conservatives and 
Labour. As was liable to happen in all social science, 
wayward conclusions could be traced back to faulty 
assumptions.
It was also the case that, rare and unequalled as 
the goings-on of 1960-61 were in offering a 'reality 
check' with which to test differing interpretations, the 
substance of the McKenzie thesis could not be 
conclusively proven either way. That, for one, was the 
opinion of Leon Epstein, looking at the defence conflict 
in the light of democratic principle and 
practice(587). The doctrine of parliamentary party 
freedom from external control, propounded by McKenzie, 
Epstein considered much more supple than his critics were 
allowing. Gaitskell's refusal, on the face of it, to bow 
to the will of Conference did seem to be in accord with 
the strong version of leadership. On the other hand, 
Scarborough had not established PLP supremacy. The 
lengths to which the leaders went in getting 
unilateralist decision overturned implied at the very 
least respect for the authority of Conference. 
"Uncertainty on this point cannot be fully resolved on 
the basis of the 1960-61 experience". "Unfortunately for 
political science", a second Conference defeat for 
Gaitskell had not materialized. All that they had to go 
on - and despite the best efforts of McKenzie, Crossman, 
Pelling, Harrison et al --was what had happened after one 
such defeat, and to -this extent the evidence could be 
read both ways. But Epstein did agree that, in the final 
analysis, the "unworkability" of external party policy­
making was shown up. This was not just because of the 
especial requirements of British constitutional practices
587. L.D.Epstein, 'Who Makes Party Policy: British
Labor, 1960-61', in The Midwest Journal of Political Science, 
May 1962, pp.165-182.
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■that forced changes on the parties. It derived, as in 
every other advanced society, from the nature of the 
appeal to the voting public by any responsible party 
"wanting to gain and hold power". Hence the British 
Labour case had a broader application, its "excellent 
illustrative material" eventually finding its way into 
Epstein's wider generalizing about Political Parties in 
Western Democracies(1967).
The whole debate revealed the shaky basis of general 
covering laws in political and social science. McKenzie 
was roundly praised for having broken new ground. A mass 
of new material was imaginatively arranged and deployed, 
so as to emulate the clinical objectivity of natural 
science. But his theories were still subject to the 
inescapable constraints of approach and method. Too many 
of his basic terms (leadership control) were too 
imprecisely formulated. His working methods had been 
crudely inductive, seeking out only confirming instances, 
so that awkward evidence was excluded. He did not take 
sufficient note of human inventiveness, which can breathe 
life into the most overused slogans. And, given that 
outright refutation of any theory is anyway very unusual, 
it was left unclear what kind of proof would count in 
clinching or falsifying his case. The question of the 
distribution of internal party power seemed to be 
ultimately indecidable. There were no mutually 
recognised parameters for choosing between alternative 
explanations, without which there could be no measurable 
disciplinary progress. If political scientists were 
unable to resolve an issue in such favourable 
circumstances, they were unlikely to be able to do so at 
all. Incapable of being proved or disproved, all that 
one was left with was McKenzie's forthright elucidation, 
from a very personal point of view, of his one big idea.
Hilliam Pickles
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That later developments did not fully bear out the 
substance of McKenzie's claims did not deter him from 
extending his argument into an analysis of permanent 
significance. He recognised that, in seeking to stress 
the originality of his book he had overstated his case, 
and went some of the way to meeting objections in a new 
edition in 1963, which included an epilogue bringing the 
story up to time of Alec Douglas Home and Harold Wilson. 
He did so by clarifying some of what he had taken for 
granted. He had not meant to mislead by saying that party 
ideology would be left out - he was "deeply concerned 
with the ideological issues and policy disputes which 
have racked the parties". He was ready to grant that the 
mass organization made a far larger impact in the Labour 
than the Conservative party. Both parties were anyway 
multi-faceted. All of this was understood. But he 
refused to admit that the degree of trade union influence 
had been inadequatefy dealt with - the relevant section 
on block voting was retitled but otherwise left 
unchanged. The basic argument was unaltered, indeed in 
some respects was stiffened by Labour's policy-making 
arrangements and the almost unlimited opportunities they 
provided for the perpetuation of internal disputes, 
fatally damaging - as Gaitskell had found - Labour's 
election prospects. Epstein, but not the self-deceiving 
Crossman, agreed with him. Re-working the text was, even 
so, kept to a minimum. McKenzie had welcomed in The 
Observer Dalton's vain, "off putting" but immensely 
informative High Tide and After, adding it to his updated 
bibliography(588). But its contents were not slotted 
into the narrative. The task had become too great.
The T.L.S. reviewer surely went too far in 
contending that the second edition would extinguish 
McKenzie's "dwindling" band of critics altogether. Not
588. R.T.McKenzie, 'Witness at the sick-bed of 
socialism', The Observer, 4 February 1962, p.29.
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only had he generalized too hastily from the immediate 
post-war years, playing down (though he had had every 
excuse for doing so) the influence of leading trade 
unionists in throwing their support behind the party 
leaders up until the mid-fifties. He also tried to 
prolong the point into the late 50s and early 60s, when 
circumstances had so radically changed. William Pickles, 
McKenzie's L.S.E. colleague, a man "born into the Labour 
party", was the severest judge in this matter. Though he 
wrote little, Pickles had a close knowledge of the ways 
of the party and the back channels through which power 
and influence were exercised. Pickles believed that 
McKenzie was unaware of the part played by dominant union 
personalities like Lawther, Deakin and Williamson, taking 
their authority as in the nature of things. But the 
hereditary succession in the Transport and General 
Workers Union had gone wrong with the election of Cousins 
in 1957, and from that point on the McKenzie thesis was 
in trouble. The classic relationship by which the 
biggest unions constituted the "steadying ballast" of the 
party was turned upside down, and he had no doubt that 
this had been caused by a decline in the quality of new 
union leaders(589). So long, Pickles argued, as the 
majority of Labour MPs continued to take “the view that 
they owed a primary duty to those who had voted for them, 
then .the exercise of outside influence could not be said 
to be "unconstitutional". 1960-61 had explicitly 
demonstrated this. While this stood, the problem of 
party and parliament was reconciled. But no amount of 
stretching could hide the point that McKenzie's argument 
were wearing thin. The organic party-union alliance was 
a contingent one, and no longer quite the same as in the 
past. There was no two-party 'system' as such - this was 
to make things more complicated than they needed to be.
589. W.Pickles, 'Trade Unions in the Political Climate', 
in B.C.Roberts (ed), Industrial Relations -contemporary 
problems and perspectives (1962), pp.28-61.
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What there was was a two-party fact, brought into being 
by the electors themselves, in ways that were still 
mysterious(590). Those trying to make the study of 
politics into a science raised hopes they could never 
fulfil. The less, scientific it strove to be, the more 
worthwhile it would become.
Samuel Beer: bringing the ideology back in
Starkly expressed books excite strong opinions, and 
the McKenzie thesis was not without its many detractors. 
Others, at first persuaded by McKenzie's description of 
how alike the Labour and Conservative parties had become, 
had cause to reconsider. Samuel Beer, a Roosevelt and 
Kennedy liberal(591), was initially of like mind, 
surprised - on returning to England in 1953-54 - at the 
degree of party agreement and convergence, all so 
different from what had been expected on the basis of 
pre-war experience. Beer arranged for McKenzie to take 
over his office and teaching duties at Harvard while he 
was back in England again in 1958. Beer had already 
developed a typology of value clusters, viewed over time, 
which had found later expression in the group politics of 
post-war. These he allied to changing theories of 
representation, and the distinctive political formations 
to which they gave rise. McKenzie had been fascinated.
But on further reflection, Beer pulled back, 
distinguishing between the similarities in promises and 
policies of the big two parties and "the underlying and 
continuing conflicts in their basic values and 
interests"(592) - the survival, in other words, of
590. W.Pickles, 'Democracy as Dialogue', The
Twentieth Century, October 1957, pp.316-324.
591. A.Schlesinger, A Thousand Days - John F. Kennedy in 
the White House (1965), p.58.
592. Letter to the author from Samuel Beer, 11 January
1984.
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ideological politics into the modern era. Labour's 
internal turmoil in the 1950s convinced him that there 
was more to the party than McKenzie had made out. Going 
through many policy documents from the party's early days 
brought home to him that Labour was not only moderate and 
reformist but also class-based and ideological. These 
observations he wove together in his dazzling, part- 
historical, part-sociological 'Modern British Politics' - 
a study of parties and pressure groups (U.S. title - 
British Po1 itics in the Collectivist Age), a tour de 
force linking the evolution of the modern party and group 
system to the ideas and beliefs of the time in which they 
were created, an effort which had defeated others before 
him. From a point close to McKenzie, Beer ended up 
finding himself in direct opposition.
Beer announced his intentions at the first 
opportunity, conceding that politics was at least a 
struggle for power, but a struggle which embodied 
"radically different moral perspectives". Britain was an 
old country, constructed around tradition, custom and 
usage. The 'Tory' and 'Whig' forms of representation of 
the eighteenth century, though analytically separate, he 
found to have had a common root in their attachment to 
"estates", "ranks" and "orders", social groupings of 
which the natio’n was composed. These were superseded by 
newer, more diverse 'Liberal' and 'Radical' ideas of the 
following century, stressing individualism and popular 
sovereignty, the older notions of paternalism and 
community only reasserting themselves in the collectivist 
age, clearing the way for a massive growth of state 
power. Combined with older Tory notions of hierarchy and 
order, the new collectivist outlook made for strongly 
delineated class-based representation. The concentration 
in two main parties of democratic power and political 
programme ushered in the era of 'party government'.
Social class, then, although unifying, also divided.
Having set the scene, Beer then turned (in parts two 
and three) to applying these ideas to Labour and 
Conservative politics.
Labour's early history belonged to the closing phase 
of liberal-radicalism, being a largely interest-centred 
coalition of pressures, of which the trade union element 
was dominant, but entirely consonant with the principles 
of advanced liberalism. It was only in 1918 with the 
adoption of avowedly socialist aims that the Labour party 
"became something more", registering an ideological shift 
but also leading to the creation of an entirely new 
political formation. Labour's bid for political 
supremacy tied in ;with a new ideological outlook. 
Socialist thinking fitted, even though it was "incidental 
to", the strategy of fully-fledged independence as a way 
of "asserting a claim to power". He took seriously 
Labour's rhetorical claim of solidarity of purpose, built 
around consciousness of class. It was not just another 
party in the state; it envisaged introducing a new social 
order. Socialist ideology was therefore the ideological 
counterpart to a party structured on democratic lines. 
Given this arrangement, he speculated, the ideological 
element of Labour politics might be expected to go into 
decline, once real power by the party was attained.
Two central chapters on the structure and ideology 
of the party covering the years from 1918-1948 examined 
the accuracy of this proposition. Power and purpose 
featured in equal part, but the latter placed 
identifiable limits on the former, modifying the 
behaviour of the party leaders. The nationalisation of 
the mines and of iron and steel illustrated how this 
worked out in practice, leading up to the Mikardo 
resolution at the 1944 Conference which showed how 
(thanks to Dalton's memoirs) both rank-and-file pressure 
and elite manipulation helped to frame the content of the
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1945 manifesto - a document he believed of remarkable 
resemblance to the position staked out in 1918.
A key assertion now followed. How far did his model 
of programmatic party account for the experience of the 
Attlee governments? Without Beer wanting to go too much 
into details, the answer was immediately forthcoming: "To 
an unprecedented extent in British political history the 
legislation of [that] Government was dictated by a party 
programme". Promise and performance exactly tallied.
But more than this, the government did not, in an 
important rider, go beyond its pledges. It went so far, 
and no further. Furthermore, this solidarity of purpose 
was reinforced, once in power, by a highly disciplined 
party regime. Party cohesion, according to his analysis 
of parliamentary voting, was virtually unflawed.
Agreement on the basic measures of party policy ensured 
that the party could act "effectively, harmoniously and 
coherently". The Attlee governments, then, were a 
winning combination, the historical culmination of 
democratic power and socialist purpose. They had shown
that the Labour party could be made to ’work* .
Even as this was happening, however, the exercise of 
power and purpose had been influenced - in unintended 
ways - by the new group politics and the existence of 
peak producer organizations of the managed economy and 
the welfare state. The critical turning-point came in 
the 1947-50 period, when circumstances had compelled 
Labour to turn away from direct physical planning towards 
a much looser form of economic management, not as a
result of a conscious "choice" or "decision" - that would
be to over-rationalize - so much as a recognition of the 
impact of new forces with which the old party orthodoxy 
was unable to cope. The principal though not exclusive 
cause of this was the resistance which the government 
encountered from the trade unions to governmental control
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over manpower and wage-fixing. The unions, as Roberts 
had previously pointed out in his book on Nat ion al Mages 
Policy in Mar and Peace(1958) wanted controls on 
everything except wages. The government, moreover, 
preached fairness, while individual trade unions believed 
in preserving differentials. When voluntary wage 
restraint was finally agreed upon in 1948, it proved 
temporarily successful, but only at the price of reducing 
manpower planning to a dead letter. Both the material 
conditions of trade unionists, and the power position of 
the unions nationally, had dramatically improved over the 
preceding decade. A new social contract, underwritten in 
wartime, a shift in the economic balance of power which 
preceded the electoral swing, had been the decisive 
moment, of which 1945 and after, and indeed the 
competitive bidding of the 1950s, was a later phase.
This new configuration of political power undercut the 
more doctrinaire style of politics and - the real 
importance of McKenzie's omission now becoming clear - 
acted as the impediment which the Labour government had 
run up against, robbing it of its forward impetus.
The obvious answer was for the party to adjust to 
the new realities, and revisionist sections in the party 
wished to do just that. But there were also 
fundamentalist elements hostile to any dilution of 
traditional socialist objectives. Opposing conceptions of 
socialism fought it out, ensuring that the party could 
not, after 1951, do what the Conservatives had managed 
after 1945, re-inventing itself while out of power. An 
elitist model, imagining a clash between leaders and 
followers, did not explain what had transpired. There 
was no question of the leadership imposing its views on 
the mass of the party. Conflict appeared at every level. 
The revisionists were no less doctrinal than the 
fundamentalists. It was the "compulsive ideologism" which 
lent to the quarrel its peculiar character. Labour had
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chosen to be both ideological and democratic, fortunately 
combined in the years up to 1945. The ending of this 
relationship revealed the conflicting tendencies on which 
the party was built.
The Tory conception of governing, on the other hand, 
while it had altered to accommodate "bidding" for the 
support of consumer interests and "bargaining" with 
organized producer groups, remained distinctive and 
contrary, as the record of the later 1950s demonstrated. 
Re-defining the party's purpose in the 'Industrial 
Charter' had been almost entirely an elite initiative, 
expressive of its "will to power" and a self-sufficient 
explanation. And although some outside interests did 
exert some influence, it was wrong to see party policy 
merely as a reflex of business pressure. The leadership 
was not bereft of all guidance from the mass membership, 
but the crisis policies of 1955-58 exhibited "an 
essential Toryism" of stability and order where were 
regarded as valuable ends in themselves. Whatever the 
case, this was a quite different reaction from the way a 
Labour government would have handled the problem.
His closing verdict was unequivocal:
"The major test case in the period with which 
we are poncerned is presented by the 
legislative program of the Labour Government of 
1945-51. When one seriously asks where this 
program came from and how it achieved its 
authoritative place as a party commitment, one 
cannot avoid examining a long historical 
development that goes back to the party's very 
inception. Whatever may have been the actual 
role of that ultimate integer, the member of 
the rank and file, the vigorous group action of 
the party's components in this development
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demonstrates a degree of pluralistic democracy 
that is worlds apart from the elitism of the 
Conservatives. For good or ill, moreover, 
throughout its disordered 1950s, Labour 
continued to display its lack of a true elite 
and its obsessive commitment to intraparty 
democracy. I conclude that in practice as in 
theory, in the actual distribution of power as 
in their reigning conceptions of authority, the 
two parties were deeply opposed"{593).
Labour and the Conservatives, he concluded in an 
upbeat finale, were the "institutionalised" agents of the 
reigning collectivist ideas. The operation of interests 
pulled them together, forcing them to occupy the middle 
ground in a classically executed two-party manoeuvre; but 
rival ideological outlooks kept pulling them apart, 
preventing any real identity of viewpoint. There was 
consensus, but also division. Happy the country in which 
such tranquillity obtained. Beer was to praise J.K. 
Galbraith for "clearing up the ambiguities" of the 'New 
Deal'(594). In explaining the origins of the historic 
1945 programme, its eventual implementation, and what had 
brought it up ,short, he had done the same for Labour's 
social revolution, effectively integrating belief and 
action.
.McKenzie was being good-humouredly but no less 
expressly challenged, as most reviewers were quick to 
appreciate. What there was less agreement about was 
whether the challenge was effectively carried off, and 
where this left the differences of view.
593. S.Beer, ibid (1965), p.388.
594 S. Beer, *Tfwo Models of Public Opinion', in Royal 
Historical Society Transactions, 24 1974, p.96.
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•Although Beer was "too polite" to do so openly, 
according to Noel Annan, his whole book was a refreshing 
and convincing controverting of McKenzie's well-known 
analysis(595). Beer's brilliant account had "set 
right", in Max Beloff's view, McKenzie's basic error by 
showing how the Labour party, in structure and spirit, 
was far more different than similar to the 
conservatives(596). The insistence on treating Labour 
as the party of a 'movement' was greeted (even if 
reluctantly) by Denis Brogan as remedying "one of the 
weaknesses of McKenzie's admirable British Political 
Par ties"(597). McKenzie's bible, David Marquand 
wrote, might have been plausible for the 'ins' and 'outs' 
of the 1950s, but it had been knocked sideways by the 
long controversies of 1960-61, so that Beer, in re­
emphasizing the force of ideas, was "the most powerful 
single counterblast"(598). At times exaggerating the 
differences for effect, Beer had nevertheless "made good" 
his criticism of the McKenzie thesis, Crick 
decided(599). His was not, however, just a necessary 
and overdue corrective. It was a "masterly" evocation of 
recent history which deserved acclaim on its own account.
Some thought the book's blemishes made its overall 
worth unsatisfactory. The two halves were not 
effectively joined. Beer had little to say about the 
processes of government, giving the impression that
595. N .Annan, 'This Unhappy Breed', The New York Review
of Books, 11 November 1965, pp.25-28.
596. M.Beloff, in Public Administration, Spring 1966, 
pp.107-109.
597. D.W.Brogan, 'To Rule Brittania', The New York Times 
Book Review, 18 July 1965, pp.10-12.
598. D. Marquand, 'Myths about ideology', Encounter 
(February 1966), pp.68-75.
599. B.Crick, 'On Method and Matter', Government and 
Opposition, April 1966, pp. 414-421.
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policy was made by ministers. The parties were taken too 
much at their own valuation, especially the Labour party, 
for which he had consistently over-accentuated the 
importance of doctrine (and an American obsession with 
nationalization). The real character and atmosphere of 
political debate passed him by. He was "trapped" in the 
'thirties and 'forties, when, the Labour party's agonies 
to the contrary, the real substance of politics was 
otherwise(600).
But it was Bob McKenzie's own review of Beer, 
carried in The Observer(601), that demonstrated how many 
were genuinely in two minds, his comments veering between 
approval and disappointment. Beer's depiction of the 
past was stimulating but tendentious, his view of the 
distribution of party power simply "wrong -headed". More 
than this, it was "retrograde", by which he meant that 
Beer accepted al*l too readily the propaganda of the 
literary left. Miliband's "much neglected" work,
McKenzie said, would disabuse him of this. "I am sorry 
to find myself so completely in disagreement with those 
aspects of Professor Beer's model of t h e ’British party 
system because I have read this book with greater 
pleasure and profit than anything written on British 
politics for many a year".
Beer and McKenzie subsequently took part in an 
enlightening staged confrontation on BBC radio(602).
Again, it was the historical evolution of Labour and not 
the Conservatives that proved the most puzzling. And 
agap.n, 1945 was regarded as the decisive event in that
600. J.D.B.Miller, in The Political Quarterly (Summer
1966), pp.107-109.
601. R.T.McKenzie, 'Parties in Perspective', The 
Observer, 5 September- 1965, p. 26.
602. Reproduced in the 'Book Section' of Parliamentary 
Affairs, Summer 1966, pp.373-384.
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evolution. Beer, in outlining his original purpose, 
explained that the more he had looked at the inter-war 
period and wartime, the more he had been persuaded that 
the parties differed both in their structure of power and 
in their social purpose. A major clash of ideas and 
social forces had taken place. Out of this conflict, and 
it could not be made sense of in any other way, the 1945 
programme had emanated. To McKenzie's reply that the 
1918 commitment came from above, with little party 
discussion, Beer reminded him of the trades union 
presence, a built-in feature of Labour that had no 
parallel in the Conservative party, and he called in 
Pelling as his expert witness. Both seemed to agree that 
Labour was the more programmatic party; it was just that, 
for McKenzie, policy originated in both from on high. In 
the case of 1945 this was all too obvious - had Labour 
been in power for the same length of time as the 
Conservatives, it would be plain for all to see. Beer 
paraphrased his chapter on the post-war collision of 
socialist orthodoxy and external reality. Labour's great 
problem had been "how to cope with the trade unions in a 
period of inflationary pressure", a problem which he had 
spent a good deal of time in his book sorting out. The 
failure of Labour to re-adapt thereafter, in the same way 
as the Tories had done, suggested something else. The 
party had a heritage of ideas, a deeply embedded 
fundamentalism, holding it back. The two North American 
protagonists exchanged parting pleasantries. McKenzie 
saw a gulf in British party politics no greater than the 
one in the United States. Beer was convinced that the 
British did not see the importance of ideas in their own 
political life. There they left it, with British 
Pol it ical Parties and Modern British Politics the two 
great bookends of the political science literature, their 
authors arguing about how far, and for what reasons, the 
fierce ideological passions of pre-war Britain, which 
came to a head in 1945, had gently subsided.
i
i
t
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Beer's stand-off with McKenzie perfectly described 
the mixed fruits to be garnered from "growth points" in 
political science(603). His point had been that a 
science of politics would only be found by trying it out. 
And yet neither the evidence nor the methods would admit 
of a final conclusion. Beer had forced the need to modify 
the McKenzie view, without completely demolishing it. A 
flat contradiction was not the same as a blanket 
refutation. It was not that either was demonstrably 
wrong. There was simply no way of telling, no means of 
proving or disproving plausible hypotheses that might (as 
every political scientist hoped) satisfy scientific 
criteria(604).- Both approaches were, in their own 
terms, justifiable. That was why it made no sense to 
pick out a winner, as many commentators had done(605).
603. B. Crick, 'The Tendency of Political Studies', IVew 
Society, 3 November 1966, pp.681-683.
604. P.Pulser, in The American Political Science Review, 
June 1966, pp.400-402.
605. J.P.Nettl, Political Mobilization (1967), p.336.
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The Concept of Labourism
Hardly in use before the 1950s, Labourism caught on 
in radical circles as an all-purpose label for describing 
the characteristically ambiguous politics of the Labour 
party, revealed in the party’s trials and tribulations 
after 1945. It was the construction which the New Left 
put upon what Labour governments did. Imprecision was 
perceived to be of the essence. Marking a clear advance 
upon ideas that were no more than progressive and 
liberal, but geared expressly to the interests of 
organised labour, the party’s kind of socialism fell some 
way short of a major assault on power and privilege. 
Positing a slow transformation of economy and society by 
mildly and marginally collectivist reforms, the leaders 
of the party hoped, by pursuing a policy of class 
collaboration, to head off business antagonism. 
Untheoretical and self-limiting, it was the doctrine of 
Labourism which held socialists and social reformers 
together in the same party, blurring the issue of the 
party’s central objectives. Paradoxically, it was the 
very same achievements of the Attlee governments, by 
taking the principles of the Labourist project as far as 
they could be taken, which brought the issue of the 
party’s fundamental purposes to the point. The internal 
party debate was framed in Gaitskellite and Bevanite 
terms. Those further to the left employed the concept of 
Labourism as a way of escaping all Labourite categories 
of thought.
Ralph Miliband’s “new era" opened when Labour had 
first entered the wartime coalition in May 1940 - 1945 
could not be appreciated except in relation to the war 
years of popular radicalism and state intervention, of
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which Labour was the electoral beneficiary(606). 
Nevertheless the first Attlee government "could well 
boast to have done more than any government had done 
before". This was not just a grudging recognition from 
Miliband of the changes that were introduced - they were, 
he conceded, "real, and of permanent importance". In 
many instances, change had taken a form which business
had strongly disliked, and which no Conservative
government would have ever contemplated. For the 
representatives of traditional England, the early post­
war years were a moment of great danger.
That this did not, in fact, turn out to be the case
could be explained, in large part, by the way in which 
Labour's leaders conceived of their task. Hesitant and 
inhibited, Attlee and his colleagues swept into power on 
a surge of working-class confidence; but they also made 
it their job to curb and restrain those expectations. 
Moderation and loyalty were urged on their followers. 
Reforms were justified on a piecemeal basis, rather than 
as part of a larger remaking of society. This was 
nowhere more clear than in the government's handling of 
nationalisation, "a good deal less extensive than the 
Labour activists had wished, or than those who had voted 
for Labour in July 1945 would in all probability have 
been ready to support". The government's overall impact, 
Miliband said, had to be viewed in the light of post-war 
- reconstruction and the need to reorganise the industrial 
base of the country in order to preserve and strengthen 
it. The whole point was not to nationalise British 
industry, but to control it and to bend it to the 
government's wishes. Miliband returned to the Mikardo 
resolution from the 1944 party conference which had 
forced a pledge about large-scale common ownership upon a 
half-hearted leadership. It was this head of steam built
606 R.Miliband, ibid (1961).
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up by the rank-and-file which was subsequently so rapidly 
expended.
Just as the age of reform preceded Labour's 
accession, so it also came to a close midway through its 
term of office. Although he had not been aware of it at 
the time, the moment of truth had occurred in 1947-48, 
when the bulk of Labour's programme had already been 
enacted. At this critical point, the nationalisation of 
the iron and steel industry was embarked upon, a symbolic 
and practical measure of Labour's radical intent, the 
only step which entailed a serious threat to the private 
sector. And it was at this stage that the weight of 
industrial pressure was brought to bear. Divisions 
within Labour's own party and government weakened its 
authority.* The moral for Miliband was immediately 
- apparent. Labour had tried to back away in the face of 
an unequal struggle with powerful vested interests. If 
Attlee and Morrison were so ready to discard party policy 
to reach agreement with the steel masters, it must mean 
that they did not really 'believe' in socialism. They 
took the reforming legislation of 1945 to be the social 
revolution. With a government that had no intention of 
replacing the ethic of private ownership with one of 
collective organisation for a common end, iron and steel 
nationalisation could only be an awkward leftover.
Still, at least the value of nationalising had a place in 
the scheme of things for old-style Labourites like 
Morrison, however defensive and apologetic; the 
revisionists of the later 1950s were prepared to abandon 
it altogether. For Miliband, increased state control of 
industry was the essential condition for socialist 
advance.
(1965) of the genesi 
of the Iron and Steel Act, written under Miliband's 
tutorship, elaborated on how far the party's leaders
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brought their difficulties upon themselves(607). The 
legislation, Ross affirmed, amounted - unlike all the 
other earlier bills - to "a direct attack on the 
productive core of British capitalism". It was the one 
measure which promised to make real inroads into the 
profitable sector of industry. Steel was power. But the 
enterprise came to grief because the party had not worked 
out its preparations thoroughly enough in advance, 
because the Cabinet had, by all accounts, allowed the 
matter to drag on in indecision and delay over three lost 
years, and because of the lack of firm leadership from 
the inscrutable Attlee, this last a major drawback for "a 
serious reforming party". The forces ranged against the 
bill, both inside and more especially outside Parliament, 
were ready to stop at nothing in order to thwart the 
government's plans. The protracted wrangle over iron and 
steel - according to Ross - carried lessons for the re­
nationalisation of iron and steel to which Labour was 
pledged in its 1964 election manifesto.
In Tom Nairn's hands, this kind of thickly
descriptive account was replaced by an adept, all- 
- encompassing analysis of the Labour party in which the 
abstract idea of Labourism was invested with a tangible 
form(608). Everything was explicable in relation to 
it. It was the beginning and the end of any discussion 
about Labour and the left, out of which all other 
considerations flowed.
In a fundamental sense, the Labour party's strengths
were also its weaknesses. It looked to a visionary
future, but was tied to a mindless past. Dominated by 
trade union concerns and expressing the unity of the
607 G.Ross, The Nationalisation of Steel — one step 
forward, two steps back? (1865).
608 T.Nairn, "The nature of the Labour Party', in 
P. Anderson and R. Blackburn (eds)*, Towards
Social ism(1965), pp.159-217.
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working classes, it also harboured within itself a 
peculiarly weak left. Founded as a challenge to 
bourgeois society, it could not escape from its 
subordinating values. Transforming itself into a 
nominally socialist party in 1918, it remained in effect 
the extremely conservative agency it had always been, 
joined by unradical theorists creamed off from the 
liberal intelligentsia. The left were locked as a result 
into an organisational design, the 'labour alliance’, 
which instead of liberating, was imprisoning.
1945 was, for Nairn, the pivotal time for Labourism, 
when “the vague image of a new world . . . half dream, half 
reality in the peculiar context of the war, hung over 
society". Most of the groundwork had been laid in the 
war years. A revolutionary opportunity to move in a 
socialist direction could be glimpsed. Indeed the 
earliest changes it introduced could still be regarded as 
opening instalments of reform which would, by their 
cumulative force, add up to the makings of Fabian 
socialism. But in the act of bringing these culminating 
changes about, a complex of dynamic forces transformed 
the meaning of the revolution, neutralising its radical 
import. The details, as he remarked, did not concern him 
(the nationalisation of iron and steel was passed over in 
a cursory couple of sentences). What mattered was that a 
government which in certain respects was successful, in 
‘other respects was clearly not - necessary and popular as 
many of the changes were, they had been integrated into a 
still predominantly capitalist order which lent them 
their real, functional significance. The Labour party 
was not equipped either by organisation or ideology to 
remodel society at all levels or break the established 
universe of rule and power. This was the actual extent 
of the failure of Labourism:
"The chance was given it in 1945. The third
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Labour government of 1945-50 is the decisive 
happening in the history of Labourism, after 1918. 
In retrospect, the Labour party seems always to 
have been tensed for this moment. A great 
electoral triumph, massive popular support, an 
overwhelming majority in parliament - Labourism's 
moment of self-realisation had arrived at last, 
it entered upon its inheritance. But, as we have 
seen, the contradictions and confusions it was 
made of were such that its period of affirmation 
was bound also to be a period of crisis and 
disintegration; being a bundle of disparate 
forces united in a delusion, Labourism could not 
rise to express its true character without at once 
threatening this unity, without disentangling 
dream from reality in a way fatal to its own 
continued existence. Its political victory 
necessarily presaged its own division and defeat. 
This fact is the key to most of what has happened 
to the Labour party, between 1945 and the 
present day"(609).
This was to handle (mishandle in Thompson's view) 
history with a vengeance, pulling and stretching and 
cutting it to fit a prior model. There were few or no 
facts with which to gain a purchase. Nairn's 
• conceptualised high theory was not straight history at 
all, but an omniscient, superhistorical mind in flight.
By the middle sixties, as it happened, a great many 
other accounts of the passage of the iron and steel 
legislation had come into being, almost all of them 
focussing on the exceptional, atypical example which it 
represented. It had had important constitutional 
implications, owing to the anticipated and actual
609 T.Nairn, ibid (1965), p.190.
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opposition of the House of Lords. A.H.Hanson, recoiling 
from all active left-wing involvement, examined it as an 
unusual exercise in parliamentary procedure(S10).
There were the noteworthy origins of Labour’s iron and 
steel pledge for Beer to consider. Hodgson highlighted 
the steel debates from the point of view of the recovery 
of the Conservative party(611). Iron and steel had 
also marked an important stage in the development of 
pressure group influence. It cropped up in the 
accomplished industry-study by Burn(612). The diversity 
of approaches reflected the usefulness of the issue in 
providing material for absorbing illustration. But none 
of these authors began from the initial assumption that 
there were underlying economic and social forces which 
largely determined the way in which events turned out.
To do so was - Dalton said in so many words to 
Miliband(613) - to have an unreal appreciation of the 
serious constraints v/ith which party leaders had to 
contend, and, by the same token, to absurdly 
underestimate the economic potentialities of democracy. 
Ross, going most of the way Miliband had gone, had 
helpfully shown how not to go abox.it writing up the 
history of an item of parliamentary legislation. Iron 
and steel was critical, but for various reasons connected 
with factors that were the normal content of liberal 
democratic politics.
To New Lefters, all of this was unacceptable.
Crisis put existing institutions "to the test, revealing 
their true character. Iron and steel repaid close study 
not for lots of little reasons, but for one big one - as
610 A.H.Hanson and H. V. Wiseman, Parliament at Hork: 
a casebook of parliamentary procedure (1962), pp. 121-180.
611 G.Hodgson, 1 The Steel Debates’, in M.Sissons 
and P.French (eds), ibid (1963), pp.306-329.
612 D.L.Burn, The Steel Industry 1939-1959 (1961).
613 H.Dalton, review of Miliband in The Political 
Quarterly 3 Vol 33 1962, pp.86-88.
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an eyeopening instance of the configuration of political 
and economic power, which the Labour government was 
neither prepared or able to combat. All of the Labourist 
apologias made sense, but only if they were viewed in 
their correct capitalist context.
There is little doubt that the New Left explanations 
brought about a significant widening of the terms of the 
argument about 1945. Many of the established Fabian 
certainties were upset, which even hostile commentators 
could appreciate(614). A means was devised to expose 
Labour politics and the deficiencies of the Labour left 
in an uncorrupted idiom. 'End of ideologists' who had 
taken this to mean the presumed demise of marxism had had 
their expectations confounded. But with the widening 
also went a distinct, polarising of liberal and marxist 
opinion. Liberals suspected that theorising induced the 
socialist left to treat abstractions as real, and that to 
try and explain everything - at such a high level of 
generality - was to explain nothing. Concepts were far 
too politically charged. Commitment in the sense that 
marxists used the term was, to the open-minded, just 
another word for bias. New Lefters, even when 
disagreeing among themselves (the Miliband-Thompson 
notion of Labourism was much more elastic than the 
structural variant of Anderson and Nairn), dismissed 
these rebukes out of hand. Factual evidence informed 
concepts, .but equally a body of facts needed organising. 
Relating general concepts to particular facts was an 
intractable problem, and one moreover which always left 
room for friction and argument. There was no way of 
evading the choice between frameworks. The non- 
ideological were ideological like everyone else, could 
they but gain an insight into their own predicament. It 
was the distinction, ultimately, between differences of
614 G.L.Arnold, in L.Labedz (ed), ibid (1962), 
p.312.
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approach - all legitimate ideas and interests of which, 
in liberal theory, harmonise - and approaches which are 
fundamentally irreconcilable.
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1945 in the 1960s
While denying that students of the recent past 
suffered from any "special disability" - all that was 
required was the refinement of techniques to cope with 
the sheer bulk of documentation - the growing band of 
contemporary historians were still hampered, in any 
comprehensive presentation of long-term trends in modern 
British history, by their ignorahce of what was to happen 
next. "This fact alone", David Thomson explained, "would 
seem to rule out reliance on any theory which implies one 
eventual direction or destination, as does the theory of 
historical progress"(615). With that qualification in 
mind, however, it was possible, he felt, in commending 
his Pelican history of England in the Twentieth Century 
(1964), to separate out a few of the most striking 
changes which future developments could hardly obliterate 
altogether - the march to full democracy, the 
transmutation of Empire into Commonwealth, and the defeat 
(in 1945) of fascist tyranny. This last date marked, he 
thought, a decisive punctuaution point in British, and 
world, history. The American scholar, Alfred Havighurst, 
who had completed a "frankly political" survey of 
Twentieth Century Britain two years beforehand, had come 
up against the same difficulty - the inability to see 
those episodes closest to the present day in due 
proportion, since everything appeared to be of equal 
significance - by pressing the leading idea of a long 
drawn-out struggle to achieve social democracy, delayed 
after World War One by economy and inertia but brought to 
the common man after 1945, effectively'tying post-1945 to
615 D.Thomson, 'The Writing of Contemporary
History’ in The Journal of Contemporary History, January 
1967, p.32.
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pre-1914 British society(616). But even this larger 
theme was not coherently or consistently pursued. In 
A.J.P. Taylor's Oxford English History 1914-1945 any such 
doubts were stilled. History got “thicker" as time 
passed, Taylor acknowledged. More interested in 
individuals (and particularly the doings of politicians) 
than institutions, he saw only "the rise of the people", 
who had turned against the men at the top in May 1940, 
paving the way for the reforms which - in Taylor's 
rhetorical flourish - were to come with war's close. He 
made no apologies for declaring that he had been drawn to 
hurrying the story along in the way he intended it to 
run. Post-Victorian Britain, L.C.B. Seaman's 1966 
history, finished before and "in no way" derived from 
Taylor, took the slightly longer vista from 1902 until 
1951 in one go, its author convinced that the period had 
been too often divided up into chunks to the detriment of 
the later forties. He found a unifying thread in the 
contrasting trends of "absolute growth" and "relative 
decline", taking it up to the early post-war days, after 
which, as he remarked, the world changed out of all 
recognition and was no part of his account. Norton 
Medlicott, in setting out the major concerns of his own 
general history of Contemporary Britain 1914—1964 (1967) 
was seemingly undaunted by the size of the task, 
finding - in reply to sceptics - that the contemporary 
historian had, on balance, many advantages, and doubting 
v/hether "the voice of impartial prosperity would speak 
with any more unanimity than our own"(617). To him the 
main impression was self-evident - "it must be the impact 
of an almost continuous series of external crises on the 
domestic outlook, economy and national policy" which the 
country had nevertheless come through. His aptitude for
616 A.F.Havighurst, Twentieth Century Britain 
(1962).
617 W.N.Medlicott, Contemoorary England 1914-1964 
(1967), p.1.
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aptitude for international and diplomatic history gave 
this added substance. T.O. Lloyd (1970)(618), in a 
shorter Oxford history designed to take account of the 
flood of work registering a change away from traditional 
political narrative to society and the social structure, 
set imperial retreat alongside internal contentment, 
couched in a viewy and readable form. But he was 
disturbed to find that, the nearer one got in time, and 
the more rapidly that 'instant' histories were overtaken, 
the harder it was to tell exactly what had been going on. 
This was, as Lloyd's general editor, John Roberts, 
remarked, only the reflection of a basic truism about 
history: "that it is theoretically boundless, a
continuing debate, and that historians in each generation 
re-map and re-divide its subject-matter in accordance 
with their interests and the demands of society". 
Definitiveness, in general histories above all, was not 
to be had.
In covering such a difficult and event-filled
period, however, any general historian needed an angle of
approach or gift for putting a pattern on the past,
without which no history can be conceived of. This need
was, despite Thomson's reservations, met by a toned-down 
version of enlightenment and improvement, of all-party, 
welfare state Whiggery, still tinged with national pride 
but more suited to a Britain with fewer resources and 
fewer illusions. That said, prospective problems and 
challenges of the kind outlined by Barraclough made even 
the most tentative of pronouncements more impermanent 
than usual(619).
It was noteworthy, considering these points, to see 
how reviewers - to a man - thought that, of all the
618 T.O.Lloyd, Empire to Helfare Statef English 
History t906-1967 (1970).
619 G .Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary 
History (1964).
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periods under discussion, the general ■treatment of the 
later 1940s was handled to best effect, all "the right 
sources" being made use of (Poirier on
Havighurst(620)), the varying emphases on internal and 
external factors "given their proper place" (in 
Medlicott, according to Mowat(621)), the balance of 
success and failure "carefully assessed" (Pelling’s 
verdict on Thomson(622)). They had attained a level of 
historical perspective, spelling out the established 
direction that historical inquiry had taken and the still 
very considerable areas left unanswered and disputable, 
that could not really be said for earlier decades. The 
state of historical play was summarised, through several 
pairs of eyes, leading to a remarkable, if 
unsynchronised, congruence of opinion.
All were agreed that post-war politics only made 
sense precisely because of the war, and that in the 
effort to overcome foreign dangers a type of democratic 
totalitarianism had been created in Britain, the probable 
effect of which was to give an accelerated push to state- 
led national mobilisation. Even so, the "special legacy" 
of the war years was uncertain. A Conservative 
government in power after 1945 might not have made all 
that much difference; as it was, the opportunity went to 
the Labour party, though this should not (and not just in 
hindsight) have come as such a surprise. The severely 
weakened state of the British economy made post-war 
finance, foreign trade and international policy 
interdependent, even though most ordinary voters were 
oblivious to the extent of Britain’s reliance on the 
goodwill of its allies and quickly became absorbed in
620 P.Poirier, in The Journal of Modern Historyt
June 1963, pp.202-203.
621 C.L.Mowat, in History, June 1968, pp.266-267.
622 H.Pelling, in History, June 1965, p.249.
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domestic concern?;. The transition to peace was 
accompanied by an extensive programme of nationalisation, 
social reform and state control (including important 
reforms relating to education, housing and town planning) 
but these, significantly, were not advanced in any fierce 
ideological spirit. Their total effect was neither as 
favourable nor as disastrous as supporters or critics at 
the time alleged. 'Social revolution’ was too grandiose 
a term - rather Labour prevented a return to the class 
bitterness and economic insecurity of the inter-war 
years, so that its objectives were distinctly backward- 
looking. Government intervention had aided recovery, and 
yet other European countries had recovered too, and more 
speedily. Whether reform, especially in welfare, had 
wrongly channelled spending away from industrial 
investment was something that historians would eventually 
have to settle. But planning had never been more than 
improvised, and prosperity - as the buffeting of 
devaluation and the Korean war showed - was somewhat 
tenuous. The international dimension to domestic reform 
was unmistakeable. One did not need to wait until the 
opening of the archives to see that. The relinquishing 
of overseas responsibilites was, particularly in the case 
of India, a shining achievement; it was doubtful whether 
this made up for the tragic division of East and West 
(which Bevin had admittedly done his utmost to avoid), or 
British hostility towards the early moves in favour of 
greater European integration. What was clear was how 
rapidly the solidarity and common purpose of wartime had 
run down, to Labour’s great disadvantage. By the end of 
its time in office, the government had 'lost the 
initiative, was bereft of ideas, and had a prime minister 
who, though he had displayed the "highest qualities", did 
not have the means to turn the situation around. The 
revival of the Conservatives was largely down to Labour’s 
own deficiencies. Britain was caught between the old 
(and, to many voters, increasingly frustrating) society
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of fair shares, and a new society of rising living 
standards, to which Labour was ill-attuned.
These common observations about the years of Labour 
rule, outweighing any lesser differences of authorial 
style or emphasis, did much to convince others of the 
success each historian had had in reaching a remarkably 
dispassionate verdict. They earned all the epithets - 
sensible, reflective, reasonable, unemotional - which the 
disinterested scholar most prized. Their agreedness was 
enough for Mowat, surveying the latest developments, to 
be able to say that the Attlee governments had "passed 
into history"(623).
The outstanding exception to this relaxed level­
headedness, at least in terms of imaginative force and 
narrative control, was Alan Taylor's English History, a 
chronologically structured but deliberately iconoclastic 
work which swept aside what Bullock called the history 
with which "most of us have grown up"(624). Throwing in 
his lot with "the common people" who had "deserved better 
leaders than on the whole they got"(625), Taylor followed 
up his controversial reading of the origins of the Second 
World War with (amongst much else) a brilliantly pointed 
demolition of wartime mythology, distributing praise and 
blame in unexpected ways and ending, perversely, with a 
stirring passage celebrating the inspirational effects 
that the war had and, for him, still symbolised. Marred 
by factual slip-ups (a number of them spotted by
623 C.L.Mowat, ibid (1971), p. 16.
624 Quoted in J.C.F.Littlewood, * The Rise of the 
People', The Cambridge Quarter 1 y, Autumn 1966, p. 311.'
625 A.J.P.Taylor, ‘Accident Prone, or What Happened 
Next', in Encounter } October 1977, p.61.
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Pel1ing(626)), eyebrow-raising exaggerations and 
uncheckable anecdotes, many fellow professionals were 
prepared, all the same, to exonerate Taylor. Indeed, in 
denouncing so much of what needed to be denounced, Taylor 
had, Elton thought, indicated how much prejudices can 
assist(627). The uneven, lop-sided shape of the text 
did not pass unnoticed. The lack of coverage of the 
growth and organisation of the labour movement or of the 
main currents of intellectual and ideological life was a 
significant neglect of elements otherwise so central to 
the history of the left(628). Taylor's own philosophy of 
history, he argued disarmingly, was that he had no 
philosophy, other than that things happened in the order 
in which they had happened, and that the historian's role 
was to seek to recount the course of events as best he 
could. His unconventionality, in other words, was kept 
within the conventional bounds that commanded scholarly 
attention.
Welcomed as an improvement upon the bland, ultra­
respectable, *uninvolved' studies of Havighurst, Thomson 
et al (the political debates of the 1950s had for Taylor 
"the flavour of warmed-up tea"), he had still not, in his 
crossbench radical way, allowed his anarchic dislikes to 
develop into a truer and deeper assessment of modern - 
Britain, or so the more robust historians claimed(629). 
For this the enforcement of a false standard of decorous, 
matter-of-fact impartiality was the main fault. Writers 
and reviewers abike had aspired to be objective, and yet
626 H.Pelling, in Past and Present, April 1966,
pp.149-158.
627 G.R.Elton, Modern Historians on British History 
1485-1945 - a critical bibliography (1970), p.145.
628 M.Shock, in The English Historical Review,
October 1967, pp.807-812.
629 J.C.F.Littlewood, ibid (1966).
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it was an objectivity narrowly construed to mean that 
they should stay impersonal and (most Englishly and 
trivially of all) non-party political. Taylor’s 
traditionalist offence was that he had personalised his 
history, conveying "Taylor’s ’ own times and "Taylor’s ’ 
England. At least he had tried to break down the 
suffocating agreement of middle opinion. It was not the 
denial or suppression of values that counted, but their 
constructive usage. Those deficient in an attitude of 
engagement were the ones who, by skirting round relevant 
but unsettling arguments (the recent questioning of post­
war redistribution, or the record of economic management) 
were holding the historical debate back. Provisional 
history was also noticeably trite and unduly complacent. 
Impartiality - in this light - turned out to be a bias, a 
bias against a more profound understanding.
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The Home Front
War holds a natural attraction (Marx, Spengler, 
Toynbee) for theory-builders. Wars have occasioned many 
of the most decisive turning points in history. Their 
destructive impact has been unmistakeable. Historians 
have drawn from this the conclusion that outbreaks of 
armed conflict represent a breakdown in civilised 
relations; economists have thought so too. The liberal 
interpretation was that all wars - in human and material 
terms - were costly. The increasing scale of 'great' 
wars in the twentieth century emphasised their increasing 
destructiveness. But along with this went a 
corresponding appreciation of greater mass involvement - 
conscription, war economics, the bombing of civilian 
targets, evacuation - in total war. From here it was but 
a short step to the consideration of the social dimension 
of war, and its effects on the social system of the 
belligerents. Titmuss, in his uplifting official 
history(630), led the way in arguing that Britain's 
war effort had necessitated securing the involvement of 
the mass of the population by holding out the prospect of 
material reward. Hancock and Gowing, in one of the 
introductory volumes in the same series, spoke of an 
implied wartime contract between government and 
people(631). Andrzejewski (1954)(632) developed 
the idea of the military-participation ratio to show how 
those social groups drawn into participating in a 
conflict would be in the best position 'to press their
630 R.Titmuss, ibid (1950).
631 W. Hancock and M.Gowing, The British War Economy 
(1949), p.541.
632 S.Andrsejewski, Military Organisation and 
Society (1954).
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claims on "the state. Although Abrams raised several 
doubts about this view(633), it was already the case that 
the matter was argued over without recourse to the actual 
(and therefore contestable) merits of the changes which 
the war introduced. Because the Second World War was 
followed in most Western countries by the long economic 
boom of the nineteen fifities, it was no difficult task 
to imply that prosperity and security had come about as a 
consequence of it, even though other countries which 
stayed out of the fighting benefitted too. Welfare 
advance might - in what was coming to be an accepted 
sociological dictum - be a concomitant feature of all 
developing capitalist societies; but it was military 
factors which many regarded as the driving force behind 
the vast social changes since 1900. Warfare, directly or 
indirectly, begat welfare.
Significantly, however, it was not chiefly military 
historians who were the quickest to take this up. 
Initially presented in a much looser form, Arthur 
Warwick*s innovative analytical frame for the "modes" of 
social change in war, published in Britain in the Century 
of Total Mar in 1968 when he was only in his early 
thirties(634), exhibited an unusual readiness to 
theorise on the basis of ideas and concepts far removed 
from the traditional soldierly interest in the conduct of 
military campaigns. Combining detailed knowledge of 
special areas (his articles on 'middle opinion* in the 
1930s and on the Labour party*s neglected contribution to 
the development of the welfare state were models of their
633 P.Abrams, 'The Failure of Social Reform, 1918- 
1920*, in Past and Present, No 24 1963.
634 A. Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total. 
Mar - war, peace and social change 1900-1967 (1968).
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kind(635) with an overall interpretative scheme,
Warwick advanced a general explanation bringing together 
the transforming influences of war, peace and social 
change. Of the two World Wars, the psychological shock 
of the First had been by far the greater, he 
acknowledged. But otherwise, the overall effects were 
strikingly similar, and could be seen in the working out 
of a number of operating mechanisms - by way of the 
disruptive action of war, and the need to reconstruct; by 
means of the dissolution and transformation of ideas and 
institutions; through the emergence of new groups and 
classes reaching out for a share of involvement; and as a 
result of the heightened emotional expectations of those 
living through the experience of war. All of these modes 
were mutually reinforcing. They could be further 
classififed by distinguishing "guided" from "unguided" 
consequences - that is, the conscious acts of politicians 
and others working towards certain ends, such as in 
state-led economic reorganisation, as compared with the 
unco-ordinated, but no less effective, force of 
independent variables like technological change or 
changes in social values. His examination of the halting 
progress of social reform from 1940 to 1945 illustrated 
the usefulness of this perception. Bombing, evacuation 
and the urgent call on the hospital services revealed 
shortcomings in existing provision which new initiatives 
were designed to rectify. An increase in state power 
began as a means of turning the economy over to military 
purposes. A new importance was attached to the labour 
unions. There was a stirring of common decency and 
national purpose. At the same time, the pressure for 
reform in social security, employment policy and national
635 A.Marwiek, 'Middle Opinion in the Thirties: 
Planning, Progress and Political Agreement', in The 
English Historical Review, 70 1964, pp.285-298; 'The
Labour Party and the Welfare State in Britain, 1900- 
1948'’, in The Aner i can Hi s tor ical Re v i e w , December 1967, 
pp.380-403.
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health was counteracted by interested (and very senior) 
opposition. The one legislative measure which did get 
passed - the Education Act - was also the least sweeping, 
and for that reason. The upheaval of war aggravated the 
problems and suggested solutions; it was left to 
political priorities to establish the exact lines that 
reform would take. But all this took place within the 
context of irreversible changes in society at large, 
especially in better standards and a new social morality, 
which the state was powerless to affect. This strong 
sense of a society in motion, and of society-led change, 
was Marwick's trademark.
It followed that the development of British society 
in the immediate aftermath of the war was largely shaped 
by the legacy of the war years, and the competing 
influences and cross-pressures it had provoked - coupled, 
of course, with the election of a state-minded Labour 
party armed with much bolder proposals than its pre-war 
ones had been. Such confidence was not, even so, enough 
to disguise the improvised nature of many of its 
subsequent policies, which lacked coherence or well- 
defined shape. Planning was more apparent than real. A 
fully integrated welfare state was no more than a pious 
aspiration. Educational reform - which lay at the heart 
of the class divide - had no effect whatsoever. The sole 
achievement of a specifically socialist character was the 
government’s insistence on the principle of universality 
in state welfare, "one of the few aspects of Labour 
policy that [did] show a genuine revolutionary 
intention". But there was to be no "mighty blow" at 
class distinctions. The Second World War, unlike the 
First, was not, then, succeeded by disillusionment.
There was something more akin to a relative, if spartan, 
contentment, since the very worst features of inter-war 
life had been done away with. This was, all the same, a 
grave disappointment to the liberals and leftists writing
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in the 1950s who had been hoping for so much more. The 
working class had lost its potency as an agency of 
radicalism. No concerted pressure for fundamental change 
was nov/ remaining. 'Butskellisnr - in economic and 
social matters - ruled. Talk of a social revolution (an 
expression which Marwick confessed he used to use) was 
extravagant. Labour was brought up short by its own 
failings, as well as by the perennial obstacles of 
compromise, traditionalism, financial stringency, Tory 
adaptability and an unyielding and in many respects pre­
democrat ic political structure which had not been exposed 
to the full blast of war. Critics of left and right 
could agree in seeing immediate post-war as a response to 
the temporary difficulties of capitalist production in a 
time of shortages and dislocation, and nothing more. The 
aim of classlessness was noble and vrorthy; the 
eventuality fell dismally short. The social revolution, 
both historically and historiographically, was 
"shrinking".
"Total war", he observed from the other end of the 
sixties, "amid all the confusing legacy of destruction 
and loss, has had the effect of bringing about social 
change on a major scale". Its negative effects were 
joined by many positive and in the long-term beneficial 
ones. The difficulty was not wartime per se but the 
peacetime playing out of the social contest, when the 
forces of entrenched authority were able to reassert 
themselves. This was a specifically British conundrum. 
Where - he wondered - was the next pressure for change to 
put things right, short of another war/ going to come 
from?
That the war produced paradoxical effects, as 
Marwick defined them (he made no large claim for the 
resolution of this paradox), was not an outcome likely to 
endear him to his elders. Sir Colin Coote, writing in
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The Daily Te legr aph , was as t ound ed by Mar w i ok " s 
willingness to overlook "the horrors of war in the belief 
that they speeded progress towards socialism. The 
objectivity of youth also brought insensitivity. If, as 
Donald Read commented(636), this v/as an unfair charge, it 
did at least indicate that Marwick"s acceptance of war 
would surprise those over 40, still more those over 70, 
for whom the trial of the Great War had been a personally 
felt catastrophe (Coote, who was born 1393, v/as v/ounded 
and gassed on the Western Front). It v/as a generation 
gap that was bound to grow, since in the years to come 
the history of twentieth century Britain "will be 
increasingly written by scholars for whom not merely the 
Kaiser but also Hitler is just one more figure in 
history". As for himself, he found that the book could 
have come to the analytical part more promptly, 
notwithstanding the fact that Marwick v/rote "from an 
avowedly left-wing viewpoint". Even discounting the more 
controversial elements of his argument, it still stood as 
a valuable and stimulating synthesis of the present state 
of scholarship.
In Alan Milward's stern view(637), it failed even on 
that score. Charting the course of the debate on the 
economic effects of war, and the swing away from the 
older liberal perspective, Milv/ard admitted that 
Marwick"s Titmuss-lke account was based on more reading 
than, for example, Abrams; "neither, hov/ever, rests on 
research". The superiority of research over opinion 
deserved to be encouraged. Well or ill-informed social 
comment v/ould not suffice. The debate 'had so far also 
suffered from an "unfortunate" parochiality, leaving out
636 D.Read, in History, 54 1969, pp.322-323, from 
which the reference to Coote"s Daily Telegraph review is 
taken.
637 A. Milv/ard, The Economic Effects of the 14or Id 
Mars on Britain (1970), p.24.
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the wider and altered international financial situation 
in wartime. It was time for historians to move on from 
the examination of short-term changes during the war 
itself - which were not really at issue, in his view - to 
the longer-term evolution of Britain, and the way they 
had started to think of British society over recent 
years.
Like Marwick, Angus Calder was "the child of a 
distinguished intellectual family (Ritchie Calder v/as a 
journalist with The Daily Herald, and v/as active in the 
1941 Committee and the C.N.D.) with a political 
bent"(638). After Cambridge, he went on to do 
postgraduate work at the University of Sussex, completing 
a mammoth two-volume doctorate on the Commonwealth party 
which had flourished in 1942-45. A.part from interviewing 
and looking through the private papers of old party 
members, Calder was also one of the first to consult the 
wartime reports of Mass Observation, an organisation 
which had pioneered the use of impressionistic social 
surveying in the late thirties, and it was the insights 
gleaned from this source, allied to the detail contained 
in the 30-odd volumes of the official civil histories of 
the war, which he used to compile The People's War
(1969), a lively, witty and ironic celebration of the 
Second World War as it v/as lived through and endured by 
ordinary people, "protagonists in their own history in a 
fashion never known before". But this was no social 
history of a conventional kind, only dealing with more 
extreme conditions. There was no distancing of the 
author from his subject. Calder meant 'to recover and 
recreate the everyday experience of the civilian war, 
recounting what it had really been like behind the screen 
of official propaganda, and to make this accessible to a 
larger audience-. The object was to empathise, not to
638 E.Bowen, 'All people great and small', The 
Spectator, 20 September 1969, p.367.
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launch (as one reviewer erroneously saw it) upon "an 
essay in unadulterated nostalgia"(639). His sympathy 
with the popular hardships of wartime was total. War 
entailed harnessing the willing co-operation of the 
masses to work towards a new’ democracy after the conflict 
v/as over; in response to this call, as Calder described 
it, the people "surged forward".
Calder went to great lengths to differentiate, in a 
way Asa Briggs (his PhD supervisor) said Taylor had 
not(640), between peoples. There had been different 
experiences at different levels, even, ranging across the 
whole of the British Isles, different wars - "It was not 
a homogenous nation of heroes and Stakhanovites". Often 
there v/as nothing to unite the conscript, or female 
factory worker, or rural evacuee, save for a shared sense 
of disaster and danger. The sheer diversity of wartime 
living militated against any rash assumptions about its 
radicalising effect. Indeed many forms of anti-social 
behaviour - looting, waste, rumour-mongering - were rife. 
There was also a healthy resistance to many government 
appeals. And yet it was very far from being the 
anonymous war that the 'Old Gang* v/anted to make of it.
A new populist elite was borne to prominence, 
exemplifying a clean break with the past - J.B.Priestley; 
the up-and-coming Cripps; Monty, the People's General; 
above all, Sir William Beveridge and his reports on 
manpower and social insurance (Keynes made an unlikely 
economist of the people). They in turn expressed the 
common hopes in a struggle which, contrary to widespread 
myth, involved everyone. In the opening two years of 
fighting, as Calder reminded his readers, the "many" had 
won the Battle of Britain (in a neat reversal of
639 See Calder's preface to the second (Panther 
paperback) edition of 1971.
640 A.Briggs, 'Taylor's Own Times', in Encounter f 
February 1966, pp.65-68.
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Churchill), not. the few; wider still, Britain had not 
"stood alone" in 1940, since in truth she had "stood on 
the shoulders of several hundred million Asians".
It was in the early phase of the war, Calder was 
convinced, that the growth of a critical mood and marked 
leftward shift in public feeling occurred. the evidence 
from Mass Observation, as well as from other records of 
public opinion, indicated not only that common sacrifices 
(eg. the general introduction of rationing) were 
accepted, but that in many instances people were prepared 
to go further, wherever it was felt that others were 
"getting away with it". There was already a clear 
narrowing of incomes, which a fully employed economy did 
most to bring about. But popular aspirations outran the 
parties. With the electoral truce in force, this 
galvanised opinion found its way to independent and non- . 
aligned political groups (like the Commonwealth party), 
rather than for Labour itself. Most of the new thinking 
was in non-party circles. Labour and the Conservatives 
did not stand all that far apart, but it was Labour, 
almost in spite of itself but still strongly associated 
with the less well off, that capitalised in 1945, after a 
quiet but serious election campaign. Coming as this 
victory did in the wake of so many manifestations of 
popular discontent, the result really should not have 
been a surprise to anyone, least of all - Calder insisted 
- to the Labour leadership.
In fact, Calder believed, the fleeting chance of 
moving in the direction of a new, classless Britain v/as 
thv/arted thanks to the energetic activity of wealth, 
bureaucracy and privilege which survived with little 
inconvenience, soon resuming their old business of 
manipulation, concession and "stuudied betrayal". We are. 
not told in clear terms how this transpired, except 
through small signs - he cited the reappear since of iron
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railings - indicating the return of privacy. The last 
war, he wrote in his rejection of the 'Backing Britain' 
campaign in 1969, still provided the hope of another 
way(641). Angrier than Marwick, Calder's was meant as 
an historical indictment, popularising what ordinary folk 
would have said had they but realised.
A narrative structure carries with it certain 
confining limitations, and Calder later regretted that he 
had not integrated his political beliefs more fully into 
the narrative. The book later inspired many offshoot 
novels and plays. That he had not pressed his views 
others did not regard as a defect - quite the opposite. 
Not only were the vague references to postwar less 
interesting than the arresting minutiae of wartime 
existence(642); they were not even essential to the 
tale. "It is of course one of the virtues of so 
excellent a book as this", Marwick said(643), "that one 
can absorb the fascinating material so well presented, 
accept most of the brilliant individual judgements, and 
yet reject the main theses", in particular that the war - 
in Calder's view - merely represented "an exaggeration of 
peacetime trends". It made sense to discount the wider 
talk of a social revolution in the 1940s; Marwick had 
already done so. But it was less wise "to link the war 
directly to the preoccupations of 1969 without any 
attempt to summarise the complicated developments of the 
intervening years". This v/as not to say that the moral 
lesson was out of place (it was after all still 
central) - only that Calder's case was unsubstantiated. 
The People’s War would retain its value for other, more
641 A.Calder, 'A Refusal to Back Britain', 
Question, January 1969, pp.23-33.
642 V. S. Pritchett, 'On the Home Front-', The New 
Statesman, 5 September 1969, p.310.
643 A.Marwick, 'Degrees of Muddle', The Listener , 4 
September 1969, p.318.
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scholarly reasons, as an engrossing social document.
Of all the reviews made of Calder's work, however, 
the strongest reservations were entered by Henry Pelling, 
already at work on a Fontana student study of the Second 
World War. He too agreed that Calder's work lacked 
argument, since, having stated his general thesis about 
popular betrayal in a dogmatic introduction and 
conclusion, between times he promptly forgot about 
it(644). To establish his case would have meant 
examining "with more care" the years after the war,
"which Dr Calder does not do". Pelling found it first- 
rate descriptive writing about social change in wartime, 
without finding the reforming sentiments of Mass 
Observation wholly convincing. On the larger question of 
how far the war's effects were temporary or permanent, he 
noted, the issue remained open. His own thoughts in 
Br i tain and the Second World War appeared later in the 
same year(645). Without amy fanfare, Pelling quietly and 
persuasively dismantled the Horae Front eulogies.
Domestically, he asked, what in all probability 
would have happened to British society anyway, war or no 
war? Cause and effect were net so easily established.
The once-and-for-al1 hike in wartime government 
expenditure masked a fairly uniform growth in social 
services spending going back to the turn of the century, 
and had more to do (as in other countries) with the level 
of economic development than the pressures of war. Full 
employment had become an accepted fact of life, but, as 
R.C.O. Matthews had recently shown, it was to be doubted 
whether this could be directly attributed to the spread 
of Keynesian ideas. The general improvement in ordinary
644 H.Pelling, review in History, Vol 55 1970,
pp.313-314.
645 H.Pelling, Britain and the Second Morld Mar
(1970).
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family life had come about as a result of a widespread 
economic improvement, to which specific acts of social 
policy were secondary. True, wartime attitudes had moved 
leftwards (he preferred to rely on the evidence of Gallup 
polls instead of Mass Observation reports) but this might 
well have occurred in the normal course of events.
Though it remained hard to measure, the redistribution of 
wealth in the war years was ''moderate", and was 
consistent with a longer-term evening-out already 
underway before 1939. All told, the British war effort 
had been well-ordered, serving to reinforce a view many 
British people already held "that somehow or other, 
things in their own country were arranged much better 
than elsewhere in the world ..." Aside from moments of 
crisis, the sense of community was bound to slacken and 
war weariness set in. In many ways, popular expectations 
had run ahead of official thinking, but dangerously so. 
British relations were much more cordial with the United 
States, and much more guarded with the Soviet Union, than 
the public appreciated, with all the consequences that 
this was to have after the war had ended.
It v/as apparent from all of this that Pelling would 
take some persuading. The 'participation* thesis, in 
short, just would not carry the load it was devised to 
bear. Taylor and others (this in a bibliographical 
aside) had gone too far in re-interpretation. Those 
wanting to bring the people back in had fallen victim, 
said Pelling, to "the commonest of historical pitfalls, 
the fallacy of post hocf ergo propter hoc”. The evidence 
for political and social change in war was fragmentary, 
and one had to make do with what there was, but he could 
see little confirmation of the argument that the springs 
of action came from either the fifty or sixty politicians 
who really mattered (a la Cowling(646)) or the
646 H.Pelling, 'The Impact of Labour*, in The 
Cambridge Review, 7 May 1971, pp.180-181.
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explanation which put most emphasis on the organised 
exertions of the labour movement(647}. Middle class 
reformers were equally ineffectual. The editor of the 
Fontana series had asked for a consideration of war and 
social advance, and Pelling, unspectacularly - so 
unspectacularly that it was easy to miss - answered by 
suggesting that working class involvement in the war did 
not make all the difference to its enhanced power or 
status, "the coolest debunking of all"(648). Marwick and 
Taylor could continue to maintain that Pelling had not 
fully grasped what was meant by the participationist 
view(649), and that his dismissal of it was "not much 
more than a personal opinion, appropriate to Pelling's 
general scepticism"(650). But Pelling's objections, in 
point of fact, amounted to a great deal more than this. 
Pelling was demonstrating the ability of the historian, 
by close attention to the available empirical evidence, 
to check or negate the constructs of social science in a 
way that social science cannot match. In any 
disciplinary divide, the social scientist and 
sociologist, not the historian, had to give way.
Tracking back to the Britain of the war years began 
with Taylor, Marwick and Calder, all three of them 
approaching the- relations of state and society 'from the 
ground up'. Pelling wove together the political and the 
military aspects of the conflict, holding that the 
standing of the Coalition government had depended 
ultimately upon the progress of the war. Paul Addison,
647 H.Pelling, Popular Politics and Society in Late 
Victorian Eritain (1968 ) .
648 A.Marwick, in A.Sked and C.Cook, ibid (1970), 
p.149.
649 A.Marwick, in History} Vol 56 1971, pp.148-149.
650 A.J.P.Taylor, in The Historical Journal, Vol 14 
1971, p.464.
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in a landmark monograph on British politics in 
wartime(651), completed the tilt, captivatingly 
synthesising the small world of high-level politicians' 
politics with the subterranean movements of popular 
opinion so as to elucidate the intellectual and social 
dynamics of the war period. In an autobiographical 
journey intended to trace the making of the modern 
Britain he could see all around him, he ascribed its 
formation to the creation of a bipartisan "consensus" 
(consensus being more fundamental though less impressive 
than strife) among members of the War Cabinet and the 
government, on the backbenches in parliament, and 
reaching down into the ranks of the progressive 
intelligentsia, which crucially tied prosecution of the 
war with a programme of domestic reconstruction, and so 
erected the trail of signposts leading up to the 1945 
general election - a turnaround in political fortunes 
that, in some minds, had hitherto been all but 
unanalysable. Addison told, in as compelling a way as 
could be conceived of, how it was that the age of Baldwin 
and Chamberlain gave way, under the urgencies of war, to 
Clement Attlee's new post-war ruling dispensation, "a new 
consensus at the top which dominated Britain long after 
the last bomb had fallen".
Everything stemmed from Addison drawing the 
important distinction between the electoral truce in 
wartime - which all the main parties strictly observed - 
and the immense political changes which nevertheless came 
to pass. These changes took place in the upper levels of 
government as well as in the fluctuating swings in public- 
sentiment, which it was the business of the politicians 
to intuit and steer. In the first instance, the process 
had been one of reorganisation from above, not revolution 
from below. The displacement of Chamberlain in May 1940,
651 P.Addison, The Road to 1945 - British politics
arid the Secorid Nor Id Mar (1975).
and Labour breaking in on terms of equality (a 1931-in- 
reverse) was the defining moment when patronage and 
initiative passed out of the hands of the old rulers. In 
the Labour view, contributing to the war effort carried 
with it the complementary aim of furthering social and 
economic reform, to which the trade unions felt they were 
entitled. "If it was [the duty of the Labour leaders] to 
share in the organisation for war, it was also their 
chance to build up the left". War turned the Labour 
party into a coherent force with definite goals.
Securing a number of government posts involved in home 
front tasks made this more certain, none more so than 
Bevin's tenancy of the Ministry of Labour. Preparing for 
the peace also chimed with the interests of the radical 
writers and publicists who began actively to press for a 
statement of war aims, this in turn influencing 
government and administration. The advocates of "middle- 
of-the-road reform", excluded from power throughout the 
1930s, now found themselves on the inside, calling for 
changes which Conservatives (with Churchill a rock past 
which these currents flowed) were increasingly obliged to 
accede to.
Along with this shift in elite thinking - however - 
went a prononunced move to the left in public opinion, 
particularly after the retreat from Dunkirk, and which 
Addison worked hard to dissect. In part, it could be 
explained by the imposition of egalitarian controls which 
demanded equity on all rungs of the social scale, 
promoting, where the First World War had encouraged 
patriotism, a sense of selfless sacrifice, captured in 
the powerful and popular ideal of 'fair shares', a slogan 
originally cined in a Board of trade publicity campaign 
in 1941. Added to this were a range of other 
influences - memories of 1918 and after, loathing of the 
'guilty men', admiration for the Soviet Union - which one 
after another counted against the Conservatives, and were
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bound to favour even the lagging Labour party once 
partisan politics returned. This was where Addison's use 
of the Mass Observation findings and the reports on 
morale prepared by Home Intelligence for the Ministry of 
Information (opened in 1972) were the most revealing.
The growing consensus was not - then - in defiance 
of the popular leftward swing. Both were symptomatic of 
the Conservatives in eclipse, leaderless, bewildered and 
losing control of events, their difficulties compounded 
by the chance publication of the Beveridge report, which 
expressed and intensified the public clamour for more 
preogressive steps, jolting the main parties into 
acceptance of its recommendations as the foundation of 
post-war policy. Determined to prevent all-out soc-ialsit 
measures, the Conservative party was unable to stand in 
the way of Beveridges's attack on poverty and 
unemployment, an "irresistible" plan which the Tories 
were bounced into, reluctant converts to an idea which 
the public did not trust them with. Cripps, who briefly 
threatened Churchill's position, would have done better 
to latch on to this. But, as Addison made plain, these 
were not fundamental disagreements of a sort which could 
endanger the "fusion of purpose" of the coalition. On 
balance, the new politics of agreement represented a 
dilution of Conservative policies, to which Labour was 
giving up the most. The influence of the left especially 
diminished. Attlee's slapping down of the wilder 
elements v/as one sign, just as the free enterprisers were 
frozen out in the Conservatives. The Hayeks and the 
Laskis (for all their publicised antipathy in the 1945 
election) were marginalised, their place taken by more 
moderate opinion-formers. Indeed it could be said that 
the Labour party was more concerned with a recasting of 
the governing ethos while the war was still on than with 
looking ahead to political power in the post-war period. 
Many wanted the coalition to continue. It was the
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grassroots membership in each party which brought it to 
an end and so allowed party politics to revive. The 1945 
election campaign itself was hard fought, but the party 
differences were much narrower than the main spokesmen 
were inclined to make out. On all sides there were 
representatives of the new thinking. Labour, tested in 
government and blessed with a reputation for social 
patriotism, was only seeking to consolidate and extend 
the already established wartime consensus on a managed
economy and welfare state; the prise just fell into
Attlee's lap. Hence the peculiarly mixed and blended 
nature of the 1945-51 reforms. The history could be 
recounted in terms of the high policy of personal and 
party calculation. But this was in turn only the 
resolution of a more deep-seated process of social and 
economic change, with which Labour corresponded more 
closely.
Any overall assessment of the war could only,
Addison granted, be a subjective one, hinging on the view 
one took - and Marwick, Calder and Pelling had taken - of
its outcome in bringing about a reformed, more humane but
still efficient capitalism. This was, by his own 
reckoning, entirely for the best and no mean achievement, 
even 'radical' by British standards. It represented a 
patriotic compromise between Socialism and Conservatism, 
which satisfied the pragmatic, moderate demands of the 
left without in any way going to the roots of the 
economic problems of inequality - itself indicative of 
how little class hostility or feeling mattered. But the 
political change was not simply a question of style or 
rhetoric. It translated into more jobs and greater 
security, making a real difference to people's lives.
The war years, in this sense, could be understood as a 
passing phase of "genuine change", breaking away from 
what had gone before, and installing a new natural order 
in British politics presided over by the benign figure of
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Mr Attlee, an order which had only recently begun to fall 
apart.
It only remains to underline how great a 
historiographical feat The Road to 1945 was, 
conceptualising the entire sweep of war and post-war 
British politics. A useful test of the value of a new 
work is its success in superceding older ones - which are 
no longer required reading - in sc far as the new 
analysis it contains explains anomalous or puzzling 
events that others had been unable to account for. The 
mystery of 1945 now had a plausible explanation which 
Addison provided. It triumphed over the psephological 
approach (set on its way by McCallum and Readman) by 
drawing attention to the significance of the non- 
el ectoral realignment of 1940, rather than the campaign 
of 1945, and in demonstrating the degree to which the 
latter was the result of a rapid, but disregarded, 
political transition in wartime, best imparted in the 
language of leverage and manoeuvrability than in a 
transfer of votes. There had been an intellectual and 
social landslide for which 1945 was only the final act. 
But existing 'consensus' accounts, to be found in the 
works of political scientists like McKenzie and Beer, 
were also overtaken. Consensus as they termed it had 
been a kind of blurred merging or forced policy 
convergence, imposed on the parties by constitutional 
dictates, electoral necessities and interest group 
pressures. In Addison's hands, the notion of consensus 
was given a much clearer focus, almost an ideology-in- 
itself, a programmatic agreement formed in a time of 
abnormal party politics. The question was not, 
therefore, where the unique and special ideological 
outlook of the Labour party in 1945 had emanated from, 
but where the common front moving forward from 1945 was 
going to. To say that Addison filled a gap would be an 
understatement; he characterised and articulated an
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historical stage. The transition from one equilibrium to 
another, from Baldwininan to Attleean England, was 
convincingly engineered, and it was a political historian 
who had been best placed to do it.
Maurice Cowling, arriving at 1940 from the other 
direction(G52), offered many points of resemblance, 
although his high political approach presumed a greater 
autonomy from popular pressures from below. On the fall 
of Chamberlain, Labour had suddenly got its "foot in the 
door". A new liberal-left mandarinate had formed up, 
propagandising its own values. Few at the time saw this 
as the grounding of a new governing consensus, though 
many had indeed been looking for it. What had appeared 
at first to be nothing more than an arrangement of 
convenience turned out in fact to mark "the beginning of 
a regime", preparing the way for a massive and 
unnecessary capitulation by conservative forces. 1945 
and all that it stood for Cowling regarded as an 
"intellectual discussion-stopper", the flat, 
unreflective, "agreeable" politics of subsequent decades 
an inviting target for short-tempered reactionaries.
Thirty years on, Addison and Cowling, between the 
two of them, encapsulated a theory of *postwar*;
Colville, reproducing the original hand corrected 
typescript of Churchill*s "Gestapo" election broadcast, 
retrieved from the wastepaper basket and proving beyond 
any doubt that the speech was all Churchill*s own work, 
gave it a visible form(653).
Paul Addison's central contention - that all the 
major changes in outlook and policy were effected during
652 M.Cowling, The Impact of Hitler — British 
poIitics and Brit ish poIicy (1975).
653 J.Colville, Footprints in Time (1976), p.208.
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the war and not after it - provoked surprisingly little 
opposition, bearing in mind its novelty. Addison, 
according to K.O. Morgan, had "defined the essence of 
historical change between 1939 and 1945", fully 
justifying his claim that the Coalition administration 
was the greatest reforming government since 1905(654).
He had shown how, facing possible extinction, the system 
of the middle way took shape, moving British politics 
permanently leftwards(655). The progression from warfare 
to welfare (the 1945 election hardly came into it) was, 
A.J.P. Taylor thought, "magnificently" etched(656). 
Wartime and postwar were fused into a continuous whole, 
with the accent on the war. In places, Addison had 
obviously given the account a helping hand - Pelling 
sensed, as he had with Calder, that the swing in popular 
thinking in wartime, though profound enough, was "rather 
exaggerated"(657); Vincent-pointed out the double 
standard by which those responsible politicians who 
chanced to doubt the wisdom of Beveridge's proposals, and 
were therefore cast as non-consensus actors, were treated 
unfairly(653). But - be it noted - Pelling's 
complaint about Addison's emphases also threw open the 
validity of his general interpretation; with Vincent it 
did not. Most were ready to endorse the new conceptual 
picture with acclamation. When Addison gave the lead 
paper on 'Labour and Politics in the People's War' at a 
special meeting of the Society for the Study of Labour
654 K.O. Morgan, 'Westminster at War', The Tines 
Literary Supplement, 17 October 1975, pp.1222-1223.
655 M.Radcliffe, in The Times ' 30 October 1975,
p.8.
656 A.J.P.Taylor, in The Observer, 19 October 1975,
p. 27.
657 H.Pelling, in History, February 1977, pp.150-
151.
658 J.Vincent, 'Brave New World', in New Society,
30 October 1975, p.280.
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History, reiterating his view that promises of welfare 
were significant not for boosting popular morale but in 
radicalising public opinion, other participants were more 
concerned to examine how this promising insight could be 
pushed further(659). Calder, tiring of the bye-election 
evidence, wanted to know more about working class 
reactions, especially in the armed forces and the trade 
un i on s . And Harris, wh os e b i og raphy {soon t o 
appear(660)) of Beveridge outlined the considerable 
resistance to the Beveridge report (even from Bevin, 
inventing trade union opposition where there was none), 
speculated about why the bureaucratic form of welfare was 
the one that came to be preferred, and why the Labour 
party had no communitarian alternative to it. Only 
Pel ling met Addison's argument head on, adamant t hat- 
total war need not necessarily result in a strengthening 
of the forces favouring radical change, and that the sole 
generalisation one could derive from the First and the 
Second World War was that in both cases the immediate 
post-war election always saw a punishing reaction against 
the (culpable) party which had been in power when the war 
broke out. Continuity there may be after a war, Felling 
accepted, but continuity of a complacent sort, typified 
for example by British self-regard for the working of its 
institutions, and aided by the sharp turn to the right by 
the Labour party leadership. That said, and this is 
evident from a reading of the BSSLH report, any such 
substantive differences, while extensive, had to be 
argued out not with a priori or ad horn in er, point-scoring 
but by reference to factual and methodological issues in 
the accepted fashion. That Calder, to take one instance, 
wrote as a committed socialist, was beside the point so
659 Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour 
History, No 34 Spring 1977, pp.8-14.
660 J.Harris, William Beveridge: A Biography
(1977).
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far as his wel1-founded version of history was 
concerned(661). Objectivity was guaranteed by the 
process of arguing. There was a development to the 
debate, not just variety or fruitless conflict. The 
accepted guidelines of historical inquiry and the 
enforcement of controlling standards of evidence and 
approach were coming into play, rules which were not 
dependent solely on the good faith of particular 
historians.
Marwick, returning to the topic in an L.S.E.-edited 
tribute to A.J.P. Taylor and in a Home Front scrapbook 
took note that the literature had now turned towards the 
view that the momentum for reform had not been maintained 
after 1945. He welcomed the successive corrections to 
mythology, which had given him the excuse to reconsider 
and refine his position, but felt that the trend had gone 
too far the other way. He still stood by the notion of a 
1people's war' which had led on to a 'people's peace'.
It was just that reform had to be thought of in a more 
limited sense than before, given the forces ranged 
against it:
"There were, then [he decided], no 
great revolutionary changes after 1945 - some 
of the older writers are quite wrong here.
But if it is unhelpful to speak of a 'social 
revolution' it is positively misleading to 
speak of "a restoration of traditional values" 
[Howard] or of society sweeping along "the old 
grooves" [Calder]. Change resulted! more from 
the mechanisms touched off by total war ... 
than from the deliberate actions of 
politicians. But it must always be remembered 
that throughout the war and well into peacetime
661 A.Marwick, The Home Front — the British and the 
Second Morld Mar (1976), p.6.
there were plenty of powerful people ready to 
emulate their predecessors in 1918 in 
attempting to resume the long golden age of 
Means Test and insecurity. The clock could 
have been put back in 1945; it may not be the 
most glorious of achievements, but the Attlee 
Government did not put it back"(662).
Not radical change as such but - adopting Pimlott's 
pithy formula - radical continuity(663), solidifying the 
wartime reform programme which Addison had so 
imaginatively set out. This, at least, was Marwick"s 
minimum defence. There were some, Marwick noted, who 
were dismayed by the bogus modernisation of the decade of 
reform in the forties, once the full impact of economic 
decline had struck home, but they were lacking in a 
historical sense. Britain had gone forward by not going 
back, as it could so easily have done. That in itself 
was reason to be .grateful.
The source of the worry to which Marwick alluded 
should not be passed over. Opinion was changing, for 
reasons that had little to do with the Attlee era and 
everything to do with the altering political climate and 
state of affairs of mid-seventies Britain, which may not 
have influenced the writing of the Home Front histories 
but undoubtedly affected the way they were being 
received. The economic underachievement of the Macmillan 
and Wilson governments had been tolerated. Comparisons 
were not always made, and when they were Britain could 
still claim to set a moral example to other nations. A 
further deterioration after 1973 - along with rising 
inflation and unemployment, and trade union confrontation
662 A.Marwick, in A.Sked and C.Cook, ibid (1976),
p.162.
663 B.Pimlatt, 'Attlee in fashion', New Society, 25 
April 1985, p.124.
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- raised the prospect of political disorder, suggesting 
that the social democratic age of efficiency and welfare 
might be drawing to a close. Judgemental evaluations of 
wartime and postwar, with one eye on the present, found 
much less that was praiseworthy or even warranted(664). 
The accepted commonplace of imperial withdrawal 
counterbalanced by economic and social advance - a staple 
of the general histories of the 1960s - no longer carried 
conviction. Critics on the left were joined by vocal 
social marketeers and neo-liberals.
Two reviews of Addison - by the political historians 
Morgan and Skidelsky(665) - gave a revealing glimpse of 
just how much could be read into, as opposed to read out 
of, a book like The Road to 1945. Morgan argued that 
while Addison had dealt very well with the collapse of 
the wartime Conservative party, his coverage of the new 
ascendancy of Labour was far less assured - in the main 
because Labour's leaders were so slow to grasp the 
significance of wartime reform. 1945 had been the end 
result of a "vast democratic upsurge, unique in British 
history", a rare opportunity to remould a society in flux 
which the Labour party, committed instead to gradualist 
change within a liberal-progressive framework - entirely 
failed to exploit. In the longer run, by being content 
to preserve the wartime gains, the Attlee governments had 
done nothing to dent the blinkered conservatism which 
continued to plague the economic performance and social 
cohesion of the country right up to the time of writing - 
a sad commentary on the consequences of the Attlee 
consensus for the later condition of Bfitain. Hope was 
deferred, "perhaps for ever".
664 J.Ramsden, introduction to Trends in British 
Politics Since 1945, C.Cook and J.Ramsden (eds)(1973), 
p. x.
665 K.O.Morgan, ibid (1975); R.Skidelsky, in The 
Spectator , 25 October 1975, p.536.
o o o O O  o
"From today's perspective", Skidelsky thundered, the 
Second World War, because it had required so much 
sacrifice without providing for an alternative means of 
subsistence, had really been lost. The Churchill 
coalition, egged on by left-wing intellectuals, had made 
over-expansive social commitments before a sound basis 
for economic recovery was established. It was "an 
interlude of illusions" which shunted the Attlee 
consensus leftward without creating a continuing economic 
vitality. Addison, in swallowing whole the wartime 
legend, was too much a child of his time, sounding as if 
it was still the 1950s and 60s. "What remains today", he 
inquired, "of the war's promise of national renaissance?"
Periodic reassessments are to be expected, all the 
more so in a time of fundamental political unrest. It is 
held against the study of contemporary history that it 
always lacks the requisite distance to ascertain the full 
effects and final consequences of events only just past. 
The "economic holocaust" (Morgan's words) of the oil 
crisis and afterwards dramatically altered the 
retrospective angle of vision, modifying impressions of 
the reforms of the later forties and giving them a less 
exalted meaning. It forced a coming to terms with former 
habits and attitudes which had been accomplished on the 
continent after the war but which the British had managed 
to avoid.
By the same token, this historical revision 
reintroduced an overt political element" into the 
discussion, making the analysis of the recent past a 
political instrument. Subjective interpretations, which 
had been slowly crowded out by the co-operative conflict 
of practicing historians, began to work their way back in 
again, disturbing and enlivening the debate. There 
already were a great many grounds for dispute which fell
within historical confines - generational differences, 
the younger tending to prefer a good war; disciplinary 
priorities, evident in the clash between pure history and 
applied social science; as well contrasting methods and 
approaches (the 'top-down' versus the 'from the ground 
up' models). But it was of the essence that these 
divergences were contained within and resolvable through 
the normal working of the process of historical inquiry. 
Bias, in the traditional view, is acceptable, and can 
even be productive, providing that an allegiance to the 
proper scholarly skills involved in doing history is 
still observed. With the newer, more condemnatory 
verdicts on 1945, this was no longer so obviously the 
case. Reassessments of the recent past plainly reflected 
current, not primarily historical, concerns, and - to the 
extent that these reassessments attacked the hidden 
values of all the existing historical accounts - 
signified a growing politicisation of the debate. In 
this way the changing political context gave rise to a 
revitalised controversy about the aims and achievements 
of the war and post-war governments which counteracted 
and controverted the assumed logic of historical 
argumentation. History itself was becoming political.
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Norman Chester was the obvious choice to write a 
history of the post-war nationalisations(666). His 
career spanned academia and public service, in what had 
come to be the 'Nuffield' manner, even though his own 
background was a modest one. He wrote (in 1932) an 
industrial survey of his native Lancashire for the Board 
of Trade, toured North America to see the running of 
publicly-owned transport on commercial lines, and was 
drafted into Whitehall as a temporary 'irregular' in 
1940, first in the Economic Section of the War Cabinet, 
later becoming Secretary to the Beveridge Committee on 
social insurance and a noted critic of the Treasury mind. 
Chester was - in all respects - an outstanding archetype 
of the wartime recruits who made up Paul Addison's rising 
class of enlightened progressives (Lionel Robbins, a 
colleague of those times, dubbed him 'the Friend of 
Man'(667)). Joining Nuffield College in 1946, he set 
about establishing the teaching of public administration 
and social studies, helping in particular to clarify the 
operation of the new public utilities which his patron, 
Herbert Morrison, had taken the lead in steering through 
parliament. The founding statutes were individually 
analysed, and the fundamental principles behind this new 
form of governmental involvement in industry were laid 
down(668). As an expert with first-hand knowledge of 
the institutional growth of the state, Chester applied 
the same uncluttered method that he brdught to bear in
666 D.N.Chester, The Nationalisation of British
Industry 1945-1951 (1975).
667 Tribute to Chester by David Butler in the 
Nuffield College Report (1981-1986), p.85.
668 D.N.Chester, British Public Utility Services
(1948).
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first assembling the raw material of facts and figures, 
and then drawing out of them the logical conclusions to 
which they pointed(669). To this was added a firm set of 
personal beliefs (he was said to have stopped buying The 
Guardian newspaper ’when 'Manchester" was dropped from its 
title). Along with Professors Robson and Hanson, who 
were all called before the Commons" Select Committee on 
the Nationalised Industries, Chester was both a leading 
authority and a stout defender of the Morrisonian public 
corporation.
Strangely, Chester decided against interviewing 
widely - he felt the documents were more than full 
enough. He listed only three civil service informants, 
one of whom (Keif-Cohen) had written an intemperate 
attack on the large, unaccountable and unchecked 
expansion of state power soon after retiring from the 
Ministry of Fuel and Power, a book which Chester 
disliked. Furthermore, he was conventionally discreet. 
Only a hadnful of officials were named in over a thousand 
pages (the wartime histories had not mentioned individual 
officials at all), even though, as was clearly apparent, 
the administrative workload that fell on their shoulders 
was a very heavy one. Chester went most of the way to 
redressing the balance between the work of ministers and 
their most senior advisers, necessary in any reappraisal. 
But the official fiction of ministerial responsibility 
was preserved.
Chester’s main difficult:^ was in organising his 
material and finding a convenient cut-off point (taking 
it all the way up to 1960, as originally intended, would 
have been too onerous a task). He eventually decided to 
group his material around the headings of administrative
669 S.Pile, 'Norman sets out for a delayed 
conquest", The Sunday Times, 24 October 1982, p.8.
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problem-solving - structure, finance, compensation, and 
the relations of the new board with parliament - 
emphasising how the framing of legislation and the 
passing into lav/ of the seven nationalising acts had 
meant devising and developing a wholly new and 
experimental form of public body - the public corporation
- for which the pre-war versions provded no assistance.
In translating the Labour party's long-standing electoral 
aims into legislative action, a procedure about which 
there had, even by the 1970s, been very little detailed 
academic coverage, he was able to show to what extent it 
was an exercise in administrative improvisation, adjusted 
to the particular needs of each industry and the 
political imperatives of ministers. The difference 
between the earlier and later Acts was evidence of this. 
With the coal industry, a relatively non-controversial 
piece of legislation, the starting functions were worked 
out first; only then was a structure designed to achieve 
them. For iron and steel, the last and most contentious 
of all the Acts, it was a national board vested with full 
control over the industries that was essential, around 
which the future operating guidelines had then to be 
fitted. In the latter instance, the ideological thrust 
clearly took priority. The lengths to which the 
government went to secure the acceptability of its 
legislation in parliament (in spite of its commanding 
majorit;/ in the Commons) did not, moreover, substantiate 
the common assertion that the legislature played only a 
subordinate role. Where the government suffered most, 
however, was in its deficiency of thinking. A mixture of
- often contradictory - motives inspired the demand for 
public ownership, just as the purposes to which they were 
meant to be put were never clearly established. On the 
key question of political direction and economic 
efficiency, for which the public corporation model 
supposedly provided the best of both worlds, the exact 
relationship was full of ambiguity. The problem, it
could be argued, was one that, could only be resolved in 
practice, and for which there was no ready-made solution. 
But Chester, in his concluding remarks, had no qualms 
about suggesting that, in launching upon such a huge 
legislative programme of ill-conceived measures at a time 
of economic uncertainty, was too much to ask. The pace 
could not last. Ultimately, the confusion surrounding 
the objectives of the nationalised industries was only a 
part of the wider issues of inflation, employment, the 
balance of payments, and of the management of the post­
war economy as a whole. If these matters are still 
unresolved in our own time, he wrote, it should not come 
as a surprise to find that their answer was not apparent 
in 1945-51 either, even though it had then been "a much 
simpler world with much lower expectations"(670).
The wealth of information - everything that was in 
the files and nothing that was not (and there were very 
few references to the secondary literature) - made it, as 
Chester conceived it to be, a work of reference, an 
anatomical manual of legislative change from which others 
could then draw. Its main use was prospective, 
encouraging new interpretations but not by itself 
generating them. The end result, judging by the 
historiographical yardstick, was a definitive but 
heavygoing read. Partly this was because of the author's 
unobtrusive style and exaggerated restraint, concealing 
his own staunch, even crusty Labour sympathies. One 
might never have guessed that Chester, in his discussion 
of bigness and centralisation - a dominating concern of 
the seventies - had in his own time in "the wartime civil 
service taken a strong decentralist line; nor that he had 
become worried, over the last few years, by the accretion 
of bureaucratic power, upsetting the traditional balance
670 D.N.Chester, "The austere crusader', The Times, 
1 December 1982, p.12.
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between Whitehall and Westminster(671).
The drawbacks were also, however, in the nature of 
official history and its narrow terms of reference. The 
uncertain basis on ’which the nationalised industries had 
been set up, most evidently in the failure to devise a 
criterion for their operation in the public interest, was 
obviously germane to the contemporary debate, especially 
after a second wave of nationalisations beginning in 
1971-72. The other related issue was the economic 
performance of the nationalised undertakings since the 
war, about which economic opinion (divided at the best of 
times) was already shifting. Pryke, aware that the 
public judged the publicly-owned industries and services 
by their financial behaviour much more than their 
administrative shortcomings, had provided evidence to 
show that, in the ten years up to 1968, the public sector- 
had done as well as private industry, taking into account 
labour productivity and the allocation of 
resources(672). In the decade thereafter, however, 
publicly-owned industry had done significantly worse, and 
for reasons he believed that were intrinsic to state- 
owned enterprise: an abrupt about-turn(673). This 
climate of unease made it all but impossible to treat 
nationalisation as if it was only a matter of 
technicalities, as Chester, Robson and others had for 
long been hoping to make it, or that the ownership of 
industry was really an irrelevance. The 'Whitehall'’ 
vantage point, too easily devoted to the rigmarole of
671 P.Bennessy, 'A lone voice preaching against 
bigness', The Times, 8 August 1978, p.3.
672 R .Pryke, PuhIic Enterprise in Pr act ice (1971).
673 R.Pryke, The Nationalised Industries (1933).
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public administration with the politics left out(674), 
could leave the impression that the machinery of state 
existed for its own sake(675). One could not tell 
from the text that the book dealt with one of the major 
clashes of political principle of the century(676). It 
was not so much neutral, as neutered.
674 A.Sutcliffe, review of the HMSO volume on post­
war environmental planning, in History, February 1978, 
p.152.
676 S.Pollard, 'Through the proper channels'’, The 
Times Literary Supplement, 27 February 1976, p.214.
675 B.Alford, in History, February 1977, pp.ISO-
151.
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The Battle of the Biographers
To an extent more than was usual, the collective 
reputation of the 1945 government already rested on an 
appreciation of the contribution of its 'Big Five" 
leading members in giving effect to an historic programme 
of legislative reforms against overwhelming odds. This 
was so in spite of the mutual antagonisms of senior 
Cabinet ministers, by now well known because of Hugh 
Dalton’s memoirs and the pathbreaking biography of 
Herbert Morrison. By working through colleagues and 
leaving the initiative to others, Attlee’s own part in 
British reconstruction after the war seemed to be 
inseparable from that of his party and 
administration(677). But it was not Labour’s term in 
office so much as the events immediately preceding its 
fall, when all of the government’s older figures were 
worn out, temporarily indisposed, or dying, that 
differences of personality inside the government, between 
some of its more junior members, proved most publicly 
damaging. The dispute about the rearmament budget of 
1951, notwithstanding the best efforts of an economic 
historian like Joan Mitchell, continued to reverberate 
down the years. That the clash of personalities was also 
endowed with ideological significance meant that the 
authorised biographies of the principal contenders, when 
they appeared in the nineteen seventies, -were bound to 
revive old feuds.
Michael Foot’s double volume life of Aneurin Bevan, 
a work of devotion based, in the absence of family 
papers, on Foot’s own recollections of the years they had 
shared, was a hagiography of the highest order. In a
677 Lord Longford, in 1000 Makers of the Twerit ieth 
Ceri tur y (1969 ) .
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career otherwise apparently directionless, and for the 
most part inexplicable to contemporaries, Foot hailed 
Bevan - his Bevan - as the torchbearer of a political 
creed, articulate, spacious and liberating, which it was 
the biographer's primary task to rekindle. In this 
endeavour, the story of the fate of the 1945 Labour 
government was pivotal.
Foot conceived the idea of a full-length biography 
shortly after Bevan died in 1960. "Meanwhile on Tuesday 
I had Michael and Jill Foot to dinner". Crossman records:
"I had thought it possible that I could 
write a quick portrait of Nye, not a full- 
scale biography but the kind of thing 
Francis Williams did of Bevin. Michael 
explained to me that Jennie [Lee] said she 
wanted to do it but she had also agreed that, 
if she didn't, Michael should. I said we 
should get a young man from Nuffield College 
to do the spadework and Michael said he 
could do it all by himself and wanted to 
spend two years on it. This finished any 
idea I had of butting in. If Michael really 
will do it, he can produce his one and only 
masterpiece, none the worse for its being 
the product of someone who adored and 
worshipped Nye"(678).
Bevan and Foot had effected a reconciliation in the 
last few weeks of Bevan's life, after rowing in 1957.
But their differences were as nothing to the treatment 
meted out in the past to Bevan by the popular press, and 
which made Foot and Bevan's widow understandably 
defensive. The real truth could prevail in biography,
678 J.Morgan (ed), The Backbench Diaries of Richard 
Grossman (1981), entry dated 4 August 1960, p. 862.
Foot believed, even if it had not done so when Bevan was 
alive. Foot himself was not put off by colourful 
partisanship - Guilty Hen was a pamphleteer’s dream, and 
he thought it normal for historians to attack each other 
"like bye-election candidates"(679). He also had a 
persistent record of party rebellion (according to Philip 
Morton, nobody else in any party during the 1945-74 
period rebelled against the party line more often than 
Foot(680)). The Bevan of the first volume, published 
in 1962 by McGibbon and Kee (owned by Howard Samuel, the 
backer of 'Tribune’) and coming out appropriately enough 
when Foot was without the Labour whip, had travelled a 
"rough, precipitous road to power"(681). Caged in by the 
ingrained timidity of the party’s leaders, Bevan alone 
had risen to the occasion during the Second World War, 
cut Churchill down to size, galvanised the faithful, and 
lifted Labour into office. It remained to be seen how 
Foot would handle the more difficult, dilemma-fraught, 
post-war phase.
Gaitskell’s death in 1963, and his replacement by 
Harold Wilson, brought from Foot an enthusiastic pre­
election booklet on the new leader(682). That Wilson 
was "a politician to his fingertips" was excusable. He 
had, Attlee-like, healed Labour’s self-inflicted wounds, 
and had - in addition - a Bevanite past of sorts. There 
was nothing about Labour’s poor showing after 1966 that 
could not be put right by a better team of leaders, he
679 M.Foot, introduction to Armistice 1918-1939 
(1940) .
680 P . Morton, Disse n s i o n i n the Ho use o f C o m m o n s 
1945-1974 (1975).
681 M.Foot, Aneurin Bevan , 1397-1945 (1962).
682 Harold Hi Ison — a pictorial biography, J.Parker 
and E.Prager (eds)(1964).
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told his 'New Left* inquisitors(683). But by 196S he 
was said to wish the Wilson book could be 
"suppressed"(684). He resumed work on Bevan in 1971- 
72, with less of a change of tone from the first volume 
than might, after such a protracted gap, be expected.
But as before, the outlook of the biographer and his 
subject were indistinguishable. It was not that Foot 
wrote himself into the storyline. Whole passages 
consisted of an imaginative rendering of Bevan*s 
innermost thoughts and feelings. The motive force and 
literary invention of the book stemmed precisely from a 
retrospective attempt to make of Bevan the Bevanite that 
Foot had wished him to be(685).
The "great nothings" of pre-war were not, however, 
as much in evidence. "In such a climate [of war and 
electoral victory in 1945]", Foot explained,
"lilliputians might grow to Brobdingnian stature".
Attlee, previously a cipher, became an inscrutable man of 
the golden mean. Cripps, no less impressive, though now 
mystifying to Foot, had shifted to the right. Bevin was 
a formidable individual. Their raised prestige matched 
the times. Circumstances were not favourable for a root- 
and-branch transformation of society. The whole 
atmosphere was one of "suffocating necessity". Labour 
was "blown off course" - shades of 1966 - by "a catalogue 
of disasters", financial and other. But its actions were 
politically defensible, even more so with the realism of 
hindsight. The government gave way where it had to, 
where its very survival was at stake, in order to do what 
it did want to do - no other course was open to it.
683 M.Foot, 'Credo of the Labour Left*, The Nett
Left Review, May-June 1968, pp.19-34.
684 P.Jenkins, The Battle of Downing Street (1970), 
p.114.
685 M.Foot, Aneurin Bevan 1945-1960 (1973).
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Bevan's own contribution was of central importance. The 
middle sections of the book were those chapters dealing 
with the lengthy negotiations over, and actual 
establishment of a nationalised hospital scheme (not a 
manifesto commitment), a tale strikingly told and with 
much new information. It was not quite the trial of 
strngth that the newspapers had had it. Here one saw the 
private Bevan who, on entering a meeting intent on 
charming his audience, never left his principles outside. 
Here too was the patient process of building up a 
coalition of allies, Bevan having to keep in mind 
"outflanking the BMA, enlisting public support, averting 
left-wing attack, [and] winning over the Cabinet". He 
shrewdly assessed the balance of forces, using the 
Commons - as it should be used - as the cockpit of 
partisan debate. Bevan had held his nerve, finally 
breaking the deadlock with a series of judiciously-timed 
concessions. It was the peak of his achievements - 
"Nothing less than to persuade the most conservative and 
respected profession in the country to accept and operate 
the Labour government's most intrinsically Socialist 
proposition". There is little doubt that Foot, in 
recounting these events and still incensed by the way 
Bevan's role had been overlooked, knew exactly what he 
wanted to say beforehand: when he went to interview Sir 
John Hawton, the former Deputy Secretary at the Ministry 
of Health, it was Foot who had done most of the 
talking(636). This gave his account an epic quality. 
Democratic socialism was in the making. To the later 
charge that Bevan gave too much away, Foot was convinced 
that his was the only national health service that could, 
at that time, have been got.
But Bevan was still a man apart, even to those like 
Foot on the left of the party who craved his leadership.
686 J.E.Pater, conversation with the author, 10 
January 1983.
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He was not motivated only by personal advancement. Foot 
charted the long build-up to the 1951 confrontation with 
Gaitskell, and Bevan’s anxiety that the revolution of 
1945 was about to be cut short - a principled matter 
which divided the two of them, not "a last minute 
fabrication”:
"He [Bevan] noted not the will and 
courage but the other aspects of 
Gaitskel1 ism: the parched political 
imagination, the pedantic insistence on 
lesser truths in the presence of great 
ones"(637).
In the end Bevan did not resign; he was "driven out" 
by others, notably Gaitskell and Morrison, plotting 
against him. The Bevanites, by implication, were obliged 
to band together in self-defence. This was remarkable 
coming from the author who had done his utmost to 
persuade Bevan in 1951 that it was time to go. There was 
no sense in which Bevan had brought about his own 
undoing. Foot and Jennie Lee exceeded Bevan in their 
adherence to a more aggressive pariiamentarianism, and 
were only occasionally able to persuade him of this. In 
Crossman's diary, which Foot saw, Bevan was a reluctant 
and the least assiduous of conspirators. He was fully 
capable of talking 'left' and acting 'right'.
This then was the Bevanite case rationalised and 
Bevan, his old battles successfully refought, vindicated. 
Partly, it had been a matter of style - Foot was not 
unaware of this. But personalities always embodied 
underlying ideals, and it was ideals which gave to 
history its meaning. There was a poetic entitlement, 
since the Bevanite side of the argument had been
637 M.Foot, ibid (1973), p.295.
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neglected for so long, to exaggerate, even to 
mythologise, in pursuit of a truer account. "Virtue lies 
on the left", as Foot once expressed it(688). What Bevan 
had really thought remained "locked, in his own heart", 
and the closing chapters of the book, when Foot and Bevan 
went their different ways, were clearly the hardest to 
compose. A life should not be judged, he said of Bevan"s 
final few despairing months, by its last flickerings.
Even so, the impression lingered of a magnificent but 
unexplained failure.
Aneurin Be van was highly acclaimed, "a book (one 
fellow bibliophile wrote) any man might be proud to have 
written, one of those books which justify a lifetime of 
authorship"(689). Enoch Powell warmed immediately to 
the portrait of one who strove to "make his own ideas the 
ideas of his party" (690). Others saw it as a summarising 
statement of * Tribune" socialism, which Bevan more than 
anyone else gave expression to(691); he had not sat 
confiding his frustrations to his diary. The 1 other" 
Bevan whom Foot had rarely seen was missing - a 
difficult, volcanic person, his differences nothing to do 
with policy. The belittling of colleagues, especially 
the caricature of Gaitskell, was deprecated. But only 
Marquand (close to finishing his life of Ramsay 
MacDonald) saw fit to question the general hang of the 
book altogether(692). The biographer must enable the
688 T.Coleman, 'Master of Consent", The Guardian, 
26 March 1976, p.13.
689W.Rees-Mogg, 'A heroic tragedy", The Times, 8 
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690 E.Powell, 'Bevan Agonistes", The Listener} 11 
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691 B.Crick, introduction to Orwell’s The Lion and 
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692 D.Marquand, 'Was he really a Bevanite?", The 
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348
reader to see the world through his subjects * eyes, which 
Foot had - he agreed - triumphantly achieved; but he must 
also drain himself of all predispositions, dealing fairly 
with the views of those whom he disapproves of. "My one 
quarrel with Foot is that he doesn't believe it necessary 
to try". For this reason Foot’s Bevan only occasionally 
emerged in his pages from beneath the conventional hero 
of left-wing legend. Foot had completely misunderstood 
the demands of biography. Marquand aside, however, most 
reviewers were prepared to accept the premise of Foot’s 
passionately argued account. The book was to be judged 
as the work of a rhetoritician. The total effect 
mattered, rather than the small details.
The official biography of Hugh Gaitskell, written by 
"an old sympathiser with Gaitskell’s views" and dedicated 
to one of his ideological successors, Anthony Crosland, 
appeared in 1979(693). Its’ author, a Fellow of Nuffield 
College and a lifelong member of the Labour party, had 
taken on the task in 1968, after Roy Jenkins had had to 
drop out. Apart from a diary kept intermittently by 
Gaitskell from 1945-56, Williams also conducted many 
interviews (only Eden and Hailsham refused to see him). 
Along the way, he was converted to the value of oral 
history, as long as it was in conjunction - wherever 
possible - with other sources(694). He wrote asking 
for an early sight of the relevant Cabinet papers, but 
his request was refused. Williams had known Gaitskell 
only slightly. But his loyalties were with the social 
democratic wing of the party - an old scourge of Mr Bevan
693 P.M.Wi11iams, Hugh Gaitskell — a political
biography (1979).
694 P.M.Williams, "Interviewing politicians: the
life of Hugh Gaitskell’, in The Political Quarterly, 
July-September 1980, pp.303-316.
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and his followers(695), he had also been a founder of 
the Campaign for Democratic Socialism in I960. When it 
came to his scholarship, he saw no merit in professing 
detachment and practising partiality. He wanted to be 
fair to Gaitskell's critics. But he was surprised "at 
how often, on thorough examination, [Gaitskell’s] case 
proved stronger than he had anticipated". Williams made 
a special point of wanting to put the record straight on 
a number of controversial episodes which he felt were 
"inadequately or misleadingly recounted elsewhere". In 
this attempt, he singled out one major culprit.
Monumental in form, respectful in tone, and with 
little to say about private life or psychology, Williams 
was concerned above all with the disfigurement of 
Gaitskell by his detractors, past and present. In large 
part, this had occurred during his time as party leader 
after 1955, but many of his later difficulties had their 
origin in the events of the Attlee governments.
Gaitskell had served as Dalton's chef de cabinet during 
the war, and was one of the 'young victors' elected on 
the tidal wave in 1945. He spent less than a year on the 
backbenches, before being offered a vacancy as 
Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power. Gaitskell it was who ensured that electricity 
supplies were maintained for essential services in the 
fuel crisis of 1947. Eventually he was promoted to the 
post of full Minister. Shinwell, who had never trusted 
his junior, suspected foul play, though Williams could 
find no evidence of this. Gaitskell's .officials, 
interviewed in retirement, were almost unanimous in their 
compliments about their new political master. Attlee 
later asked Gaitskell to handle economic affairs in the 
absence of Cripps, and together with Douglas Jay he 
oversaw the devaluation of the pound, convincing the
695 See his letter to The Times, 1 November 1951,
P.7.
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doubters and fending off an eleventh hour deflationary 
package cooked up by the Treasury. The detailing of this 
episode was meticulous, the technique the same as 
Williams had employed to analyse the plots, crises and 
scandals of the French Fourth Republic, and Jay for one 
said he learnt much from it that he had not known 
about(696). The consequential measures following 
devaluation led to health charges first being mooted, a 
portent for 1951 but an issue that arose well before 
Gaitskell*s Chancellorship. Everything could not, he 
indicated, be put down to Gaitskell*s famous obstinacy.
Gaitskell*s meteoric rise to the post of Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, exceptional in terms of his age and 
experience, only heightened tensions within the 
government. The intricately-sourced retailing of 
Gaitskell*s one and only budget brought out Williams*s 
handiwork at its best. He could find no hard proof, 
earlier than the middle of March 1951, for Bevan’s 
opposition to the arms programme, and judged - as Attlee 
had done - that Bevan broadened the issue of teeth and 
spectacles to rearmament as a whole only after he had 
resigned in April. All surviving Cabinet members seemed 
to agree on this. Gaitskell, on the other hand, behaved 
faultlessly throughout, offering to go quietly if asked, 
but adamant about the need to stand up to Bevan.
Williams guessed rightly that Attlee, convalescing in 
hospital, waited until the last possible moment before 
siding, as any Prime Minister must side, with his 
Chancellor. In a decisive use of interviewing, he traced 
back to Morrison the false rumour that Gaitskell 
deliberately split the party so as to further his own 
chances. Rearmament had been a gamble, but a necessary 
gamble. Bevan resented being passed over - "big men have 
big faults". Attlee, then and later, was irresolute.
696 D.Jay, conversation with the author, 24 July
1980.
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Tribune newspaper, and Tribune alone - backed by the 
sinister Beaverbrook - "ended several years of 
reasonable harmony in the Labour party and resumed the 
fractricidal civil war which has lasted on and off ever 
since". Gaitskell, for his part, devised no moves to 
drive out the threat, and refused to give the struggle 
within his own party priority over that against the 
Tories. Labour had to do the right thing, and for the 
right reasons; it had to demonstrate that it knew how to 
act and govern responsibly. Opposition in the 1950s saw 
the long playing out of this conflict. Williams was 
apparently content to hide in a footnote the vital 
information that Attlee hoped (this was by 1954) 
Gaitskell v/ould succeed him and that he would time his 
retirement accordingly.
The centre of gravity of the Gaitskell biography was 
placed much more on Gaitskell's tenure as party leader 
after 1955, and the "years of strife" over the party 
constitution, defence policy and latterly the Common 
Market which followed on from electoral defeat in 1959. 
These ructions overshadowed his earlier conciliatory 
phase as leader, but they revealed again the same 
qualities which had stood him in good stead back in 1951: 
an emotional but unflinching audacity, a readiness to 
risk his career to fight for his principles and the 
party's public standing. Williams did not exonerate 
Gaitskell entirely. But about the larger significance of 
these crises he was emphatic - they were about "more than 
a struggle over a doctrinal point like Clause Four, or 
over a policy issue like unilateral nuclear disarmament, 
or over a personality clash concerning Gaitskell's 
leadership, or even over the location of power within the 
party". "It was", he said, "a conflict about its 
character: whether the party was to be a protest movement 
or a prospective government of the country". Gaitskell, 
emerging from the traumas of the early 1960s, was
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destined to change the course of British politics but, at 
the age of 56 and in sight of election victory he died of 
a rare and then incurable disease, for Williams "the last 
irony".
Of bulky proportions, with two hundred pages of 
references alone, the size of the biography appeared 
excessive for a politician who never became prime 
minister(697). It was more political and less 
personal than many would have liked. In the attention it 
paid to long forgotten politicking it struck some as 
almost obsessive(698). His ex post facto justification 
of Gaitskell's actions in 1951 seemed strained; the 
objectivity he had fought to attain with Gaitskell was 
squandered in his comments against Bevan(699). But of 
the biography's "demythologising" qualities there was no 
question. Gaitskell was a good man in a party full of 
rogues scrambling for preferment, and the Namierite 
representation of the party which Williams provided was 
entirely appropriate. The nod at contemporary 
developments in the Labour party of Wilson and Callaghan 
had an undeniable appeal - the resort to a form of words 
to conceal fundamental differences could not go on 
indefinitely, and Gaitskell, alone among Labour leaders, 
had grasped this(700).
But the direction of his biographical attack was 
plain for all to see. Williams had fired an early 
polemical broadside at the distortions contained in
697 S.Koss, 'Labour in travail', The Times Literary 
Supplement, 23 November 1979, p.12.
698 A.Watkins, 'Hugh the holy', The Spectator, 27
October 1979, p.17.
699 P.Stead, in The Helsh History Review, Vol 10
1980-81, pp.263-266.
700 P.Johnson, 'Gaitskell the Gambler', The Sunday
Telegraph, 21 October 1979, p.15.
Michael Foot's eulogy of Bevan six months before his own 
book went on sale. In an article in Pol it ical Studies he 
accused Foot of lack of documentation, a string of 
slipshod inaccuracies (consistently in Bevan's favour) 
and a severe biographical "squint", all of which had led 
him to appreciate Bevan the temperamental rebel rather 
than Bevan the power-conscious realist(701). The 
Gaitskellites were made to appear as the real enemies of 
socialism, first in their continued efforts to compromise 
Bevan or expel him from the party, and then as the group 
that gathered around the 'Hampstead set'. Williams 
described the Bevanites in his book as "elitist 
sectarians who posed as the sole guardians of socialist 
principle, while seeking personal publicity and factional 
support at the expense of the party". In his account of 
the 1959 party conference, he had Foot coming into view 
from "the blackest and most invisible quarter" of the 
hall to speak in the Clause Four debate, and noted with 
satisfaction that Foot "had just lost again at Devonport, 
suffering the third worst swing in the country".
In his review-reply, Foot spoke of the Williams 
biography as the quintessential "Nuffield" biography - 
the worship of facts, facts and more facts, none of which 
could be equal or speak objectively for themselves(702). 
Never before had so much reconstituted reminiscence and 
gossip been assembled. And what must be the fate, he 
asked, of those politicians, like Bevan, who keep no 
diary? The charge against Gaitskell was not that he 
lacked honesty or courage or fine intellect, as Williams 
had supposed, but that "he was seeking to guide the 
Labour party into alien channels", and Foot challenged
701 P.M.Williams, 'Foot-faults in the Gaitskell- 
Bevan Match', in Political Studies, March 1979, pp.129- 
140.
702 M.Foot, 'Gaitskell's infirmity', The Listener , 
18 October 1979, pp.530-531.
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the tacit assumption that the party was and is somehow 
inherently centrist and reformist. Stung by the huge 
number of errors Williams had unearthed, Foot signed off 
with the promise of more to come.
On the face of it, the Foot-Wi11iams collision was 
an illustration of the extension of party warfare by 
other, literary means, the left confronting the right in 
an explicitly ideological disagreement over "two rival 
conceptions of the party's future". Both accepted the 
oratorical conventions by which internal disputes were 
conducted, so that the parameters of scholarly debate 
were pre-set. This greatly simplified the biographer's 
task. But it typecast the principal contenders and 
twisted those issues which cut across the left-right 
divide. The contrast with Martin Gilbert who, after 
years of indefatigable study, still felt unable to guess 
beforehand what attitude Churchill would take to 
particular matters which arose, is instructive. Marquand 
indeed was driven to conclude that, if Bevan was not 
strictly a Bevanite, Gaitskell was hardly ever a 
Gaitskellite - followers were more ardent than 
figureheads; and he now wondered whether Gaitskell would 
have gone on, had he lived, to create the broad-based 
party of the centre-left that his old supporters once 
hoped and believed (Marquand willingly, Williams 
reluctantly, signed up for the SDP in 1981). Style of 
leadership and temperamental differences were just as 
important a consideration in politics as ideas and 
beliefs, sometimes more so. Ideological accounts were 
the characteristic deformation of writing about the 
politics of the Labour party. The advance that the 
biographies of Bevan and Gaitskell bestowed was also very 
much a reiteration.
At another level, the dispute between Foot and 
Williams was less to do with ideological opposites than
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the meeting of an old-fashioned practitioner of amateur 
political biography and the professional historian who 
has seen and read everything. Foot, the devotee of 
Carlyle, full of romanticised attachment to the values 
that Bevan espoused ("Don't confuse me with the facts", a 
Shadow Cabinet colleague recalls him saying), and an 
approach unlikely to come well out of the exacting 
textual scrutiny of Williams who, although no less 
intensely involved, was concerned to see that scholarly 
standards were observed. A stern view of the kind 
propounded by Marquand would brand the Footite method as 
an illegitimate use of the biographical mode, that Foot 
and his work - by dealing in unscrupulous myth-making - 
was no historian and not history. A more tolerant view 
is tc recognise that Foot and Williams were trying to do 
different things, within the scope which biographical 
conventions permit.
The second of these interpretations was in fact 
shown to be nearer the mark when the complete run of 
Cabinet papers for the 1945-51 governments had been made 
available at the Public Records Office by 1982, 
enabling - in a comparatively rare instance where rival 
accounts were reducible to a single point of discord - 
the charges and counter-charges over the 1951 budget to 
be independently assessed. The first to do this was the 
Oxford historian K.O. Morgan, for his Labour in Power; 
1945-51, in which he relayed the Cabinet budget 
discussions in full, courtesy of the much fuller notes 
taken for the occasion by Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet 
Secretary(703). Bevan, it now transpired, had had 
reservations about the proposed scale of rearmament from 
the word go - "episodic" warnings, it was true, but no 
less keenly felt. Much could be said for Gaitskell's
703 For the background to this additional
notetaking, see the PREM 8/1480 file in the Public 
Records Office, Kew.
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f. i d e of the case, anci the .jo ft l ousi es of Bevan. Bevan hftd 
been angered by the provocative imposition of health 
charges; furthermore, in his short time at the Ministry 
of Labour, he had come up against the intractable matter 
of trade union wage restraint. Both of these factors 
were important in influencing his reactions.
Nevertheless, on "the main issue", Bevan and Wilson had 
undoubtedly got the better of the argument, a verdict 
which carried conviction even when one sensed who 
Morgan's heart was with. All of those, including many 
colleagues, who could not recall any early objections 
from Bevan, were shown to have erred. Michael Foot, in 
The Observer t greeted the nev/s with relish, delighted 
that the "official" story of Bevan's trumped-up 
resignation - "his ego off the leash" - had been exposed 
as a shameful falsehood which had concealed the way the 
sedate Attlee Cabinet was "stampeded" into accepting the 
rearmament budget, truly "a political and economic 
disaster"(704). Williams did eventually agree,
"though distinctly grudgingly", that Bevan's doubts about 
rearmament were of longer standing than he had conceded, 
but he was, Morgan felt, inclined to be a shade partisan 
on the point: "I expect the poor man thought the same of
me!"(705) After his death in 1984, a Nuffield 
colleague wrote in an appreciation that Williams "tried 
to justify Gaitskell's position on the 1951 defence 
budget and the cuts in the NHS which led to the traumatic 
conflict with Aneurin Bevan - although it must be said 
that Williams wrote prior to the release of the relevant 
public records and that the Cabinet minutes of 1950-1 do
704 M.Foot, 'Attlee and Co. ', The Observer 3 4 March 
1984, p.22.
705 EC. 0. Morgan, letter to the author, 25 January
1986.
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not altogether sustain his account"(706). Thereafter, 
the new discoveries were quickly accepted, and when 
Woodrow Wyatt still harped on about Sevan’s vanity and 
opportunism, he was slapped down now that "after 30 years 
the subject is just beginning to be susceptible to more 
balanced judgement"(707). John Campbell, the full­
time historical biographer who had delivered the rebuke, 
had his own revaluing life of Bevan which was published 
in 1937, incorporating much of the new material(708).
The outrage which it excited among old Bevanites might 
have seemed a sure indication of his fair- 
mindedness (709), and in truth it was one of the great 
strengths for which he was praised that Campbell managed 
to "disinter the bones of Nye"(710), using the Foot 
biography - brilliant in its way but written in the v/ay 
it was so as to deter others - and building upon it, 
coolly reassessing a political career that had long been 
in need of it. The figure of Bevan that took shape was 
in several respects much more complex than Foot had 
allowed for, or could have known. Bevan Campbell 
regarded as having been activated by a strain (however 
unsystematic) of marxian fundamentalism, minimised by 
Foot, which made him believe that History, and Britain, 
were moving inexorably along a socialist path, founded on 
the numerical force of the working class majority, and 
for which 1945 was a clear demonstration. Equally, and
706 D.Johnson, "Philip Maynard Williams, 1920-1984’
in Proceedings of the British Academy, 1986 (1937),
p.550.
707 J.Campbell, letter in The Times, 16 March 1934,
p. 15.
708 J. Campbell, Mye Bevan and the Mirage of British 
Sodali s m ,
709 C.Brown, "Historian angers Kinnock corner’, The 
Independent, 26 March 1987, p.l.
710 B.Pimlott, "The Legacy of Nye’, The Observer, 
29 March 1937, p.36.
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equally passed over by Foot, he was a serious-minded 
politician, politically astute, "a curious blend of anger 
and intellect" who could fight his corner in Cabinet and 
was, from 1947 onwards, very much a member of Attlee's 
inner circle of ministers. Departmental papers also 
showed him to have been more doctrinaire about state 
housebuilding than health policy, the later rejection of 
public provision of housing no less a defeat for his 
outlook than the government's initial underestimation of 
the costs of state medicine. Campbell found some signs 
that Bevan, by the late 1940s, sensed that the socialism 
he had visualised was not going to come about, and sought 
in vain to revitalise the movement, treating "issues as 
symbols" with which to reignite the crusading spark. The 
clash with Gaitskell (when, joining Morgan, Campbell had 
Gaitskell wanting to impose charges from his very first 
day in office) was the moment when the vision began to 
fade, his resignation - made up of equal proportions of 
principle, provocation and pique - the pent-up expression 
of frustration. But Campbell, unburdened by adversarial 
loyalties, thought that there was no point in endlessly 
going over the rights and wrongs; it was tragic for all 
concerned, the party just as much as the protagonists. 
Doubtless Sevan's was the greater tragedy, his 
fundamentalism by the end of his life an historical 
anachronism, the mistaken prophet of a rising working 
class distracted by consumerism. The trouble was that 
successive Labour leaders had been dishonestly cashing in 
on the posthumous canonisation of Bevan ever since, 
invoking his name to legitimise the abandonment of 
practically everything that he had worked for, and 
preventing a realistic reappraisal of his legacy. The 
4New Fabian' economists of the 1930s had had a much 
better understanding of historical trends. Hence 
Campbell's urging of a return to the pre-1914 alliance of 
the progressive centre, with the mildly interventionist 
adaptation of society that had grown out of it - an
or.q
SDPish slant which was not lost on his readers(711). 
Despite straying off into polemics(712)(his introduction 
and conclusion were noticeably spiced up), and overdoing 
the "flimsy" theme of Sevan's failed marxism(713), most 
reviewers found more than enough to give Campbell's well- 
researched. biography a warm welcome. As for Campbell, he 
was taken aback that the book was seen by so many as a 
political tract dictated by his own preferences. He had 
meant it as an "historically objective account" 
transcending partisan allegiances, and should be taken as 
such.
In the war of words between the biographers of Bevan 
and Gaitskell, the immediate issues were also bound up 
with contrasting approaches to the nature of biographical 
inquiry. A strong prejudicial bias instinctively guided 
Foot's account; for Williams, truth was only to be found 
in precision. It was the difference in acquiring 
knowledge by feeling as well as by (documentarily) 
knowing. As things turned out, on the all-important 
question of Bevan's resignation, the Bevan of 'faith' and 
the Bevan of 'history' proved to be closer than many had 
thought, and it was Williams who was obliged to give 
ground. The Bevanite myth was confirmed, so forming the 
basis for a new, factually more accurate but also more 
impersonalised evaluation, the externally certifiable 
facts superseding all previous arguments. But this in no 
way lessened - indeed it sanctioned - the ongoing 
influence of those imaginative insights which had sprung
711 J.Campbell, 'Lessons for anti-Conservative 
forces in the pre-war alignment', The Independent} v 4 
February 1988, p. 20.
712 K.O.Morgan, 'Nye comes in from the cold', The
Guardian, 27 March 1987, p.22; M.Rutherford, 'End was
Nye', The Financial Tines, 4 April 1987, p.14.
713 D .Marquand, * Maximum embarrassment', T h e  Lo nd o n 
Review of Books, 7 May 1987, pp.3-5.
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from the mind of "the biographer.
Keynes and the Keynesians
Throughout the years of high and stable employment, 
lasting loosely from 1948 until 1973, British economic 
history was largely relayed in terms of 'Keynesian' 
history(714). Governments had been equipped by Keynes 
with the tools to control the level of demand in the 
economy by fiscal and monetary means, allowing them to 
maintain resources at or near to a fully employed 
position. Keynesian tenets had demonstrated their 
superiority by the test of instrumental policy 
application. Though economic relationships could not be 
categorically established, the disappearance of large- 
scale unemployment was taken as a striking corroboration 
of the essentials of Keynesianism. This historical 
version was never monocausal. Other factors, such as the 
impact of the war economy, the increased bargaining power 
of the trade unions, and the pick up in world trade after 
1945, were given a place. Nor did it assume policy­
making infallibility, given politically-induced mood 
swings and policy mistimings. But - as Dow had pointed 
out - however much policy may have been destabilising, 
there was no way of knowing what would have occurred if 
the government had acted neutrally or done nothing 
whatsoever. Forecasting of macroeconomic aggregates, 
which Keynes had made possible, was better than no 
forecasting at all. As one historian of the interaction 
of economic thinking and official policy wrote 
disarmingly, he could quite see how the (false) 
impression was created that he regarded Keynesian 
economics as the higher wisdom, "the summit of all
714 A.Budd, in F.Cairncross (ed), Changing
Per c ept i o n z i ti E c: <•.> n o m ic Pol icy (1981), p . 5 3 .
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progress"(715}.
The questions raised by R.C.Q. Matthews, in a 
landmark paper (1963), were of a more probing nature, 
puncturing the "simple-minded" view that there had been 
full employment since the war owing to the announcement 
of "a full employment policy"(716). If true, he 
observed, "it would be a most striking vindication of 
Keynes’s celebrated dictum about the ultimate primacy of 
abstract thought In the world of affairs". But the 
pledge made by the Coalition government in 1944 was of no 
relevance, Matthews argued. The important point was to 
explain the historically and "unprecedentedly" high level 
of demand in the post-war economy - this was what was 
really new. To what extent, then, could this be ascribed 
to government action? A fiscal explanation was unlikely, 
in view of the consistently large budget surpluses. 
Compared with 1937, exports had recovered from a 
depressed level, outweighing the fall in overseas income 
and the rise in the propensity to import, but this was 
not the whole story. By a process of elimination, he 
arrived at the view that the climb in investment, and 
particularly private investment, during and after the 
war, was at the heart of the matter, and that although 
the field was still unresearched, this could be accounted 
for either by a one-off wartime boost, or as a result of 
a greater willingness to invest on the part of 
entrepreneurs, because of confidence in the government. 
Going further back (to before 1914), there had also been 
a continuing scarcity of labour relative to capital, a 
decidedly non-Keynesian factor. This was not to say that 
the record might not have been any different — avoidance
715 D.Winch, Economics and Policy - a historical 
survey (Fontana 1972), p.10.
716 R.C.0.Matthews, 'Why has Britain had full
employment since the war?', The Economic Journal}
September 1968, pp.555-569.
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of excessive deflationary measures at least meant that 
governments had not done anything to check "the tendency 
for demand to be high", and for this they could take some 
credit. Within the framework of Keynesian thinking - 
therefore - government action was never wholly certain or 
predictable in its effects; governments could only, in 
the later formula, create the conditions within which a 
fully employed economy could flourish. Depressions of 
the damaging character of the past were now 
inconceivable, the modern role of governments being to 
provide the assurance necessary to steady business 
expectations, the mere statement of this intention 
bringing about full employment "as if by magic"(717). As 
unemployment rose above the half-a-million mark in mid— 
1968, Matthews, and others involved with the London and 
Cambridge Economic Service, were well placed to 
comment(718).
This line of argument had two disturbing aspects, as 
Stewart (1971 and 1977(719)) - a former economic adviser 
to the Wilson governments - noted. It was impossible to 
disprove, relying as it did on an implied count erf actual 
assertion that private investment after the war would 
have been much the same come what may; it could not be 
downed. And it threw off demand management as an 
"unnecessary charade", giving credence to the reviving 
belief in the classical conception of an automatically 
adjusting economy that Keynes had so effectively disposed 
of. The first point was well made, indicating that, 
though not cast in a testable form, the, Matthews argument
717 R. C.0.Matthews, The Trade Cycle (1959), p.263.
718 R. C.0.Matthews, 'An upswing of a sort’, The 
Times, 13 October 1969, p.23, and 'Realism in setting 
Britain's targets', The Times, 14 October 1969, p.25.
719 M. Stewart, Keynes and After (2nd ed 1971); The 
Jeky11 and H y d e Yea rs ~ po1itics and economic po1icy 
since 1964 (1977).
364
was at least lacking in plausibility.
The second thrust was more dubious. The one feature 
Matthews made no reference to was that of inflation and 
the price level which, from the point of view of the 
monetarist counter—theory then gaining ground again, 
Keynesianism was not well designed to cope with. Keynes, 
it was conceded, had been alive to the dangers of 
inflationary pressure; his self-appointed followers were 
not. Johnson (1971), one of a select band of market 
economists, saw that their hopes of persuading other 
economists did not depend on establishing the scientific 
status of monetarism, useful as the methodology of 
positive economics might be in throwing up predictive 
hypotheses. The only way to prove its worth and escape 
the charge of reversion to dogma was to show that their 
analysis of monetary phenomena had a pay-off in terms of 
problem-solving in the realm of actual policy.
Leijonbufvud*s achievement in On Keynesian Economics and 
the Economics of Keynes (1968) in driving a wedge between 
Keynes and the Keynesians Johnson praised for its 
clearing of the air of "a stultifying ideological 
controversy, paving the way for a further advance in 
economic understanding”(720). Monetarists looking at the 
post-war experience were convinced that the British 
economy had only been kept going by short-term 
expedients, deceiving policy-makers into thinking that 
their coarsened prescriptions were having the desired 
effect, all the while storing up inflationary trouble for 
the future, a reading of the economic past tailored to 
the call for a full-scale reversal of state intervention. 
The course of post-1945 policy may have been radical, in 
so far as it ensured the continuation of interventionist 
government and further weakened industrial 
competitiveness; it was not, in all probability (Hayek
720 E.G.Johnson, 'Revolution and Counter-Revolution 
in Economics'', in Encounter , April 1971, pp. 23-33.
was one of the few to differ on this) in accordance with 
the views of Keynes himself.
Emphasis on the delaying power of Keynesian-inspired 
policies, on their postponing of an economic crisis that 
had now arrived, was a belief that monetarists shared 
with the leftist-going-on-marxist critique of 
Keynesianism. Keynes - in this regard - had reconciled 
capital with labour by doing away with the old division 
between planning and the market; he had saved democracy 
from more drastic remedies, the moderation of the 
Keynesian approach (ensuring full employment and welfare 
as the normal state of affairs) providing the 
intellectual support to persuade the Attlee governments 
of the benefits of the managed, mixed economy. 
Keynesianism mitigated the harsher features of economic 
life; what it could not do was to totally eradicate the 
persisting inequalities of wealth and power which were 
the fundamental dynamic of the still largely capitalist 
economic system. The recent reappearance of economic 
instability manifested itself in a crisis of production 
and profits which Keynesian commentators had no answer 
to. The more the government intervened to correct the 
malfunctioning of the market, the more it was generating 
tensions in reaction against it. There had not, as most 
economists had claimed, been a "final victory" for the 
new, Keynesian economic science(721). Keynes, as a 
liberal social theorist, had merely furnished a 
conceptual adaptation of classical economic theory, 
extending the life span of capitalism while leaving the 
basic structure of society unaffected(722). Keynesians 
had taken up the promise of painless gadgets and policy 
weapons, the acceptance of the ideas of Keynes greatly
721 T.Balcgh, "Keynes and the IMF', ■ The Times 
Literary Supplement, 10 October 1975, pp.1211-1214.
722 V.L.Allen, ibid (1975), pp.26-28.
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eased by their "deeply conservative" character. 
Unfortunately the Keynesian era was proving to be only an 
intermezzo, brought up short by the incapacity of 
economists to account for the latest disquieting 
developments. The left gave full credit to the 
tenaciousness of Keynes in eventually influencing policy; 
what he had been driving at was anything but 
revolutionary.
A neo-Keynesian case was framed to meet this double- 
pronged attack (among those who felt it deserved to 'be 
taken seriously) in assorted essays and assessments of 
the legacy of Keynes in the light of the disturbances of 
the mid-1970s, in combination with the gradual 
publication of a complete edition of Keynes's Collected 
Uorks by Donald Moggridge, also the author of a short 
life of Keynes(723). It consisted in demonstrating that 
both sets of critics had a warped sense of history, 
caused by reasoning that preceded rather than grew out of 
the evidence they had before them.
In line with Keynes' belief (contested by both the 
New Left and the New Right), post-war Keynesians gave 
greater weight to ideas over interests in explaining how 
barriers to change were overcome. Several forces were 
already moving in the direction of increased state 
regulation - Keynes helped to speed that tendency 
(Meade), although the achievement of full employment was 
no more than an inheritance (Opie) from the war. Ills 
main success lay in breaking the hold of established 
doctrines. Skidelsky (in M.Keynes, 1975), merging 
economic and political analysis, took the argument to its 
furthest extent: wartime was the real engine of reform,
723 D.E.Moggridge(ed), Keynes; Aspects of the Han 
and his Mork (1972); M.Keynes (ed), Essays on John 
Maynard Keynes (1975); D.E.Moggridge, Keynes (1976); 
R.Skidelsky (ed), The End of the Keynesian Era (1977).
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diminishing the influence of older habits of thought, and 
Keynesianism was the "ideal ideology" to underwrite the 
new technique of economic management and the new social 
consensus that lasted on into peacetime. This sharper 
ideological focus to the ideas and impact of Keynes was a 
sign of the times, alien to the older generation of 
liberals and social democrats, but of a piece with 
Addison's account, arrived at independently and with the 
same sense that the Keynesian era was passing away. It 
was not a re-defining of what Keynesianism was about so 
much as the recognition, under the pressure of competing 
ideological alternatives, of its true nature.
Coming to the post-war period itself, realistic 
Keynesians (Stewart's phrase) were ready to admit to 
mistakes of judgement and timing, without seeing the need 
to accept that the whole approach was misguided.. One had 
to take Keynes along with the Keynesians. Stung by* 
Congdon's attack on "counterfeit Keynesians" who had 
taken too many liberties in propagating a spurious 
'Keynesian' tradition, Moggridge warned against lifting 
quotations out of context, cited Keynes's recommendation 
(in 1942) that controls would probably have to be 
retained for some time after the war, and explained - 
going on the basis of what he had so far seen among 
Keynes's papers - that on the key question of full 
employment in the post-war transition, Keynes for one 
"had not come to any firm policy conclusions"(724). It 
would not do to prematurely attribute views to him. 
Whether Keynesian measures had been stabilising or 
destabilising was, according to Moggridge, now beside the 
point - "the argument has shifted to the consideration of 
relatively small swings around generally high levels of 
employment and output from the much larger swings of the 
inter-war and pre-1914 periods". How much of this was
724 Letter in reply to Congdon’s 'Are we all 
Keynesians now?', in Encounter, September 1975, p.89.
368
due to an investment boom, technical innovation, arms 
spending or some other factor was an empirical matter 
that also had to do with the personal leaning of each 
economist. The understanding of economic processes was 
simply not advanced enough. But however slight or 
indirect the effect of Keynesian ideas might be said to 
be, the record of post-war prosperity was still 
“remarkable". The capitalist economies had been reformed 
and civilised, solving the economic problem of 
accumulation, and some at the very least of this had 
undoubtedly been of Keynes's doing(725).
We can summarise the argument by saying that the 
modern exponents of Keynesianism continued to stress how 
great a leap forward, even after the rising inflation and 
unemployment of recent times, the Keynesian revolution in 
theory and policy still represented. This might have 
been an effective counter to those who had never accepted 
Keynesian ideas from the off and had been surprised by 
the unexpected duration of post-war economic expansion. 
Hutchison, well versed in the transformation of economic 
doctrines over time, granted that Keynesian prescriptions 
were the only coherent ones available in the severe 
economic circumstances in which they were originally 
formulated. What interested him still more, in a Hobart 
paper he wrote for the free market Institute of Economic 
Affairs (1977)(726), was their subsequent hardening and 
over-simplification into a dogma by so-called 'Keynesian' 
publicists and popularisers who had added on “distorting 
accretions" that put such a different complexion on them 
as to amount to an entirely new, and far less Keynes- 
like, theory. No one could be certain what Keynes would 
be saying in today's climate. But in his last relevant 
peacetime pronouncements, in 1937, the fear of inflation
725 D.E.Moggridge, ibid (1976), pp.161-162.
726 T . W . Hutch i s on, K g  yn e s i/ e r s u s t h e ' Kg  yri e s i a n s '
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loomed largest, carrying with it the corollary that it 
was wrong to try and bring unemployment down below 
something akin to a 'natural rate', a concept dear to 
monetarists. As for claiming his support for modern 
measures - ever higher targets for employment, 
'growthmanship', incomes policies, and indifference to 
rising prices - it was impossible to find statements 
about these in his writings. In Keynes's own thinking, 
the kind of purposive demand management of monetary and 
fiscal policy had no place. There was plenty of evidence 
to show that Keynesian theory had been thrown into crisis 
by internal weaknesses, as much as by historical and 
institutional changes which were hastening its 
obsolescence - but that was best left to the critical 
comment of others. The real issue was the classic 
instance Keynesianism provided of a ruling paradigm 
coarsened and corrupted by economists whe had entertained 
an excessively confident idea about the state of economic 
knowledge. Hutchison was not one to argue that there was 
no equivalence between the social and the natural 
sciences. It was only that, in order to guard against 
the ubiquitousness of values, it was vital to maintain 
the "utmost purism"in the handling of concepts(727). On 
this score the much-vaunted suppleness of modern 
Keynesianism fell down. It was the 'Keynesians' who had 
stretched knowledge and ignorance in economics beyond its 
limits, operating on the assumption that economic opinion 
was becoming progressively integrated. Hutchison was 
anxious to disillusion them. Advances were made, on the 
contrary, by disintegration. Keynesianism had been 
turned into a complacent orthodoxy which it was incumbent 
upon other who thought like him to topple.
Publication of the official memoranda and 
correspondence of Keynes when he was working in the
727 T.W.Hutchison, ibid (1981), pp.23-24.
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Treasury from 1940 onwards did, to some extent, 
substantiate the point that Keynes had always hedged his 
recommendations about with cautious qualifications which 
others had later forsaken. Wilson, a member of the Prime 
Minister's Statistical Section throughout the war, 
reviewed some of the papers in The Guardian, remarking 
that in coming down in favour of a post-war unemployment 
target of around 5%, Keynes did not believe that 
Beveridge's working assumption would be feasible, though 
he saw no harm in trying. "...It would not be unfair", 
Wilson conjectured, to say that he [Keynesj attached 
much the same importance to a 1 per cent variation as was 
subsequently attached in the Fifties and Sixties to a 0.1 
per cent variation". Furthermore, the national accounts 
should be divided up into an ordinary (taxation) budget 
and a capital budget covering public investment - but 
only the latter should be made to vary anticyclically, a 
significant additional proviso to the practice of deficit 
financing. With one exception (social security 
contributions) he was staunchly opposed to anti-cyclical 
changes in taxation. Not wanting to end on a negative 
note, however, Wilson recalled Keynes's desire to 
preserve a free society and a liberal economy, something 
overlooked by ultra-monetarists, and the hazards that 
full employment presented to these. Discretionary action 
by government was, nevertheless, an overriding 
rquirement. "During the first three post-war decades 
these conclusions would have seemed obvious and 
uncontroversial; but it is a different matter 
today"(728).
Taking Keynes's revealed views on employment policy 
together with the evidence of the Public Record Office 
files, it was apparent to Booth (1983) that the old, 
"delightfully simple" account of the triumph of
728 T.Wilson, 'Don’t blame Keynes for Keynesian 
failures', The Guardian, 19 March 1981, p.19.
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Keynesianism over Treasury opposition in the 1944 White 
Paper on Employment must yield to a more complicated 
detailing of the emphases and interpretations in official 
opinion, which Hutchison's stimulating but emotive use of 
the term 'Keynesian' had done little to aid(729).
Knowing that the Treasury had in fact shown greater 
flexibility towards counter-cyclical public works in the 
later 1930s (following the researches of Howson and 
Winch) than previously thought still did not indicate a 
complete identity of outlook in wartime between Keynes 
and the Treasury, or that the 1944 White Paper could be 
regarded as a kind of joint statement that was about as 
far as officials (Keynes among them) were prepared to go. 
In specific policy areas - employment, but also war 
budgeting and social policy about which Keynes also kept 
very much in touch - Booth found that their respective 
positions moved noticeably apart, his own views much more 
likely to coincide with the Keynesians in the Economic 
Section. Keynes did not query a future policy of wage 
restraint, and displayed an unmistakeable "expansionist 
bias", even to the point (which Hutchison did not know 
about) of tolerating deficits in the ordinary budget if 
all else should fail to cure unemployment in the longer 
term. This being so, it followed that the White Paper 
ought still to be viewed as the compromise document that 
it had been seen as all long, Keynes and the Keynesians 
being obliged to take a conciliatory line in order to win 
round the Treasury, making it not the culmination but 
only a "milestone" on the road to the full conversion of 
the Treasury to Keynesian methods. For, the first two 
years after 1945, even this momentum was lost, as 
Labour's leaders - having little understanding of 
Keynesian ideas - either pressed ahead wibh the planning 
of economic recovery (Morrison, Cripps) or else (Dalton)
729 A.Booth, 'The "Keynesian Revolution" in
economic policy-making', in The Economic History Review, 
36 1983, pp.103-23.
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stuck to a quite orthodox financial attitude. Continuing 
official scepticism and the ministerial preference for 
the planned use of economic resources, tied in with the 
retention of controls, thwarted the advance of 
Keynesianism, making a nonsense of Paul Addison's facile 
presentation of war as the accelerator of ideological 
change. It was only with the inflation and balance of 
payments difficulties of Spring-Autumn 1947 that the 
Treasury belatedly applied Keynesian remedies 
significantly to choke off excess demand as inflation 
threatened - and against Dalton's better judgement - that 
the last obstacles were finally removed.
Two conclusions suggested themselves to Booth. The 
offical adoption of Keynesianism was "scarcely 
revolutionary", an uneven and protracted process spread 
out over more than ten years, and still not complete even 
then. As to the evolution of Keynes's own thinking, his 
pre-war prognostications had not been his last pertinent 
thoughts, nor was he closed to new initiatives - both 
claims made by Hutchison. Lining Keynes up against the 
Keynesians fell down, leaving economic historians in need 
of a better framework of explanation. That said, the 
wartime experience of economists in government was wholly 
beneficial - freshness and originality came from 
outsiders who did not think like civil servants; 
economists in return gained a sense of professional unity 
and of the demands of policy that was to serve them well 
after 1945(730).
Aimed at Hutchison, Booth's paper also had in its 
sights Tomlinson's dismissal of the 'revolution' that
730 A.Booth, 'Economists in Government 1939-45', 
SSRC Newsletter 50, November 1983, pp.21-23.
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never was(731). Tomlinson had confined his 
interpretation of Keynesianism to its central concern 
with the inter-war problem of unemployment, picking up 
where Matthews had left off in 1963 by referring to the 
budget surpluses that were run up immediately after the 
war, and going on to make the broader point that, for at 
least the next decade, budgetary policy had never been 
subordinated to the goal of securing high employment.
The buoyancy of the international economy enabled 
governments to advocate and indeed seem to attain full 
employment without actually having the means to do so.
The essential "cutting edge" of Keynesianism - deficit 
financing to counter unemployment - was at no time put 
into effect. Governments did learn to manage budgets, 
but this was to contest elections, not to maintain 
employment levels. The Treasury captured Keynesian 
doctrines by turning them over to the pursuit of the more 
traditional aims of controlling rising prices and public 
expenditure. When governments did eventually reflate, in 
the 1970s, they were blocked by the unwillingness of the 
markets to finance government borrowing. This was not to 
deny that a revolution on the theoretical side took 
place, which influenced the language of political debate. 
But other historical developments that had nothing to do 
with economic theory, such as the growth of the public 
sector, were of far greater importance. The changes had 
to be conceived of in terms of the institutional 
environment of policy-making - in modern parlance, the 
essentials of public policy - emphasising the 
bureaucratic and interest group entanglements, a 
dimension which Tomlinson said Booth had made only scant 
reference to. The Keynesian fallacy - that ideas alone 
determine events - was exposed.
731 J.Tomlinson, 'Why was there never a "Keynesian 
Revolution” in economic policy?', Economy and Society, 10
1981, pp.73-87.
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Booth, in a rejoinder(732), argued that Tomlinson's 
doggedly-maintained thesis was entirely without 
foundation. Confining the notion of Keynesianism to the 
blunt "deficit test" ignored its wider reach extending to 
control of aggregate demand across the whole economy. 
Matthews, anyway, had assigned a role to the influence of 
government in acting upon business expectations after 
1945, even if it was a more modest one than others had 
presumed. Bringing in related historical developments 
tending in the direction of bigger government might be 
rewarding, but there was no end to it. To contend - in 
short - that there was no 'Keynesian revolution' at all 
was to fly in the face of the huge volume of received 
scholarly opinion, both 'pro' and 'anti'. Most observers 
had, to be sure, tended to take Keynesianism in a wider, 
macroeconomic sense, the largeness of its impact in turn 
prompting an argument about where to pin the 
responsibility for contemporary economic distress. On 
the other hand, Tomlinson's apprehensions about the 
driving force of economic theory or the capacity of 
governments to have any substantial effect on economic 
activity was in tune with the lowered popular 
expectations in government — and of the low public and 
self-esteem of economists — in the 1980s. The historian 
who feels that all others are engaging in elaborate 
mythologising is not to be lightly swayed. The 
respective starting-points of Booth and Tomlinson were at 
such variance that, even with the onrush of their follow- 
up works and later literature(733), the parameters of the 
debate were so constructed as to make the achievement of
732 A.Booth, 'Defining a "Keynesian Revolution"', 
The Economic History Review, 38 1984, pp.263-267.
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"near agreement", conveyed to at least one 
reviewer(735), was deceiving. Only by widening the 
discussion to include a wider range of documentary (non- 
Treasury) evidence and other disciplinary approaches 
could progress be made.
The more eye-catching argument of Tomlinson did take 
some of the sparkle off Booth's otherwise bold rewriting 
of the Keynesian past, especially with his reminder of 
the economic planning of the Attlee governments at the 
outset of its first term of office. Ben Pimlott's prize- 
winning biography of Hugh Dalton went even further in 
rescuing the brief 1945—47 period of Dalton's tenure as 
Chancellor, now coming under heavy fire again(736). 
Pimlott had begun work in 1977, and was then invited to 
edit his unpublished diaries. The latter, which Dalton 
used in Pimlott's view as an outlet for emotional 
release(737), enabled him to go beyond the 
conventional biographical account, filling the political 
history of the public Dalton with psychological insight. 
Many of the best Daltonian passages had already been 
drawn on elsewhere, and there was no point, as Pimlott 
saw things, in reproducing those sections of the diaries 
which Dalton had liberally quoted in his own memoirs. 
Nevertheless, the controversy over the Keynesian 
revolution gave what Pimlott had to say an added 
interest.
734 S.Newton, "The Keynesian revolution debate:
time for a new approach?', in A.Gorst, L.Johnman and
W.S.Lucas, Contemporary British History 1931-61 (1991).
735 T.Hart, "A century of managed economies', The
Times Higher Education Supplement, 11 May 1990, p.32.
736 B.Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (1935).
737 B.Pimlott, 'Hugh Dalton's diaries'. The
Listener, 17 July 1980, pp.72-73.
It was Dalton, more than anyone else, who after the 
debacle of 1931 stimulated the Labour party’s 
intellectual rebirth, aligned its policies with 
Whitehall, and saw them through to enactment once in 
government. The war had, Pimlott wrote on the 40th 
anniversary of the 1945 victory, reshaped much of the 
party’s pre-war thinking. Mutual dislike between Keynes 
and Dalton delayed the taking up of Keynes’s ideas. The 
1945 manifesto, furthermore, had only been drafted in the 
vaguest of terms, and with little expectation of outright 
victory. The fleeting opening two years were those when 
the government was under the severest external pressure, 
but they were also, coinciding with Dalton’s time in high 
office, the years of maximum impact, more so perhaps than 
even Dalton realised. He it was who also found the money 
and constructed the necessary financial policies to 
support welfare reform and the location of industry, and 
was indeed willing to "pay almost any price", in spite of 
the institutional forces ranged against him. Of course, 
this had called for a degree of blind faith, for which he
was much criticised. But Dalton’s aims were quite at
odds with the apparently "objective", technical 
complaints of academic economists , or - a little while 
afterwards - of Gardner. "In the immediate aftermath of 
the war", Pimlott explained:
"the instincts of Webbian socialists and non­
socialist Keynesians were often sharply in
conflict, despite agreement on the need for
government action to maintain full employment.
Where socialists preferred a state-controlled 
economy to the market as a matter of principle, 
Keynesians longed for a return to the market 
and the abandonment of controls; where Dalton 
saw physical controls as a tool for reducing 
inequality, many Keynesians regarded the 
pursuit of greater equality for its own sake
as a distraction from the main purpose of
pursuing prosperity"(738}.
For a period, then, the economy was relatively 
tightly controlled. As Worswick has confirmed, little 
thought had been given to their dismantling in the 
Economic Section(73S); Jay (one of the few in a position 
to know) indicated that there was even a stepping up of 
controls{740). Similarly with Keynes's optimistic 
hopes for the creation of a new world economic order, 
hopes which Dalton did not share. Dalton was ready to 
accept Bretton Woods "for the sake of domestic reform". 
Agreement was given to the risky terms of the American 
loan as a way of buying time for a radical programme 
"that could not have been achieved without it". The 
choices may not have been quite as stark as Keynes 
presented them. But the immediate advantages overrode 
the long-term drawbacks. By concentrating primarily on 
domestic priorities, the Atlantic orientation of British 
policy was made almost without thinking, and was 
certainly not a caving in to American demands. It would 
have made no sense to jeopardise everything in a stand-up 
confrontation.
This was not a picture of the onward march of 
consensus. The very, fact that Dalton was so vilified was 
an indication, to Pimlott, that no Keynesian middle way 
was then taking shape. Labour at that time had been at 
the forefront of a tide of progressive opinion, a party 
of ideas and not just of class, when "Labourish" beliefs 
were the common sense of the epoch. Beveridge, Dalton
738 B.Pimlott, ibid (1985), p.473.
739 G.D.N.Worswick, 'Advised by experts', The 
L o r> d o n R e t' i e w a f E o o k s , 21 Dec emb e r 1889, p . i5 .
740 D.Jay, 'Dalton: the prophet of recovery’, The 
Sunday Times, 17 March 1985, p.44.
had told supporters, was not “one of us". Name me a more 
"socialist Chancellor", Pimlott demanded at the end of 
it. He added one final twist in suggesting, after 
exhaustively examining the proof, that come the budget 
leak in 1947, tiring of Dalton’s continual scheming, had 
wanted to be rid of him.
The Fabian-Keynesian dispute was given a final 
airing in Elizabeth Durbin's New Jerusalems(741), a work 
of filial devotion and an "intellectual homecoming", a 
group portrait of her father (who had died in a bathing 
accident in 1948) and the other 'New Fabians' of pre-war 
who had "filled out an effective programme for socialist 
action", pointing the way forward to 1945. Retracing 
their steps in Oxford, Cambridge and London, and 
detailing the work of party and other research committees 
on which they were active, she provided by far the 
fullest account of the groundwork that, hidden from 
public view, lay behind the legislative success after the 
war. The keynote was calculus, not ideology, a balancing 
of the market and the state, overlapping at times with 
the evolutionary proposals of Keynes, but ultimately as 
distinct from liberal Keynesianism as it was from the 
alarmist thinking of Hayek. A Keynesian approach by 
itself would not be enough - this was what made them, in 
Meade's distancing terms, "real socialists", intent on 
replacing, and not Just modifying the economic system.
By bringing out the superficial similarities and the more 
fundamental differences(742), the economic rationale for 
post-war revisionism, a task Evan Durbin had begun but 
never finished, was clearly asserted. In the author's 
formula, "socialism was about Justice, the economy was
about efficiency, and planning was the way to get 
both"(743). Comparison of the 1930s with the eighties 
was chastening to her. The group effort that the New 
Fabians invested was largely selfless and unseen, "a last 
great flowering” of intellectual concern and social 
commitment. Over the intervening period, however, their 
faith in the power of rational scientific progress and 
enlightened government had been lest, the emotional basis 
of the Fabian outlook mercilessly attacked, the whole 
Fabian enterprise condemned (by one former New Fabian who 
had long since turned towards economic liberalism) for 
its naive, vacuous duplicity(744).
Apprised of the fact that the Keynesian framework of 
post-war political economy - with its assurance of a 
confidence-building command of economic science - had 
broken down, the 1980s saw the completion of a number of 
ambitious, long-range pull-togethers, juggling at 
considerable length (as against the summary diatribes 
from some of the New Left and New Right) with the 
relative contribution made by individuals, ideas and 
institutions to the making and unmaking of modern 
Britain. Middlemas's first volume in a projected trilogy 
(1986) was only one such work, but it was the one which 
made roost of the economic component of the political 
contract which helped to comprise "the post-war 
settlement"(745). Uniting politics with economics, 
Middlemas advanced a moderate but avowedly "systematic 
explanation" that could stand comparison with the schools 
of neo-liberalism and marxism.
743 E.Durbin, 'Fabian Socialism and Economic 
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Profiting from the Qotsffionts nmde gbout his Politics 
in I ridustr ial Society, Middlemas was also struck by the 
far more heated nature of the contemporary political 
argument. It might not be the best time to attempt such 
an essay - but with the rush to judgement in other 
disciplines, he believed an historical account to be at 
least as justified. To carry conviction he had first to 
demonstrate that the settlement had been an historical 
reality, an observable feature "arising out of the 
[historical] material itself". One way to authenticate 
it was to tap the historic memory of the politicians and 
administrators who had devised it and "invested their 
intellectual and moral capital in making it work". It 
was by relying on this testimony that Middlemas was able 
to discard the liberal narrative of evolutionary 
improvement with which post-war history had been 
typically written up, but which the participants at the 
time had had no inkling of. The settlement, he came to 
see, had been formed out of a set of conflicting 
departmental and sectional interests thrown together by 
the extension of the machinery of state regulation in 
wartime, born of the war emergency rather than through 
any notion of "moral progress". These competing 
interests, primarily industry, the unions and finance, by 
being drawn into the discussion about the post-war 
future, thereby carried their differences into the very 
heart of government. Balance was achieved by an 
unwritten understanding of the rewards and the reciprocal 
duties which went with this Incorporation - the 
centrepiece of this package of ideas being the guarantee 
to maintain a high and stable level of employment. By 
this means it was hoped to prolong the agreement after 
war's end, furthering the attainment of political 
stability, economic reconstruction and social 
improvement. Informal rather than statist, the terms of 
the accord not only marked a clean break with the past
but also entrenched industry and the unions as "organic" 
parts of government. The crucial point about the quasi- 
corporatist alliance, however, was that forging an 
arrangement of interdependent collaboration meant evading 
any contentious issues (monopoly, wage restraint) which 
would have made agreement impossible. All of the various 
sectional interests had made a sacrifice in wartime, and 
were not to be denied. The 1S44 Employment White Paper 
was an agreed political document struck in an atmosphere 
of genuine enthusiasm and as an expression of the higher 
national interest; but it did nothing to resolve 
conflicts of ethos, outlook and even ideology. Thus it 
was that the post-war shape of the economy was "tailored 
to the exisiting mentalities and practices of industry 
and labour", imparting to the Attlee administration "a 
dangerous ambiguity".
Labour's success after 1945 stemmed from its being 
able to bridge the gap between pre-war strategy and the 
country's post-war dilemmas, giving to the new 
administrative pattern the Labourite character of public 
ownership and indicative planning, while staying within 
the spirit of the wartime understanding. Part of the way 
the electoral mandate was interpreted was that the 
party's leaders would not tolerate any form of command 
economy. Government could try to persuade and induce, 
but it could not coerce. Middlemas was certain that the 
settlement embodied a hegemonistic idea, kept in being by 
far more than rising living standards. Even in the early 
1950s, with the return of the Conservatives, there were 
no outbreaks of outright opposition to the relationship 
of mutual competition which had grown up. In time, 
however, many of the safeguards of 1944 were impaired 
and, when economic difficulties ensued, capital and 
labour were pulled apart, leaving the government with no 
way of re-^imposing co-operation. Economic management 
became intertwined with electoral calculation, to civil
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service dismay. The main producer groups, slow -ho change 
their ways but still invested with a negative power, 
reached bargains that were often unenforceable, even 
renegotiable. By the end of the decade, the wartime 
tripartite mechanism was wearing out, the wartime 
mandarins who had had a hand in designing it were passing 
on, and political debate was increasingly coloured by new 
forms of ideological dissent. Central to this 
"substratum of hostility" (though still only a minority 
view on the left and right which had never quite been 
killed off) was the belief that the eorporatist system 
itself was at fault, and that it had only worked to start 
with through the elimination of organised self-interest 
brought on by the wartime external threat. To this 
extent, the politial settlement had outlived its 
political context, and the physical presence of its 
authors, so that the buried questions of the past - 
concerning the role and degree of state activity - 
resurfaced with the re-appearance of fundamental 
anatagonisms.
It was reasonable to ask how little and how much of 
the Keynesian-inspired history Middlemas left standing. 
Disliking loose talk of 'Keynesian social democracy', 
whose meaning he found hard to discern, Middlemas thought 
of the post-war settlement less in terms of ideas and 
assumptions and more by way of an organisational 
principle or administrative logic which took on a life of 
its own. In place of widening prosperity and security, 
he described instead a tale of mounting, predicaments. 
Although unsympathetic to their message, he nevertheless 
offered a structural analysis as to why it was that the 
older ideologies of class and interest came to enjoy a 
new lease of life. The once-dominant Keynesian 
historiography had gone and Middlemas, Marquand reported,
383
had done more than any other scholar to demolish 
it(746). All that remained was a "cacophony" - 
vigorous, enlivening, indiscriminating in its plundering 
of the past for ahistorical ends, but as yet unresolved.
But the Middlemas method of blending narrative and 
model did raise eyebrows. Many thought his approach 
frankly unbelievable, a shaky theory spoiled further by 
the realisation that the 400 pages of closely argued text 
were not error-free(747). Was post-war Britain 
actually "quasi-corporatist", or was the corporatist 
concept simply a useful but only partial analytical 
device? Middlemas said that he went out and had found it 
to be so, something which others, had they been so 
inclined, would have uncovered too(748). It cannot be 
held that his account derived exclusively or even mainly 
from the official archives, which he drew on far less 
than expected. His special source was elite interviewing 
of the administrative and political class of the forties, 
the prevalent attitudes of the Keynesian-Beveridgean 
mandarinate dependably reproduced. For all his 
allusiveness, this also smacked of the old consensual 
history by another name. Many retired officials had 
become disillusioned later in life by the way things 
turned out(749), but this did not absolve them from all
746 D.Marquand, 'Exit Left in Loud Disarray", The
Times Higher Education Supplement, 15 June 1990, p.18.
747 J.Turner, 'Acronymous relations", The Times 
Literary Supplement, 12 October 1990, p'. 3.
748 See the interview with Middlemas in
Contemporary Re c o r d, Winter 1991, pp.519-541 and his
review of Greenleaf in History} June 1990, pp.359-361.
749 P.Hennessy and D.Hague, Hoi'j Adolf Hi 4- 7C a. u.“ /
Reformed Whitehall (1985), p.48; see also E.Plovden, dr?
I Tl du s t r J. <:ilist in the Treasury (1989 >, A.Ciairn cross and
N .Watts, The Economic Section? a - > > rf \/ ..l ^ f i. n e c o n o m i c
ado i s in g (1989) and A.Cairnoross (ed). The Robert Hall
D i a r i e s } Vol 1 1947-1953 (1989).
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blame. To New Rightists, scornful of the bureaucratic 
urge to control, they ought by now to have known better. 
The New Left had no time for the Fabian ideal of a 
expert, patrician but basically undemocratic 
clerisy(750). On balance, as one patrician expositor 
(who knew everybody) could conclude, it was right to say 
that the representatives of Our Age owed their 
contemporaries an apology(751). It was not just because 
of Middlemas's touching rendition of wartime and post-war 
values, which had since gone out of fashion. That kind 
of outlook was now held - with the full force of 
hindsight - to be morally and intellectually 
indefensible.
Theory choice
The exchange of arguments about the impact and 
legacy of John Maynard Keynes and of Keynesian ideas 
marked an important stage in the development of economic 
science, conceived from the point of view of historical 
economics.
On a number of counts, understanding was heightened. 
New archival sources made it easier to pin down the 
individual attitudes of Keynes and other economists and 
advisers at particular points in time, even if 
fluctuations in opinion made it harder to make sense of 
what was going on. The meaning that could be attributed 
to the 'Keynesian revolution', with its associated 
assumption of the power of ideas to influence policy, was 
carefully explored, the lack of agreed definitional terms 
requiring scholars to go to great lengths to clarify 
their interpretation of the concept and even causing some
750 B.Schwarts, 'Conservatives and Corporatism',
The New Left Review, Novernber-Decernber 1987, pp. 107-128.
751 N. Annan, Our /Ige •- portrait of a generation
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to argue that it should be abandoned altogether. And the 
events of the 1970s forced a revision of existing 
attitudes about the ability and willingness of 
governments to effect changes in the economy, which 
inevitably reflected back on to the war and post-war 
years, altering the perspective but compounding the 
uncertainty. The total effect of these advances was to 
encourage the replacement of a simplistic with a more 
involved and complicated historical account which, by 
expanding the particulars, compelled a greater regard for 
what could and could not be firmly established.
But this is to seek out slender agreement in a world 
of fundamental difference. New sources did come to 
light, only to be evaluated according to preconceived 
positions. The concept of a Keynesian revolution was 
taken apart and reconstructed, but mainly in order to 
highlight and extend the grounds for disagreement. New 
views of the economic past, claiming to free the 
discussion from a dominant ideological orthodoxy, 
reintroduced new, all-knowing strains of dogma.
'Keynesian' history was challenged, but it was as if all 
of the main schools - Keynesian, free market liberal and 
marxist - were seated at separate tables, debating the 
same or a similar range of issues within their own 
frameworks(752).
In part, this academic discord can be said to have 
had a sociological basis in the professional organisation 
of academic economics in the post-war period. The 
participation of many economists in wartime government, 
the apparently successful management of the economy 
immediately after the war, and the expansion of economics 
teaching in the universities, all fostered a belief in
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the confident, problem-solving ability of economic 
understanding applied to matters of practical policy.
More recent economic troubles cast doubt on this earlier 
faith, which, critics argued, was built upon a dangerous 
over-estimation of intellectual capacity. 'Primitivist* 
pre-war ideas and outlooks which had been driven out now 
began to flourish once more, bringing the discussion full 
circle. The extent of disciplinary agreement and 
disagreement had to do, in other words, with the special 
circumstances of economists and economics in the period 
after 1945.
An economic positivist will maintain that the 
proliferation of schools need be no bar to the 
elucidation of factual assertions about economics, the 
study of which is essentially about organising knowledge. 
Different accounts and explanations can therefore be made 
consistent in so far as they are subject to the 
arbitration of the available evidence. But if, instead, 
one thinks of the main schools as alternative, 
internalised and exclusive 'ways of seeing* the economic 
aspects of reality, testing by reference to an objective 
realm of facts is ruled out. An approach is not, in this 
case, assessed against an empirical backdrop; rather 
there is a contest between one approach and several 
others, which economists do not have the tie-breaking, 
purely economic criteria to decide between(753). 
Subjective influences can be minimised, but the effects 
of fashion, value-preference and unexamined prejudice can 
never be eliminated entirely. In so saying, economics is 
bereft of the methodological means which alone can be 
said to confer scientific authority.
753 M.Blaug, in the introduction to Economic 
Theories: True or False? Essays in the History and
11 eth o d o 1 o g y o f E c o n o m i c s (1990).
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Mr Attlee's Britain
In the comparatively short space of two-and-a-half* ^ ? 
years, taking us up to the middle of 1985, devotees of*- * ’
contemporary history were supplied with a quintet"of1
-J
indispensable - and complementary - accounts and analyses 
of the Attlee governments which they had been so ' - ^
conspicuously lacking. Major Attlee made a remarkable^^ 
comeback, the 'age of austerity' was bathed in - a *v' 
revivalist glow, - and the immediate, eventful5 post—1945^**^^* 
period at last got the histories it deserved;In^tjtrrst^" 
of sustained critical appreciation and cross-reviewing,' ^  ^"
the new works were evaluated for their comprehensiveness/ ’* - 
accuracy and fairness in a way that only a■-fuHy^formed’ ■ 
historical judgement - though historians were 'Stdld^  - ;
troubled by demands for scientific ri gour andAsocial* ^ - v ’ - 
relevance - could bring. Political history had’
"returned"(754).
Primari ly, the newly opened government ^ arch ives-?*-*^  
taken together with a careful combing of other private ^ 
manuscripts and the interviewing ^ of eminent survivors; ^  
yielded more than enough of the right sort of recorded - ^ 
material to allow for all-in-one, richly sourced accounts 
displaying chronological and factual solidity. In the ** 
first full year of the Public Record Office papers X1977—* 
78), the rate of documentary requests fthough not of 5
readers) jumped sharply(755), and, notwithstanding- the ’- - 
shortcomings of the public records, thos e who 'had* opted ' 
to wait upon their release were confirmed- in their ^  
decision. The play of personality andthe evolution
754 D.Kavanagh, 'Why Political Science Needs : 
History'? Political Studies, Vol ’39’ 1991, p. 487.-
755 PRO Readers Bulletin; No 1 1988, p:i.
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policy -turned out on inspection to always be much'more- y 
convoluted. Actions seen from the inside made more sense 
that had outwardly appeared. Known consequences had* to 
be measured against*official - and unofficial — 
intentions. Most of all, the turbulent shakeupof * 
Britain's domestic economy and social structure had-1-been 
tied by -all- kinds of inter-relationships to the1 much*-**■-» 
wider remedying of the post-war European and international 
order. The breadth and depth of the new findings were* 
such that it ceased to be reasonable, or advisable; to 
talk about Attlee's Britain-in the comparatively 
uninformed, pre-archival terms. There was still-room for 
argument. But disputes- could now be settled by1 appeal?to- 
a documented record of demonstrable information that held^ 
good for every type of persuasion. "
Side-by-side with this went a keen sense of 
disciplinary efficacy. History was often charged-witlr>'~ * 
being little more than the- privileged epinion^of?*^ ' 
historians, whose values and beliefs needed - - ' T 
deconstructing; for this purpose, one groundless version ‘ 
of the past was as good as -any other; • Alternatively^ it<-: 
was regarded as an accessible -body of' material* for- ^ * ^
generat ing and testing hypotheses and- generalisaticnsy^in * * 
the continuing * quest for'daw^ 1 ike certainty.- - Modern ^  ' * 
political historians> in attempting to show the currents 
worth of history as a systematic object of^study-with* am*??*' 
identifiable subject-matter and recognisable methods r had* ?*• 
to guard against both the 'new' historians who -renounce1 
the possibi 1 ity of any real knowledge of the past and* the ^  
theorists who presume to know more than they really do * 
know. This called for an emphasis on the particular and - 
the contingent, and on the openness of all historical^  ^
situations. History was a discipline - not an’ ideology 
or a science.
Both these elements contributed to what was the most
389
audacious claim attaching to the new range of ^ studies • of ^v 
the Attlee Tyears - that they represented a powerful and* " 
mutually reinforcing thrust in the direction of a more 
disinterested view of an only just recent past, an 
exploit which even many mainstream historians were highly 
sceptical about. The matter of 1945 had been the subject 
of heightened contention since the early 1970s, ^
undermining the customary accounts of liberal-left 
advance. The authors of the latest works were never • 
unjudging. But they had the advantage of being able to r 
approach early postwar in its own time and on its own 
terms - in its full historical context - which allowed - 
them to stop the clock before it ran on into the* for  ^
many, apocalyptic succeeding period.
Good old Clem
The authorised and overdue tribute to Clement % 
Attlee, which went on sale on the eve of the centenary* 
year of his birth, was the first book-length work to ^ 
utilise^the plentiful official files, including from the" 
PREM class, which - by 1982 - covered the whole of his * 
premiership(756). Although lacking in footnotes  ^ *•
(which were only added for the paperback edition) and > 
heavily edited, without drawing on Transport House; ' '
-Harris,-as befitted The Observer's star "interviewer, put  ^
to good use a number of private conversations he had had ' 
with Attlee in the years from 1958 to 1967. Further to ~ 
this, Attlee's regular and less guarded letters to his * 
brother provided important insights; The biography^both 
marked, and helped towards* the upward valuation of; ; '
Attlee's standing.
Attlee was lauded for having made "the best of an - 
impossible situation" - that had been the essence of his"
756 K.Harris, Attlee (1982).
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leadership in government. Only he could have held the 
colliding egos of ambitious colleagues together. Knowing 
when to temporise, he could also act with unflinching - 
firmness. The country fatally weakened by war, he 
nevertheless was able to ensure that his administration 
had an impact on Britain and the world that no other 
twentieth-century administration could match. His 
primary concerns, Harris saw Attlee as having seen it, 
were international ahead of domestic ones - the 
"momentous" decision to quit India, when Attlee really" 
came into his own, offset by the failure over Palestine; 
Without a Foreign Affairs or Commonwealth committee of 
the Cabinet, Attlee and Bevin kept in the closest of 
touch, neither moving without first securing the support 
of the other. Attlee, much earlier and more resolutely 
anti-Soviet than*his Foreign Secretary, had been - in one 
chapter heading - *the real "Cold Warrior". But Harris *  ^
was happy to repeat the well-worn story of Attlee's • 
flight to see Truman in 1950, long since-questioned. ’His ;^ 
statesmanly handling of the sea of troubles with which 
they were engulfed was evidence to - Harris that Attlee —  - 
grew with high office. Consistently more popular than 
the government or party he * led, his hold -only began to **■ 
slip in 1949, when Bevan first began pushing his claims 
The Bevanite arguments cast a shadow oven these later* r 
years. Attlee's reputation, as such, had been wrongly 
tarnished by incidents which had occurred after leaving 
office and were no part of the main story. In the 
context of his time and of the course of events, Attlee 
proved himself to be of the highest calibre.
The assessment, and not just the content, was the 
most notable feature of Harris's summing up, in a book 
which otherwise contained few novelties: v Attlee, 
'accidental' prime minister that he was, fitted to ! 
perfection. His modest ordinariness, picked out by »
Burridge in a second run around the course(757), was. 
his chief asset. The country, retired civil servants ' 
informed Harris,~ had never been so well governed. No-one -1 
else could have effected such immense changes with so ? 
little alarm. Harris ran out of superlatives. In an 
already congested biographical, field, Attlee - just as he 
had at the time - outshone them all.
Harris did not solve the enigma of Attlee(758), 
attributing his commanding presence(759) to the ■ *
delivery of a series of we11-chosen formulae (many of 
them included in an appendix). Hennessy-and Arends,- 
taking the Harris biography as their starting-point, and 
dipping into the large official archive, grasped the 
importance of his harnessing of the Cabinet committee 
structure(760). Aside from foreign affairs, where 
Attlee and Bevin “did the job themselves", Attlee had * *
touched on many other key areas of government activity *— ^
economic policy (especially from 1947 on), the atomic- 
programme, and the managing of labour disputes. The 1949 + 
Defence Review also for the first time saw the light of 
day. The colossal range and workload of the committee - 
network gave an indication not just of what the Attlee
757 T.Burridge, Clement Attlees A 'Political* 
Biography (1985), in which the author- argued that the 
mystery about the commonplace Attlee was that there was 
no mystery.
758 R. Jenkins, 1 The unknowable -Prime Minister-*,* The 
Observer, 26 September 1982, p. 28.
759 “The recent publication — under the -thirty- 
year rule for disclosure of Cabinet documents —  -of* the 
Cabinet Conclusions for 1946, has led commentators 5-to- 
express surprise at Attlee's domination of the
proceedings. The writer did not enter the Cabinet until'* 
1947, but if 1946 was like 1947 and the succeeding years 
it is not at all surprising": H.Wilsont A * Pnime Minister 
on Prime Min isters (1977), p.291.
760 P.Hennessy and A. Arends, Mr ■ ■* Attlee's Engine 
Rooms Cabinet committee structure and the Labour
government 1945-51 (Strathclyde paper, 1983).
governments did, but of how - in administrative terms-'- " -
it was all done. Their view was that, in line with the
upward revaluation of the undemonstrative Attlee, and r 
with the mass of supporting detail now being made 
available, "Attlee looks better with every passing year’-. 
The booklet bordered on the reverential, and this despite 
the "old Buffer" being no fan of open government.
The rehabilitation of Clem was thus ensured. Harris 
concurred in Attlee's own high opinion of himself. ^
Whatever view one took of its overall achievements (and 
the serious questions, Campbell felt, still had to be 
addressed(761)), it was - Harris explained in a radio
symposium( 762) - undeniable "-that- the period had been - -
one of huge significance. So much was carried out in the- 
most arduous of conditions, and was only just coming to 
be fully appreciated. And in that reapppraisal, Attlee's 
role, whether in co-ordinating or delegating, had been ^  '
crucial — the 'little' man in a 'big' government, radical- 
change brought about by a cautious, even c o n s e r v a t i v e ^  
leader (Jenkins recalled a similar contradiction with 
Asquith), the legacy inseparable from thd man. "In 1000  ^
years time when we are all dust", M.R.D. Foot commentedi' 
Attlee's name rather than Churchill's is the English one 6 
that may yet shine out of the muck of the mid-twentieth 
century"(763).
Harris's point was made for him by others also ready 
to subscribe to Attlee's upgrading, their memories of 
postwar overlain with a modern gloss. Attle's abilities - 
and achievements had - rightly - to be regarded as epoch- '
761 J.Campbell, 'Subscription Manager for 
Socialism', HistoryToday, January 1983, p.53.
762 'Everybody's Politician', led by Edmund Ions, 2 
January 1983.
763 M. R. D. Foot, review - in■ Books and Bookmen / 
January 1983, p.3.
making. But this was because the politics and language 
of "the 1945 Socialists" (the phrase is from Macmillan’s 
biographer) were all too easy to forget. "The Labour 
party's legislation of 1945-51 was drastic and far- 
reaching", Lord Blake considered:
"One does not need to read Kenneth 
Harris's excellent biography of Attlee to be 
reminded of how strongly socialistic it was.
Yet for nearly a quarter of a century that vast *
extension of etat isme was regarded as semi- 
sacrosanct, even by the Conservatives who were 
in office for most of the time. This is not 
true today"(764).
Jo Grimond, invited to review Harris for The Sunday 
Telegraph, was the most outspoken of all. Though 
Attlee's reputation as the very model of an 'English' *< 
Prime Minister was secure, and his record in dealing with 
the main issues of the transition from war to peace was 1 
creditable, he had left behind him one damnable 
inheritance - the extension of state socialism through - 
the nationalised industries and the welfare state; which 
had made the economy unmanageable and killed off the ^ 
possibility of economic expansion. Those policies were; 
Grimond conceded, hugely popular at the time,* and Attlee 
and his colleagues had neither the imagination nor the 
interest to think up new forms of economic and social 
organisation. To this extent, they and the party leaders 
that followed remained prisoners of the past, a decline 
inherent in all parties of the left. As with so many 
other parallel historical situations, great though 
Attlee's accomplishments were in their day, they had led 
on to ultimate failure, even disaster. The aftermath was
764 R.-Blake, 'Disraeli's descendants', The
Guardian, 4 October 1982, p.7.
everything(765).
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The Mighty Bevin
Only Bevin - the centenary of his birth also 
recently celebrated - stood higher. Some even complained 
of a personality cult(766). Alan Bullock’s third and 
final volume, sixteen years after the second, did little 
to dispel such a notion(767). Bullock had chosen to 
delay publication so as to consult and incorporate the  ^
voluminous State papers, British as well as American. In 
Bevin, he believed-, life and times were as one —  ^ the— ^  
1940s he labelled "the decade of decisions" (7*68) in 
fofeign policy, which the country had been 1iving off ' ■ 
ever since; Bevin he took to be the principal architect. !
Aged thirty when Bevin became Foreign Secretary, ** 
Bullock had also had ample opportunity to watch the 
historical perspective "slowly change< and display new *< 
facets", especially in more recent y e a r s , o. development'^ 
which he had found both instructive and engrossing. « 
Revisionist historians in the United States had breathed j 
new life into the left-wing case against Bevin/ whichr 
British-based scholars like Avi Schlaim and Bill Jones ~ i 
showing how far Attlee and Bevin had grown apart*from 
Russophile colleagues while the war was on(769) — had
765 J.Grimond, 'Attlee: what did he really
achieve?’, The Sun day Telegraph, *2 January 1983, p.11.
766 M. L. Dockrill, review * in * 7/ie - Royal United
Services Institute JournaIimMo.rch 1985, pp.80-81. ' -
767 A.Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 
1945-1951 (1983).
768 A comment made in Peter Hennessy’s 'The Great 
and the Good’ radio broadcast, 21 September 1985.
769 A.Schlaim, 'Ernest Bevin’, in British Foreign
Secretaries Since 1945, A.Schlaim et al (eds)(1977),
pp.27-69; B.Jones, The Russia Complex (1977).
done something to obstruct. Paradoxically, as Rothwell 
put it, "the literature on Bevin's left-wing critics- 
within his party has been in inverse ratio to the effect - 
which those critics had on his conduct of foreign 
policy"(770). A subsidiary dine of attack exploited 
the highly charged issue of the Labour government's 
policy in Palestine. But there were also questions being 
asked about the cool reaction to the Schuman plan and the 
early moves in favour of European integration, which had  ^
not worn well. Last of all were developing criticisms; 
emerging from neo-conservative circles, blasting Attlee • 
and Bevin for entering into a whole range of ill-advised- 
domestic and external commitments which were, looking - •
back, politically and economically unsustainable. A 
'select' bibliography of books, monographs and articles ! 
on immediate post-war international relations ran to more 
than 150 items, in a field that was large and still 
growing.
Bullock cut a path through the documentary tangle-by 
pointing up the chaos of muddle, accident and' 
unpredictability that govern all human affairs.
Contemporary history to him was a matter of being'trained- •*- 
in the right habits, avoiding conjecture and ' 
concentrating on those political or diplomatic events' '*r *
where individual choices and decisions had made a 
discernible difference. This was not to skim over the 
surface of events, as the 'quantifiers' of history were 
inclined to assert. With Bevin, he had to take on the 
most demanding of assignments: conveying complexity with 
clarity. Some sense of order might then emerge out of 
"the unstructured world of experience". It was this 
humanistic approach which Bullock hoped would disarm~
Bevin's foes. "The Labour party still cannot take
770 V. Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941— 47 
(1982), p.228.
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Ernie", he confessed(771).
Bevin had never expected to hold the post of Foreign 
Secretary- But he was not without expertise. Along with 
Attlee, he had dealt with many international problems in 
the wartime coalition. Bevin was very far from being the 
one-man band people were accustomed to think of. Once in 
office, however, he was given a remarkably free hand by 
Attlee. Only the Indian sub-continent fell outside his 
responsibilities. Allied to this was his involvement 
ranging over the whole field of government policy — -
manpower, wages, planning. Bevin did not, Bullock was -•* 
keen to stress, enter the Foreign Office with any 
preconceived ideas about future conduct, tie believed; as- 
did all his colleagues, that Britain's international < and - ! 
economic difficulties were only temporary and that she--' 
was still a "great power", and he acted upon this basis.' 
The immensity of his task only gradually d.awned on him. * 
His greatest fear to begin with was that the United - 
States and the Soviet Union might forge a separate peace, • 
over his head. There was no thought at this time of a - ■ s 
close Atlantic alliance; for which neither side was r
prepared. It was also apparent how late on Bevin was 
willing to entertain hopes of an understanding with the - 
Russians, despite the mutual distrust.
"-'"On this point the fiercest opposition arose from 
sections of his own party. Bullock pointed out that it * 
was Attlee - by proposing in the Spring of 1946 a British 
disengagement from the entire Mediterranean and Middle 
East, against the wishes of Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff 
- who presented the stiffest challenge to Bevin's initial 
position. Within a few months of this, UK and US views - 
were already beginning to move closer, though there was 
nothing certain about such a rapprochment. “ Having held^
771 P.Hennessy, 'Timely reminder of a bulldog 
presence', The Times, 1 November 1983, p.3.
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the line until American opinion swung round; Britain was 
only then able to relinquish some of its overseas 
responsibilities.
This opening phase, when Bevin was often at a loss 
as to what to do next, overwhelmed by Palestine(772), 
frustrated in his Middle Eastern designs(773), and 
when, had he stopped there, he would have been considered 
a failure, was all too easily merged with the later 
phase, from 1947-48 onwards, and the hardening of East- 
West conflict. Hence the two Bevins. Bullock even dated 
the turning-point with some accuracy to the moment, in * 
July 1947, when Molotov rejected French overtures to take 
up the American offer of economic assistance to Europei 
"This", Bevin whispered to his Principal Private 
Secretary Pierson Dixon (we know this because Dixon wrote 
it down in his diary) "really is the birth of the Western 
bloc". “ -
The dilemma from Bevin's^point of view was one of 
retaining some independence of thought and action, whide " 
at the same time recognising the basic and necessary • 
dependence upon American goodwill, which in turn led him 
to an appreciation of Britain's -domestic economic * - - 
recovery. He understood that economics and diplomacy 
were overlapping spheres. The Anglo-American 
relationship was not entirely without friction. Bevin 
agitated for a special place for Britain in the Marshall 
aid scheme, wishing to receive the full benefits while 
staying apart - much to the annoyance of the Americans -
772 R.Ovendale, 'The Palestine Policy of the 
British Labour Government, 4945-1946'> im  International' 
Affairs, July 1979, pp.409-431; '1947: The Decision - to 
Withdraw', In ternational Affairs, ^January 1980, pp. 73-93:r i
773 W.R.Louis, The British Empire in the Middle 
East, 1945-1951 s arab nat ional ism, the United States>, and 
postwar imperialism (1984), a book which carried 
Bullock's imprimatur.
from the rest of continental Europe. In mid-1947, with 
Labour in disarray, the Truman administration regarded 
the Attlee governments as no more stable than the French 
or Italian coalitions. But Bullock stressed how close 
Western Europe was to collapse. It might be easy, long 
afterwards, to see those fears as exaggerated; they did 
not seem exaggerated then. In this Bullock reinforced 
the traditional argument that, though Marshall aid had 
led to the hardening of divisions between America and the' 
Soviet Union, there had been no feasible alternative to 
helping the Western Europeans to help themselves.
Greece, Palestine and Berlin may, then, have taken up the 
lion's share of Bevin's time, but they were peripheral to 
the main object in mind - securing the economic revival 
of Britain and Europe, now to be served in addition by 
the association of the US with the embryonic North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, guaranteeing that America's 
fate was tied to that of the^Europeans. The fact that 
Labour's left-wing was sympathetic to the new turn was of 
no more consequence to Bevin;than its former-hostility.
The forging of co-operation with the United States, 
seized upon by Bevin, together with the country's 
Commonwealth links, precluded - in the Labour Cabinet's 
view - any closer-economic and political integration with 
the rest of Europe, of the kind envisaged in the Schumann 
plan. No-one else thought differently at the time, not
even, in his heart of hearts, Churchill. As America's--
symbolic "principal ally",■and -with the early ending of 
Marshall aid, just as Bevin's powers were starting to 
fade, Britain was now invigorated and "on’ course".
Although Bevin's record was marred by the outbreak 
of war in Korea, and the question of whether he should 
have been moved earlier by Attlee, the basic framework of 
policy was in place. In Bullock's final reckoning, this 
was how Bevin should be measured - as the first Foreign 
Secretary to have to face up to the full extent of
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Britain's weakness, but one nevertheless able to play a 
decisive part in shaping the post-war settlement which, 
so far from representing 'continuity', committed Britain 
to a wholly new balance of power that was to last for 
another generation. Bevin could be classed as America's 
truest and most dependable friend, but this was never 
carried to the point of subservience. Nor could he 
justifiably be accused of failing to recognise the 
permanence of Britain's declining position. He gave a 
strong lead, to the best of his ability and the country's, 
resources. Later on, it could be said, Britain slipped 
badly, both in terms of economic strength and 
international status, "but it would be hard to put the 
blame for that" on Bevin's foreign policy. The years 
from 1945-50 (and it was, Bullock was at pains to remind * 
people, those first five years that he was concerned 
with) were vastly different from the later 1950s and 
1960s.
Time had vindicated Bevin, just as he had - on his 
deathbed — prophecied to Francis Williams(774), even •••>••• 
if he had never been able fully to speak his mind about 
his real intentions. Sir Frank Roberts, Bevin's Private 
Secretary between 1947 and 1949*(during Bevin's most 
constructive phase) fully endorsed the view that his 
achievement was on a par with any of his distinguished 
predecessors(775). In his own way, Bevin was even 
quite 'European' (776). Bullock was not, even so, 
expecting that all controversy would now die away. Some  ^
aspects, such as British intelligence operations in the
774 F. Williams, ibid (1952), p.5.
775 Sir F.Roberts, 'Ernest Bevin as Foreign
Secretary', in The Foreign Policy of the British Labour 
Governments 1945-1951, R.Ovendale (ed)(1984), pp.21-42.
776 J.W.Young/ Britain, France and the Unity of 
Europe 1945-1951 (1984).
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Middle East, were still a closed book(777). Others ■■
tended to play down the myth of Bevin as the driving 
force, as compared with the respective foreign policy r"
elites(778). On Europe it seemed that the attitudes 
of some later writers were immovable. But on the central ~
issue of policy - the real scope for an independent 
foreign policy after 1945 - Bullock was unstinting in-his 
admiration. Pinning the blame on him for the 
deterioration in East-West relations, as the 'Keep Left 
faction had done, was no longer credible. The later 
charge that he had sought unrealistically to prop up 
Britain's ailing position was equally unfounded, relying ' 
as it did on an "unhistorical" knowledge of subsequent - 
events. As for the latest, vogue idea that Britain had 
actually lost the war in the longer-run, he had no time -
for it. However misguided it may appear, the British 
regarded themselves as winners, and could not contract ' - ’
out of a^role in the peace settlement. Bevin, his feat - 
comparable to that of any of his predecessors, was *
instrumental in establishing a strong' and secure place 
for Britain in the unstable world after the war, r
bequeathing to his successors a full range of 
opportunities; “whether they made the best use of them is " 
another matter".
The book's reception was a useful barometer of 
feeling, and an indicator of the slow build-up of a 
detached viewpoint. The half-a-million word memorial was 
generously praised, and Bevin's stature alongside the 27 
other Foreign Secretaries of the century favourably
777 K.Roosevelt's Counter coup - the struggle for 
the control of Iran (197*9) was withdrawn after pressure 
from B.P^„.(formerly the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). See 
also 'The First Oil Crisis', radio broadcast, 8 July 
1980, and 'Britain's role in Mossadegh's downfall'; The 
Guardian,* 28 July 1980, p.l.
778 D.C.Watt, Succeeding John Bull - America in 
Britain's Place (1984), Chapter 5.
assessed(779). Wyatt, a long way from his 'Keep 
Lefting' days, pleaded forgiveness(780). Crick, 
praising Bullock's coolness of judgement, said that it 
was time for Bevin to be honoured by Labour and not any 
more reviled(781); the intellectuals - and Bullock was 
carefu], not to crow - had been in the wrong, and this 
should be, recognised. In Marquand's eyes the whole 
trilogy was masterly history, "imbued with a robust horse 
sense reminiscent of Bevin's own"(782). This did not 
deter other respected reviewers from suggesting that 
Bevin's whole approach had been based on a 
contradiction - independence at the price of dependency —  
which had helped to1lock Britain into a system of 
constricting alliances, bringing in its wake the kind of 
choices which were not always, as later became clear, to 
the good(783). To their way of thinking," those 
glorifying Bevin were over-inclined to lose their * 
critical faculties. But the whole shape and tenor of 
Bullock's work was a standing example to others, making 
of it "a brilliant historical recreation" of the mood of 
the times - rather than a polemical account of how things 
should have been different - the clutter and confusion 
swamping any facile verdict. For all the adjustments in 
outlook since-Bullock first began in the 1950s, it was 
still therBevin of old, answering to his contemporaries
779 R. Jenkins, 'On a grand scale', The Observer-,- - 6 
November 1983, p25.
780 W. Wyatt, 'Colossus of the Cold War', The Times'
10 November 1983, p.11.
781 B.Crick, 'The way it was', The New Statesman
30 December 1983, pp.18-19.
782 D.Marquand, 'Life-size portraits of two
giants', Encounter, April 1984, pp.43-44.
783 E.Powell, 'Losing the peace', The Sunday Times,
6 November 1983, p.43; C.Thorne, 'The aftermath of war', 
The Times Higher Education Supplement, 18 November 1983, 
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in the surroundings and circumstances that he was 
compelled to wrestle with, on which Bullock was 
determined to rest his case. More was known now than had 
been known then. But on almost all the vital issues, and 
being better informed now, it was Bevin who had seen 
clearest and furthest.
Hi gh and Loin Pol i tics
Biographies predominated. But there was already by 
now enough in the way of new source material to complete 
a study of the 1945-51 Labour governments seen in the 
round, an administration from start—to-finish bordered by <*- 
electoral victory and defeat. The Attlee years were ripe 
for compression. Eatwell's undergraduate primer led the 
way, expressing a clear view of -its own, though limited 
by the publishers to 70, 000 words(784) -In 1984, - and ~
within months of each other, Kenneth-Morgan,and his 
predecessor at Queen's College, Oxfertd, Henry Felling f 
finished the long march through to post-war Britain at 
the head of a movement of historiographical ferment. 
Historians of renown, familiar with the very full public ’ 
and less plentiful private papers' (and using oral *
evidence only sparingly), they also differed on important 
matters of emphasis and interpretation. What they shared  ^
was a^determination to pierce through the mythical, 
legendary and partisan readings which enveloped the 
Attlee governments and to penetrate to their historical 
core.
Of the two, Morgan was the more all-encompassing 
and, although, as he argued, "wholly scholarly", the more 
politically indulgent(785). His criticisms of Labour
784 ft. Eatwellj The 1945— 1951 Labour Governments
(1979).
785 K.O.Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-1951 (1984).
and the left were always,, as he wrote in introducing a 
later set of essays, "criticisms from within"(786).
Author of highly regarded works on Welsh politics and i n.
particular* on David Lloyd George, Morgan drew much from 
the favourable comparison between the 1918 of his earlier 
research and 1945. His study of Viscount Addison 
(1980)(787) neatly fused - as Addison had fused - the- 
Cabinets of Asquith and Attlee. But even when a 
biographical account was well executed; as he thought * 
Harris's was, Morgan saw the tight scope which it ! 
afforded. Political history, he maintained, "transcends  ^
sheer biography"; politicians are not simply scoundrels - 
on the make. The historian should never donnishly 
overlook the jumble of politics(788). "They (the 
post-war Labour governments) were not concerned with ' • - 
proclaiming universally valid truths, but with 
reconciling, managing and muddling through, relating* - -
their principles to the real, ravaged, terrifying world 4 
as they faced it in 1945".. Of course, analysis of the ^ ' 
framing of high policy was essential. But the operations 
of power had to be joined to the enormous changes in-^1 
national" psychology, economic restructuring and 
demographic upheaval after the war. This was part of the* 
"political history" of the times too(789).
Morgan's resident reviews in The Times Literary - 
Supplement in the late 1970s can be seen as rough notes
786 K.O.Morgen, Labour People — leaders and
1 ieutenants: Hardie to Kinnock (1987), p.-v.
787 K.O. and J.Morgan, Portrait of a Progressive - 
the political career of Christopher, Viscount Addison
(1980).
788 Professor Morgan was one of the 275 Oxford 
University signatories of the petition aganist awarding 
an honorary doctorate to Mrs Thatcher in 1985.
789 K.O.Morgan, 'Political History', History Today, 
January 1985, pp.16-17.
for a book in preparation. He gave an enthusiastic 
welcome to the dynamics of wartime change' contained in 
Paul Addison's The Road to 1945, agreeing about the 
central importance of the war, arguing that the extent of 
wartime transformation was "debatable", and singling out 
Bevan as one of the few figures who grasped its full 
potentiality(790). The promise of 1945 was clearly at 
this point in Morgan's thinking unfulfilled. Enjoying 
the republication of Bevan's In PTace of Fear, he-also 
saw how it was rooted in its period, but stayed loyal to 
the achievements of the previous administration in a way 
that the Bennites were not. From what he had so far come 
across in the records, there was no "prolonged 
dissatisfaction" on Bevan's part with the pace and 
direction of change after 1945, as his wife was 
implying(791). On the other hand, 'Bevanism' (ably 
described in Mark Jenkins's account) went further and 
deeper than a quarrel over the 1951 budget(792).
Other notables on the left (Laski, Wilkinson) also came 
in for fresh treatment, bearing out Morgan's impression 
of the creative tension between the various elements that 
made up the Labour coalition - a movement, he agreed, and 
not just a machine to be manipulated. all of these 
insights were worked into his final draft, and in the 
process - in seeking to "propel" the age of Attlee out of 
the mists of pre-history - Morgan came instead to 
appreciate the unconsidered progress of the period, 
judged with the historical perspective it ought to be 
judged, led by the real "unknown Prime Minister" (not
790 K.O.Morgan, ibid (1975).
791 K.O. Morgan 'Adding - freedom to freedom',» The' 
Times Literary Supplement, 14 November 1980, p.
792 K.O.Morgan, 'Dimensions of dissent', The ‘Times 
Literary Supplement, 25 September 1981, p.1090.
Bonar Ljaw but Attlee(793)). In the meantime the 
picture of a "missed opportunity", favoured by the left 
but a misunderstanding of events, faded out of sight.
One way in which Morgan managed to impress this on 
the reader - in one of his most innovative arguments — 
was to suggest, much more forcibly* than beforehand, that 
1945-51 had been more than a straightforward 
reaffirmation of wartime changes. The war had been 
crucial, but the varied effect of social forces, 
sometimes conflicting and contradictory, was not easily 
reconciled. There were four respects in which Labour 
became identified with greater reform - its leaders had 
held sway over the home front during hostilities; as a 
junior partner, the party had been allowed to govern and 
oppose simultaneously; the trade unions, incorporated 
into the governing fabric, enjoyed new authority; and, 
lastly, organisationally and as regards policy, the party 
was much better prepared.
Superimposing this onto 1945 should not, however, 
hide the unexpected nature of the "seismic" victory that 
resulted. Nor could pre- and post-1945 be seen as 
seamlessly joined. For one thing, the degree of 
consensus and continuity then prevalent had been grossly 
exaggerated in later accounts, concealing important 
shifts and divergences. This was true not only for the 
nationalisation proposals in 1945-49, the key element in 
the programme, clearly finite in scale and yet quite 
different in form to the wartime blueprints, but also 
with the more "socialistic" aspects added on to 
Beveridge's welfare base, pride of place going to BeVan's 
NHS scheme, which he called "Labour's - perhaps Britain's 
- finest hour". In other repects, such as planning, 
there had been little more than the retention of
793 K.O. Morgan, 'The reticent prime minister' / The 
Times Literary Supplement, 24 September 1982, p.1026.
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controls. Shinwell's advocacy of statutory wage 
regulation was firmly rebuffed by the trade unionists in 
the Cabinet. In the main, it was the latter, welfare 
objective which, for the historian, marked out the prime 
case for Labour as the unique custodian of the 
progressive idea.
For- another, the late forties were a time of strong 
political feelings, which - in his least effective 
chapter, on the social and cultural mood - Morgan tried 
to assess:
"The idea [he wrote] of a broad 
consensus after 1945 in which the NHS, 
nationalisation and the retreat from empire 
commanded universal, bipartisan support, is 
perhaps a later construct which requires 
qualification. It does not conform to much of 
the record of events, to the personal 
recollections of those active at the time, or 
to the voters' contemporary ^ conception of 
themselves"(794).
It had been an "intensely political time", as he 
could well remember(795).
In a similar way, and just as seriously, later 
commentators had transposed back on to the immediate 
post-war years the decline in Britain's international 
influence. In the conditions of 1945/ Britain was still * 
one of the three larger powers, a view from which few 
then dissented. Rejection of the Schuman plan, for a 
number of "excellent" reasons, could not be said to have
794 K.O.Morgan, ibid (1984), p.329.
795 K.O.Morgan, conversation with the author, 8 
March 1983.
closed the door to closer European co-operation, as 
Bullock had already outlined. Besides which the plan 
fitted badly with other national priorities, especially 
in the fields of colonial development and the creation of 
a multi-racial Commonwealth, where altruism and self- 
interest combined to produce some of Labour's "brightest" 
acts.
But Morgan was clear about the extent to which 
foreign and defence considerations dictated domestic 
advances. Britain's great power prestige (Lord Franks 
had talked in such terms to him) made possible the 
democratic socialist experiment at home, and military 
leadership^ abroad, even if any "moral capital" was 
sacrificed. This was brought home graphically in the 
last few months of the second Attlee government - robbed 
of its overwhelming parliamentary majority and, following 
the outbreak of the Korean conflict, under pressure from 
the Americans to boost defence spending. Several months- 
beforehand, Bevan had sensed the undermining of the 
achievements of 1945, and it was "quite wrong" of Attlee 
to say that Bevan only later widened his objections - a 
disclosure of great interest in the war between the 
biographers and yet one, as Clarke noticed, that the 
uninitiated could easily miss. As to the upshot, there 
was no disputing that Labour, harassed on all sides and 
its momentum spent, was (despite going hopefully into the 
1951 election) a government on its last legs.
In spite of this falling away, Labour's 
accomplishments remained considerable. Morgan had some 
lingering .sympathy with the "retreat from Jerusalem" 
lament, and of other left critiques, but they were too 
full of one-sided dogma and passion to withstand
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searching appraisal(796). The debunkers of 1945-51 - 
left and right - had gone too far. There were evident 
shortcomings, such as in the lack of institutional 
reform. Attlee was not all that he was cracked up to be. 
But by its own realistic estimation, in the very 
different position pertaining in 1945, there had been a 
substantial slab of economic and social change. Great 
strides were made in balancing economic improvement and 
social liberty. The Labour party, throughout, was to an ‘ 
unusual extent united in its actions and certain of its 
purpose. These years were not to be seen as a form of ~
"advanced liberalism", a mild precursor to the SDPite 
1980s, given substance by David Marquand, amongst others. 
Opportunities were taken , and not just missed. Labour 
often took the radical way out of a tight corner. If 
continuity was *to be found anywhere, it was after 1951 
and the Tory confirmation of what Labour had done. 
Comparing post-1945 with post-1918, about which he was an 
acknowledged expert, sealed his case. What was true for 
Wales was true for Britain as a whole. 1945 represented 
a respectable heritage, symbolising "the British version 
of socialism in one country"(797); 1918 was well 
forgotten(798).
Academic colleagues engaged on similar work were 
ready to grant that, in what was after all the first 
full-scale overview of the period, Morgan had confirmed 
his place as one of the leading political historians. In 
striking the balance between successes and failures, he
796 See his review of John Saville's 'The Labour 
Movement in Britain*, The New Statesman and Society, ^ 1 0 *  
June 1988, pp.41-42.
797 K.O.Morgan, 'How good was the Attlee
government?*, New Society, 23 February 1984, p.286.
798 K.O.Morgan, 'Post-war reconstruction in Wales, 
1918 and 1945*, in The Harking Class in Modern British 
History - essays in honour of Henry Pelling, J.M.Winter 
(ed)(1982), pp.82-98.
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had - Addison thought - applied'just enough bias to 
illuminate, but never too much to distort(799).
Though Morgan’s instinct was to give Labour the benefit 
of any doubt, it was a book, Burk said, on which one 
could depend(800). For Clarke, the grip of 
controversy was not easy to escape, even thirty years on, 
and even guided by as scrupulous a historian as Morgan; 
but the "hard slog" through the thickets of policy had 
been well worth it(801). Conscious of the furore 
which still surrounded many aspects of the age of Attlee, 
it was the* elements tending towards fair-minded 
disinterestedness which were the most valued.
Instead of a continuous narrative, Henry Pelling's 
concise reassessment of the 1945-51 Labour governments 
consisted of a set of highlight essays, chronologically ' 
arranged, drawing on the public records and the extensive 
secondary literature, and employing The Times as his 
watchpiece(802). Its circumspect, sourced brevity was 
entirely characteristic. His own one-volume life of 
Churchill(803) had been a commercial success, and 
Pelling was known to believe that other recent books on 
the 1940s were over-long(804). Severe illness held up 
his academic work, but an early copy of his opening 
chapter, a reconsideration of the 1945 general election 
(McCallum's study having been the first of its kind, but
799 P.Addison, ibid, 5-18 April 1984, pp.3-5.
800 K.Burk, review in The Pol itical Quarterly,
October-December 1984, pp.450-452.
801 P.Clarke, 'High tide for the left'> The Times
Literary Supplement, 16 March 1984, pp.263-264.
802 H. M.Pelling, T h e ‘'Labour Governments> 1945-^51
(1984).
803 Hv:M:Felling, Hinston Churchill (1974).
804 H.M.Pelling, conversation with the author, 22
October 1982.
also, by now, "the crudest and least adequate") appeared - 
in The Historical Journal in 1980(805). Later 
sections went on to cover the main areas of 
reconstruction and welfare on the domestic front, 
external policy, the 1947 hiatus, a novel sketching in of 
the Marshall aid programme and the OEEC (expanded into a 
book(806)), before reaching the winding-down in 1950- 
51. His judgements were often astute. Not venturing 
further than a listing of the likely causes for the 
turnaround in 1945, he drew attention to "Churchill's 
inadvertent building up of the personality of Attlee. 
Sceptical of manifestoitis, he showed how the 
nationalisation of the hospital service had been a civil 
servant's idea. 'Keynesianism' he found to be too vague 
a term to have any real meaning in the immediate post-war 
years. There was gentle irony, also, in many of the 
otherwise very moral pen portraits of Attlee, Morrison 
and Cripps. Flat and uncontentious as his tone generally^ 
was, the Lasting nature of Labour's achievement, however,- 
was never put in any doubt: externally imposed limits, 
which the government had been very much "at the mercy - 
of", were the decisive factor; but within those limits, a 
meritable "social betterment" had come about, in which 
continuity - the Conservative continuity that followed— - 
remained the keynote. J
It was a disappointing result, even for his friends 
and admirers. J.M. Winter, editor of a Felling 
festschrift in 1982, had made much of Pelling's standing 
as a historian of record, providing the yardstick against 
which all other scholarship could be measured, and 
arguing that "anyone working in labour history today is ■*
805 H.M.Pelling, 'The 1945 General Election 
Reconsidered', The Historical Journal, 23 1980, pp.399- 
414.
806 H.M.Pelling, Britain and the Mar shall Plan 
(1989).
informally one of his students"(807). He drew heart 
from Pelling's we11-honed skill at taking "the sound and 
fury" out of historical discussion. But in this case it 
had been overdone. Where Morgan was alive to the 
functional mythology of the labour movement, acting as a 
guardian of struggles past (the earliest supporters 
indeed using history as a substitute for theory), Pelling 
"deprive[d] much of that history of the passion and 
conviction which give it its special character"(808). 
Morgan's account was seen to be partial, but acceptably, 
even inspiringly so, whereas - with Pelling - the sober,** 
pedestrian task he set himself of purging legends did not 
always satisfy. Any history of the Labour party, and 
above all any account of its high tide in the late 40s, 
had also to treat with what the party had made of its 
history. A detachable viewpoint, while valuable, could 
only be taken so far.
Pelling had, moreover, in Addison's view, missed in 
a way that Morgan had not the rise during the war of an 
alii since between the radical intelligentsia and the 
leaders of the unionised working classes, the joint ' 
impact of "which - in his own persuasive thesis - was the 
"efficient secret" that ultimately lay behind the more 
immediate causes of the victory in 1945. The war had 
shsLken up Britain in a dramatic way, adding force to 
Labour's collectivist drive, and enabling it to dictate 
the main lines of social development "right down to the
1970s". Though he did still wonder whether the
government had done all it might have done, one had all 
the same to grasp sind convey the changes wrought upon the
underlying econmy and society. Sticking to the
legislative changes in an undramatic style muffled and
807 J.M.Winter (ed), ibid (1982), p.xii.
808 J.M.Winter, 'Say not the struggle', The London 
Review of Books, 1-14 November 1984, p.16.
muted the "social dynamics"(809).
Their contrasting methods were brought out in the 
short chapter^ which Morgan and Pelling had contributed 
to a collection of essays on the theme of 'high' and 
'low' politics the year before(810). Pelling gave a 
brisk run through of his essential findings, sweeping 
aside the fallacy that the party's 1945 programme had 
only to be announced for it- to be capable of 
implementation. Recalling McKenzie's neglect of the r 
trade union factor in the Labour party, which had badly 
skewed his account of 1931, Pelling explained how the 
guiding hand of the unions after 1945 added to the 
institutional and other pressures which had affected the 
timing and realising of the main election pledges, the 
least influential of these being the greatly enlarged 
Parliamentary Labour Party. Administrative 
practicalities and- electoral considerations meant that 
the mandate which Labour sought in 1950 and 1951 was less 
far-reaching that was the case in 1945. But there was no
suggestion that the history of 1945-51 deserved to be ■ *
written about*in any way differently from the history of 
any previous government, Labour or otherwise. Pelling's 
conventional bent, accentuated by his reliance on the
official archives, contributed to making the high
political approach not just a good but the best means of 
tackling what the Attlee governments were able to 
ach i eve.
Morgan also referred to McKenzie's erroneous 
analysis, compounded by his mistaking of Labour's
809 P.Addison, 'Attlee's - new order', The * Times 
Literary Supplement, 31 August 1984, p.960.
810 H.M.Pelling, 'The Labour governments of 1945—  
51: the determinants of policy' and K.O.Morgan, 'The High 
and Low Politics of Labour: Keir Hardie to Michael Foot'
in M.Bentley and J.Stevenson (eds), High and Low Politics' 
in Modern Britain (1983), pp.255-284 and 285-312.
"constitutional normality" after the war as somehow 
standard, when in fact the 1945-51 period, he remarked, 
was - because ideological tensions were momentarily 
stilled - untypical in Labour history. For a variety of 
reasons the party was marked by a powerful, disciplined 
and harmonious unity, its leaders already tested in 
office and its policies laid down with exceptional 
clarity, out of all recognition so far as other Labour 
governments went. The stirring of constituency activism 
in the later 1930s, kept in being throughout the war 
years, had added to the forward thrust after 1945, just 
as rank-and-file discontent, and trade union revolt, fed 
into the Bevanite unrest after 1951. Pressure from below 
(not to be dismissed simply as disruption by the left) 
was really a history-long constant, past disputes between 
populists and elitists in the party having more to do 
with "democracy" than "socialism", a thread of discord 
that could not be glossed over by inventing iron laws o r  
historical proofs. Having seen off the political1.- '- 
scientists, Morgan also rebuked his fellow historians. 
Although the high politics of Labour had gone through its 
"classic" phase between 1945 and 1951, a longer view 
demonstrated how imperfectly the party conformed to the 
high political mould. He was far less convinced that-the 
traditional kind of institutional political history, of 
parties administering the state rather than striving'to * 
radically change it, was strictly appropriate to Labour's 
past. Labour was - and remained - different.
Though the editors of the High and bow volume 
admitted that the argument which had flared up in the 
early seventies about the methodological merits of the 
high political approach had since died down, the main 
issues had not been settled. It was apparent how much 
more emphasis Morgan placed on the popular, societal 
dimension of Labourism after 1945 than Pelling had. But 
to others arrayed across the political spectrum who were
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less enamoured by the collectivist, egalitarian ideal, 
even this did not suffice. They felt his disavowal of 
partisanship to be unconvincing, and the -attempt to 
'objectify' the Attlee years a misleading undertaking. 
Coverage of the then Labour governments was of vital 
contemporary importance, since so much of what they stood 
for was being actively repudiated by Conservative 
governments of the early 1980s, but in adopting the 
Westminster and Whitehall perspective on Labour Britain, 
Bullock, Morgan and Pelling had uncritically imparted the 
official assumptions of great power pretension and 
beneficient statism. To recapture the true temper of the 
times, one had to take the measure of the Attlee 
government's full sociological impact.
One variant of this angle of interest homed in on 
why the government - in such a strong position in 1945 —  
had not been able to go far enough to make its reforms 
stick. E.P. Thompson, writing "not as a professional 
historian but simply as a politically-conscious citizen 
who lived through those years" questioned the value of 
excessively government-oriented accounts, conjuring up 
instead the earnest, hopeful mood in the country at 
large, far to the left of official Labour, and the 
activities of maverick individuals like Konny 
Zilliacus(811). There were issues at stake in that 
government, according to Barnett, that could not be 
wished away in a cloud of "consensus-prose"(812).
Saville, in an extended review of Bullock, was worried 
that the same illusions about Labour's government of
811 E.P.Thompson, 'Mr Attlee and the Gadarene 
Swine', The Guardian, 3  March 1984, p.9.
812 A.Barnett, review in Marxism Today, July 1984,
P . 41.
weary titans lived on(813). Was the country really 
more socialist in 1951 than in 1945, Anthony Wright (the 
biographer of G.D.H. Cole) inquired?(814) And why, if 
this was so, did the Labour government slip downhill so 
quickly? The attempt to replace class divisiveness with 
communal co-operation, binding Britain into a single, 
coherent society, had been left unfinished, and Stedman- 
Jones gave hisf own reasons(815). But the "structure 
of determination" of the leading accounts debarred them 
from even beginning to understand the incomplete nature 
of the 1945 reform-revolution.
A similar but contrasting line was also on offer, in 
this case decrying the entrenched, immovable character of 
Attlee's bureaucratic socialism. The wholly exceptional, 
dragooned solidarity of the war(816) had been allowed 
to persist into the peace, creating a manufactured 
consensus which had taken in even Pelling. The nation 
had been saddled with monolithic state monopolies in 
services and health, while providing for large vested 
interests gathered closer to the heart of the economy, 
carving out a huge*welfarist, unionised, public sector 
political constituency. Labour Britain was a socialised 
Britain, which had inhibited economic revival and " ■» •
established an ideological control from which the country 
had been unable to extricate itself(817). Was it not
813 J.Saville, 'Ernest Bevin and the Cold War, 
1945-1950', in The Socialist Register 1984, 
R.Miliband,J.Saville and M.Liebman (eds)(1984), pp.68— 
100.
814 A.Wright, 'The one big lesson of 1945', New 
Socialist, November 1984, pp.45-47.
815 G.Stedman-Jones, 'March into history?', - New 
Socialist, January-February 1982, pp.10-15.
816 K.Joseph and J.Sumption, Equal ity (1984), p.61.
817 S.Walkland, 'The failure of Labour', The Tines 
Higher Education Supplement, 3 August 1984, p.14.
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possible, then, that the success story of 1945 was the
biggest myth of them all?(818)
These protests amounted to a refusal to allow the 
discussion about the collectivist forties to be ground 
down by a process of documentary, dry-as-dust attrition. 
Not only was there no immaculate, impartial road to the 
past; the period in question was not yet detachable
history, being so much a part of present politics. The
whole attempt at historicising the immediate post-war 
years was meritorious but fundamentally misconceived.
Economic reconstruct ion
After a pause of more than twenty years, with 
nothing since J.C.R. Dow's standard work, a substantial 
and well-researched economic history of 1945-51 followed 
in 1985, written by Sir Alec Cairncross, 'the former head 
of the Government Economic Service (1964-69) and an 
economic adviser to the Board of Trade between 1946 and 
1949(819). A wily, undoctrinaire Keynesian, conscious of 
the limits* of economic theorising and the interaction of 
policy and politics, Cairncross was a leading critic of 
Thatcherite economics in the early 1980s and was one of 
the famous 364 objectors. Having edited for publication 
the wartime papers on Anglo-American economic 
collaboration of 'Otto' Clarke, Cairncross turned to a
lengthier consideration of the early post-war practice of
"economic management", mainly seen from a Treasury 
viewpoint, endeavouring to work out what had been in the
minds of policy-makers, and the alternative lines of
action that had seemed to be open, on the basis of the 
figures that they had had in front of them. Cairncross
818 P.Johnson, 5Why Bevan resigned', The Spectator, 
24 March 1984, pp.20-21.
819 A.Cairncross, Years of Recovery - British 
economic policy 1945-51.
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drew much less on his time in Whitehall than he had 
expected; his main advantage lay in knowing where to find 
what he was looking for in the departmental archives.
The wealth of official statistics for the post-war period 
(unlike for earlier periods) unquestionably made the 
interpreting of events far easier(820). But the 
"shifting sands of statistical revision" - by which 
earlier figures were revised according to later 
recalculations of seasonal trends and the flow of 
invisibles - introduced an element of arbitrariness, one 
construction put upon any change being (arguably) as good 
as another. In some respects, as Clarke reported, new 
calculations "turned the story upside down"(821). The 
passage immediately after 1945 was of the greatest 
interest to Cairncross because of the huge economic 
adjustments that were completed over such a short time 
span, with their attendant difficulties. They were years 
of recovery - as he termed them - but years interrupted 
by regular emergencies, and with Ministers (including 
some from the front-line economic departments) all too 
often coming to the issues ill-prepared and 
uncomprehending.
This lack of understanding was most obvious in the 
poor grasp of the relationship between the home economy 
and external economic policy, which Attlee had 
"vigorously" denied, compounded by the separation of 
overseas from domestic sectors in the machinery of 
economic co-ordination. The dollar shortage, though in 
the end less prolonged than originally believed, governed 
policy. For the first two years in the life of the
820 A.Cairncross, 'The post-war years 1945-77', in 
The Economic History of Britan Since 1700 (Vol-2: 1860 to 
the 1970s), R.Floud and D.McCloskey (eds)(1981), pp.370- 
416.
821 P.Clarke, 'Guessing at the future', The Times 
Literary Supplement, 21 June 1985, pp.683-684.
government, however, ministerial expectations were wildly 
unrealistic. Partly, this had come about as a result of 
bad advice, as was the case with the American loan in 
1945 (Keynes was let off lightly by Cairncross). But it 
also stemmed from a failure to appreciate the extreme 
precariousness of the post-war position, and the urgency 
this gave to the earning of dollars to offset a balance 
of payments deficit. Whereas UK exports increased four-' 
fold (as a consequence of growing world markets, not 
increased competitiveness), so that an export-led 
recovery could get underway, the terms of trade moved 
consistently in the wrong direction, requiring successive 
import cuts to bring the economy into line, each 
retrenchment provoking Cabinet-level rifts. The low 
point arrived in 1947, with the acceleration in the 
dollar drain, helped, but not actually created, by 
convertibility. A worst-case 'doomsday' programme was 
even drawn up - a story first broken by Hennessy. There- 
was also a huge capital outfkow, in spite of exchange 
controls, of a far greater magnitude (this was from the 
1981 revision) than officials were then aware, meaning 
that the balance of payments deficit for 1947 was in fact 
much closer to the one originally projected in that 
year's Economic Survey. It was here, Cairncross wrote, 
that rationing and controls did have an effect, not so 
much in restraining inflation as in curbing the value of* 
dollar imports - the one area in which the government's 
planning boast was fully justified.
In other'respects, they fell short. The fuel 
crisis, an early demonstration of Britain's energy 
vulnerability, was badly mishandled. The margin of 
failure was only a narrow one - an industrial shutdown, 
with a severe loss of production, and all for a minute. —
saving of coal - a clear cut case where ministerial 
action made things worse. There was a similar untidiness 
to the 1949 devaluation, delayed beyond the point of
advantage (Cairncross had been urging it at the end of 
1948) and eventually forced upon ministers so that it 
looked like a climbdown to market opinion. Cripps, of 
the 'Big Five', the author indeed of the 1947 Economic 
Survey, was the only one to have a sense of what 
organising the nation's resources actually entailed, but 
it had only been by chance that he had assumed the sole 
responsibility. After his elevation, economic and 
financial policy were united in the hands of a strong 
minister with a clear line of policy. The shift from 
physical to financial control, however, only gradually 
came about, this judgement of Cairncross's being “in 
keeping with the findings of other historians who have 
been pushing back the date at which the Keynesian era in 
economic management can be said to commence"(822).
Here, the author's Board of Trade instincts were at their 
starkest. He had some trouble with Gaitskell's “odd 
doctrine", before and when Chancellor, that some physical 
controls should remain as an integral part of a properly 
planned economy. But a mooted Full Employment Bill, 
intended to entrench the range of manpower controls 
Gaitskell thought desirable, was dropped in 1951. Such 
restrictions were only residual, according to Cairncross, 
and secondary to the fiscal measures being applied to 
influence the level of demand. The 1 fiscality' of 
Keynes's ideas - as.Keynes's own papers showed - was not 
as thoroughgoing as commonly believed. Cairncross was to 
conclude that "we cannot say with assurance how much 
intervention and what kinds of intervention Keynes would 
have accepted as the price of full employment", a remark 
close to the agnosticism of Moggridge.
If, as Dow had suggested, government actions could 
at times be destabilising (though he had come to see this 
point as "trivial", compared with the sheer over-
822 P.Clarke, ibid (1985).
ambitiousness of demand management that now struck 
him(823)), so too - Cairncross decided - it was right 
to attribute economic fluctuations to forces largely 
outside government control. Thus, as far as could be 
ascertained (and contra Dow), the dislocation following * 
on from rearmament in 1951 could be blamed on rising 
import prices.
How the extensive programme of nationalisation 
fitted into all of this was unclear to Cairncross. It 
had nothing to do with the country's most pressing 
economic problems. The government attached more 
importance to it than it warranted. Ministers never 
learned that the commanding heights of the economy were 
dominated by the balance of payments, not iron and steel.
All in all, the period had been one of painful and 
difficult structural change, quite unlike the picture of 
steady legislative enactment and retrospective coherence. 
Nevertheless there were considerable successes to record. 
Post-war deflation was avoided. Recovery was achieved, 
despite recurring difficulties, and in spite of acute 
exposure to world conditions. Though the government did^ 
not always know where it was heading, it knew where it 
wanted to go. The economy was put on a path that it was 
to follow over*the next two decades. Cairncross found 
little to support the argument that still more could have 
been done. "Few governments* have proclaimed more 
insistently the need for higher production", even if bhe 
level was raised by less than was once thought. Some 
controls were inevitable, even if the burden of hardship 
was distributed unequally - it did not follow that reform 
was pushed too far. These were years of "learning by
experience" the techniques of economic steering. Whether
\
looking forward from 1945, and examining the economy
823 See his comments in F.Cairncross (ed),ibid
(1981), pp.56-57.
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sector-by-sector, or looking back from the present, the 
economy was "set fair", as fair (Cairncross added wryly) 
as the British economy ever is set fair.
That this upbeat conclusion sat ill with the 
chronicling of hesitation and ignorance in earlier 
chapters took nothing away from the judicious 
thoroughness which several reviewers noted(824). His 
"prosaic" delivery, disclaiming originality, was 
reassuring(825). To this extent, he put the economic 
analysis of 1945 on a more "secure footing" than the 
statistical information might have allowed(826).
Austen Robinson, who had worked in wartime in the 
Ministry of Production, in a semi-autobiographical 
note(827), did not regard the later revised figures as 
being any mord 'right' than the earlier 'wrong'.
Personal judgements still counted for much. He too 
considered 1945-47 as largely wasted, before the getting 
of wisdom. But he wondered whether Cairncross had not, 
through natural tact, played down the anxieties of the 
era (Robinson had been a member of the 'doomsday' 
committee) and the tenuous form that the recovery to' 
begin with took. "We were in the nick of time rescued by
Marshall aid", he wrote. Without American help,
reconstruction would have been slower and even more 
painful. Britain without America would have been in a
far more fragile state - that was the opinion of the
whole government, and the reader who knows the happier 
ending needed, he added, to be told of this.
824 K.Burk, review * in The- Political Quarterly 
April-June 1986, pp.
825 B.Pitnlott, ibid, 25 April 1985, pp. 124-125.
826 P.Clarke, ibid (1985).
827 A.Robinson, 'The economic problem of the 
transition from war to peace: 1945-49',>in The Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 10 1986, pp.165-185.
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On this last point, however, historical views were 
undergoing further changes. In the United States, the 
orthodox-revisionist confroiitation had run its course, 
the revisionist reaction against the idea that Marshall 
aid had 'saved7 Western Europe from Soviet subjugation 
having begun to be supplanted by a less ideological, 
"post-revisionist" synthesis - led by Charles Maier of 
Harvard - favouring multi- rather than monocausal 
explanations for the outbreak of cold war antagonism, and 
giving greater emphasis to the Europe-wide institution- 
building policies of modernisation and productivity along 
Keynesian lines, which the programme reputedly ushered 
in(828). American ties with Europe were placed 
against a longer backdrop. Post-World War One American 
aid initiatives, because they had been privately funded, 
had invariably dried up. But after 1945, use could be 
made of the inter-allied maohinery that had been set up 
while the war was still on. Hogan, making the comparison = ~ 
with earlier foreign aid efforts, argued that what 
distinguished the Marshall plan programme was the v 
comprehensive attempt at integrating the European- 
economies(829). Mobilising moderate, non-communist 
trade unionists behind the plan became an essential 
element in the strategy. Marshall aid had, as such, a 
"politico-economic" importance, bringing with it the US 
government reassurance missing from private sector loans. 
This technocratic account, by overtaking the academic 
divisions between left and right and Europeans and 
Americans, marked a significant shift, with the result, 
Maier commented, that "even before the Cold war ended,~ 
the history of the Marshall plan became far less its
828 C.S.Maier, 'Revisionism and the interpretation 
of cold war ^origins', reprinted in The Origins of the 
Cold War and Contemporary Europe, C.S.Maier(ed)(1978), 
pp.3-34.
829 M.Hogan, 'European integration and the Marshall 
plan', in The Marshall Plan - a retrospective, S.Hoffman 
and C.S.Maier(eds)(1984), pp.1-6.
hostage".
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Alan Milward, in an impassioned and arresting 
tome(830), volunteered another possibility. The 
evidence he had come across for an economic slowdown in 
Europe in 1947 was "unconvirlcing", based upon a wide 
variety of separate economic causes, peculiar to each 
country, which were anyway symptoms of rapid growth and 
expansion, and hardly of imminent breakdown. The many 
crises of that period, said to reveal the severity of the : 
UK's fundamental weakness, were a reflection rather of 
the political arguments deployed* at the time, not least 
the need for the Truman administration to win 
Congressional approval. The long postwar boonr - to his 
own great surprise - had begun in 1945. What the 
provision of Marshall aid dollars did, therefore, was to - 
give a further upward boost to the already strong 
economic and social changes in an increasingly 
interdependent Europe, in the interests of economic, 
political and military safety. It followed that Marshall 1 
aid was not the "exceptional economic phenomenon" it was 
singled out as (and for such a strangely long time, to 
his mind) in the years afterwards, something which both 
orthodox and revisionist writers had taken for granted. 
Earlier treatments of reconstruction came in for 
"complete reassessment"(831).
There was a more pronounced sense in Milward than in 
Cairncross that economic factors - being fundamental and 
irresistible - were all-important. Unsurprisingly, the 
notion that Europe had not after all been helpless was a 
controversial one, especially across the Atlantic but 
also among Whitehall veterans in Britain., Milward, in
830 A.S.Milward, The Reconstruct ion of Western - 
Europe 1945-51 (1984).
831 R.Bullen, review in The Journal of Common 
Market Studies, June 1986/ p.348.
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his angry discontent, had stretched a point, it was 
said(832). Altruistic motives on the part of American 
policy-makers, since these were harder to gauge than the 
patterns of multilateral trade payments, were too easily 
and wrongly dismissed(833). The point anyway - as - ~
Kindleberger, a junior officer in the State Department at 
the time, noted - was what practical steps to take to 
deal with the problems, on the balance of risks to 
European stability, if America was not just to stand 
by(834). Gardner, in a reprise of his earlier study, 
was adamant that the plan and its forerunners were a - 
“miracle" of statesmanship(835). The differences were 
basically due to differences of disciplinary approach.
The economic evidence was open to debate, in Ellwood's ^ 
summary; "the political and social facts point in almost < 
all cases in quite the opposite direction"(836).
A 'great power' delusion?
On the whole, though, in Britain, where the 
revisionist flare-up had been largely disregarded, the 5 
'post-revisionist' tendency did not so readily apply. 
Nevertheless the long-standing British preoccupation with 
the centrality of Britain's role did help to dismantle 
the outdated bipolar framework of US histories. The UK's 
increasingly close links with the European Community also 
'Europeanised' much historical discussion, the UK's
832 See the comments made in J.Major's 'A Spark to 
Fire the Engine', radio broadcast (1 of 3), 5 June 1987.
833 K.Burk, 'Britain and the Marshall plan', in 
Warfare., Diplomacy and politics - essays in honour of AJP 
Taylort C.Wrigley(ed)(1986), pp.210-230.
834 C.P.Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Days (1987).
835 R.N.Gardner, 'Sterling-dollar diplomacy in 
current perspective', in W.R.Louis and H.Bull(eds), The. 
Special Relatonship (1986), p.190.
836 D.Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe (1992), p.260.
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continuing European dilemmas having their source in the 
early cold war division of Germany and Europe, American 
aid, and early steps to create a Common Market. New 
documentation suggested promising new lines of 
research(837), and serving officials from the 1940s 
were cross-examined about the evolution of policy, having 
their thirty-year old memoranda quoted back at 
them(838). Younger historians, -unhampered by a 
lifetime of cold war associations, found ways of taking a 
fresh, archivally accredited look at familiar 
questions (8.39).
To take one example, attacks on the 'great power* 
delusion of the 1940s, disparaged by critics on the left 
and right, was harder to credit when it transpired from 
the official papers that Britain had been anything but a 
minor player in the important 1945-47 phase, Bevin —  as- 
Bullock had already forcefully underlined - emerging more 
and more as a key figure. ^Dependence on the archives 
could be overdone, the assumption being that, whatever 
may have been said in public, the private record was 
pristine and credible{840). But privately, and then -■■■* ~ 
by the Summer of 1946 openly, as Anne Deighton 
demonstrated(841), Bevin spearheaded the move to bring * 
to an end the Grand Alliance, thereby obliging the United 
States to take sides. This did not come as any surprise
837 A. and J.-Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (1988).
838 M.Charlton, ibid (1983).
839 R.Crockatt and S.Smith, The Cold Mar - past and 
present (1987).
840 V.Rothwell's review of E.Barker's Britain 
Between the Superpowers, The Times Literary Supplement, 
16 March 1984, p.264.
841 A.Deighton, 'The "frozen front": the Labour 
government, the division of Germany and the origins of 
the cold war*, in International Affairs, Summer 1987, 
pp.449-465.
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to old hands like John Saville who, having waded through 
"many hundreds" of files relating to Bevin's stewardship- 
of the Foreign Office, was as convinced as ever of 
Bevin's "undeviating hostility" to the Soviet Union 
(842). But Deighton's point was the very different 
one that one could now make a study of the period 
"without the risk of being called a neo-marxist or a CIA 
agent"(843). Greater recognition of the multilateral 
nature of Britain's other strategic, economic and - 
military relationships afforded a clearer understanding 
of actions and attitudes which were not explicable only 
on the basis of politicians and civil servants clinging 
to outdated beliefs. Newton (1984) showed that Britain's 
reluctance to join fully in the plans for European union 
was governed by well-founded considerations of economic - 
necessity rather than by a so-called anachronistic 
attachment to an imperial role. - Sterling Area 
responsibilities were real and could not be summarily -
ducked(844). -When it came to the issue of the *
development and production of a British atomic bomb, 
discussed with advisers and-scientists while leaving to 
one side the wisdom or morality of it(845), Bevin's 
insistence on a weapon "with a bloody Union Jack on top" 
emphasised in no uncertain terms how it had been an "of 
course" decision about which there could be no serious 
objection, possession being a natural military and 
diplomatic appurtenance. Later historians had let their
842 J.Saville, in The Guardian, 7 August 1990,
p.35.
843 Quoted by P.Hennessy in 'Britain hangs on to 
Potsdam's poisoned chalice", The Independent, 5  November - 
1990, p.5.
844 See^the summary of his comments in The Bui let in 
of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, April 1984,
P.2.
845 P.Hennessy, 'A Bloody Union Jack on top of it', 
radio discussion, 16 May 1988.
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knowledge of Britain's medium-ranking status colour their 
perceptions of an earlier period, instead of reading 
forward from 1945, which was the only way the post-war 
years could make any historical sense. Events had to be 
viewed just as those directly involved had viewed them, 
not doing as they pleased but acting as they must.
Golden years
What was it - to return to our opening claim of 
contemporary historians - that made this fresh crop of 
academically endorsed studies mature, authoritative and 
required reading?
The essence of the claim rested on the declared 
ability to establish an increasingly detached account of 
the early post-war years, in a way that reflected well on 
the growing prestige and professionalism of contemporary 
history. The new abundance of primary (archival and 
oral) source material was blended with new directions in - 
the growth of scholarship, the two parts held together by 
an 'invisible college' of historical review, exchange and » 
comment. The very fullness of the complicating detail 
that was brought into the open exposed the partiality of 
dubious (ministerial-), unsound (social science modelling) 
or misleading (partisan) constructions imposed on the 
past, enabling the actors to be restored to the 
historical circumstances and attitudes of their own time. 
"The past ten years have been a great education for us 
all", Paul Addison wrote in his sequel to The Road to 
1945; both the marxist left and the radical right had 
succeeded in illuminating "a disturbing corner of reality 
neglected by conventional opinion", pointing to truths 
that remained so in spite of "the fallacious ideological 
baggage with which they were mixed up". But, he 
continued,* they were neither plausible history nor 
workable politics, and were yielding to a more considered
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- and appreciative - evaluation(846).
The mass of complicating detail, contrary to 
expectations, contributed to an enhanced understanding of 
the heroic scale and immense achievements of a government 
confronted throughout by the most forbidding of domestic 
and international problems. This interconnectedness, the 
international context of domestic reform, was generally 
regarded by all authors as the dominating fact about the 
years after 1945: economic recovery, as well as the 
precondition for recovery - security. The whole of the 
government's efforts were turned towards fulfillment of 
these aims. A bold domestic and a strong foreign policy 
were fused, Morgan-argued, by the general Labourite 
convictionvthat Britain, for*all its short-term 
difficulties, remained one of the great powers. Relative 
economic decline and reduced international standing," if 
one was searching for origins, post-dated 1950/ as'did 
the thwarting of post-war expectations. There had been 
too much backward, and -censorious, extrapolation. A line 
dividing off the past from the present was firmly drawn, 
sealing the forties off from ensuing hostility. This was 
the most valuable of scholarly attainments.
Scholarship is never enough 'by itself, however, to 
modify historical opinion, and the Attlee era was still 
not quite'purged of all emotional connotations. Most 
writers were as detached as possible, but as committed as 
was thought permissible. There was, even in the most 
reserved of analyses, something of an undimmed affection 
for the standards and values of Labour Britain - spartan, 
worthy, exhibiting great social strength, civic pride -and 
reforming purpose, the country in the hands of (in *
846 P.Addison, ibid (1985), preface.
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Addison's expression) “social patriots"(847). By any 
measure of greatness - though the measures were almost 
always classically orthodox ones - the Attlee age scored 
highly(848).
847 ' P.Hennessy's later, magical and very 
personalised Newer Again - Britain 1945-1951 (1992) was 
not to everyone's taste.
848 G.W.Jones, 'The Attlee governments', Government 
and Opposition, Winter 1985, p.126.
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Guilty Men
Confounding the trend towards a more dispassionate 
accounting of post-war Britain, the sharpest-worded and 
most hotly received work (the argumentativeness of its 
author for once being matched by the reviewers) was also 
one of the latest - Correlli Barnett's The Audit of Mar - 
the illusion and reality of Britain as a great nation 
(1986), an analysis of and a prescription for the 
nation's plight which met full on the contrived mythology 
of Britain's finest hour. Adept at creating a stir,
Barnett had distinguished himself as a tough-minded young 
realist in the 'What Went Wrong' debate of the early »■
1960s, lashing out at the fatal decency and smug do-
gooding of nineteenth-century liberal humanists whose 
teachings, appropriate to an age of empire, were a 
debilitating luxury when it came to the country's fight ^  ^
for economic survival in the modern world. The theme was 
expanded upon in The Col lapse of British Power (1972), in 
which Barnett described the impact of the "British 
national character" on the totality of its political, 
military, social, economic and technological development 
in the inter-war period. 'The English disease', Barnett 
believed, was a consequence of the retention of habits of 
thought which had initially been formed in the era of the
country's wealth, success and security, but which had -
psychologically cushioned the nation against the reality 
of industrial decay, the necessity to adapt and change 
being inhibited by the same "informed opinion" which 
disseminated outmoded values(849). Barnett's spirited 
and irreverent tone, it should be added, was reminiscent 
of the line-up in many earlier historical controversies - '
849 C.Barnett, 'Obsolescence and Dr Arnold',
reprinted in P.Hutber (ed), What's Mronq Nith Britain? 
(1978), pp.29-34.
the plain-speaking 'pretender', accepting-the authority 
of historical understanding in general but (a school all 
of his own) appealing against its authority in one 
important particular, in the hope of modifying the 
prevailing view, but risking at the same time the claim 
to the label of a true historian.
Although it was the case that Barnett's views were 
already we11-advertised and long-contested, 'The Audit of 
War' (a chapter heading in his 1972 book) was buttressed 
by a culling of archival evidence, in an ESRC-funded 
project, drawing on the reports, surveys and forecasts 
from the Wartime ministries to catalogue the fundamental 
"strategic" error that was made in applying t;he apparatus 
of the war economy to post-1945 conditions. This made it 
one of the most extensively researched and validated o f ~  
the new critiques. Barnett was not, he wished to 
emphasize, * locating the root causes - of decline -in 'the ^- 
post-war era, as so many other rightists had done; nor 
giving substance to the fashionable verdi'ct of 'the 
victor vanquished'. Decline went'b a c k ^ f  ast to the 1 
1870s, if not before. But the war had presented an all 
too rare chance for the country, its fate in its own 
hands, to break out of the pattern of ruinous 
disintegration. This was the opportunity that was 
foolishly squandered.
The Audit of Mar began - as it ended - with a 
frontal offensive on the politics of the 'New Jerusalem': 
the slogans and aspirations, the social^ goals of a better 
world belonging to the left-wing prophets, churchmen, 
publicists and the enlightened Establishment, which were 
formulated and pressed upon the departments in Whitehall 
in complete ignorance of the state of the actual 
resources of the nation, and at the expense of what was 
really required - a root-and-branch rebuilding, on the 
state-directed Prussian model (he was no ordinary free
marketeer) of the UK’s industrial base. Barnett did 
acknowledge that triumph in war could be, and was, taken 
by many as having vindicated the British way of ordering 
things, but insisted that the apparently - artificially - 
stimulated war economy, kept alive by American 
assistance, had masked the inferiority of the UK’s 
industrial and technological performance. Shortcomings 
in key sectors of the economy, in coal, steel, 
shipbuilding and the aircraft industry, well-known to - 
government officials, were shrouded by the euphoria of -* 
victory. The' overall picture was one of low morale, poor 
labour relations and insanitary working conditions, a 
scarcity of good management, lacklustre output, 
absenteeism, stoppages and go-slows. But these economic 
and industrial symptoms were expressions, more than all, 
of the cultural debilitation of national life, and of the 
wasting of its human resources. Neglect of technical 
education, an elitist bias towards the liberal arts and 
the time-wasting irrelevance of religious education had " 
left a workforce ill-equipped to compete.
The shock of war might have jolted the expectation 
of broad social advance. Some Ministers and officials, 
though very much outnumbered, questioned the 
affordability of large-scale social programmmes, and 
argued the, case for a corporate dash-for-growtbr strategy, 
as was to happen in Western Germany and Japan. Instead, 
each party sought to outbid the others, especially in 
promises about the provision of new housing, with 
Whitehall running to catch up. The false, uncosted 
prospectuses of 1945 opened up "the illusion of limitless 
possibility", in which it was implied that only the ' 
goodwill was lacking. A ‘social’ miracle was preferred 
to an ‘economic’ one. A unique breathing space was 
frittered away. The British brought it upon themselves. 
The reforms that were really needed were put off for 20 
years and more, concealed by withdrawal from empire and
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domestic progress, the post-war dream in the meantime 
turning “to the dank reality of a segregated, 
subliterate, unskilled, unhealthy and institutionalised 
proletariat hanging on the^nipple of state maternalism".
Much of importance was left unelaborated by Barnett, 
or glossed over. He did not sufficiently explain why it 
should have been at the close of the Second World War 
that a decisive break for freedom could have occurred.
The momentum behind wartime social reform was 
inadequately dealt with - at times he called it a 
"popular yearning", at others it was scaled down to the? 
urging of one man's ego. He never quite made it clear 
whether the shining economic lift-off, which he di<L-So * 
much to evoke, ever was a realistic alternative, within 
the realm of the politically possible; as Vaizey had 
argued, only a handful of people then thought in terms of 
a free market strategy(850). The eventual and 
disastrous "failure" of the 'New Jerusalem' ideal, with a 
footnote setting out the plentiful critical literature on 
education, housing, poverty and health and the class 
divide, did not, evidently/ need demonstrating. The 
assumption throughout was that close acquaintance with 
the evidence could admit of no other inference.
Barnett's 'good bad'(851) book was widely 
discussed, its claims not so unreasonable that they could 
be peremptorily brushed aside. Points of substance were 
a main preoccupation. His talk of 'decline' was 
generally condemned for its rhetorical looseness, since 
it mattered exactly what at every stage he intended to
850 J.Vaizey, ibid (1983), p.134.
851 George Orwell, borrowing the phrase from G.K. 
Chesterton, referred to "the fact that one can be amused 
or excited or even moved by a book that one's intellect 
simply refuses to take seriously" - The Co 1Jected Essays, 
Journalism and Letters of George Orwell: Vol 4 In Front
of Your Nose 1945-50 (Penguin 1970), p.39.
mean by it. His latching on to the war years unfairly*’ 
saddled the Churchill and Attlee administrations with a 
heavy burden of responsibility. His 'fresh' evidence 
from the Whitehall files was in fact long familiar to 
those who 4mew the field. And what kind of an audit was " 
it, scholars asked, which was all debit and no 
credit?(852)
His interpretative framework did not escape 
attention either. Paul Addison, in his review and in a 
later survey of 'The Road from 1945'(853), welcomed 
the first serious work since Calder and Cowling to 
challenge wartime attitudes. But he felt that Barnett 
had misunderstood the demands that lay behind social 
reconstruction - working-class participation in the war 
effort had meant holding out the reward of greater 
provision of welfare. It was the shift in the politics 
of class, and not the sentimental idealism of 
intellectuals, that needed attending to. Barnett might 
alter the historical perception; he was unlikely to 
convince.* Economists were similarly sceptical. Sir Alec 
Cairncross was amazed by what, for a military historian, - 
was Barnett's silence on the post-war deadweight of 
military expenditure. It would have been’ difficult, he 
added, in view of the efforts by the Labour government, 
to have accorded a still higher priority to exports and 
investment.' The praise in some quarters for the book 
only made sense to him because it went with the grain (in - 
'Industry Year') of many Tory prejudices(854). Barker 
thought that it was wrong to judge peacetime by the
852 M.Gowing, contribution in Contemporary Record, 
Summer 1987, p.18.
853 P.Addison, 'Warfare and Welfare', The London 
Review of Books, 24 July 1986, pp.6-7; 'The Road from 
1945', in P.Hennessy and A.Seldon (eds)(1987), pp.5-27.
854 Sir A.Cairncross, letter to the author, 7 April
1990.
exceptional circumstances of the war(855), while 
Worswick doubted whether Barnett's findings from the 
official papers formed a representative sample(856).
The general belief was that Britain's post-war economic 
difficulties were not so easily explained. "The economic 
historians", Lord Annan drily concluded, "have not on the 
whole been sympathetic to Barnett's interpretation ..." 
(857)
But this litany of complaints was nothing compared 
to the presumed breach of collegiate etiquette, for the 
real force of Barnett's style depended, as Calder 
observed, not on revelations but polemic(858).
Gowing, especially, was irked by Barnett's histrionics, 
delivered, as others said, "at the top of his 
voice"(859), a vestigial reflex having no place in 
scholastic discussion. Barnett always wanted someone to 
blame, and now it was the intellectuals.
Given, leave in the ESRC's newsletter to "review his 
own critics"(860), Barnett did not stick to material 
issues. "To challenge cherished national legends", he 
wrote, "question the value systems of governing elites 
and expose the self-serving conduct of vested interests 
rarely ensures universal popularity in an author - least
855 Con temporary Record, ibid, Summer 1987.
856 G. D. N. Worswick, review in The Economic Journal, 
June 1987, pp.502-503.
857 N. Annan, 'Gentlfemen vs. Player-s', The New York 
Review of Books, 29 September 1988, p.65.
858 A.Calder, - 'How we didn't build Jerusalem', The 
Guardian, 25 March 1986, p.10.
859 S.Maclure, 'An audit of the nation', The Times 
Education Supplement, 11 April 1986, p.4.
860 C.Barnett, ESRC Newsletter, September 1986, 
P P . 35-36.
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of all when he is reviewed by the very kind of people he 
is criticising" (even Lord?Blake was not spared). His 
academic research had not been carried out, he said, in a 
frivolous liberal vein "for its own sake" or from the 
standpoint of "social conscience" and "values". The 
polemical vas still historical - he insisted - and no 
less valid for that. Only the conceited could believe 
that it was a sign of cultivated intelligence to hold 
opinions lightly. The intelligentsia was a self- 
interested party to the argument, which was precisely why 
his views were "emotionally and intellectually so 
distateful" to them.
Robert Skidelsky's lengthy and acrimonious exchange 
of correspondence with Barnett crystallised the 
differences, switching from matters of strict historical 
fact and conjecture to the subject of authorial 
motivation and ending up With the two of them barely on 
speaking terms. Faying his respects to Barnett's 
perseverance(861), Skidelsky had taken considerable 
time to draw out and then contest the main elements of 
his thesis, pointing out the uncertainty involved in 
Barnett's talk of 'decline', questioning whether the 
"illusions" of wartime were really illusions when a great 
victory so obviously validated a nation's culture and 
institutions, and indicating that there is no 
straightforward connection between military strength and 
social welfare. It was a stimulating and incisive 
reinterpretation, Skidelsky decided (and certainly not 
one that he was predisposed to argue against), but its 
leaning was perverse and its intent uncertain. Barnett 
was driven to protest at the way Skidelsky managed to 
"garble" his argument, restating that, as the wartime 
documents made plain, the illusions of the war had 
encouraged the misplaced hopes that were carried over
861 R.Skidelsky, 'Failures of the will to power', 
The Times Literary Supplement, 21 March 1986, pp.295-296.
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into the peace, which was what made the nineteen forties 
of such immense importance. Weaknesses apparent then 
cast light on the history of failure leading right up to 
the present day, and the current inability to conquer 
world markets, confirming his tough-minded 
analysis(862). Skidelsky stood by his point about 
Bassett's confusing use of* 'decline', maintaining that 
long-held moralising Establishment values which were 
endorsed by success in the war could not also be '~~
dismissed as illusions, and adding that the-Attlee 
government did everything in its power to promote exports 
and investment - "Barnett's mistake is to look at this 
period through Thatcherite spectacles"(863). The 
change of tack in Barnett's second reply showed his 
impatience with the hair-splitting tactics adopted by 
Skidelsky which he felt were more suited to an academic 
seminar, instead of as a contribution to "a boardroom 
discussion about the problems of an industrial 
conglomerate losing market share", reminding everyone 
that his "operational study" had been based on a thorough 
trawling of the relevant archives(864). To
Skidelsky's short riposte(865) that he had thought 
they were academics discussing historical matters,
Bassett was adamant: he wrote "in a spirit of active 
engagement", just as legitimate an approach as the high—  ^
minded and "remotely academic", and perhaps -"'in the 
circumstances - even more constructive(866).
862 Letter in The Tiroes Literary Supplement, 11
April 1986.
863 Letter in The Times Literary S u p p l e m e n t 25
April 1986.
864 ..Letter in The Times Literary Supplement 9 May
1986.
865 Letter in The Times Literary Supplement, 21 May
1986.
866 . Letter in The Times Literary S u p p l e m e n t d une
1986.
It would have been too much to expect that Skidelsky 
and Barnett would come to terms, given that there is no 
obvious way of reconciling Skidelsky's view of what the 
war and post-war governments actually did with what 
Barnett, citing chapter-and-verse, believed that they 
ought to have done. But there is a deeper issue to 
address, which is the problem the 1lone-ranger', 
contemptuous of academic ways and unwilling to be rated 
by them, presents to the established rules of scholarly 
engagement. Barnett refused to partake of a co-operative 
enterprise, damning all earlier historians and their 
histories for perpetrating supposedly objective but in 
fact appeasing accounts of recent events. Although 
dogmatic, his "inverted Whdggism"(867) was, in his 
view, entirely justified. Others were part of the * 
problem, their continued adherence to the social 
democratic ideals of 1945 an affliction(868). He 
offered a solution.
Some respondents were content to judge Barnett's 
dissenting analysis solely on its merits, consistent with 
the approach that personal preferences could have no 
final bearing on the quality of his argument; others were- 
quite ready to reply in kind by attacking the author too.
' Of these alternatives, the former is the harder to 
sustain - if it is right that bias is inevitable and that 
the only thing to do is to state one's own point of view 
as honestly as possible, this does leave a great deal up 
to the discerning powers of the reader. Conversely, to 
resort to personal vindictiveness endangers the claim to 
impartial scholarly evaluation, without fear or favour.
867 D.Edgerton, 'Dogfight in defence of Britain', 
The Higher, 8 November 1991, p.15.
868 See also W.Rees-Mogg's 'A wrong theory with the 
wrong results' in The Independent, 19 February 1990, and 
the subsequent correspondence with P.Clarke, P.Reynolds 
and J.Burrow.
439
But there is a respectable argument with which to fall 
back on, in so far as it can be said that Barnett (even 
though he asked to be judged by extra-academic standards) 
did alter and affect the course of the historical 
argument, though largely in the form of more or less ^ 
strenuous attempts to rebut or refute him. The only 
commitment that mattered was not his energetic resolve to ^
assist national recovery but his commitment - shared in 
common with critics and sympathisers - to a genuine 
evidence-based historical account for which he was 
publicly accountable. In this sense, the logical 
unfolding of historical inquiry still applies, even on 
the most rousing of topics, and even when it is denied.
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Conclusion: The Commitment-Detachment Thesis Reconsidered *-■ ■ 
A recapitulation of the argument
Recent historical publications claim to have cast 
the aims and achievements of the Labour governments of - 
1945-51 in a proper historical perspective, overcoming 
the technical and methodological obstacles that stand in 
the way of a critical appreciation of the contemporary 
past, and - in spite of the particular difficulties 
associated with the writing of and about the Labour party 
and left-wing politics generally - managing to attain n J 
recognisably objective view of the period, the 
personalities and its preoccupations. The purpose of ths 
present work has been to examine this assumption of 
historiographical progress by considering the form and 
content of successive additions to the 1iterature 
relating to the early post-war era, and the contribution 
which these have made to our understanding of (in the 
title of one of the most recent of all the books) "the 
Attlee years"(869).
In Chapter 2, the evolution of the main strands of 
political, historical and other opinion were set out, 
paying due attention to the advances in the state of 
documentation, perspectival outlook and disciplinary 
development, but with especial emphasis on the 
presuppositional assumptions of the respective schools of 
thought, with their distinctive ways of approach and^ 
discourse, and the extent *to which these characterisibdcs 
have allowed and encouraged, hampered or indeed ruled out 
altogether the fruitful exchange of viewpoints. The •* - 
journalistic, impressionistic accounts of earliest
869 N.Tiratsoo (ed), The Attlee Years (1990).
origin, where judgements were shaped by what participants 
had seen with their own eyes, refracted by party or - 
personal interest, were shown as having been succeeded by 
the analytical rigour and sociological theorising of the 
new political and social sciences, in which impartial 
investigation of the social world was married to the 
needs of policy and reform. Latterly, and partly 
reacting to the 1 scientific' nature of earlier writings, 
the first accredited histories emerged, helped by the 
freeing up of source material denied to predecessors.
The representation of 1945 and after as an impersonal 
period piece dates from this time. Presented in this 
chronological way, however, conceals more than it 
reveals. Contributions to the discussion did not always 
address the same issues or speak in the same language. 
They varied in the account they took of the surrounding, 
and changing, climate of political opinion. The 
background, generation and values of the various1* authors 
often clashed. Proponents of an accepted or orthodox 
history that was thought to be growing up were confronted 
by others out of sympathy*with the characterisation of a 
one-way loosening of historical partisanship from which 
all deviations could be classed as partial or loaded. * 
The exploding of the assumptions of social science in the 
1970s coincided with the onset of contemporary history 
writing, compounding the problems. From this it might be 
said that all of the various schools and approaches - 
English empiricism, the Fabians and the anti­
collectivists, American political science, Keynesian and 
neo-Keynesian political economy, the historians of 
labour, the new left and the anglo-marxists, and 
traditional and modernist historians - were comprised of 
elements both of historical insight and historical 
distortion.
Chapter 3 consisted of a detailed, case-by-rjase 
reconstruction of a selection of the most prominent
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themes and leading controversies that formed up, designed 
to show how different outlooks - starting out from 
differences in their approach to evidence, perspective 
and interpretation1 - came together, at what point pre­
conceived attitudes were squeezed out by collective 
debate, and where signs of the persisting influence of 
competing value systems were still apparent. This was 
not to vulgarly suggest that the animated arguments 
constituted the whole of intellectual activity; simply 
that the relative importance of notions of commitment and 
detachment would only be disclosed by detailed 
demonstration. It remains, bearing in mind the caution 
against generalising from a single set of examples, to * 
draw from the material some pertinent conclusions, 
relating them-to a wider consideration of the nature of 
historiographical change and historical understanding.
Progress towards a more dispassionate view
Evidence for the advancing state of historical 
understanding is compelling, tenable on the combined 
grounds of product* and process.
Judged by results, development is apparent on all 
fronts, the moving picture of 1945 having broadened and 
deepened with the passing of time.
Discoveries-of-fact have enormously enlarged the 
range of information, falsifying many earlier beliefs* 
which are now plainly unsustainable. It can no longer 'be 
claimed - for instance - that it was the Services' vote ‘ 
which made all the difference in the 1945 election. Or ' 
that the statistical information about the economy which 
the Attlee governments had to hand was accurate or 
reliable enough to permit sound management, let alone any 
kind of planning. Or that the trade union factor in the 
Labour party could be taken for granted. Or that the
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assumption of an extensive war and post-war 
redistribution of incomes was clear and unambiguous. Or 
that Attlee was merely a 'good chairman*. Or that what ’ 
was completed between 1945 and 1951 was a 'social 
revolution* - neither more nor less. Popular 
misunderstandings and misconceptions have been exposed by 
the new findings which, though less sweeping and 
spectacular, are, because they are more complex, nearer 
to the truth.
The growth of factual knowledge has also made for 
greater technical exactitude, forcing a revision and 
refinement of earlier, more loosely formulated ideas and 
concepts. The relative importance of party ideology and 
group interests in the framing of policy has been 
clarified, as well as the impact of war on short and 
longer-term social change. An effort was made to improve 
on conceptual tools which were hitherto underpowered \eg. 
Labourism) or, like the notion of a 'Keynesian 
revolution*, overloaded. Even those concerned to 
demonstrate that the changes after 1945 had come in place 
of something else that would have been more necessary or 
radical have contributed to an understanding of the 
politics of reformism. Internal 'consensus*, 
considerably sharpened by academic argument, is now set 
alongside external impressions of British 'greatness*, 
and connections drawn with the comparative national 
decline of- postwar. Tentative theories of the 
'stateless* state have resulted. In so doing a whole 
range of ideas and concepts have been subjected to 
examination with the aim of improving their descriptive, 
empirical and explanatory usefulness. A remarkably 
unvarying vocabulary of expressions and recurring themes 
have nevertheless been expanded and reconceptualised in 
such a way as to be virtually unrecognisable from earlier 
versions.
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Increasing specialisation has, it must be granted, 
encouraged the development of different research 
programmes, so that, in some instances, disciplines have 
been walled off from each other. Political, economic and 
social historians, by nature highly sceptical of large- 
sounding general theories, have maintained that the more 
closely certain favoured abstractions are inspected the 
less there is to be found. They have been far happier 
converting notions like consensus into the more familiar 
terms of continuity and discontinuity. But recent years 
have also seen the completion of a number of over-arching 
historical accounts, based on innovations-in-theory, 
designed to encompass the abundance of detail and 
variations of approach in expressions of greater scope 
and generality, which - it is hoped - can carry 
conviction with the specialists. Even where these 
attempts liave not been persuasive, the value of what has 
come out of them has been universally recognised. It 
cannot be maintained that current historical thinking on 
1945 is marked by an increasing capacity of historians to 
say the same thing; there is no single view, even in the 
student guidebooks(870). Jt is unquestionably the 
case, however, that the enlargement of objective and 
accessible knowledge, without dictating any absolute 
answers, has acted to limit the range of plausible * 
accounts. Apparent fragmentation disguises the makings 
of a higher synthesis.
The case for a progressively greater historical 
comprehension of early post-war Britain can be made 
stronger still when we turn from the results of 
historical inquiry to the methods involved in 
ascertaining and analysing evidence that go to make up
870 D.Dutton, British Pol it ics Since 1945 — the
rise and fall of consensus (1991); T.Gourvish and'
C.O'Day, Problems in Focus - Britain Since 1945 (1991);
K.Jefferys, The Attlee Governments 1945-1951 (1992).
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the activity of a historian. It is on this larger basis- 
that the claim of history as a systematic, organised, 
objective field of study commonly rests. The whole 
nature of the academic discipline of history (and this 
must include contemporary history) revolves around the 
idea of a progressive, empirically founded and 
identifiable mode of research with its own character and 
development, which is capable of freeing itself from the 
influence of personal values and which is sufficiently 
adaptable to retain its form throughout any wider changes
in intellectual and political thinking. It posits a ...
'past' that is amenable to investigation, and which is 
not just of the historian's own making. The popularity- 
of approaches and attitutes may alter over time, but the 
past itself does not change - all that changes is tha 
viewpoint(871). The constancy of the historical
<
method is what distinguishes it from an aimless 
recitation of equally valid versions, or the distorting 
exercise of opinion and rhetoric, and without which the 
study of history would have no rationality or integrity. 
Although the modern trend has been to relax the call for 
or assertion of historical objectivity, historians are 
still inclined to reproach those who confuse the . 
difficulty of detachment and impartiality with their 
supposed impossibility. The gratifying wonder of history 
to historians is that advances as much as it 
does(872 ).
The persistence of remaining disagreements
The logic of historical inquiry - and its regulating 
disciplines - does not require that all argument must 
ultimately come to an end. Evidence can be inconclusive,
871 D. C.Watt, 'Battle of the history men', * The ' 
Evening Standard, 22 March 1990, p.7.
872 J.A.Passmore, 'The objectivity of history', 
Philosophy, 33 1958, pp.97-111.
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theories provisional, temperaments contrary. Historical 
problems are often only partly answerable, still less 
explicable. The larger an issue, the more likely that 
the taking of sides will ensue. The historical past* is 
acknowledged to be more complicated than historians can 
hope to convey. There are limits to which it can be * 
grasped imaginatively, as opposed to documentarily. * 
Sometimes to understand more is to know less. Much of 
the best kind of historical writing, instead of claiming 
to account for everything that happened, leaves open or 
suggests issues for future investigation. The historian, 
then, knowingly initiates a discussion or debate which he 
or she must expect, sooner or later, will make their own 
work obsolete. The intractable nature of the subject, 
while it leads naturally to different and even 
conflicting approaches, need be no bar to historical 
progress, providing that the primary commitment to the 
common, publicised, problem-solving methodology of 
history is not compromised. Distinct 'schools' are 
replaced by sequential 'problems'.
The cardinal point to grasp is that the anti- * 
positivist case (which has a great deal of philosophical 
support) against an advancing historical view exploits 
the same inherent ambivalence and uncertainty in the « 
study of history to argue for the inescapabi1ity of value 
judgements in any historical interpretation. It makes a 
virtue out of variety by insisting that, since the 
available facts to hand never suffice by themselves to 
entirely justify the preference for one account or 
explanation over another, then this will always leave 
open the door to capricious, nonrational, unhistorical 
influences. Facts have first to be selected and 
rejected. All concepts have a descriptive and an 
evaluative content. Although historians develop a sense 
of judgement and proportion, there may be no way of 
discriminating between contradictory, though factually
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consistent, points of view. Disputes about the nature of 
the Labour party, or the radicalising effects of the 
Second World War, or the influence of Keynesian thinking, 
or the merits and demerits of Mr Attlee's post-war 
Britain, cannot be formally and finally settled, however 
rich the source materialhowever distancing the 
perspective, and however inventive the intepretation.
And where rival frameworks exist, dialogue is 
constrained. The understanding of the facts can * 
converge, but the meaning ascribed to them may be ■* 
completely and ununderstandably at variance; truth is 
opposed by other truths, even by an alternative 
rationality. Not only will the choice of a framework* 
necessarily exclude all others. That initial choice i*s 
not defensible exclusively on empirical grounds.
Personal preferences always play a part. There can - it 
is concluded - be no new knowledge without the exercise 
of reason; but neither can there be creative endeavour 
without an emotional commitment. Attitudes are 
determined (strong) or conditioned (weaker) by pre­
existing presuppositions whose impact, though modifiable 
by experience, is not thereby diminished. The logic of 
historical inquiry may indeed operate to good effect, but 
only in so far as historical knowledge is seen as the 
product of a specialised community sub-divided into 
smaller groupings with their own special methods and 
dominating values. It follows that there is no * 
identifiable and ordered historical method, or clear-cut 
distinction between history and non-history. Engagement, 
once dismissed as a freakish aberration from the normal 
pattern of English life and letters(873), is something 
that has to be accepted. It is the very idea of the * 
impartial scholar which is out of date, now held to be *
873 E.ShiIs, 'The Intellectuals 
Britain', in Encounter, April 1955, p.7.
- I: Great
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applicable only to the cloistered academies of 
old(874), and the vain pursuit of objectivity the read 
obstacle to fuller comprehension. Values do not *
"intrude" into the historical discussion; the 
indeterminate, unresolvable and unknowable nature of 
historical knowledge invites and requires them.
Knowledge and ignorance in historical understanding
In the abstract, these competing outlooks are 
irreconcilable, since each logically proscribes the 
other, and - academic priorities being what they are - 
great efforts have gone into staking out the differences 
end divergences. The one is denounced (by seemingly 
evading all criticism) for destroying all means of 
rational intercourse. The other rejects outright' any 
notion of an established, canonical way by which history 
should be studied. In practice, however, the differences 
are overdrawn. 'Either-or' propositions rarely hold* 
good. All historians have to be able to work on the » 
basis of being able to say something without knowing *■ 
everything. Equally it is accepted that there are 
specific minimal and independent criteria of authority 
which help to sort out good from bad history. Each of 
these conceptions involves the other, in a "two-way link" 
between explanatory approach and political or personal 
standpoint(875), and there is no useful sense in which 
it cam be claimed that one of them is the more important 
or valued. Their very entanglement is what makes history 
what it is. A field of study cam flourish and develop 
even though it is built on shaky foundations. Regarded 
in this light, the objective and the subjective are 
really two elements in one single undertaking: the
874 P.Novick, That Noble Dream: the 'objectivity 
question' and the American historical profession (1989).
875 D.Miller and L.Siedentop (eds), introduction to 
The Nature of Political Theory (1983), pp.11-12.
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historical study of the distant or recent past, with all 
its large possibilities and intrinsic limitations.
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